A       -m       *•   -w— «i     -*— ^      •*•      ^-w          . 

AMERICA  AMONG 
THE  NATIONS-/*? WEWS 


AMERICA 
AMONG  THE  NATIONS 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

NEW  YORK  •    BOSTON  •    CHICAGO  -   DALLAS 
ATLANTA  •    SAN  FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  LIMITED 

LONDON  •    BOMBAY  •    CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA,  LTD. 

TORONTO 


AMERICA 
AMONG  THE  NATIONS 


BY 


H.  H.  POWERS 

Author  of  "The  Things  Men  Fight  For' 


fork 

THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 
1917 

All  right*  reserved 


COPTEIGHT,   1917, 

BY  H.  H.  POWERS. 


Set  up  and  electrotyped.    Published  December,  1917 


TiortoooU 
Berwick  &  Smith  Co.,  Norwood,  Mass.,  U.S.A. 


TO  MY  WIFE 

MY  ABLEST  AND  MY  KINDEST  CRITIC 


373713 


AUTHOR'S  PREFACE 

tions  of  British  susceptibility,  I  was  honoured  with  his 
general  and  emphatic  approval.  So  important  is  any 
word  from  this  most  distinguished  of  British  admini 
strators  that  I  have  ventured  to  give  brief  considera 
tion  to  his  article  in  the  Appendix. 

As  the  historic  facts  referred  to  are  for  the  most 
part  commonplaces  of  popular  knowledge,  I  have 
thought  it  unnecessary  and  undesirable  to  encumber 
the  book  with  footnotes.  Those  who  care  to  go  into 
these  questions  of  historic  detail  with  more  thorough 
ness,  will  find  them  admirably  presented  in  Johnson's 
America's  Foreign  Relations  (The  Century  Co., 
1916)  a  work  of  singular  clearness  in  its  statement  of 
facts,  though  proffering  little  by  way  of  interpreta 
tion,  especially  in  the  later  chapters. 


CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION 


PART  ONE 

CHAPTER  AMERICA   AT    HOME  pAGE 

I  THE  FIRST  AMERICANS 15 

II  THE  LOGIC  OF  ISOLATION 27 

III  THE  GREAT  EXPANSION 40 

IV  THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  THE  PACIFIC       ...  56 
V  DESPOILING  THE  LATIN 70 

VI  THE  BREAK  WITH  TRADITION       ....     83 

VII  THE  GREAT  INADVERTENCE 97 

VIII  AFTERTHOUGHT  AND  EMPIRE 108 

IX  THE  AFTERMATH  OF  PANAMA      .      .      .      .122 

X  THE  UNFINISHED  TASK 141 

XI  PAN-AMERICANISM 158 

XII  THE  DEPENDENCE  OF  THE  TROPICS     .      .      .175 

PART  TWO 

AMERICA   AMONG   THE   WORLD   POWERS 

XIII  THE  GREATER  POWERS 197 

XIV  THE  MONGOLIAN  MENACE 211 

XV    GREATER  JAPAN 223 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

XVI     THE  UNFEARED  POWERS 240 

XVII  THE  BACKGROUND  OF  EUROPE      ....  259 

XVIII  GERMANY,  THE  STORM  CENTRE     ....  274 

XIX    THE  STORM  AREA 292 

XX    THE  GREATEST  EMPIRE 311 

XXI    THE  GREAT  FELLOWSHIP 324 

XXII     FORECAST 343 

APPENDIX 363 


AMERICA 
AMONG  THE  NATIONS 


INTRODUCTION 

When  of  old  the  pilgrim  to  Delphi  went  to  inquire 
of  the  oracle  concerning  the  things  of  the  future,  he 
was  confronted  at  the  entrance  to  the  sacred  precinct 
by  the  admonition,  "  Know  thyself."  To  the  Amer 
ican  people,  as  they  turn,  in  this  momentous  hour,  to 
inquire  what  Destiny  has  in  store  for  them,  this  injunc 
tion  is  peculiarly  fitting.  Perhaps  no  great  people 
ever  reached  so  advanced  a  stage  of  development  un 
der  the  influence  of  such  complacent  prepossessions. 
Isolated,  during  the  earlier  stages  of  our  development, 
from  the  fierce  rivalries  of  Europe  and  confronted  in 
our  own  domain  with  no  opposition  worthy  of  the 
name,  we  have  reached  our  present  sprawling  growth 
without  any  real  experience  of  race  competition,  and 
with  the  consequent  comfortable  conviction  that  we  are 
a  peaceable  and  reasonable  people,  strangers  to  the 
fierce  hate  and  the  wicked  concupiscence  of  unregen- 
erate  Europe.  With  everything  that  we  need  lying 
before  us  and  to  be  had  for  the  taking,  we  are  shocked 
at  those  who  would  get  what  they  need  by  fighting. 
Opulent  in  lands  and  mines  and  harbours,  the  impulse 

1 


2  ^TKODpCTION 

to  encroach  upon  a  neighbour's  territories  seems  to  us 
peculiarly  reprehensible. 

Our  theory  of  international  morality  is  thus  as  easy 
as  it  is  simple.  Nations  should  live  content  within 
their  boundaries.  Normal  and  legitimate  relations 
between  nations  are  relations  of  friendship.  To 
maintain  such  relations  is  perfectly  easy,  given  only 
the  most  elemental  good  will.  That  nations  can  live 
peaceably  without  encroachment  or  sinister  designs  on 
one  another's  territory  needs  no  other  proof  than  the 
fact  that  we  do  so.  With  due  modesty  and  absolute 
sincerity  we  offer  ourselves  as  a  pattern  to  a  jarring 
and  misguided  world. 

That  the  world,  despite  our  example  and  demon 
stration,  continues  to  be  misguided  and  quarrelsome,4 
is  a  fact  which  naturally  calls  for  explanation.  The 
explanation  lies  ready  to  hand.  We  are  a  democracy, 
a  government  of  the  people,  by  the  people,  and  for  the 
people.  Other  nations  are  ruled  by  kings,  or  have 
but  recently  escaped  from  their  malign  control. 
Autocracy  with  its  resulting  slavery,  and  dynastic  am 
bition,  arch  enemy  of  peace,  of  these  we  know  noth 
ing,  while  Europe  is  still  the  victim  of  their  baneful 
sway  or  the  heir  of  their  blighting  tradition.  The  co 
incidence  furnishes  an  explanation  altogether  congenial 
to  our  habits  of  thought.  Autocracy  is  the  cause  of 
war  and  democracy  its  cure.  Our  task  as  friends  of 
humanity  is  to  destroy  autocracy  and  "  make  the  world 
safe  for  democracy."  It  is  true  that  in  our  moments 
of  self  criticism,  when  no  comparison  with  other  peo 
ples  is  involved,  we  are  wont  to  question  the  reality 
of  this  government  by  and  for  the  people,  and  are 


INTRODUCTION  3 

disposed  to  assign  to  untitled  potentates  among  us  all 
the  baneful  power  which  we  decry  in  the  rule  of  kings. 
Equally,  when  occasion  suits,  we  are  fond  of  assert 
ing  that  kings  are  but  figureheads  quite  unable  to  with 
stand  the  force  of  popular  opinion.  But  such  slight 
inconsistency  as  these  minor  diversions  involve,  is  sel 
dom  allowed  to  disturb  our  confidence  in  the  major 
propositions.  "  For  the  human  mind  is  hospitable 
and  will  entertain  conflicting  views  and  opinions  with 
grave  impartiality." 

Even  less  are  we  influenced  by  the  fact  that  other 
nations  do  not  wholly  share  our  view  either  of  our 
selves  or  of  our  institutions.  Our  Latin  American 
neighbours,  though  sharing  our  preference  for  democ 
racy  and  modeling  their  governments  as  closely  as 
possible  on  our  own,  persist  in  regarding  us  with 
mingled  suspicion  and  fear.  Neither  our  protestations 
of  friendship,  nor  our  democracy,  nor  our  history  as 
they  read  it,  reassures  them.  They  are  not  convinced 
that  peaceableness  and  content  are  our  inherent  char 
acteristics  or  that  other  nations  are  safe  from  our  ag 
gression.  The  nations  of  Europe  can  hardly  be  said 
to  judge  our  claims  more  favourably.  So  far  from 
being  convinced  that  we  are  considerate  and  unag- 
gressive,  they  attribute  to  us  rather  unusual  preten 
sions,  and  have  been  known  to  characterize  our  claims 
as  "  international  impertinence."  The  fact  that  we 
are  at  peace  at  a  given  moment,  is  no  proof  to  them 
that  we  are  peaceable.  The  most  belligerent  nation 
in  the  world  can  honestly  claim  to  have  kept  the  peace 
longer  than  we  ever  did.  Nor  does  the  world  credit 
us  with  magnanimity  as  a  victor.  We  are  conscious 


4  INTRODUCTION 

of  special  and  justifying  reasons  for  our  spoliations. 
The  world  remembers  only  the  spoliations,  and  re 
mains  unconvinced  that  we  are  pledged  to  maintain 
the  world's  peace.  By  way  of  compliment  quite  as 
much  as  by  way  of  reproach,  they  refuse  to  credit  the 
nai've  simplicity  which  we  seem  to  affect.  The  friendly 
greet  our  complacent  pose  with  a  smile,  the  cynical 
with  a  sneer,  but  both  with  incredulity,  refusing  to 
recognize  in  us  a  different  type  of  humanity,  or  in 
our  institutions  a  different  political  principle  from 
those  with  which  they  are  familiar.  Just  as  the  en 
gineer  sees  in  the  half  filled  but  filling  tank  no  different 
hydraulic  principle  from  that  in  the  tank  that  is  filled 
and  running  over,  so  they  see  in  the  uncrowded  popu 
lation  of  our  half  filled  land  men  of  like  passions  with 
themselves,  and  men  who  are  certain,  when  similarly 
circumstanced,  to  assert  themselves  in  like  manner. 

Nor  do  the  nations  of  Europe  concede  to  us  that 
pre-eminence  among  the  exponents  of  democracy  which 
we  are  wont  to  assume.  A  majority  of  them  have 
long  been  fully  committed  to  the  democratic  principle, 
and  some  have  devised  means  of  registering  the  popu 
lar  will  more  promptly  and  accurately  than  we  can  do. 
Kings  have  disappeared  or  have  become  docile  instru 
ments  of  democracy.  Even  where  kings  still  reign, 
democracy  is  potent  and  monarchs  are  circumspect. 
It  is  a  very  limited  autocracy  that  survives  in  Europe 
today.  And  equally,  it  is  a  very  imperfect  democ 
racy  to  which  we  have  now  attained.  Other  nations 
may  be  pardoned,  therefore,  if  they  refuse  to  recog 
nize  our  democracy  as  having  talismanic  virtue,  the 
more  so  as  they  are  unable  to  discover  in  us  those  pe- 


INTRODUCTION  5 

culiar  virtues  which  we  had  invoked  democracy  to 
explain. 

If  our  self  analysis  leaves  something  to  be  desired, 
it  is  at  least  as  satisfactory  as  our  estimate  of  other 
nations.  Having  never  known  the  needs  which  con 
strain  the  older  nations  to  unwelcome  action,  we  see 
that  action  only  in  its  unlovely  outer  aspects,  and  pro 
nounce  it  unnecessary  and  perverse.  "  If  the  people 
have  no  bread,  why  don't  they  buy  cakes?  "  was  the  re 
proachful  query  of  the  unstarved  queen.  With  that 
promptitude  of  opinion  which  is  our  national  char 
acteristic,  we  unhesitatingly  assign  the  most  unplausi- 
ble  reasons  for  foreign  action  and  propose  the  most 
unpractical  remedies  for  foreign  ills.  Our  cocksure- 
ness  is  neither  ingratiating  to  them  nor  enlightening 
to  us.  It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  the  prevalent 
American  opinion  of  every  foreign  country  is  not  only 
false  but  uncomplimentary,  a  veritable  caricature  of 
the  reality. 

As  America  assumes  her  new  position  among  the 
nations,  or  more  exactly,  as  she  suddenly  becomes 
aware  of  her  actual  position  and  realizes  that  she  must 
work  in  intimate  co-operation  with  nations  which  she 
has  been  wont  to  disparage  and  which  have  seemed 
to  disparage  her  in  turn,  the  importance  of  a  juster 
estimate  becomes  apparent.  These  doubtful  ameni 
ties  do  not  contribute  to  mutual  helpfulness  and  effi 
cient  co-operation.  Yet  that  co-operation  is  a  neces 
sity  of  the  moment  and  probably  of  the  entire  future. 
It  is  true  that  we  do  not  intend  our  present  alliance 
with  nations  from  which  we  have  hitherto  held  aloof, 
to  be  permanent,  but  a  year  ago  we  did  not  intend  to 


6  INTRODUCTION 

enter  even  a  temporary  alliance.  Intentions  count  for 
little  in  the  face  of  unexpected  situations.  There  is 
no  telling  how  long  this  alliance  will  last  or  how  com 
prehensive  it  may  become.  There  will  be  less  of 
shock  and  less  of  inconsistency  in  staying  in,  than  there 
was  in  going  in.  And  even  if  the  alliance  is  but 
temporary,  it  constitutes  a  precedent  which  is  almost 
sure  to  be  followed  by  this  or  other  combinations  as 
future  exigencies  may  require.  All  signs  point  to  an 
increased  co-operation  among  nations.  National  iso 
lation  is  past  and  national  independence  is  passing. 
Confronted  by  combinations  and  unable  to  avoid  col 
lision,  there  is  much  reason  to  apprehend  that  we  shall 
adopt  a  policy  of  co-operation  and  strive  for  more  or 
less  permanent  friendships  with  those  with  whom  we 
find  that  we  can  make  common  cause.  This  will  in 
volve  difficulties  and  dangers,  abandonment  of  our 
traditional  policy,  and  all  that.  It  may  be  more  a  sub 
ject  of  regret  than  of  congratulation.  But  our  opin 
ion  in  the  matter  counts  for  little.  It  is  not  a  matter 
of  our  choosing.  Science  and  invention  have  de 
stroyed  the  barriers  between  nations,  and  whether  we 
like  it  or  no,  we  must  come  to  terms.  Whether  the 
nations  group  themselves  in  rival  camps  in  one  of 
which  we  find  our  place,  or  try  to  maintain  a  more 
difficult  equipoise  as  individuals,  matters  little. 
Closer  relations  have  become  inevitable,  and  these  re 
lations  can  not  be  satisfactorily  based  on  mutual  dis 
paragement  and  misunderstanding. 

In  the  following  studies  two  principles  have  been 
borne  constantly  in  mind.  First,Giations  reveal  their 
character  by  what  they  do  rather  than  by  what  they 


INTRODUCTION  7 

say.4  With  them  as  with  individuals,  there  is  often 
a  wide  divergence  between  practice  and  profession, 
each  individual  deviation,  of  course,  having  its  spe 
cial  explanation  and  excuse,  but  entering  none  the  less 
into  the  permanent  structure  of  character  as  into  the 
record  by  which  posterity  will  judge  that  character. 
Professions  which  contradict  this  record  count  for 
very  little.  They  may  and  ordinarily  do  represent 
ideals  which  react  upon  conduct,  but  in  that  case  they 
find  recognition  in  the  record  of  conduct.  To  the 
practical  man  it  matters  not  what  a  man  thinks  he 
stands  for.  The  question  is  simply,  what  does  he  do 
when  put  to  the  test?  And  what  he  has  done,  espe 
cially  what  he  has  done  repeatedly,  he  is  likely  to  do 
again.  That,  at  least,  is  the  only  safe  guess.  So 
with  nations.  Every  nation  has  certain  political 
principles  which  it  reiterates  until  they  become  shib 
boleths.  It  has  an  astonishing  power,  too,  to  take 
these  shibboleths  seriously  as  reflecting  its  real  con 
victions  and  character.  "  Equality  before  the  law/* 
"  consent  of  the  governed,"  "  non-intervention  in  the 
affairs  of  other  nations,"  "  the  Monroe  Doctrine,"  we 
can  point  proudly  to  an  unvarying  profession  of  these 
principles  throughout  our  history,  and  can  easily  per 
suade  ourselves  that  this  credo  has  represented  our 
true  position.  The  writer  has  no  intention  of  proving 
or  refuting  this  dogma.  He  would  rather,  if  possible, 
forget  these  time  honoured  formulas  and  arrive  at  an 
independent  estimate  of  national  character  from  the 
homely  facts  of  our  national  history.  Equally,  he 
would  if  possible  discard  the  time  honoured  preposses 
sions  and  epithets  which  have  too  long  done  duty  with 


8  INTRODUCTION 

us  as  estimates  of  foreign  nations,  and  arrive  at  a 
juster  conclusion  based  on  their  action. 

In  short,  this  is  a  modest  attempt  at  a  historic  in 
terpretation  of  our  national  character  and  our  rela 
tion  to  other  nations.  Not  that  the  writer  professes 
to  adduce  new  testimony  or  to  unearth  facts  hitherto 
unknown.  With  all  deference  for  those  who  are  en 
gaged  in  this  important  task  of  historical  research,  the 
writer  ventures  to  doubt  whether  their  labours  will 
seriously  modify  the  data  for  historical  judgments. 
Doubtless  many  minor  obscurities  remain  to  be  cleared 
up,  but  the  main  facts  of  history  for  the  period  with 
which  this  study  deals,  are  known.  Those  which  are 
here  cited  are  commonplaces  of  popular  knowledge. 
But  knowledge  is  one  thing  and  interpretation  another. 
Interpretation  can  never  keep  pace  with  knowledge. 
The  facts  of  our  first  hundred  years  as  a  nation  are 
known,  but  their  meaning  is  scarcely  appreciated  and 
is  being  progressively  revealed  by  the  things  that  come 
after.  Interpretations  require  continual  revision.  It 
is  to  this  task  that  the  author  ventures  his  slight  con 
tribution. 

The  second  point  to  be  emphasized  is  the  basic 
principle  that  nations  act  from  self-interest.  A  like 
assumption  regarding  individuals  underlies  the  science 
of  economics,  and  without  it  no  such  science  is  possi 
ble.  This  does  not  mean  that  nations  never  do  the 
generous  thing, —  generosity  often  furthers  self-in 
terest,  especially  if  spontaneous  and  sincere, —  but  it 
means  that  nations  know  their  own  needs  better  than 
others  know  or  can  know  them,  and  that  they  are 
necessarily  charged  primarily  with  the  duty  of  pro- 


INTRODUCTION  9 

viding  for  those  needs.  This  would  seem  to  be  even 
more  true  of  nations  than  of  individuals,  for  nations 
have  much  less  of  that  kind  of  acquaintance  of  one 
another  which  makes  sympathy  and  consideration 
possible.  With  a  horizon  of  national  consciousness 
extending  but  little  beyond  their  own  boundaries  and 
a  struggle  to  provide  the  necessaries  of  national 
existence,  usually  of  a  nature  to  tax  their  powers,  any 
thing  like  deference  or  actual  concession  becomes  ex 
ceedingly  difficult,  and  must  be  the  rare  exception.  It 
is  a  popular  fallacy  that  friction  between  nations  is 
due  to  injured  sensibilities,  and  the  frequent  allusion 
to  the  vague  entity  known  as  "  national  honour  "  lends 
colour  to  this  belief.  The  writer  has  repeatedly  been 
asked,  on  returning  from  visits  to  Japan :  "  How  do 
the  Japanese  feel  toward  Americans? "  Were  it 
possible  to  answer  this  question,  it  would  hardly  be 
worth  while  to  do  so.  If  there  is  ever  trouble  be 
tween  Japan  and  America,  it  will  not  be  because 
Japan's  feelings  have  been  hurt,  but  because  her  in 
terests  are  endangered.  No  doubt  in  a  strained  situ 
ation  where  conflict  of  interests  has  brought  nations 
to  the  breaking  point,  an  affront  may  serve  as  a  pre 
cipitating  cause.  It  did  so  in  the  present  war,  as  in 
the  Franco-German  War  of  1870.  The  value  of  an 
affront  in  such  connections  is  such  as  to  make  it  eagerly 
sought  by  the  would-be  aggressor.  But  to  attribute 
the  war  to  the  affront  is  like  attributing  the  rifle  shot 
to  the  trigger, —  true  in  a  way,  but  in  a  way  that  ob 
scures  the  real  forces  at  work.  The  precipitating 
cause  of  the  present  war  was  the  murder  of  the  arch 
duke;  the  real  cause  was  the  conflict  of  interests  be- 


io  INTRODUCTION 

tween  the  Central  Powers  and  their  eastern  and 
western  neighbours. 

It  is  the  danger  of  all  such  inquiries  as  the  present 
that  they  should  stop  short  with  proximate  causes. 
These  causes  are  infinitely  varied  and  defy  all  classi 
fication.  Interpretation  in  terms  of  these  surface  ac 
cidents  never  gets  us  anywhere  or  gives  us  a  true  basis 
for  ameliorative  action.  For  instance,  the  Kaiser 
signed  the  order  for  mobilization  and  so  precipitated 
this  war.  To  remedy  the  world  calamity,  send  the 
Kaiser  to  St.  Helena.  Japan  is  reported  to  be  in  a 
menacing  mood  because  we  have  wounded  her  pride. 
To  remove  the  menace,  study  courtesy  toward  Japan. 
Wars  are  precipitated  by  secret  diplomacy,  therefore 
abolish  secret  diplomacy.  There  is  often  a  modicum 
of  truth  in  such  suggestions,  but  it  is  never  the  signifi 
cant  truth.  The  Kaiser  would  not  and  could  not  have 
signed  the  order  for  mobilization  if  the  nation  had 
not  previously  become  convinced  that  its  vital  interests 
were  at  stake.  There  would  have  been  no  discourtesy 
toward  Japan  and  no  sensitiveness  on  her  part  if  in 
terests  had  not  been  in  conflict.  No  secret  diplomacy 
ever  causes  war  if  there  are  not  serious  issues  which 
refuse  peaceable  adjustment. 

In  contrast  with  the  precipitating  causes,  these 
deeper  interests  of  national  life  have  a  singular  uni 
formity.  It  goes  without  saying  that  they  may  be 
misconceived  and  unwisely  defended,  but  they  are  the 
stern  reality  underlying  all  relations  between  nations. 
When  a  nation  conceives  its  interests  to  be  vitally  af 
fected,  it  will,  if  possible,  take  action  to  protect  them. 

The  problem  of  interpreting  international  relations 


INTRODUCTION  n 

and  of  forecasting  their  development  reduces  there 
fore  to  a  few  simple  —  but  difficult  —  inquiries. 
What  are  the  vital  interests  of  the  nations  involved? 
What  is  their  capacity  to  perceive  those  interests? 
What  is  their  habitual  method  of  protecting  or  as 
serting  those  interests  ? 

For  the  answer  to  such  inquiries  history  is  our  only 
reliable  guide.  We  must  judge  the  future  by  the  past. 
The  future  will  not  be  quite  like  the  past,  and  we 
shall  necessarily  err  somewhat  in  our  forecast.  But 
if  we  can  get  beneath  the  accidents  of  the  past  and 
discover  its  essence,  our  error  will  not  be  fatal.  In 
its  essence  there  is  a  continuity  in  national  character, 
as  in  human  nature  generally,  which  offers  an  adequate 
basis  for  prophecy  and  for  constructive  endeavour. 

Finally,  the  writer  wishes  strongly  to  insist  that  this 
is  an  inquiry,  not  a  propaganda.  If  the  conclusions 
reached  are  somewhat  positive  and  startling,  the  wish 
has  none  the  less  nowhere  been  father  to  the  thought. 
The  writer  is  neither  an  optimist  nor  a  pessimist.  In 
some  mild  sense  of  the  word  he  may  perhaps  be  de 
scribed  as  a  fatalist,  by  which  is  meant  merely  that 
history  seems  to  him  less  a  matter  of  voluntary  choices 
and  more  a  matter  of  cosmic  forces  than  is  commonly 
assumed.  The  great  decisions  of  nations  have  seem 
ingly  been  unconscious.  Men  are  free  to  choose 
among  the  alternatives  which  present  themselves,  but 
they  have  little  power  to  determine  what  those  alter 
natives  shall  be.  Their  choices,  even  within  the  limits 
allowed,  have  a  significant  uniformity.  There  is 
nothing  depressing  in  these  facts.  We  need  a  very 
stable  and  dependable  world  about  us  if  choice  is  to 


12  INTRODUCTION 

have  any  significance.  If  choice  could  determine  the 
greatest  things,  who  knows  what  some  other  man's 
choice  might  do  ? 

Be  this  as  it  may,  one  who  sees  in  history  princi 
pally  a  record  of  cosmic  forces  and  of  subconscious 
human  decisions,  has  little  temptation  to  be  a  Peter- 
the-Hermit.  Poor  Peter!  How  much  he  thought 
he  was  accomplishing!  How  little  he  realized  that 
he  was  but  a  bubble  borne  along  on  the  surface  of 
a  resistless  cosmic  current! 

This  book  is  written  with  a  paramount  conscious 
ness  of  this  current.  Upon  it  ride  the  frail  craft 
which  bear  the  destinies  of  men.  It  bears  us,  we 
know  not  whither.  We  have  no  reason  to  believe 
that  it  threatens  us  with  destruction.  We  may  fairly 
hope  that  it  is  more  spacious  and  more  placid  as  it 
nears  the  great  sea.  Nor  are  we  helpless  or  deprived 
of  a  worthy  task.  The  navigator's  task  is  still  a 
man's  task,  though  he  does  not  make  the  river  or 
determine  its  current. 


PART  ONE 
AMERICA  AT  HOME 


CHAPTER  I 

THE    FIRST   AMERICANS 

THE  history  of  the  American  people  as  such  be 
gins  with  the  founding  of  the  English  colonies  of 
North  America.  There  were  other  colonies  and 
earlier  colonies  of  Europeans  planted  within  the 
limits  of  the  United  States,  and  these  colonies  have 
not  been  without  important  influence  on  the  history 
and  character  of  the  American  people.  But  these 
earlier  colonies  have  not  themselves  survived,  and 
their  chief  contribution  to  American  character  was 
the  hardihood  engendered  in  their  political  exter 
mination.  As  individuals  they  of  course  survived, 
and  their  descendants  are  easily  recognized  in  the 
Spanish  families  of  our  southwestern  states,  the 
French  of  Louisiana,  and  in  the  Dutch  aristocracy  of 
Manhattan.  But  their  numbers  being  insignificant 
and  their  political  independence  early  extinguished, 
they  have  necessarily  merged  in  the  larger  body  of 
English  speaking  population,  and  have  accepted  or 
are  accepting  its  civilization.  It  is  therefore  with  the 
English  colonies  that  we  have  to  deal.  The  strug 
gles  with  earlier  and  later  rivals,  like  the  struggles 
with  the  Indians,  are  merely  incidents  in  the  history 
of  the  English  colonies.  They  were  very  important 
incidents,  however,  and  must  receive  due  attention 
at  the  proper  moment  in  any  inventory  of  American 
achievement  and  character. 

is 


1 6    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

It  is  a  truism  of  history  that  the  success  of  the 
English  colonies  was  due  in  large  measure  to  the 
stern  natural  selection  by  which  the  colonists  were 
recruited.  With  slight  exceptions  the  colonies  were 
the  result  of  dissensions  in  the  homeland  and  the 
colonists  the  most  irreconcilable  of  the  dissenting 
minority.  A  dissenting  minority  is  almost  of  neces 
sity  more  assertive  and  belligerent  than  the  opposing 
majority.  The  majority  may  contain  individuals 
quite  as  assertive  as  any,  but  its  average  can  hardly 
be  so.  The  imitative  and  quiescent  temperament  in 
stinctively  seeks  countenance  in  traditional  and  major 
ity  opinion.  Dissent  from  accepted  opinion,  there 
fore,  while  seldom  characterized  by  reasonableness 
and  equity,  is  a  pretty  sure  guaranty  of  independence 
and  aggressiveness.  That  it  was  so  in  the  English 
dissensions  of  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries, 
no  one  familiar  with  the  history  of  that  time  will 
doubt. 

It  was  from  this  picked  stock  that  a  second  and 
much  severer  test  culled  those  stern  spirits  which 
were  to  form  the  nucleus  of  the  American  common 
wealths.  The  hardships  of  those  early  settlements 
were  tremendous,  and  though  but  imperfectly  antici 
pated,  they  were  still  such  as  to  deter  all  but  the 
sternest  and  most  aggressive.  If  dissent  had  not 
completely  eliminated  the  adherent  of  conventional 
and  concessive  temper,  colonization  almost  certainly 
did  so,  especially  at  first.  It  was  a  Gideon's  band 
that  planted  the  Anglo-Saxon  standard  on  these 
shores. 

The  character  of  the  early  colonist,  as  seen  in  the 


THE  FIRST  AMERICANS  17 

juster  perspective  of  history,  with  all  the  trivial  de 
tails  of  personality  eliminated  and  the  generic  fea 
tures  brought  out  into  bold  relief,  quite  confirms  this 
a  priori  conclusion.  The  portrait  reveals  a  stubborn 
ness  of  conviction  and  a  relentlessness  of  purpose 
which  seem  unbeautiful  to  a  softer  and  more  tolerant 
age.  Whatever  his  weaknesses,  sentimentality  and 
forbearance  were  not  among  them.  He  seems  fear 
fully  opinionated,  the  more  so  since  his  estimate  of 
moral  values  has  not  stood  the  test  of  time,  but  he 
had  the  courage  of  his  convictions  and  a  vigour  in 
their  defence  which  we  can  not  but  admire,  even  when 
we  do  not  emulate. 

It  will  be  recognized,  of  course,  that  we  are  sketch 
ing  primarily  the  portrait  of  the  New  England 
Puritan,  and  it  may  be  objected  that  he  was  but  one 
of  many  and  widely  divergent  types  among  the  early 
settlers  of  America.  But  apart  from  the  fact  of  his 
undoubted  primacy  in  this  early  delegation,  he  was 
more  representative  than  is  usually  recognized. 
These  pioneers  were  catholic  and  protestant,  conform 
ist  and  non-conformist,  pacifist  and  militarist,  but  they 
were  one  and  all  confronted  by  the  same  necessities 
and  selected  by  the  same  tests.  The  single  exception 
of  government  aid  to  Virginia  was  not  continued,  and 
the  English  colonies  were  saved  from  the  demoraliz 
ing  government  patronage  which  ruined  the  colonies  of 
France.  Even  the  Quaker  seems  to  have  adapted 
himself  to  the  stern  necessities  of  this  fighting  time, 
and  while  avoiding  war  in  the  conventional  form  which 
he  had  foresworn,  appears  pretty  uniformly  in  an 
attitude  of  belligerent  assertion. 


1 8     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

This  ancestral  stock,  though  constantly  diluted  by 
the  indiscriminate  admixture  of  later  years  and  soft 
ened  by  the  lesser  exactions  of  an  easier  time,  has  left 
an  enduring  impression  upon  American  character. 
Heredity  accounts  for  much,  while  the  long  continu 
ance  of  frontier  conditions  has  done  not  a  little  to 
counteract  relaxing  tendencies.  Above  all  there  has 
been  a  legacy  of  intellectual  and  spiritual  ideals  which 
has  perpetuated  the  Puritan  type  in  the  face  of  an  in 
undation  of  alien  thought  and  sentiment.  Aliens  have 
been  dealt  with  piecemeal,  and  constrained,  one  by 
one,  to  forswear  their  old  allegiance,  until  they  find 
themselves,  even  when  in  majority,  committed  to  the 
ideals  of  a  dwindling  minority.  The  passing  of 
Puritan  New  England  is  sometimes  deplored.  The 
wonder  is  that  it  did  not  pass  sooner  and  more  com 
pletely.  New  England  is  still  Puritan  in  a  substantial 
degree,  and  with  it,  our  nation  as  a  whole,  the  off 
spring  and  heir  of  New  England. 

This  initial  character  of  the  American  people  was 
accentuated  and  maintained  by  the  situation  in  which 
they  found  themselves  and  the  tasks  which  confronted 
them.  The  mere  task  of  exploration  and  the  subdu 
ing  of  nature  was  one  calling  for  enterprise  and  hardi 
hood  in  the  highest  degree.  Even  yet,  after  three 
hundred  years  of  occupation,  the  work  of  the  pioneer 
is  not  finished,  and  it  is  in  the  memory  of  men  now  liv 
ing  that  he  has  achieved  his  greatest  triumphs.  Con 
tinued  stimulus  and  uninterrupted  selection  have  thus 
tended  to  maintain  original  characteristics. 

In  this  struggle  the  Indian  has  played  an  important 
part.  Always  a  feeble  antagonist,  he  from  the  out- 


THE  FIRST  AMERICANS  19 

set  forfeited  his  claim  to  compassion  by  his  own  in 
evitable  savagery.  The  Indian  could  be  annoying 
from  the  first,  even  dangerous,  but  to  become  civilized 
and  useful  required  time  and  an  amount  of  coddling 
and  forbearance  which  the  colonist  could  hardly  af 
ford.  The  inevitable  relation  was  one  of  conflict, 
conflict  which  might  have  been  different  in  its  inci 
dents,  but  hardly  in  its  essence.  And  if  the  conflict 
was  unavoidable,  its  outcome  was  even  more  prede 
termined.  Even  without  conflict  it  is  probable  that 
the  Indian  must  have  disappeared  before  the  white 
man.  No  possible  considerateness  of  treatment  could 
have  compensated  for  the  inherent  disparity  between 
the  two  races.  As  it  was,  no  such  considerateness 
was  shown.  White  superiority  asserted  itself  rather 
ruthlessly,  impatient  of  obstruction  by  a  conspicuously 
inferior  race,  and  the  Indian  suffered  the  inevitable 
consequence  of  his  inferiority.  Nor  did  the  later 
grudging  recognition  of  obligation  on  the  part  of  the 
more  efficient  race,  with  its  perfunctory  and  demor 
alizing  tutelage,  greatly  help  the  situation  or  modify 
the  outcome. 

Whether  the  world  has  lost  by  the  disappearance 
of  the  Indian  is  not  the  question.  We  are  concerned 
only  to  note  his  influence  upon  American  character. 
The  struggle  was  little  calculated  to  develop  military 
science  on  our  part,  but  it  was  even  less  calculated  to 
make  us  pacifists  or  to  encourage  theories  of  human 
brotherhood.  Such  theories  may  be  accepted  as  of 
universal  application,  but  as  an  actual  working  pro 
gram,  they  are  apt  to  fare  badly  when  we  are  dealing 
with  savages.  Considerations  of  practical  utility  are 


20    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

equally  at  a  disadvantage  in  this  case.  The  savage 
seems  to  be  a  cumberer  of  the  ground.  The  matter- 
of-fact  competitor  for  his  place  in  the  sun  is  little  af 
fected  by  ideal  considerations.  You  can  make  a  man 
of  him  in  time,  no  doubt,  but  not  half  so  easily  as  you 
can  displace  him  with  a  better  man  already  made. 
Such  considerations  as  these,- —  felt  rather  than  rea 
soned, —  make  the  competition  between  civilized  and 
savage  races,  especially  in  regions  suited  to  either,  a 
very  ruthless  one,  and  deepen  the  instinct  of  race  as 
sertion  and  race  aggression.  They  have  done  so  in 
the  American  people. 

But  far  more  important  than  the  conflict  with  the 
Indians  was  the  conflict  between  the  English  and  the 
earlier  colonists  to  whom  reference  has  already  been 
made.  This  struggle  was,  of  course,  only  the  reflec 
tion  of  the  age-long  conflict  between  the  parent  peo 
ples  in  Europe.  Those  who  see  in  war  only  a  strug 
gle  for  trade  or  the  pressure  of  congested  population 
will  find  it  difficult  to  account  for  many  things  in  these 
conflicts.  At  a  time  when  France  and  England  had 
to  seek  each  other  in  America  across  almost  impassa 
ble  barriers  of  unoccupied  territory,  when  seemingly 
from  sheer  lonesomeness,  they  should  have  welcomed 
each  other,  they  compassed  land  and  sea  to  destroy 
each  other,  anticipating  friction  which  if  realized, 
could  be  realized  only  after  centuries  of  development. 
In  this  struggle  they  sank  a  capital  which  no  profits 
from  the  trade  they  foresaw  could  ever  repay.  The 
struggle  seems  to  have  been  instinctive  rather  than 
calculated,  the  spontaneous  manifestation  of  race  com 
petition. 


THE  FIRST  AMERICANS  21 

This  fundamental  antagonism  was  sharpened  by 
certain  differences  of  lesser  import  which  performed 
the  important  service  of  furnishing  the  pretexts  of 
which  our  unreasoning  instincts  always  have  need. 
Spaniard  and  Frenchman,  Frenchman  and  Briton,  in 
stinctively  grudged  each  other  a  place  in  the  vast  ter 
ritory  which  they  were  so  long  unable  to  fill,  but 
neither  quite  knew  why.  It  was  therefore  with  pe 
culiar  satisfaction  that  they  recognized,  each  in  other, 
the  exponent  of  a  sinful  heresy,  and  in  themselves  the 
chosen  instrument  of  God,  for  its  extermination. 
This  situation  has  its  counterpart  in  the  experience  of 
every  nation  and  of  every  individual  when  account 
must  be  given  to  an  importunate  reason  for  action  in 
deference  to  an  inscrutable  instinct. 

When  the  great  competition  began,  England  and 
France  were  in  revolt  against  the  intellectual  bondage 
of  Roman  Catholicism,  while  Spain  was  intensely 
loyal.  Geographical  situation  first  brought  Spain  and 
France  into  conflict,  the  earliest  French  settlements 
like  the  British  having  been  founded  by  dissenters. 
The  ruthlessness  of  the  resulting  struggle  has  few  par 
allels  in  ancient  or  modern  warfare.  It  was  no  war 
of  subjugation  but  a  war  of  extermination  deliberate 
and  complete.  The  actors  seem  to  have  viewed  their 
work  with  complacency,  and  if  they  ever  felt  remorse, 
the  fact  is  not  recorded. 

When  later  French  and  English  came  into  conflict, 
reaction  had  triumphed  in  France,  Coligny  and  the 
Protestant  cause  had  perished  at  St.  Bartholomew's, 
and  with  them  their  ill  starred  colonial  schemes. 
Colonies  fostered  by  state  aid,  under  the  supervision 


22    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

of  the  church,  and  soon  under  the  direction  of  the 
Jesuits,  supplied  abundant  and  mutual  justification  for 
a  relentless  war  against  the  tenacious  heresies  of 
colonies  even  more  heretical  than  the  heretical  land 
from  which  they  came.  Other  differences  added  as 
perity  to  the  conflict. 

The  struggle  which  followed  lasted  for  a  century, 
and  left  no  generation  without  experience  of  warfare. 
If  less  pitiless  than  the  earlier  struggle  between  Span 
ish  and  French,  it  was  still  a  war  of  savage  ferocity. 
Conquest,  to  be  sure,  was  followed  by  subjugation 
rather  than  by  extermination,  but  such  incidents  as  the 
exile  of  the  Acadians  by  the  English  and  the  employ 
ment  of  Indians  by  the  French,  with  its  accompani 
ments  of  massacre,  torture,  and  cannibalism,  have 
given  to  the  memory  of  this  war  a  peculiar  horror. 
The  final  issue  was  settled  in  1759  between  Mont- 
calm  and  Wolfe  on  the  plain  of  Quebec,  and  in  the 
great  competition  of  civilizations,  the  vast  potential 
weight  of  America  was  thrown  into  the  scale  of 
Britain. 

But  what  concerns  us  is  the  reaction  of  these  events 
upon  the  character  of  the  American  people.  From 
the  first  settlement  of  the  English  in  America  to  the 
final  British  triumph  at  Quebec, —  a  period  of  a  hun 
dred  and  fifty  years, —  the  colonists  may  be  said  to 
have  lived  in  an  armed  camp.  They  had  gone  armed 
to  church  as  a  protection  against  the  treacherous 
native.  They  had  participated  in  innumerable  cam 
paigns,  often  puny  and  inefficient,  but  not  the  less 
bitter  and  positive  in  their  reaction.  They  had  fought 
an  unsparing  foe  and  had  learned  to  be  unsparing. 


THE  FIRST  AMERICANS  23 

The  colonists  had  no  need  of  land.  They  could  have 
given  a  province  to  every  household.  When  at  last 
the  continent  was  assured  to  them,  they  were  scarcely 
sufficient  to  police  its  eastern  border.  Nor  does  it 
appear  that  the  vision  of  a  countless  posterity 
prompted  them  to  so  colossal  a  provision.  To  the 
alien,  unless  heretical,  they  accorded  the  heartiest  wel 
come,  as  to  a  fellow  soldier  in  the  fight  against  nature. 
That  the  land  should  ever  be  insufficient  both  for 
themselves  and  for  him  was  unthinkable. 

Nor  do  these  colonies  seem  ever  to  have  contem 
plated,  like  the  Spanish  and  French,  the  enforcement 
of  uniform  religious  beliefs.  Many  of  them  had 
intense  convictions  and  were  exceedingly  jealous  of 
their  right  to  be  religious  in  their  own  way, —  even 
jealous  of  all  dissenting  opinion  within  their  midst. 
But  the  notion  of  forcing  other  colonies  to  their  own 
opinion  does  not  seem  to  have  been  entertained.  Re 
ligious  liberty  in  the  modern  sense  of  tolerance  for 
all  opinions  was  certainly  not  their  ideal,  but  as  be 
tween  their  several  isolated  settlements  they  exhibited 
passive  tolerance  at  least.  Whatever  may  be  true  of 
the  French,  the  English  did  not  fight  these  wars  in 
the  interest  of  religious  propaganda. 

Nor  yet  for  trade,  though  the  traders  of  the  two 
peoples,  penetrating  the  remote  wilds  in  quest  of  furs, 
were  in  continual  clash  and  were  the  advance  guards 
of  settlement  and  of  the  pernicious  Indian  alliance. 
But  the  obligation  of  a  nation  to  protect  its  citizens 
beyond  its  boundaries  was  not  recognized  then  as  it 
is  now,  and  it  is  difficult  to  believe  that  the  colonies 
would  ever  have  consented  to  vast  expenditure  of 


24    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

blood  and  treasure,  and  would  have  risked  their  very 
existence  in  perpetual  wars  in  the  interests  of  traders* 
profits.  The  recent  much  heralded  discovery  that 
war  does  not  pay,  could  hardly  find  better  illustration 
than  in  such  an  outlay  for  such  an  end. 

For  what  then,  if  not  for  land  or  faith  or  trade? 
There  is  but  one  possible  answer,  and  that,  perhaps, 
a  new  riddle  to  explain  the  old.  It  was  an  age-long 
struggle  for  supremacy,  for  dominion.  The  indi 
vidual  was  provided  for  in  either  event.  Under  the 
one  flag  as  under  the  other  he  could  sow  and  reap 
and  gather  into  barns.  Under  either  allegiance  he 
could  trade  and  get  gain.  If  his  individual  interests 
were  menaced,  it  was  primarily  because  of  his  al 
legiance.  With  this  stone  of  stumbling  removed,  his 
path  was  clear.  But  far  from  purchasing  individual 
well  being  by  the  surrender  of  allegiance,  he  was  will 
ing  to  maintain  his  allegiance  at  the  expense  of  indi 
vidual  well  being.  The  Englishman  wanted  the  new 
world  to  be  British;  the  Frenchman  wanted  it  to  be 
French.  Neither  knew,  nor  yet  greatly  cared  to 
know,  why.  It  was  enough  that  his  own  was  familiar 
and  the  other  strange,  enough  that  he  had  inherited 
fealty  to  the  one  and  not  to  the  other.  Perfectly  ir 
rational,  do  you  say,  this  blind  loyalty  to  an  unproved 
good?  Yes,  no  doubt;  as  irrational  as  the  love  of 
life.  Who  ever  yet  proved  that  life  was  worth  liv 
ing?  What  healthy  man  ever  tried?  This  is  all 
merely  a  way  of  saying  that  we  are  dealing  with  in 
stinct,  not  with  reason,  and  it  is  not  to  reason  but  to 
instinct  that  nature  has  committed  the  guardianship  of 
our  vital  interests. 


THE  FIRST  AMERICANS  25 

This  struggle  of  civilizations  of  course  did  not 
originate  on  our  continent.  It  grew  up  in  Europe  un 
der  very  different  conditions  and  was  transferred  to 
our  shores  as  a  part  of  the  colonist's  heritage.  It 
might  have  been  expected  that  under  the  very  different 
conditions  here  prevailing,  it  would  lose  its  bitterness 
and  perhaps  disappear.  Europe  was  land  hungry, 
America  land-surfeited.  Changed  conditions  might 
reasonably  be  reflected  in  a  changed  attitude.  But 
there  was  no  change  of  attitude.  Hostility  between 
the  two  civilizations  continued  unrelenting,  and  the 
empty  land  found  no  room  for  the  two.  This  un 
compromising  assertion  of  race  instinct  under  condi 
tions  that  afforded  it  none  of  its  usual  pretexts  is 
peculiarly  illuminating  as  to  the  nature  of  the  force 
with  which  we  have  to  deal. 

This  blind  instinct  of  race  assertion  we  have  no 
occasion  either  to  challenge  or  to  defend.  There  are 
pros  and  cons  in  plenty,  but  we  are  studying  history 
just  now,  and  are  concerned  to  know  the  American 
people  rather  than  to  correct  them.  The  broad  fact 
is  that  throughout  the  colonial  period  they  were  ab 
sorbed  in  a  ceaseless  struggle  for  race  ascendancy. 
Harassed  rather  than  endangered  by  the  Indian,  they 
were  never  allowed  to  forget  him  or  let  him  alone. 
The  tolerance  that  they  might  have  shown  him  was 
made  impossible  by  his  alliance  with  an  implacable 
rival.  With  this  rival  in  turn  they  were  compelled 
to  wage  a  relentless  and  far  more  desperate  warfare 
until  victory  at  last  compelled  submission.  How  dif 
ferent  would  have  been  the  history  and  the  schooling 
of  the  American  people  if,  like  Spain  in  South  Amer- 


26    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

ica,  their  occupation  had  met  no  challenge  from  foe- 
men  worthy  of  their  steel.  It  was  a  Spartan  disci 
pline  that  the  colonists  underwent  in  the  century  that 
closed  with  Britain's  triumph  before  the  walls  of 
Quebec. 

But  this  was  not  all,  nor  yet  the  most  important. 
Throughout  the  long  conflict  the  colonist  was  never 
wholly  unconscious  that  he  was  playing  a  minor 
role  in  a  vast  drama  which  had  the  world  for  its  stage 
and  the  most  powerful  nations  of  the  world  for  its 
actors.  During  a  period  of  a  hundred  and  thirty 
years  ending  with  the  Battle  of  Waterloo,  England 
and  France  fought  seven  great  wars,  the  aggregate 
covering  a  total  of  sixty-seven  years,  or  more  than 
half  of  the  entire  period.  The  prize  of  victory  was 
nothing  less  than  the  privilege  of  leading  the  world 
that  was,  and  of  peopling  the  world  that  was  to  be. 
All  that  men  care  most  for  was  involved  in  the  issue, 
their  race,  their  speech,  their  institutions,  and  their 
ideals.  In  all  these  wars  except  the  last  the  English 
colonies  were  actively  engaged.  They  won  for  their 
race  the  leadership  of  the  nations,  and  for  themselves 
the  right  to  become  the  American  people. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE    LOGIC   OF    ISOLATION 

IT  would  be  strange  if  a  people  so  sired,  so  selected, 
and  so  schooled  as  were  the  American  people,  had  not 
developed  characteristics  consonant  with  their  origin 
and  their  experiences.  They  had  been  compelled  to 
fight  for  everything,  and  they  had  developed  the 
fighting  temper.  Their  antagonists  had  been  too  un 
intelligent  or  too  implacable  to  make  compromise  pos 
sible,  and  they  had  become  uncompromising.  They 
had  prospered  in  war,  and  were  the  easier  persuaded 
to  resort  to  it.  They  had  known  its  sacrifices,  but 
never  its  humiliations,  and  therefore  did  not  feel  its 
chief  deterrents.  On  the  other  hand  there  was  much 
in  these  early  experiences  to  mislead  them,  for  war 
as  they  knew  it  was  not  the  war  of  organized  and  dis 
ciplined  Europe,  and  they  quite  overestimated  their 
ability  to  deal  with  a  serious  antagonist.  Aggressive, 
over-confident,  undisciplined,  and  incautious  we  should 
expect  them  to  be,  and  such  we  find  them.  The 
events  of  the  years  immediately  following  the  great 
colonial  triumph  might  have  been  predicted. 

Unfortunately  for  Britain,  her  political  evolution 
had  not  kept  pace  with  her  territorial  expansion. 
This  was  inevitable.  A  great  deal  of  undeserved 
acrimony  has  been  expended  upon  the  British  policy 

27 


28     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

of  this  period,  and  especially  upon  the  misguided 
monarch  who  had  the  misfortune  to  be  conspicuously 
associated  with  it.  It  is  all  so  very  plain  now,  what 
ought  to  have  been  done.  The  great  principles  are 
so  obvious, — u  no  government  without  consent  of  the 
governed,"  "  no  taxation  without  representation," 
and  the  like, —  so  very  obvious,  except  (as  always) 
in  contemporary  applications.  It  is  barely  possible, 
too,  that  a  supreme  genius  in  place  of  George  III 
might  have  perceived  these  principles  and  persuaded 
his  people  to  recognize  them  in  their  dealings  with  the 
colonies.  It  would  have  been  a  supreme  achievement, 
however,  one  for  which  history  scarcely  furnishes  a 
precedent,  for  it  is  not  usually  the  dominant  partner 
who  first  discovers  the  rights  and  needs  of  the  weaker 
party.  It  can  not  be  too  strongly  insisted  that  the  re 
lation  which  the  colonies  sought  to  establish  with  the 
mother  country  was  one  for  which  history  furnishes 
no  counterpart.  Much  has  happened  since  to  prove 
their  contention  to  be  reasonable  and  wise,  but  it  did 
not  and  could  not  seem  so  then,  especially  to  the  more 
responsible  party.  This  point  is  so  vital  to  all  our 
subsequent  discussion  that  we  may  well  make  a  little 
effort  to  see  how  the  world  looked  to  an  Englishman 
of  the  eighteenth  century. 

The  problem  of  empire,  the  management  of  com 
plex  states,  is  a  very  old  one.  When  the  king  of 
Egypt  relinquished  the  time  honoured  privilege  of 
plundering  the  Syrians  against  the  payment  of  an  an 
nual  tribute,  he  laid  the  foundations  of  empire.  He 
seems  to  have  done  nothing,  however,  to  help  his 
tributaries,  unless  by  protecting  them  from  other 


THE  LOGIC  OF  ISOLATION  29 

marauders.  He  taught  them  no  arts  and  sent  them 
no  administrators.  He  left  them  to  their  own  rulers 
and  their  own  devices,  so  long  as  the  required  tribute 
was  paid.  The  conquered  territory  was  like  a  hunt 
ing  preserve  in  which  the  proprietor  had  learned  to 
hunt  discreetly,  giving  the  hunted  the  benefit  of  a 
closed  season.  Its  justification,  like  the  justification 
of  all  things  historic,  lies  in  the  fact  that  it  was  a  way 
station  on  the  road  from  worse  to  better  things. 

The  Roman  Empire  marks  a  great  advance  upon 
the  empires  of  this  primitive  type.  Rome  still  sub 
dued  peoples  and  exacted  tribute,  but  she  created  the 
wealth  that  she  took  and  much  more.  She  made 
roads,  bridges,  and  harbours,  protected  life  and  prop 
erty,  administered  justice,  and  defined  the  relation  be 
tween  man  and  man.  The  hunting  preserve  now  be 
came  a  cultivated  estate  whose  proprietor  reaped 
harvests  of  his  own  sowing  instead  of  depending  on 
the  scanty  yield  of  nature.  If  material  well-being 
counts  for  anything,  Rome  has  put  the  world  very 
much  in  her  debt. 

This  system  was  such  an  immense  advance  over 
anything  that  the  world  had  previously  known,  and 
its  success  was  so  imposing  that  the  world  has  some 
times  forgotten  its  limitations.  Yet  Rome  failed,  and 
failed  because  she  was  unable  to  meet  the  require 
ments  which  her  very  success  created.  The  system 
worked  admirably  for  a  conquered  and  alien  people 
who  were  not  Roman  and  who  might  plausibly  be 
placed  in  tutelage.  But  as  these  countries  gradually 
became  Roman  in  culture,  intelligence,  and  feeling, 
their  status  as  protected  inferiors  became  both  less  ac- 


30    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

ceptable  and  less  appropriate.  Yet  there  was  no  ade 
quate  means  for  their  participation  in  the  direction  of 
affairs.  The  whole  empire  was  governed  essentially 
by  the  citizens  of  the  imperial  city.  Citizenship,  to  be 
sure,  became  more  widely  distributed,  but  as  the 
Roman  could  exercise  political  functions  only  by  com 
ing  to  the  City  of  Rome,  citizenship  of  non-residents 
counted  for  little  outside  of  personal  prestige  and 
protection. 

As  the  Republic  expanded  to  vast  proportions  with 
corresponding  increase  of  tribute,  it  became  too  much 
for  any  city  to  manage,  while  at  the  same  time  the 
pampered  city  became  hopelessly  demoralized  and  in 
capable  of  exercising  its  functions.  The  provinces,  on 
the  other  hand,  were  still  sound,  and  their  competency 
had  steadily  increased.  But  there  was  no  way  of 
calling  them  to  the  aid  of  the  state.  Rome  had  de 
veloped  arteries  by  which  she  sent  her  creative  author 
ity  out  to  the  uttermost  parts  of  her  dominion.  But 
she  had  no  veins  through  which  she  could  bring  back 
the  life  current  to  the  wasted  centre.  With  the  break 
down  of  the  municipal  control,  she  could  think  of  noth 
ing  better  than  to  reinforce  it  with  a  military  despotism 
which  was  based  on  the  same  defective  principle  and 
had  only  the  merit  of  being  temporarily  more  efficient. 

Yet  it  is  tantalizing  to  note  how  near  Rome  came 
to  taking  the  next  great  step  and  solving  the  problem. 
When  Julius  Caesar  appointed  Gauls  and  other  bar 
barians  to  seats  in  the  Roman  Senate,  he  recognized 
in  essence  the  great  principle  of  representative  govern 
ment,  and  Rome  seemed  near  to  adding  the  crowning 
glory  to  her  achievement  by  devising  an  adequate 


THE  LOGIC  OF  ISOLATION  31 

means  for  creating  and  maintaining  the  authority  back 
of  her  administration.  But  the  reception  which  these 
rustics  met  at  the  hands  of  those  born  to  the  toga  ef 
fectually  deterred  them  from  exercising  their  new  pre 
rogative,  and  as  the  policy  did  not  command  the  sym 
pathy  of  Augustus,  the  experiment  passed  with  its 
originator,  and  the  principle  which  it  involved  re 
mained  unnoticed.  Probably  it  was  incapable  of  ap 
plication  at  that  time.  So  military  autocracy  had  its 
day,  while  authority  maintained  a  precarious  existence 
by  the  initiative  of  genius  and  the  momentum  of 
heredity. 

And  now  the  world  hibernated  for  a  thousand  years 
and  waited  for  Britain.  Outside  this  single  little  area 
the  world  recognized  the  traditional  method  of  con 
stituting  authority  which  had  received  the  sanction  of 
imperial  Rome,  autocracy  founded  by  chance  and  per 
petuated  by  birth,  the  whole  under  the  awful  sanction 
of  divine  right.  Britain  recognized  the  same  author 
ity  and  was  hardly  conscious  of  standing  for  a  dif 
ferent  principle.  But  Britain  had  found  the  talisman 
that  Caesar  had  sought.  She  had  her  Parliament,  her 
institution  for  "  parley "  between  people  and  king. 
It  was  crude  and  weak  as  yet,  still  fighting  for  its 
doubtful  prerogative,  but  it  involved  the  precious 
principle  of  representation.  Through  delegates  the 
people  spoke  with  the  king  concerning  the  matters  that 
were  of  concern  to  them,  without  the  necessity  of  com 
ing  to  the  capital  city.  Slowly  and  painfully  the  Eng 
lish  schooled  themselves  in  the  difficult  task  of  cre 
ating,  renewing,  and  supervising  the  authority  to 
which  they  subjected  themselves. 


32     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

It  is  impossible  to  exaggerate  the  difficulties  that 
attended  this  task,  continued,  as  it  was,  without  the 
guidance  of  precedent  and  against  the  determined  op 
position  of  the  monarch.  Success  would  have  been 
impossible  in  any  but  a  small  and  well  defined  area 
with  a  fairly  homogeneous  people  whose  interests  were 
so  uniform  that  all  could  understand  them.  Race 
differences,  natural  barriers,  or  diverse  interests  would 
have  wrecked  it  in  its  earlier  stages,  may  conceivably 
wreck  it  even  yet. 

It  was  while  this  struggle  was  in  progress  that  the 
colonies  were  founded.  Indeed  they  were  in  part  an 
incident  of  the  struggle,  for  it  was  the  malcontents 
who  saw  no  hope  that  their  views  could  be  made  to 
prevail  and  who  were  unwilling  to  accept  the  necessary 
compromises,  who  were  most  prominent  in  the  move 
ment.  It  is  doubtful  if  any  one  thought  much  about 
the  political  problems  that  were  involved.  They  were 
still  Englishmen  and  went  with  the  consent  of  the  king 
and  under  his  protection,  but  they  went  to  get  away 
from  the  conditions  prevailing  under  the  English  gov 
ernment,  and  England  knew  and  recognized  with  them 
that  this  action  put  them  beyond  the  pale.  How  it 
would  work  out  probably  no  one  knew  or  felt  it 
necessary  to  know.  They  could  wait  and  see. 

But  the  all  important  fact  for  us  to  note  is  that 
whether  they  wanted  to  be  a  part  of  England  or  not, 
it  was  now  physically  impossible  to  be  so.  Practical 
administration  must  have  things  handy  and  accessible, 
while  they  were  many  weeks  away.  It  implies 
familiarity  with  conditions,  and  this  was  something 
that  no  English  minister  could  claim.  To  refer  mat- 


THE  LOGIC  OF  ISOLATION  33 

ters  to  London  always  involved  long  delay  and  usually 
resulted  in  perfunctory  and  unpractical  decisions. 
Meanwhile  the  colonists  were  not  savages,  but  Eng 
lishmen  quite  as  competent  as  those  at  home  and  in 
finitely  better  informed  regarding  local  conditions.  It 
was  inevitable  that  such  men  should  have  their  own 
way  in  most  matters,  and  that  although  England  might 
send  them  governors  and  go  through  the  forms  of 
administering  the  colonies  from  London,  no  governor 
would  get  along  with  them  who  did  not  respect  their 
judgment  and  their  wishes.  As  England  was  rarely 
concerned  in  the  matter,  no  sensible  governor  would 
invite  trouble  by  opposing  their  will,  or  bother  his 
superiors  by  referring  matters  needlessly  to  them. 
The  inevitable  modus  vivendi  was  from  the  first  some 
thing  like  this.  The  colonies  allowed  the  king  to 
rule  in  theory,  and  he  allowed  them  to  rule  in  fact. 
To  challenge  either  half  of  this  arrangement  was  to 
insure  trouble. 

By  a  similar  unwritten  arrangement  the  colonists 
were  subject  to  taxation,  but  paid  no  taxes.  Being 
British  subjects  and  under  the  king's  protection,  his 
right  to  demand  tribute  was  as  old  as  monarchy  itself, 
a  right  not  invalidated  by  the  growing  power  of  Par 
liament.  But  at  a  time  when  Britain's  rivals  were 
supporting  their  colonies  by  grants  from  the  royal 
treasury,  regarding  them  somewhat  as  expeditionary 
forces,  it  was  clever  financiering  on  Britain's  part  to 
get  her  colonists  to  pay  their  own  expenses.  To  tax 
them  for  the  privilege  of  waging  an  arduous  frontier 
campaign  for  the  mother  country  would  have  been 
preposterous.  No  doubt  the  time  would  come  when 


34    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

their  lot  would  be  that  of  normal  citizenship,  and  nor 
mal  duties  would  be  recognized.  Until  then  taxation  r' 
must  be  postponed.  But  the  longer  it  was  postponed, 
the  more  difficult  it  became  to  establish  it.  The  days 
of  hardship  were  long  continued,  and  as  poverty 
slowly  gave  way  to  modest  affluence,  colonial  needs 
absorbed  the  local  revenues.  Quite  naturally,  the 
colonies  came  to  regard  this  arrangement  as  reason 
able  and  just.  They  looked  out  for  their  own  end 
as  the  home  folks  did  for  theirs.  Their  burdens  were 
as  heavy  and  their  work  as  well  done.  They  shared 
in  the  common  defence.  When  England  fought 
France,  they  fought  New  France,  and  served  at  their 
own  charges.  They  asked  no  help,  and  no  help 
should  be  asked  of  them.  If  this  was  not  ideally 
equitable,  it  was  as  near  it  as  men  are  likely  to  get. 
All  this  was  felt  rather  than  asserted  by  the  colonists, 
and  England  acquiesced  by  silence  rather  than  by  di 
rect  avowal.  The  right  to  tax  was  neither  asserted 
nor  withdrawn.  It  was  merely  held  in  abeyance  until 
it  was  eliminated  by  atrophy. 

Representation  in  Parliament  was  the  third  matter 
of  vital  concern  to  a  Briton.  In  the  case  of  the  colon 
ists,  this  right,  like  so  many  others,  went  by  default. 
As  the  home  government  was  chiefly  occupied  with 
home  affairs,  it  interested  the  colonists  but  little,  and 
they  would  have  felt  it  a  burden  rather  than  a  privi 
lege  to  participate  in  its  management.  Representa 
tion  in  Parliament  in  the  early  days,  when  the  colonies 
were  but  insignificant  communities  of  malcontents  who 
had  shaken  off  the  dust  of  their  feet  against  the  British 
government,  was  of  course  unthinkable.  When  later 


THE  LOGIC  OF  ISOLATION  35 

these  conditions  changed  and  representation  might 
have  seemed  more  appropriate,  the  colonists  were 
canny  enough  to  realize  that  if  they  helped  govern 
England,  England  would  help  govern  them.  Repre 
sentation  thus  wore  the  aspect,  not  of  a  privilege,  but 
of  an  insidious  menace.  Meanwhile  the  colonists  had 
developed  little  parliaments  of  their  own  and  were 
jealous  of  their  prerogatives.  They  were  the  weaker 
party,  and  their  prerogatives,  in  theory,  rested  only  on 
English  suffrance.  The  less  said  about  the  matter 
the  better.  So  they  waived  their  right  to  representa 
tion  in  the  great  council  of  Englishmen. 

To  summarize  the  situation,  in  theory,  the  colonists 
were  Englishmen,  entitled  to  all  the  privileges  and 
subject  to  all  the  duties  of  British  subjects.  But  just 
because  they  went  so  far  away  that  they  could  not 
conveniently  communicate  with  England  or  act  under 
the  detailed  direction  of  her  government,  they  had 
developed  a  substation  or  advanced  base  of  govern 
ment  direction,  and  to  this  they  reported  for  duty  or 
applied  for  privilege,  until  all  working  relations  with 
the  central  station  were  forgotten  and  died  of  disuse. 
Yet  while  they  had  been  growing  self-sufficient  and 
American,  they  were  still  Englishmen  and  had  not  the 
slightest  idea  of  being  anything  else.  It  is  a  puzzling 
relation,  and  one  that  the  world  had  hardly  known  be 
fore,  and  was  therefore  unable  to  define  clearly.  Or 
ganic  connection  between  homeland  and  colonies, 
though  nominally  intact,  had  quite  ceased  to  function. 
Yet  there  was  a  conscious  union  of  a  very  real  char 
acter,  something  quite  different  from  the  mere  friendli 
ness  existing  between  two  independent  states.  Try  to 


36    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

concrete  it  in  the  form  of  taxes  and  parliamentary 
control,  and  resistance  was  at  once  manifest,  but  leave 
it  alone,  and  it  remained,  an  impressive  reality,  in 
tangible  but  potent. 

The  saying  of  Bismarck,  that  the  art  of  the  states 
man  is  the  proper  evaluation  of  the  imponderables, 
was  never  better  illustrated  than  here.  The  unity  in 
question  was  built  of  imponderables,  of  things  that  can 
not  be  weighed  or  translated  into  material  terms.  A 
proper  evaluation  of  the  imponderables  would  have 
discerned  in  this  unity  an  infinitely  precious  thing. 
Unfortunately  the  faculty  here  required  is  the  gift  of 
a  few  rare  spirits,  among  whom  can  not  be  included 
the  English  monarch  and  his  advisers  of  this  period. 
The  king  inherited  a  struggle  the  necessary  issue  of 
which  he  was  unwilling  to  accept.  The  authority  of 
the  people,  as  expressed  through  its  responsible  Parlia 
ment,  had  steadily  encroached  upon  the  irresponsible 
authority  of  the  monarch,  who  now  engaged  in  a  des 
perate  struggle  to  save  and  if  possible  to  strengthen 
his  prerogative.  The  main  issue  was  between  Parlia 
ment  and  himself,  an  issue  in  which  the  colonies  were 
not  directly  concerned,  save  that  it  gave  them  a  pow 
erful  ally.  But  if  the  king's  authority  had  weakened 
as  regards  Parliament,  it  had  also  weakened  as  re 
gards  the  colonies,  and  that  for  a  different  reason. 
Parliament  did  not  represent  the  colonies,  and  it  was 
an  open  question  whether  it  could  claim  authority  over 
them.  It  might  plausibly  be  contended  that  their  re 
lation  was  to  the  king  alone.  Yet  their  avowed  al 
legiance  had  been  shadowy  in  the  extreme.  If  royalty 
was  to  recover  its  prerogative,  this  normal  allegiance 


THE  LOGIC  OF  ISOLATION  37 

must  be  translated  into  fact.  The  rights  and  duties  of 
British  subjects  must  become  real  through  experience. 
To  the  minds  of  these  men,  as  to  certain  in  our  day, 
only  material  relations  were  real  relations.  The  im 
ponderables  were  too  unsubstantial. 

It  is  but  fair  to  add  that  Parliament,  though  at 
feud  with  the  king  and  therefore  the  logical  ally  of 
the  colonies,  was  neither  able  nor  willing  directly  to 
espouse  their  cause.  Not  only  was  Parliament  at  the 
time  in  artificial  subserviency  to  the  king,  but  it  had 
its  own  feud  with  the  colonies,  claiming,  like  the  king, 
an  authority  over  them  which  they  were  nowise 
minded  to  recognize.  Parliament  as  a  whole  was 
hardly  more  expert  than  the  king  and  his  ministers  in 
the  evaluation  of  imponderables.  But  there  were  a 
few  who  recognized  the  fatuity  of  the  king's  effort  to 
control  Parliament  and  of  his  attempt  to  assert  in  the 
colonies  an  authority  which  was  both  alien  and  out 
worn.  These  few  proved  to  be  the  true  representa 
tives  of  the  English  people. 

We  know  the  outcome,  and  yet  we  perhaps  do  not 
always  recognize  its  significance,  for  we  too  are  not 
always  able  to  appraise  the  imponderables.  The  all- 
important  fact  is  that  at  the  outset  the  colonists  were 
Englishmen,  owing  an  allegiance  to  Britain  which  was 
a  tremendous  reality,  albeit  imponderable.  The  king 
and  his  ministers,  endowed  with  no  diviner's  sense  for 
the  things  of  the  spirit,  felt  that  this  structure  of  the 
imponderables  was  unsubstantial  and  untrustworthy, 
and  sought  to  transmute  it  into  a  more  material  sub 
stance.  In  so  doing,  they  wrecked  the  mystic  fabric 
of  British  allegiance  and  British  unity.  When  they 


38     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

began,  the  colonies  were  British.  When  they  ended, 
they  were  American.  The  change  was  not  outward 
and  political  merely.  There  had  been  a  regrouping 
of  the  imponderables. 

It  must  not  be  concluded,  however,  that  this  was 
due  to  the  character  of  George  III.  Had  there  been 
no  struggle  with  Parliament  and  no  effort  to  recover  a 
vanished  prerogative,  the  issue  would  have  arisen  in 
another  way.  The  situation  was  one  which  had  never 
arisen  before,  and  one  which  the  most  intelligent  of 
peoples  could  hardly  be  expected  to  appreciate. 
Never  before  had  two  countries  been  really  one  in 
their  inmost  consciousness  and  yet  completely  inde 
pendent  in  all  their  political  activities.  History  was 
witness  that  real  bonds  between  nations  had  always 
been  material  bonds.  Assuming,  as  everybody  did, 
that  unity  was  to  be  maintained,  it  seemed  a  patriotic 
duty  to  supply  the  material  bonds  which  alone  could 
guarantee  its  continuance.  So  they  reasoned,  so  any 
body  would  have  reasoned  in  their  place.  Their  rea 
soning  was  natural  and  in  the  light  of  past  experience, 
conclusive.  It  was  a  mistake  that  simply  had  to  be 
made.  It  chanced  to  be  a  king  who  made  it.  It 
might  just  as  easily  have  been  a  Parliament,  and  a 
very  reasonable  Parliament  at  that.  King  and  min 
isters  and  personalities  were  accidents  in  the  case. 
The  essence  of  the  situation  was  British  unity  existing 
under  conditions  of  extreme  geographical  separation. 
The  new  thing  which  these  brought  into  the  world  was 
not  at  once  to  be  recognized  by  those  schooled  in  a  less 
intangible  order  of  things.  The  reign  of  the  impon 
derables  was  not  yet. 


THE  LOGIC  OF  ISOLATION  39 

The  temptation  is  irresistible  to  turn  for  a  moment 
to  this  same  struggle  in  our  own  day.  A  nation  has 
arisen  which, holds  a  quarter  of  the  earth  in  fief,  and 
which  yet  seems  to  be  no  nation,  for  its  parts  are 
themselves  nations,  jealous  of  their  liberty  and  brook 
ing  no  interference,  yet  feeling  themselves  one,  bound 
together  by  the  imponderables.  And  there  is  an 
other  nation  that  puts  its  trust  in  more  material  things, 
sceptical  of  bonds  that  can  not  be  seen  with  the  eye 
and  handled  with  the  hand,  a  nation  that  has  de 
clared  through  the  mouth  of  its  prophet  that  a  nation 
united  by  other  bonds  is  "  a  sham,"  that  you  have  but 
to  touch  it  and  it  will  fall  to  pieces.  And  they  have 
given  heed  unto  their  prophet  and  have  touched,  and 
the  world  waits  the  outcome.  Was  that  other 
prophet  right,  or  was  he  wrong,  when  he  said  that  the 
art  of  the  statesman  was  to  appraise  the  imponder 
ables? 


CHAPTER  III 

THE    GREAT   EXPANSION 

THE  nation  which  was  thus  started  on  its  inde 
pendent  career,  with  those  characteristics  in  its  peo 
ple  which  resulted  inevitably  from  a  long  frontier  ex 
perience,  was  dowered  with  a  domain  of  uncertain  ex 
tent,  but  vastly  in  excess  of  present  or  even  prospective 
needs.  Its  settlements  formed  a  chain  of  fairly  de 
veloped  communities  along  the  Atlantic  seaboard,  with 
a  narrow  fringe  extending  westward  into  that  illimita 
ble  domain  in  which  as  yet  they  could  not  even  post 
their  sentinels.  Remorseless  as  had  been  their  war 
of  extermination  against  the  French,  there  was  noth 
ing  they  needed  so  much  as  population  to  fill  the  aching 
void  from  which  the  French  had  been  expelled.  The 
motive  which  has  seemingly  impelled  men  to  migration 
and  conquest  in  all  ages  of  the  world,  the  need  of  room 
for  a  growing  population,  was  one  that  the  Americans 
had  never  known.  The  crying  need  was  always  for 
population  to  fill  the  empty  spaces  and  do  the  yeo 
man's  work  and,  save  where  religious  prejudice  inter 
fered,  immigrants  seem  always  to  have  been  wel 
comed.  The  peopling  of  the  whole  western  territory 
might  have  been  foreseen,  and  the  expulsion  of  the 
French  and  other  movements  of  appropriation  thus 
justified,  the  usual  motive  working  merely  by  antici- 

40 


THE  GREAT  EXPANSION  41 

pation.  But  there  is  much  evidence  that  it  was  not 
foreseen  and  that  the  American  people  long  regarded 
themselves  as  an  Atlantic  coast  people,  backed  by  a 
great  interior  which  would  never  be  filled  by  the 
growth  of  their  own  population.  Many  decades  after 
we  became  a  nation,  there  were  intelligent  Americans 
and  even  distinguished  American  statesmen  who  re 
garded  the  idea  of  filling  up  the  land  from  ocean  to 
ocean  by  the  natural  growth  of  the  American  people 
as  wholly  chimerical. 

It  is  important  to  get  clearly  in  mind  this  prevail 
ing  feeling  of  our  people,  as  the  psychological  back 
ground  of  this  first  century  of  our  national  history. 
If  they  sought  new  territories,  it  was  because  they 
wanted  them,  not  because  they  needed  them.  It  is 
easy  for  us  to  see  that  real  need  was  only  a  question  of 
time,  but  they  did  not  live  in  any  consciousness  of  such 
a  time.  We  also  can  see  that  there  were  urgent 
strategic  reasons  for  our  territorial  expansion,  but  it 
is  all  but  certain  that  they  wrought  their  work  un- 
guided  by  any  such  ideal.  The  seer  may  have  under 
stood  the  craving,  but  the  people  merely  felt  it.  They 
lived  in  a  constant  consciousness  of  territorial  suffi 
ciency,  but  sufficiency  brought  no  satiety. 

The  first  century  of  American  history  is  a  record  of 
unparalleled  territorial  expansion.  This  expansion 
began  almost  from  the  first  moment  of  our  independ 
ent  life.  It  has  been  noted  that  the  nation  began  es 
sentially  as  a  chain  of  coast  settlements  with  a  slight 
and  uncertain  western  fringe.  The  Atlantic  coast 
was  the  only  certain  thing  about  its  boundaries.  Even 
that  was  uncertain  at  either  end. 


42     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

The  first  problem  was  started  by  the  treaty  of  peace 
with  Britain.  It  will  be  remembered  that  this  treaty 
had  a  certain  clandestine  character.  We  had  pledged 
ourselves  not  to  make  peace  with  Britain  except  in 
conjunction  with  France,  our  ally.  When  the  sur 
render  of  Cornwallis  made  peace  possible,  France 
began  to  manoeuvre  for  a  peace  that  should  make 
the  colonies  in  a  sense  dependent  upon  her.  As  this 
design  became  apparent  the  American  envoys  were  in 
dignant  and  evaded  the  spirit  of  the  agreement  while 
observing  its  letter.  They  negotiated  a  treaty  with 
Britain,  settling  all  details,  and  then  laid  it  before  the 
French  minister  for  his  adhesion  and  approval.  He 
was  intensely  indignant  at  being  thus  excluded  from 
the  negotiations  where  alone  he  could  have  hoped  to 
accomplish  his  purpose,  but  as  the  complete  agreement 
left  him  no  plausible  pretext  for  objecting  in  a  relation 
where  France  had  steadily  professed  disinterestedness, 
he  assented  with  bad  grace. 

The  clandestine  character  of  the  treaty  went 
further,  however,  and  included  a  provision  of  a  more 
questionable  character,  in  the  shape  of  a  secret  clause 
which  was  not  included  in  the  text  of  the  treaty  and 
was  never  revealed  to  the  French  minister  at  all. 
England,  it  must  be  remembered,  was  then  at  war,  not 
only  with  the  Colonies,  but  also  with  France  and  Spain. 
Both  England  and  Spain  had  widely  scattered  posses 
sions,  and  it  was  pretty  certain  that  when  the  time  for 
peace  came,  there  would  be  exchanges.  Gibraltar  was 
the  chief  object  of  contention,  but  it  was  certain  that 
England  would  not  surrender  this  on  any  account. 
The  only  question  was,  how  much  would  it  be  neces- 


THE  GREAT  EXPANSION  43 

sary  or  wise  to  concede  elsewhere  in  order  to  reconcile 
Spain  to  the  loss  of  the  famous  fortress.  Florida  was 
most  likely  to  be  the  price  of  peace  with  Spain.  It  was 
a  Spanish  settlement  anyway,  and  England  had  but  re 
cently  acquired  it  by  exchange  in  order  to  round  out 
her  colonial  boundaries.  Now  that  the  colonies  were 
lost,  its  value  was  much  lessened,  and  if  "  swaps  " 
were  called  for,  Florida  was  likely  to  go. 

The  boundaries  of  Spanish  Florida  had  been  much 
as  at  present  except  that  the  western  projection  ex 
tended  to  the  present  eastern  boundary  of  the  State  of 
Louisiana  or  almost  to  the  Mississippi  River.  But 
when  England  acquired  it,  she  found  it  convenient  to 
extend  it  clear  to  the  Mississippi,  adding  that  tip  of 
Louisiana  which  she  had  acquired  about  the  same  time. 
She  also  extended  it  considerably  to  the  north,  adding 
a  broad  strip  of  territory  which  belonged  to  none 
of  her  colonies  and  which  she  could  most  easily  ad 
minister  in  this  way. 

Now  that  she  faced  the  possibility  of  yielding  Flor 
ida,  this  question  of  boundary  was  important.  Hence 
this  secret  clause  above  referred  to,  which  specified 
that  if  Florida  remained  British,  the  northern  boun 
dary  was  to  be  the  parallel  of  thirty-two  degrees  and 
thirty  minutes,  but  if  Florida  became  Spanish,  the 
northern  boundary  was  to  be  the  parallel  of  thirty- 
one  degrees  as  at  present.  Florida  was  to  extend 
westward  to  the  Mississippi  in  either  case,  for  as 
Spain,  who,  by  the  previous  acquisition  of  Louisiana, 
controlled  the  other  side  of  the  Mississippi,  desired 
above  everything  to  control  its  mouth,  this  was  the 
thing  that  chiefly  made  Florida  valuable  to  her.  The 


44    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

result  was  a  broad  zone  of  debatable  territory,  the 
"  Yazoo  Lands,"  about  the  size  of  the  State  of  Penn 
sylvania.  By  this  treaty  Britain  said  in  effect  to  her 
late  rebellious  colonies:  ;'  If  I  keep  Florida,  I  want 
these  lands,  but  if  Spain  is  to  have  Florida,  I  would 
rather  they  would  be  yours." 

The  significance  of  this  attitude  on  the  part  of 
Britain,  an  attitude  manifested  in  many  other  connec 
tions,  will  be  considered  later.  At  present  we  are  con 
cerned  to  note  the  American  attitude  toward  terri 
torial  expansion.  Little  is  recorded  on  the  subject, 
for  the  reason  that  that  attitude  is  taken  for  granted. 
From  the  first  it  was  one  of  stout  insistence.  The 
lands  were  neither  strategic  nor  needed,  nor  were  they 
closely  akin  in  population.  To  secure  them  would 
not  give  the  country  a  natural  frontier.  Spain,  having 
acquired  Florida  in  the  settlement,  of  course,  found 
out  about  the  secret  clause  and  insisted  that  Florida, 
which  had  been  ceded  to  her,  could  not  be  one  thing 
to  one  claimant  and  another  thing  to  another.  Flor 
ida  was  Florida,  and  if  the  northern  boundary  was 
thirty-two  degrees  and  thirty  minutes  for  Britain,  it 
was  thirty-two  degrees  and  thirty  minutes  for  Spain,  a 
very  plausible  contention.  It  all  availed  not.  Amer 
ica  insisted,  and  at  last  in  1795,  under  a  virtual  threat 
of  war  which  Spain  was  in  no  condition  to  face,  Spain 
yielded,  and  the  line  was  drawn  at  thirty-one  degrees. 
Technically  this  may  perhaps  be  classified  as  a  defen 
sive  act  rather  than  conquest  and  annexation.  We 
merely  insisted  on  our  "  rights  "  under  the  treaty  with 
Britain,  waiving  the  question  whether  Britain  had  any 
right  to  grant  us  such  rights.  The  important  thing  to 


THE  GREAT  EXPANSION  45 

note  is  that  Spain  denied  our  right  and  yielded  to  a 
threat  of  force.  This  is  conquest  in  essence,  for  con* 
quest  is  usually  based  on  some  alleged  right,  and  this 
right  is  enforced  by  coercion.  The  American  "  for 
ward  policy  "  was  thus  inaugurated  at  the  very  birth 
of  the  Republic,  and  it  scored  its  first  considerable 
victory  when  our  constitution  was  six  years  old. 

This  advance  was  necessarily  followed  by  others. 
Slight  as  was  the  general  appreciation  of  strategic 
problems,  anybody  could  see  that  existing  boundaries 
were  no  stopping  place.  Florida,  extending  clear 
across  to  the  Mississippi,  completely  cut  off  the  coun 
try  from  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  closed  our  southern 
access  to  the  West  Indies  with  which,  at  that  time,  we 
maintained  an  extensive  commerce.  The  very  nar 
rowness  of  this  artificial  barrier  was  an  incitement  to 
break  it  down.  More  important  still  to  all  the  in 
terior  territories  was  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi. 
We  had  extorted  from  Spain  by  force  the  privilege  of 
navigating  the  river  to  its  mouth,  but  her  people  re 
sented  the  concession  and  made  it  as  uncomfortable 
for  us  as  possible.  The  control  of  the  river,  there 
fore,  even  more  than  access  to  the  Gulf,  engaged  the 
attention  of  the  Americans  and  their  government. 
This  was  made  possible  by  an  extraordinary  turn  of 
events  in  Europe.  Napoleon,  just  risen  to  power,  re- 
acquired  Louisiana  from  Spain  in  exchange  for  cer 
tain  rather  specious  promises  of  a  dynastic  character 
which  he  never  fulfilled.  The  transfer,  long  con 
cealed,  was  divined  by  the  Americans  as  the  result  of 
renewed  obstructions  to  the  navigation  of  the  Missis 
sippi.  It  is  noteworthy  that  there  was  an  instant  and 


46     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

widespread  clamour  for  war  with  Napoleon  who  was 
already  at  the  zenith  of  his  fame.  The  President, 
however,  sent  a  commission  to  buy,  if  possible,  the  city 
of  New  Orleans  and  some  portion  of  Florida  to  secure 
control  of  the  Mississippi,  the  purchase  price  not  to 
exceed  $2,000,000.  As  Napoleon  was  confronted 
just  then  with  a  war  with  England  who  controlled  the 
seas  and  would  almost  certainly  seize  the  territory,  he 
offered  to  sell  the  whole,  and  the  commissioners  has 
tened  to  buy  for  eight  times  the  sum  allowed  them. 
To  go  home  without  Florida  which  they  had  been  sent 
to  purchase,  and  with  a  territory  which  had  not  been 
asked  and  which  the  American  imagination  had  not  yet 
come  to  desire,  and  above  all  with  an  expenditure  eight 
times  the  authorized  amount,  implied  some  confidence 
in  American  imperialist  sentiment.  That  confidence 
was  justified  by  the  prompt  ratification  of  the  treaty. 
It  is  worth  while  to  note  that  Jefferson  fully  believed 
that  he  was  violating  the  Constitution  in  the  purchase, 
a  fact  the  more  significant  when  we  recall  that  Jeffer 
son  and  his  party  were  inclined  to  construe  that  docu 
ment  in  the  most  conservative  sense.  Evidently  all 
parties  to  the  transaction  "  had  their  nerve  with 
them."  Spain  protested  that  France  had  not  acquired 
title  and  that  she  had  pledged  herself  not  to  dispose 
of  the  territory  to  any  other  power,  both  perfectly 
valid  objections,  but  we  ignored  them  as  matters  that 
did  not  concern  us.  The  reluctance  against  purchas 
ing  stolen  goods,  we  did  not  feel,  as  indeed  nations 
never  do.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  Britain  did  not  pro 
test,  although  this  sale  of  her  booty  at  the  moment 
when  she  was  about  to  seize  it,  might  have  been  open 


THE  GREAT  EXPANSION  47 

to  objection.  She  seems  not  to  have  regretted  the 
strengthening  of  America. 

This  acquisition,  the  largest  ever  made  in  all  our 
history,  was  accomplished  at  the  ripe  age  of  fifteen 
years.  It  extended  our  territory  westward  to  the 
Rocky  Mountains,  a  very  vague  boundary,  but  one  little 
liable  to  cause  actual  disputes  throughout  the  greater 
part  of  its  length.  Unfortunately  it  gave  no  northern 
or  southern  boundary,  thus  insuring  later  difficulty 
with  Britain  in  Canada  and  with  Spain  in  Mexico,  dif 
ficulties  to  be  settled  as  might  be  expected,  in  the  one 
case  by  agreement  and  in  the  other  case  by  war.  It 
is  a  great  pity  that  the  southern  boundary  was  not  de 
fined  at  once,  but  American  statesmen  seem  to  have 
been  incapable  at  that  time  of  appreciating  the  need 
of  definiteness  in  the  vast  unpeopled  West.  There 
was  a  little  difference  of  opinion  between  Spain  and 
France  as  to  the  boundary  between  Louisiana  and 
Mexico,  a  difference  amounting  approximately  to  the 
present  State  of  Texas,  but  as  no  one  at  the  time  had 
the  slightest  interest  in  Texas,  and  all  attention  was 
focused  on  the  control  of  the  Mississippi,  it  did  not 
seem  worth  while  to  undertake  a  negotiation  with  a 
nation  that  was  feeling  aggrieved  in  order  to  secure  a 
definite  line  through  an  immeasurable  wilderness. 
Our  acquisitions  had  not  only  outrun  our  needs,  but 
had  completely  outrun  our  imagination,  a  much  more 
important  consideration,  for  men  seldom  care  to  de 
limit  carefully  that  which  has  not  been  taken  posses 
sion  of  by  their  fond  fancy. 

Spain  undoubtedly  felt  aggrieved,  and  with  reason 
as  regards  France.  Naturally  we  acquired  her  resent- 


48     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

ment  along  with  her  possessions.  This  was  respon 
sible  in  part  for  the  somewhat  dubious  plan  of  cam 
paign  by  which  we  now  sought  to  complete  our  original 
program.  For  if  we  were  indifferent  to  Texas,  we 
were  keenly  alive  to  the  desirability  of  controlling 
Florida,  particularly  West  Florida,  for  all  along  the 
dominant  consideration  was  the  Mississippi.  We  now 
controlled  all  of  the  western  bank  and  all  of  the  east 
ern  bank  north  of  latitude  thirty-one.  We  wanted 
the  rest. 

Our  first  move  was  to  challenge  the  validity  of 
Spain's  title.  The  title  was  doubtful,  as  indeed  most  of 
these  early  titles  were,  but  it  would  have  seemed  suf 
ficient  if  it  had  been  ours.  Spain,  of  course,  stoutly 
defended  the  title,  but  being  unable  to  defend  the  ter 
ritory,  America  had  the  better  of  the  argument.  She 
got  a  foothold  in  the  very  year  of  the  Louisiana  pur 
chase,  then  negotiated  vainly,  threatened  war,  and 
finally  took  forcible  possession  of  the  western  portion 
of  West  Florida  in  1810.  By  this  time  Alabama  and 
Mississippi  were  filling  up  and  wanted  access  to  the 
Gulf.  In  default  of  other  means,  or  perhaps  in  pref 
erence  to  other  means,  the  balance  of  West  Florida 
was  seized  in  1813.  The  extreme  preoccupation  of 
Europe  with  the  Napoleonic  struggle  made  possible 
this  unceremonious  procedure.  Spain,  of  course,  pro 
tested  frantically,  and  even  Britain  lodged  formal 
protest,  but  all  to  no  purpose. 

There  remained  East  Florida,  the  Florida  of  our 
own  day.  Her  case  was  radically  different  from  that 
of  West  Florida.  She  did  not  control  the  Mississippi, 
nor  was  she  necessary  to  give  any  other  state  or  terri- 


THE  GREAT  EXPANSION  49 

tory  access  to  the  sea.  But  failing  these  reasons, 
there  were  others.  Broader  conceptions  of  strategy 
now  began  to  prevail.  Florida,  almost  touching 
Cuba,  completely  dominated  our  commerce  between 
the  Atlantic  and  the  Gulf.  Spain  was  little  to  be 
feared,  but  her  possessions  might  be  alienated  to 
France  or  Britain.  That  was  a  thought  to  give  us 
pause,  and  it  led  Jefferson  to  state  the  essence  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  twenty  years  before  the  date  of 
Monroe's  famous  message.  To  make  matters  worse, 
Florida  became  a  refuge  for  outlaws,  filibusters,  and 
hostile  Indians,  who  harried  the  border  much  as  Mex 
ican  adventurers  are  doing  today.  The  man  who  for 
mulated  our  extremest  doctrines  about  liberty  and  the 
consent  of  the  governed,  as  well  as  his  associates,  had 
none  of  the  scruples  which  their  present  day  disciples 
profess  in  their  name.  They  openly  declared  that 
Florida  would  become  American  as  soon  as  Spain  be 
came  involved  in  another  war;  they  invaded  Florida 
again  and  again  to  chastise  outlaws  and  destroy  hostile 
posts,  and  finally  finding  that  Spain  could  not  or  would 
not  maintain  order  in  Florida,  they  virtually  took  pos 
session  of  the  territory  and  then  forced  Spain  to  cede 
Florida  for  $5,000,000,  all  of  which  was  to  be  paid 
to  American  citizens  in  satisfaction  of  claims  against 
Spain. 

There  can  be  no  possible  doubt  about  the  desirabil 
ity  of  this  annexation,  but  equally,  there  can  be  no 
question  about  its  spirit.  The  temper  of  the  country 
was  one  of  unqualified  aggression.  Jefferson's  state 
ment  that  as  soon  as  Spain  became  engaged  in  another 
war,  Florida  would  become  ours,  is  significant. 


50    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

There  is  no  suggestion  of  a  moral  impediment. 
Florida  was  necessary  to  complete  our  natural  fron 
tier,  in  itself  a  strong  incentive  to  aggression.  If  it 
had  been  objected  that  Spain  had  rights  in  Florida 
(no  such  objection  seems  to  have  been  urged)  the 
answer  would  probably  have  been  that  incompetency 
invalidates  all  such  claims,  a  doctrine  instinctively  ac 
cepted  by  energetic  peoples  and  ever  a  cardinal  prin 
ciple  of  American  policy.  Most  readers  will  remem 
ber  with  what  force  it  was  urged  against  Spain  in  our 
war  for  the  liberation  of  Cuba. 

The  acquisition  of  Florida  marked  the  beginning  of 
another  policy  which  has  been  rather  peculiarly  Amer 
ican,  the  disguise  of  seizure  under  the  form  of  pur 
chase.  Seizure  has  traditionally  been  the  privilege 
of  conquest,  and  money  payments,  if  any,  have  been 
an  added  perquisite.  Indeed  it  is  the  curious  tradi 
tion  of  this  our  world  that  indemnity  is  due  only  from 
nations  that  have  allowed  their  territory  to  be  in 
vaded,  and  who  are  thus  condemned  to  bear  the  cost 
of  the  invasion.  The  United  States  has  chosen  to 
construe  its  seizures  as  purchases,  paying  for  them  a 
moderate  sum,  the  more  willingly  when,  as  in  the 
present  instance,  the  money  could  be  kept  at  home  to 
pay  uncollectible  debts  due  to  American  citizens. 
The  method  has  the  advantage  of  salving  wounds 
which  otherwise  might  fester.  It  is  available,  how 
ever,  only  in  cases  where  the  purchaser  is  in  a  posi 
tion  to  set  the  price  unaided  by  the  seller. 

The  acquisition  of  Florida  was  at  once  followed  by 
an  agitation  for  the  acquisition  of  Cuba.  The 
strategic  argument  was  identical  and  even  more 


THE  GREAT  EXPANSION  51 

urgent,  for  a  hostile  base  in  Cuba  could  be  as  injurious 
as  one  in  Florida,  and  harder  to  get  rid  of.  The  com 
punctions  later  felt  about  the  suitableness  of  the  Cuban 
population  for  the  duties  of  American  citizenship, 
seem  not  to  have  troubled  the  ardent  doctrinaires  of 
the  time.  The  annexation  of  Cuba  as  a  state  in  the 
American  union  was  freely  urged,  Jefferson  in  partic 
ular  having  championed  the  idea  to  the  end  of  his  life. 
But  in  this  case  Britain  interposed  her  powerful  ob 
jection,  and  though  this  raised  American  apprehen 
sion  of  British  designs  and  led  to  further  develop 
ment  of  the  policy  soon  to  be  embodied  in  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  the  project  of  American  annexation  was 
dropped,  and  the  great  problem  of  Cuban  develop 
ment  postponed  for  nearly  a  century. 

The  southeastern  corner  of  our  continent  was  now 
properly  rounded  out,  and  with  the  necessary  post 
ponement  of  plans  for  overseas  development,  our 
restless  energies  turned  to  the  northeast  corner  where 
a  bit  of  rounding  out  needed  to  be  done.  The  treaty 
of  1783  in  which  England  recognized  the  independ 
ence  of  the  Colonies,  had  made  an  honest  attempt  to 
fix  definite  boundaries  between  them  and  British  pos 
sessions  to  the  north,  but  neither  party  knew  enough 
of  the  country  to  do  so.  Some  of  the  mistakes  were 
merely  ludicrous,  as  when  it  was  specified  that  the 
boundary  in  the  west  should  be  a  line  running  due 
west  from  the  northwest  corner  of  the  Lake  of  the 
Woods  to  the  Mississippi  River.  Inasmuch  as  the 
Mississippi  rises  considerably  to  the  south  of  this 
point,  such  a  line  would  never  touch  it  even  if  carried 
round  the  world.  But  where  intention  was  plain  and 


52    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

no  conflict  of  interests  was  involved,  rectification  was 
easy. 

In  the  extreme  northeast  there  was  a  more 
dangerous  ambiguity.  The  attempt  had  been  made 
to  establish  natural  boundaries  by  following  rivers 
and  watersheds,  a  perfectly  proper  method  but  dan 
gerous  unless  detailed  by  a  survey.  No  such  survey 
was  made  or  was  possible  at  the  time,  and  neither  the 
river  u  source  "  nor  the  "  highlands  "  designated  in 
the  treaty  were  so  easily  identified  as  had  been  ex 
pected.  In  brief,  there  was  a  debatable  territory  of 
something  over  twelve  thousand  square  miles  or  about 
the  area  of  Massachusetts  and  Connecticut,  which  was 
claimed  by  both  the  State  of  Maine  and  New  Bruns 
wick.  This  proved  a  difficult  question  to  settle, 
and  one  which  peculiarly  illustrated  the  American 
temper.  Maine  and  New  Brunswick,  the  territories 
immediately  concerned,  each  claimed  everything  in 
sight  and  were  absolutely  deaf  to  all  proposals  of  con 
ciliation  or  compromise.  The  Federal  government 
was  hardly  less  so.  After  the  failure  of  early  at 
tempts  at  negotiation,  resort  was  had  to  arbitration, 
and  the  king  of  the  Netherlands  was  chosen  as  ar 
biter.  He  gave  about  two  thirds  to  Maine  and  one 
third  to  New  Brunswick.  Our  minister  in  Holland 
protested  against  the  award  without  referring  it  to 
Washington.  Washington  sustained  him,  however, 
and  the  award  was  ignored,  our  government  thus  es 
tablishing  an  unenviable  and  well  nigh  unique  record 
in  the  history  of  arbitration.  Then  began  prepara 
tions  for  war,  not  only  by  the  United  States,  but 
ridiculously  enough,  by  the  State  of  Maine  on  her 


THE  GREAT  EXPANSION  53 

own  account.  Troops  were  raised  and  money  voted, 
and  if  Maine  and  New  Brunswick  had  been  left  to 
themselves,  war  would  undoubtedly  have  resulted. 
Fortunately,  one  of  the  bumptious  claimants  had  a 
sober  backer,  and  the  dogs  of  war  were  held  in  leash 
until  Webster  and  Lord  Ashburton  (uncle  of  the  late 
Lord  Cromer)  arranged  a  compromise.  This  di 
vided  the  territory  in  much  the  same  proportion  as 
the  earlier  arbitration  award  had  done,  and  the  treaty 
was  violently  denounced  by  extremists  on  both  sides, 
but  was  finally  ratified  in  1842. 

With  the  close  of  this  long-standing  controversy,  all 
boundary  problems  in  the  east  were  settled.  To  the 
south  we  had  settled  all  questions  by  wholesale  an 
nexation.  Beyond  lay  the  sea  and  the  islands  which 
were  reserved  for  a  later  chapter  in  our  history.  To 
the  north  we  had  reached  an  amicable  agreement  with 
a  stalwart  people  who  knew  how  to  stand  their  ground, 
but  insisted  upon  being  friendly.  From  the  Atlantic 
through  to  the  Rocky  Mountains  the  northern  bound 
ary  was  determined  past  all  hope  or  need  of  chang 
ing.  Meanwhile  our  domain  had  been  immeasurably 
extended  in  the  west  by  the  addition  of  the  great 
plains  which  stretched  on  and  on  till  their  margin 
faded  in  the  silent  mountains  or  the  illimitable  wastes 
of  the  great  desert,  where  desire  died  and  the  wan 
derer  stopped  and  dominion  had  no  need  to  extend. 

As  we  look  back  over  this  first  period  of  American 
history,  we  are  not  profoundly  impressed  with  the 
moderation  and  reasonableness  of  American  demands, 
or  with  the  tact  and  considerateness  of  American  pro 
cedure.  We  want  the  earth,  and  we  say  so  quite 


54    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

frankly.  Not  that  we  have  far  reaching  designs  of 
world  empire ;  —  far  from  it.  Such  unholy  ambitions 
have  always  been  abhorrent  to  us.  We  merely  want 
the  next  thing  beyond.  We  are  like  the  young  woman 
who  had  no  sympathy  with  the  craze  to  be  rich.  All 
she  wanted  was  to  have  money  enough  so  when  she 
saw  something  she  wanted,  she  could  buy  it.  We 
have  worked  out  an  imperial  destiny  from  instinctive 
impulse  rather  than  from  deliberate  purpose. 

Our  method  of  procedure  is  equally  characteristic, 
—  to  ask  for  what  we  want, —  for  all  of  it, —  and 
stand  our  ground.  Recognizing  that  possession  is 
nine  points  in  law,  we  have  shown  a  strong  inclina 
tion  to  make  appropriation  our  first  step  in  the  pro 
ceedings,  whether  we  contemplated  purchase  or  con 
quest.  We  have  also  appreciated  the  value  of  a 
threat  of  war  at  the  proper  moment. 

With  decadent  Spain  this  procedure  was  fairly  suit 
able.  She  was  hopelessly  incompetent  to  manage  her 
colonies  and  helpless  to  defend  them  against  our  ag 
gression.  Her  protests  against  our  appropriation  of 
her  territories  only  afforded  us  an  opportunity  to  give 
her  a  piece  of  our  mind.  Spain  cuts  a  sorry  figure 
through  it  all,  and  we  can  not  be  sorry  that  she  was 
dispossessed,  but  there  are  times  when  one  can  not 
help  feeling  a  bit  of  sympathy  for  Castilian  sensi 
bilities. 

With  Britain  the  American  procedure  was  less  suc 
cessful.  She  was  not  decadent,  and  knew  both  how 
to  defend  and  how  to  value  the  possessions  which  we 
challenged.  New  Brunswick  was  not  to  be  won  like 
Florida.  The  marvel  is  that  American  aggressive- 


THE  GREAT  EXPANSION  55 

ness  did  not  lead  to  more  serious  consequences.  The 
record  is  one  of  unfailing  conciliation  and  concession 
on  Britain's  part,  but  never  one  of  weak  surrender. 
The  significance  of  this  attitude  will  be  apparent  later. 


o 
>* 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE    STRUGGLE    FOR   THE    PACIFIC 

THE  building  of  our  territory  on  the  east  was  now 
done,  and  on  the  whole,  well  done.  Starting  with 
the  Atlantic  coast  line  as  our  one  definite  boundary, 
we  had  carried  our  frontier  to  the  tip  of  Florida,  and 
thence  on  round  the  Gulf  to  the  Mississippi  and  be 
yond.  So  much  at  least  was  necessary  to  our  safety. 
It  would  have  been  a  calamity  if  our  southern  bound 
ary  had  remained  at  parallel  thirty-one  as  established 
in  the  treaty  of  independence.  The  end  of  this  coast 
line,  to  be  sure,  was  arbitrary,  and  considering  the 
character  of  the  neighbour  in  that  quarter,  it  might 
have  been  surmised  that  it  was  but  tentative.  It  re 
mained  in  fact  unfinished  business  to  come  up  soon  for 
the  strenuous  consideration  of  the  nation. 

-At  the  other  end,  our  long  frontier  had  been  car 
ried  safely  round  the  corner  and  extended  through  the 
great  lakes  and  along  lesser  lakes  and  rivers  to  the 
accepted  northwestern  corner,  the  Lake  of  the  Woods. 
From  the  northwestern  corner  of  this  lake  some  brave 
guess  work  carried  our  frontier  to  the  Mississippi 
which  had  been  chosen  as  our  western  boundary. 
Guesswork  it  had  to  be,  for  no  one  had  ever  explored 
the  region.  The  guesses  were  very  unlucky  and  might 
later  have  proved  embarrassing,  had  not  the  acquisi 
tion  of  Louisiana,  long  before  settlement  reached  this 

56 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  THE  PACIFIC     57 

point,  moved  our  western  boundary  to  the  Rocky 
Mountains  and  made  connection  with  the  Mississippi 
quite  unnecessary.  We  have  now  to  follow  this 
northern  line  on  to  the  western  ocean. 

The  original  treaty  specified  that  the  line  should 
run  from  the  northwest  corner  of  the  Lake  of  the 
Woods  due  west  to  the  Mississippi.  When  the 
Louisiana  purchase  moved  the  western  frontier  to  the 
Rocky  Mountains,  the  natural  thing  was  to  extend 
this  line  to  the  mountains,  and  this  was  agreed  upon 
without  much  difficulty,  thus  obviating  the  embarrass 
ment  of  the  later  discovery  that  such  a  line  did  not 
touch  the  Mississippi  at  all.  Unfortunately  no  one 
seems  to  have  known  just  where  the  starting  point  — 
the  northwestern  corner  of  the  Lake  of  the  Woods  — 
was  situated  and  since  definiteness  was  desired,  an 
other  guess  was  made  and  parallel  forty-nine  was 
adopted.  This  again  proved  to  be  an  imperfect 
guess,  and  the  line  refused  to  make  connections  with 
the  northwest  corner  of  the  lake.  The  adjustment 
ultimately  agreed  upon  gave  to  Minnesota  a  curious 
little  piece  of  detached  territory  which  remains  as  a 
monument  to  the  ignorance  of  those  who  drew  the 
line  between  the  two  peoples. 

Ignorance  but  no  ill-will.  There  is  no  other  bound 
ary  in  the  world  so  arbitrary  as  this.  Nature  had 
seemingly  anticipated  no  such  horizontal  division  of 
the  continent,  and  had  arranged  her  mountains  and 
rivers  the  wrong  way.  The  original  plan  to  find  a 
natural  boundary  had  to  be  abandoned,  though  both 
sides  realized  the  danger  of  an  arbitrary  line.  Yet 
no  boundary  in  the  world  is  more  settled  or  more  serv- 


58     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

iceable  than  this.  It  contains  no  strategic  traps,  no 
ambiguities.  Its  acceptance  conceals  no  mental  reser 
vations.  By  a  supreme  triumph  of  friendliness  it  was 
early  agreed  that  the  line  should  not  be  emphasized 
by  fortifications.  The  unreasoning  have  argued  from 
this  the  needlessness  of  carefully  drawn  strategic 
frontiers;  the  discerning  see  in  it  the  essential  unity 
of  two  kindred  peoples. 

As  we  follow  in  imagination  the  march  of  the 
American  people  along  this  westward  line  to  the  sum 
mit  of  the  great  divide,  it  now  seems  plain  to  us  that 
destiny  beckoned  them  farther,  that  this  was  no  stop 
ping  place,  and  that  nature's  limit  must  be  the  great 
western  ocean.  But  the  United  States  had  in  fact 
reached  limits  more  natural  than  any  reached  since  or 
likely  to  be  reached  in  any  period  of  subsequent  ex 
pansion.  The  Rocky  Mountains  are  a  watershed,  one 
of  the  greatest  in  the  world.  They  do  not  culminate 
in  a  narrow  line  of  serrated  peaks  like  the  Pyrenees, 
and  a  delimitation  would  necessarily  be  arbitrary,  but 
the  sterility  of  the  soil  on  either  side  of  the  line  al 
lows  plenty  of  margin  to  arbitrariness  and  makes  de 
limitation  easy.  If  we  wanted  a  natural  stopping 
place,  this  was  the  place  to  stop. 

But  the  American  people  have  not  been  looking  for 
stopping  places.  For  them  all  stopping  places  have 
been  starting  places,  and  that  forthwith.  The  new 
boundary  was  no  exception.  Even  before  the  Louisi 
ana  purchase  was  consummated,  Jefferson,  whose 
whole  interest  in  the  purchase  seems  to  have  centred 
in  the  control  of  the  Mississippi  and  whose  original 
plan  contemplated  only  the  purchase  of  West  Florida, 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  THE  PACIFIC     59 

sent  out  the  Lewis  and  Clark  expedition  to  explore 
the  headwaters  of  the  Missouri,  ostensibly  in  the  in 
terest  of  trade  with  the  Indians.  This  expedition 
penetrated  to  the  Pacific  coast  by  way  of  the  Columbia 
River.  It  is  impossible  to  say  whether  the  thought 
of  territorial  expansion  actuated  this  expedition,  but 
it  can  hardly  be  doubted  that  the  expedition  con 
tributed  to  that  end,  adding  one  more  to  the  shadowy 
claims  which  America  was  able  later  to  advance  as  an 
offset  to  like  claims  on  the  part  of  her  rivals. 

This  region  of  vague  extent  known  as  Oregon, 
where  our  mountain  boundary,  sweeping  far  to  the 
northwest,  came  nearest  to  the  Pacific,  was  the  vor 
tex  of  international  rivalry.  Nowhere  in  the  world 
were  the  claims  of  the  great  powers  so  pretentious  or 
so  preposterously  conflicting  as  here.  It  was  here 
that  the  great  nations  of  Europe  put  out  their  longest 
tentacles  and  reached  farthest  into  the  shadowy  un 
known. 

Russia,  in  the  period  when  the  nations  of  Western 
Europe  had  been  colonizing  America,  had  pushed  her 
way  across  Asia  and  gained  a  foothold  in  America  at 
the  northwestern  corner.  From  this  point  she 
claimed  the  coast  south  indefinitely.  She  had  even 
established  a  garrison  as  far  south  as  Bodega  Bay,  a 
few  miles  north  of  San  Francisco.  Spain  was  in  un 
disputed  possession  of  South  America  and  of  the  Pa 
cific  Coast  of  Mexico.  She  claimed  everything  to  the 
north  indefinitely.  England  had  established  herself 
in  Eastern  Canada  and,  claiming  the  hinterland  west 
ward  to  the  sea,  she  struck  the  line  midway  and 
claimed  both  ways  indefinitely.  The  whole  territory 


60    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

in  question  was  therefore  covered  with  claims  three 
layers  deep  before  we  appeared  on  the  scene.  These 
claims  were  based  on  accidents  of  exploration  and  dis 
covery,  fur  trader's  stations  and  the  like,  all  of  them 
trifling  in  comparison  with  the  magnificent  domain  at 
issue,  a  territory,  it  must  be  remembered,  extending 
from  California  to  Russian  America,  wherever  the 
latter  might  be.  The  American  claim  was  hardly 
better  than  the  others,  but  in  one  respect  her  case  was 
stronger.  She  was  nearer  and  better  able  to  occupy 
the  land,  an  advantage  that  counted  in  the  end. 

It  is  not  clear  that  America  at  any  time  during  this 
early  period,  formally  adopted  the  policy  of  extension 
to  the  Pacific  coast.  It  seems  rather,  that  as  one 
question  after  another  came  up  bearing  on  the  case, 
she  "  played  safe,"  keeping  the  way  open,  with  the 
result  that,  despite  the  reluctance  of  such  statesmen  as 
Webster,  even  to  the  last,  she  found  herself  com 
mitted  to  the  policy  and  became  a  candidate  for  all 
honours. 

A  controversy  with  Russia  opened  the  competition. 
In  1808  and  again  in  1810,  that  country  proposed 
commercial  arrangements  with  the  United  States 
which  were  rejected  on  the  ground  that  we  did  not 
know  the  limits  of  Russian  territory  and  therefore 
could  not  tell  to  what  ports  the  proposed  commer 
cial  arrangements  would  apply.  Then  Russia  sug 
gested  that  a  generous  territory  be  tentatively  al 
lowed  to  Russian  trade,  exact  boundaries  to  be  agreed 
upon  later.  Again  the  United  States  refused,  doubt 
less  realizing  that  tentative  arrangements  were  likely 
to  become  permanent.  Finally,  compelled  to  be  more 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  THE  PACIFIC     61 

definite,  Russia  modestly  stated  that  she  claimed  only 
down  to  the  Columbia  River.  This  claim,  which 
would  have  given  to  Russia  the  State  of  Washington 
and  everything  to  the  north  of  it,  our  government  re 
fused  to  discuss,  and  when  later,  the  Czar  attempted 
to  assert  a  modified  but  preposterous  claim  by  imperial 
edict,  we  retorted  by  denying  that  Russia  had  any 
right  whatever  to  territory  in  the  Western  Hemi 
sphere.  These  mutual  extravagances  paved  the  way 
to  a  compromise  agreement  in  1824.  It  was  recalled 
that  the  Czar  in  1799  had  established  latitude  fifty- 
five  as  the  southern  limit  for  his  trading  company,  and 
it  was  argued  with  force  that  this  was  the  limit  of  his 
rule.  Finally  the  Russians  asked  for  a  slight  change 
to  fifty-four  forty,  the  southern  end  of  Prince  of 
Wales  Island,  a  perfectly  reasonable  request,  the 
granting  of  which  settled  the  matter.  In  this  valiant 
fight  we  crowded  back  our  later  southern  border  in 
the  firm  conviction  that  it  was  to  be  our  northern 
boundary  and  that  we  were  thus  widening  rather  than 
narrowing  our  ultimate  domain. 

When  in  1810  we  refused  Russia's  commercial  pro 
posals  on  the  ground  that  we  did  not  know  where  the 
line  was,  one  of  our  arguments  was  that  we  should  get 
into  trouble  with  Spain  who  claimed  all  this  coast  up 
to  the  Russian  line.  This  was  a  half  way  recogni 
tion  of  Spain's  claim  which  was  much  the  weakest  of 
all.  This  turned  out  to  be  good  policy  (though  it 
can  hardly  have  been  foreseen)  for  when  in  1821  we 
secured  Florida  by  treaty,  we  induced  Spain  to  throw 
in  Oregon  as  a  trifle  for  good  measure.  The  acquisi 
tion  of  this  claim  cleared  the  field  of  the  two  end 


62     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

claimants  and  left  us  with  a  single  rival.  It  also  de 
fined  the  boundaries  of  the  territory  at  issue.  Oregon 
extended  from  latitude  forty-two  to  latitude  fifty-four 
forty,  and  from  the  Pacific  to  the  Rocky  Mountains. 
That  is,  it  included  the  whole  of  Oregon  and  Wash 
ington  and  Western  Canada  up  to  our  southern 
Alaskan  border. 

The  two  residual  claimants  now  advanced  upon 
Oregon  from  the  east,  along  that  parallel  of  forty- 
nine  already  agreed  upon.  The  prolongation  of  this 
line  to  the  coast,  as  later  agreed  upon,  cutting  Oregon 
not  far  from  the  middle,  seems  the  obviously  reason 
able  settlement  of  such  a  controversy.  But  it  did  not 
at  all  seem  so  to  the  men  of  that  time.  In  the  long 
controversy  of  more  than  thirty  years  which  ensued, 
the  claims  of  each  were  urged  in  all  possible  ways,  and 
the  most  varied  proposals  were  made,  but  at  no  time 
did  either  party  show  definite  historic  reason  for  the 
line  proposed.  Above  all,  both  parties  seem  to  have 
assumed  from  the  first  that  they  must  settle  the  mat 
ter  amicably  and  must  be  patient  until  they  could 
do  so. 

Strangely  enough,  the  first  proposal  made, —  that 
of  the  Americans  in  1818, —  was  almost  exactly  the 
one  accepted  twenty-eight  years  later,  the  extension 
of  the  line  of  forty-nine  to  the  coast.  Britain  refused, 
and  proposed  the  Columbia  River  which  would  have 
given  her  nearly  the  whole  of  the  State  of  Washington. 
No  agreement  being  possible,  both  agreed  that  the  ter 
ritory  should  be  open  to  the  settlers  of  both  for  ten 
years,  an  agreement  later  renewed  for  ten  years 
more.  This  ultimately  became  the  deciding  factor 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  THE  PACIFIC     63 

for  reasons  already  mentioned,  but  this  was  not  an 
ticipated  at  the  time. 

Soon  after  came  the  extravagant  Russian  decree 
already  referred  to.  It  is  significant  that  America 
and  Britain,  though  they  had  but  just  finished  their 
second  war,  at  once  combined  against  Russia.  Amer 
ica  ultimately  succeeded  in  driving  Russia  back  to  fifty- 
four  forty,  a  victory  which  of  course  inured  to  the 
benefit  of  Britain,  as  America  soon  realized,  for  she 
at  once  proposed  the  line  of  fifty-one  as  a  boundary. 
This  was  two  degrees  higher  than  before,  but  that  was 
offset  by  the  fact  that  we  had  crowded  Russia  back. 
England  demurred,  and  proposed  the  line  of  fifty-one 
running  west  from  the  Rocky  Mountains  until  it 
struck  the  Columbia  River.  Thence  the  river  was  to 
be  the  boundary.  This  would  work  out  much  as  be 
fore,  giving  Britain  most  of  Washington.  The  next 
time  the  matter  came  up  Britain  proposed  forty-nine 
and  the  river  and  America  proposed  forty-nine  clear 
through,  both  proposals,  it  will  be  noticed,  less  favour 
able  to  America  than  the  preceding. 

Gradually  it  became  apparent  that  the  line  of  forty- 
nine,  which  did  well  enough  for  the  interior,  was 
painfully  unsatisfactory  in  Oregon.  It  crossed  the 
Columbia  River  which  both  parties  insisted  upon  hav 
ing,  and  it  clipped  off  the  southern  end  of  Vancouver 
Island  with  far  more  loss  to  the  one  side  than  gain 
to  the  other.  Hence  the  next  proposal  was  to  take 
forty-nine  as  the  basis  but  to  give  Britain  the  tip  of 
Vancouver  and  America  the  territory  between  forty- 
nine  and  the  upper  Columbia.  This  American  pro 
posal  Britain  rejected,  and  America  in  turn  rejected 


64    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

Britain's  counter  proposal.  As  the  ten  years'  truce 
agreed  upon  in  1818  was  about  to  expire,  a  second 
truce  was  agreed  upon  for  a  like  period. 

During  the  course  of  these  negotiations  both  parties 
at  times  took  extreme  ground.  Britain,  replying  to  an 
unacceptable  clause  in  Monroe's  famous  message,  de 
clared  that  she  had  a  right  to  "  colonize  "  down  to 
the  California  line.  At  another  time,  America  de 
clared  that  Britain  had  no  right  whatever  on  the  Pa 
cific  coast.  It  does  ^not  appear  that  Britain  ever  in 
tended  seriously  to  annex  the  whole  of  Oregon,  de 
spite  her  assertion,  but  the  American  contention  that 
we  were  entitled  to  the  whole  region  up  to  fifty-four 
forty,  though  perhaps  little  more  than  rhetorical  at 
the  first,  gradually  became  a  passionate  national  con 
viction  which  led  us  to  the  brink  of  war.  This  was 
due  to  the  appearance,  toward  the  end  of  the  second 
truce,  of  a  new  factor,  the  American  settler. 

By  the  terms  of  this  truce  the  territory  was  to  be 
open  to  settlers  of  both  powers  on  equal  terms.  For 
many  years  only  trappers  and  fur  traders  took  ad 
vantage  of  this  privilege,  and  of  these  the  British, 
backed  by  the  powerful  Hudson's  Bay  Company,  had 
the  decided  advantage.  But  just  before  the  expira 
tion  of  the  second  truce  a  remarkable  missionary, 
Marcus  Whitman,  who  with  others  had  gone  to  Ore 
gon  in  response  to  a  unique  Indian  appeal,  returned 
aflame  with  enthusiasm  for  the  winning  of  Oregon. 
The  result  was  not  only  a  stream  of  settlers  who  re 
turned  under  the  leadership  of  Whitman,  but  an  im 
mense  awakening  of  interest  in  the  territory  on  the 
part  of  the  American  people. 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  THE  PACIFIC     65 

It  is  wholly  characteristic  of  the  American  people 
that  once  they  were  conscious  of  the  existence  and 
value  of  Oregon,  their  attitude  was  one  of  uncom 
promising  aggression.  They  refused  to  listen  to  a 
division  of  the  territory,  and  the  demand  for  its  an 
nexation  entire  became  a  campaign  slogan  in  the  presi 
dential  election  of  1844  under  the  fine  alliterative  form 
of  "  fifty-four  forty  or  fight."  Polk,  the  exponent  of 
this  uncompromising  policy,  was  triumphantly  elected 
and  it  looked  as  if  England  must  yield  her  claim  or 
fight  for  it. 

England  was  genuinely  alarmed.  She  was  in 
tensely  averse  to  farther  trouble  with  America,  yet 
she  felt  it  necessary  that  Canada  should  have  an  out 
let  to  the  Pacific.  Could  this  outlet  have  been  se 
cured  in  any  other  way,  it  is  probable  that  she  would 
have  yielded  to  American  insistence.  She  did  indeed 
do  her  best  to  force  Russia  farther  back  and  get  an 
outlet  north  of  fifty-four  forty, —  tried  even  to  narrow 
up  the  Russian  strip  so  as  to  give  her  the  heads  of 
some  of  the  inlets,  precisely  as  Canada  tried  it  many 
years  later.  But  her  reason  for  all  this  effort  was 
precisely  Russia's  reason  for  opposing  her,  for  Russia 
did  not  want  Britain  in  the  Pacific,  and  so  she  guarded 
the  "  Panhandle  "  jealously,  hoping  that  America 
would  make  good  her  claim  and  come  up  to  fifty-four 
forty. 

Rebuffed  by  Russia,  Britain  returned  to  the  strug 
gle  with  America  increasingly  determined  to  get  her 
share.  Unfortunately,  the  affair  coincided  with  other 
causes  of  irritation  against  Britain,  and  feeling  in 
Congress  and  in  the  country  ran  very  high.  Some  of 


66     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

the  speeches  made  at  the  time  now  sound  foolish  and 
unreasonable,  but  they  were  very  characteristic  of 
American  feeling  at  the  time,  perhaps  at  other  times 
when  similar  crises  have  confronted  our  people. 

Nothing  can  be  more  striking  than  the  British  ef 
forts  at  this  time  to  effect  a  peaceable  settlement  with 
out  sacrificing  what  seemed  to  Britain  a  vital  interest. 
Proposal  after  proposal  was  made,  only  to  be  rejected. 
Arbitration  was  urged  in  several  different  forms,  but 
the  Americans  would  not  hear  of  it.  When  it  is  re 
membered  that  American  claims  based  on  discovery 
and  exploration  did  not  extend  north  of  the  Columbia 
River,  while  British  explorers  had  both  come  earlier 
and  gone  farther,  the  Americans  can  hardly  be  accused 
of  lack  of  enterprise. 

It  is  difficult  to  tell  what  the  outcome  might  have 
been  if  circumstances  had  not  created  a  diversion  that 
proved  favourable  to  Britain.  Texas  had  been  ad 
mitted  to  the  Union  and  war  with  Mexico  had  become 
inevitable.  War  with  Britain  was  therefore  less 
practicable  than  before.  Meanwhile,  Polk  having 
been  elected  president  on  the  platform  of  fifty-four 
forty  or  fight,  that  slogan,  in  accordance  with  a  fairly 
established  precedent,  was  regarded  as  having  served 
its  purpose  and  as  being  no  longer  necessary.  More 
important  than  any  of  these,  however,  was  the  fact 
that  the  nation  was  now  rent  asunder  by  the  great 
controversy  that  was  to  paralyse  its  efforts  for  a 
generation  and  make  it  impossible  for  it  to  present  a 
solid  front  on  questions  of  this  kind.  The  lines  were 
now  sharply  drawn  between  the  slavery  and  anti- 
slavery  parties,  and  all  questions  of  territorial  ex- 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  THE  PACIFIC     67 

pansion  were  now  debated  in  the  light  of  this  issue. 
Since  it  was  accepted  that  slavery  could  not  flourish 
in  northern  latitudes,  the  expansion  of  our  country  to 
the  northwest  was  looked  upon  as  strengthening  the 
anti-slavery  party,  while  extension  to  the  southwest 
strengthened  its  rivals.  Both  parties  were  intensely 
imperialist,  but  mutual  jealousy  now  insured  strong 
opposition  to  all  expansionist  schemes. 

Under  these  conditions  Britain  renewed  her  pro 
posals,  and  after  repeated  failures,  a  settlement  was 
finally  effected  in  1846,  after  nearly  forty  years  of 
controversy.  The  previously  adopted  parallel  of 
forty-nine  was  extended,  as  originally  proposed, 
through  to  the  coast.  It  was  not  carried  across  the 
island  of  Vancouver,  however,  but  stopped  at  the 
shore  of  the  great  sound  whose  waters  formed  the  ob 
vious  division  for  the  rest  of  the  way. 

Strangely  enough,  even  this  did  not  end  the  con 
troversy.  In  the  sound  were  a  number  of  islands 
which  either  country  might  plausibly  claim.  Over 
them  the  controversy  raged  for  another  twenty  years. 
The  story  is  interesting  merely  as  showing  once  more 
the  American  characteristics.  An  American  soldier 
is  said  to  have  overheard  a  British  marine  remark  that 
the  British  flag  was  to  be  raised  on  one  of  these  islands 
the  next  day.  The  soldier  reported  it  to  his  colonel, 
afterwards  General  Robert  E.  Lee,  who  sent  over  a 
small  detachment  and  raised  the  American  flag  that 
same  night.  The  British,  on  their  arrival  ordered 
the  American  flag  lowered,  which  was  refused.  The 
controversy  was  referred  to  the  respective  govern 
ments,  who  in  turn,  after  years  of  fruitless  negoti- 


68     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

ation,  referred  it  to  the  arbitration  of  the  German 
Emperor  by  whom,  after  the  most  exhaustive  study 
by  experts,  it  was  decided  in  our  favour  in  1872.  As 
this  award,  unlike  that  of  the  New  Brunswick  arbi 
tration  of  1831,  gave  us  all  of  our  claim  instead  of 
a  part,  it  was  accepted,  and  the  controversy  which  had 
continued  for  sixty-four  years,  was  at  last  closed. 

The  purpose  of  these  pages,  it  will  be  remembered, 
is  not  to  trace  the  growth  of  the  American  domain, 
but  to  ascertain  the  temperamental  attitude  of  the 
American  people  toward  militancy  and  imperialism. 
Nor  is  it  intended  to  criticize  or  to  defend  this  atti 
tude.  The  traits  of  character  so  strikingly  manifested 
in  connection  with  these  transactions,  will  be  ap 
proved  or  condemned  by  the  reader  in  accordance  with 
his  local  prejudices  or  philosophical  bias,  but  no  state- 
menjt  here  made  can  legitimately  be  construed  in 
favour  of  either  contention.  The  sole  purpose  is  to 
ascertain. 

Modesty,  moderation,  and  content  with  existing 
boundaries,  in  the  sense  in  which  Americans  have 
sometimes  enjoined  them  upon  other  nations,  have 
not  thus  far  revealed  themselves  as  American  traits. 
It  would  be  unwarranted  to  attribute  to  Americans  in 
this  period  of  national  expansion,  a  definite  policy  of 
deliberate  and  unlimited  expansion.  They  have  had 
no  such  policy,  indeed,  no  consistent  and  persistent 
policy  whatever,  and  they  have  consistently  and  sin 
cerely  condemned  such  a  policy  on  the  part  of  others. 
But  they  have  had,  like  other  peoples,  what  the  out 
side  world  quite  naturally  construes  as  such  a  policy, 
a  permanent  instinct  of  self  assertion  which  acts  auto- 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  THE  PACIFIC     69 

matically  in  all  situations.  They  don't  want  the  earth, 
—  far  from  it.  But  whenever  circumstances  have  di 
rected  their  attention  toward  some  concrete  portion 
of  it,  it  has  looked  good  to  them,  and  they  have  cast 
about  successfully  for  reasons  why  they  should  possess 
it.  They  have  wanted  it,  and  if  possible,  have  taken 
it,  from  impulse,  and  then  have  justified  the  taking  by 
arguments  developed  later.  Best  of  all,  they  have 
justified  it  by  their  own  large  power  to  organize,  de 
velop,  and  bless.  The  need  of  room,  so  often  and 
plausibly  cited  by  other  peoples  in  justification  of  their 
aggressions,  is  a  need  that  they  have  never  known. 
The  needs  and  the  convenience  of  neighbour  nations 
they  have  never  regarded.  American  imperialism 
has  been  of  the  most  unmistakable  and  undisguised 
variety,  and  never  more  so  than  in  the  campaign  of 
"  fifty-four  forty  or  fight." 


CHAPTER  V 

DESPOILING   THE    LATIN 

WE  must  now  move  round  to  the  southwestern 
corner  of  our  country  where  it  will  be  remembered 
that  the  Louisiana  purchase  had  left  our  boundary  in 
determinate.  The  boundary  had  never  been  defined, 
and  the  treaty  of  cession  made  no  attempt  to  define  it. 
The  American  commissioners  were  so  eager  to  grasp 
the  huge  prize  offered,  that  they  seemed  not  to  have 
asked  about  the  boundary  until  the  purchase  was  as 
sured.  When  they  did  ask,  they  received  from  the 
two  French  ministers  characteristic  and  seemingly  dis 
interested  replies.  One  said  the  boundaries  were 
vague,  and  that  it  was  well  they  should  be.  The 
other  advised  them  to  make  the  most  out  of  their  bar 
gain.  The  instinct  of  the  professional  diplomat  who 
saw  an  opportunity  in  vagueness,  could  hardly  be 
better  illustrated. 

The  Americans,  however,  whether  through  inepti 
tude  or  scruple,  did  not  profit  by  their  opportunity. 
They  thought  of  trying  to  stretch  their  title  over  West 
Florida,  at  that  time  their  chief  solicitude,  but  failed 
to  do  so,  and  later  acquired  that  territory  independ 
ently  by  the  simple  process  of  seizing  it.  The  western 
boundary  did  not  trouble  them  merely  for  the  reason 
that  they  did  not  know  it  and  had  not  learned  to  think 
that  far.  It  was  recognized  that  the  boundary  here 

70 


DESPOILING  THE  LATIN  71 

was  a  river,  but  whether  the  Sabine  or  the  Rio  Grande 
was  not  clear.  The  present  state  of  Texas  lies  be 
tween  these  two  rivers. 

When  they  got  round  to  it,  the  effort  was  of  course 
made  to  secure  this  territory.  It  was  planned  to  in 
clude  it  in  the  Florida  treaty  in  1821,  a  proposal  so 
universally  popular  that  it  was  opposed  and  defeated 
in  the  cabinet  by  a  cabal  hostile  to  the  Secretary  of 
State  lest  it  bring  him  undue  prestige.  Mexico  now 
became  independent,  and  we  had  a  much  more  diffi 
cult  party  to  deal  with  than  Spain. 

When  in  1827  Mexico  organized  the  territory  into 
a  state  with  a  constitution  prohibiting  slavery,  the 
southern  states  became  aroused.  To  have  the  great 
southland  take  sides  against  slavery  looked  bad  for 
them  and  might  have  serious  consequences.  From 
this  time  on  they  were  persistent  champions  of  Texan 
annexation.  But  for  precisely  similar  reasons  the 
northern  states  were  opposed  to  it.  The  result  was 
a  protracted  struggle  in  which  American  imperialism 
was  for  a  time  completely  overshadowed  by  the  bitter 
struggle  over  slavery  which  was  to  have  such  a  tragic 
conclusion. 

Proposals  for  the  purchase  of  all  or  part  of  Texas 
were  made  in  1825,  soon  after  the  recognition  of 
Mexican  independence,  and  were  repeated  in  varying 
form  throughout  the  period  of  controversy.  To  all 
such  proposals  Mexico  turned  a  deaf  ear.  She  was 
hardly  less  helpless  than  Spain,  but  she  made  it  clear 
from  the  first  that  she  had  no  intention  of  parting  with 
any  portion  of  her  territory  unless  forced  to  do  so. 
Very  soon,  however,  the  factor  which  had  proved  de- 


72     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

cisive  in  the  case  of  Oregon,  intervened  to  decide  the 
fate  of  Texas.  The  restlessness  which  had  carried 
American  settlers  to  the  Mississippi  soon  carried  them 
beyond  it,  and  they  began  to  cross  into  Texas.  A 
movement  was  early  organized  to  colonize  Texas 
systematically  with  Americans,  who  should  then  de 
clare  Texas  independent  and  ask  admission  to  the 
United  States.  This  movement,  unnoticed  at  first, 
excited  the  most  strenuous  opposition,  both  in  Mexico 
and  in  the  anti-slavery  states,  for  the  settlers  made 
no  secret  of  their  intention  to  reverse  the  policy  of 
Texas  in  the  matter  of  slavery.  But  Mexico  had  no 
power  to  stop  it  and  the  United  States  had  no  right 
to  stop  it.  So  settlement  continued,  until  in  1836 
Texas  declared  herself  independent.  War  with  Mex 
ico  followed  as  a  matter  of  course,  but  Mexico,  dis 
tracted  by  revolution,  though  she  might  harass,  could 
not  conquer  her  seceding  state.  Texas  was  duly  or 
ganized  as  an  independent  state,  slavery  was  recog 
nized,  and  admission  to  the  United  States  was  at  once 
sought. 

But  if  the  anti-slavery  party  could  not  interfere  with 
the  first  part  of  the  program,  they  had  their  say  about 
the  second.  Annexation  was  successfully  resisted  for 
nearly  ten  years,  until  at  last  Britain  and  France  be 
gan  to  interest  themselves  in  Texas.  The  exact  nature 
of  this  interest  is  open  to  question,  and  rumour  un 
doubtedly  exaggerated  its  importance,  but  it  alarmed 
the  United  States  and  elated  Texas  inordinately. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  that  these  countries  strove 
earnestly  to  prevent  the  annexation  of  Texas  to  the 
United  States,  even  arranging  a  treaty  by  which 


DESPOILING  THE  LATIN  73 

Mexico  was  to  recognize  the  independence  of  Texas 
in  return  for  a  pledge  on  the  part  of  the  latter  never 
to  become  a  part  of  the  United  States.  Their  mo 
tives,  or  at  least  those  of  Great  Britain,  are  not  far 
to  seek.  It  must  be  remembered  that  this  was  just  the 
moment  when  we  were  pushing  what  Britain  regarded 
as  excessive  claims  to  Oregon  under  threat  of  war, 
and  the  slogan  of  fifty-four  forty  or  fight  was  re 
sounding  through  the  land.  Every  proposal  looking 
to  the  joint  navigation  of  the  Columbia  River  and 
even  to  any  access  whatever  to  the  Pacific  had  been 
rejected.  There  can  be  no  question  that  Britain  re 
garded  this  contention  of  ours  as  profoundly  un 
reasonable,  and  it  would  be  strange  if  she  had  not  felt 
disposed  to  even  the  score. 

But  Britain  was  accused  of  having  another  motive, 
one  that  the  United  States  resented  much  more  pro 
foundly,  but  which  we  may  perhaps  now  regard  dif 
ferently.  She  had  some  time  before  abolished  slav 
ery  in  all  her  dominions  and  was  recognized  as  the 
uncompromising  foe  of  the  "  institution."  Nothing 
so  incensed  the  southern  states  as  Britain's  alleged 
purpose  to  induce  Texas  to  abolish  slavery,  a  purpose 
undoubtedly  consonant  with  British  opinion  if  not  ac 
tually  entertained  by  the  British  government.  Per 
haps  both  these  reasons  weighed  more  or  less  with 
the  French  people  and  government  as  well,  for  France 
had  even  more  conspicuously  if  not  more  resolutely 
committed  herself  to  the  cause  of  human  freedom. 
Doubtless  both  countries,  too,  were  moved  by  the 
jealousy  which  nations  naturally  feel  of  upstart  and 
incontinent  powers. 


74    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

Whatever  their  motives,  the  intervention  of  Britain 
and  France  had  the  effect  of  greatly  strengthening  the 
annexation  sentiment  in  the  United  States.  The  ex 
treme  bitterness  of  the  anti-slavery  agitation  still  in 
sured  powerful  opposition  to  the  annexation  of  what 
was  sure  to  be  a  slavery  state,  but  the  opposition  was 
in  the  minority  and  in  1846,  after  ten  years  of  im 
perfect  independence,  Texas  became  a  state  in  the 
American  union.  A  single  year  therefore  marked  the 
extension  of  our  northern  boundary  to  the  Pacific  and 
of  our  southern  boundary  to  the  Rio  Grande. 

Mexico  had  long  before  warned  the  United  States 
that  the  annexation  of  Texas  would  mean  war,  and  she 
kept  her  word.  The  United  States  very  properly 
prepared  by  sending  troops  to  the  Mexican  border 
where  a  petty  attack  by  Mexicans  gave  the  much  de 
sired  occasion,  and  a  two  years  war  followed  in  which 
Mexico  was  necessarily  defeated  and  her  capital  oc 
cupied.  Perhaps  no  successful  war  was  ever  the  ob 
ject  of  such  bitter  criticism  on  the  part  of  the  winning 
nation.  It  was  denounced  in  the  most  unmeasured 
terms  as  a  war  of  criminal  aggression  against  a  weak 
people  and  in  the  interest  of  an  infamous  institution. 
This  judgment,  enshrined  in  our  literature  by  the 
genius  of  Lowell,  has  become  a  tradition  with  our 
people,  and  the  frank  avowal  of  its  iniquity  has  be 
come  a  popular  form  of  innocuous  national  penance. 
This  conventional  verdict  may  well  be  challenged.  Its 
acceptance  is  of  course  due  to  the  connection  of  the 
war  with  slavery,  later  so  completely  discredited. 
Slavery  is  a  very  black  chapter  in  our  history  and  our 
awakened  national  conscience  follows  with  just  aver- 


DESPOILING  THE  LATIN  75 

sion  its  influence  in  our  national  affairs.  But  there  is 
another  side  to  this  whole  transaction  which  has  been 
unduly  neglected.  The  war  with  Mexico  resulted 
from  our  annexation  of  Texas.  Now  Texas  is  the 
only  annexation  that  we  have  ever  made  on  the  Amer 
ican  continent  with  the  expressed  consent  of  its  inhabi 
tants.  With  their  consent  and  much  more  than  their 
consent,  for  they  had  been  suppliants  for  admission 
for  ten  years.  We  did  not  ask  the  consent  of  the  in 
habitants  when  we  annexed  Louisiana  or  Florida  or 
northern  Maine  or  Oregon,  and  only  in  the  last  case 
is  it  reasonably  certain  that  such  consent  would  have 
been  given.  But  when  in  Texas  an  elected  conven 
tion  passed  on  the  question  of  annexation  every  dele 
gate  but  one  voted  for  it,  Texas  therefore  had  the 
best  possible  claim  to  membership  in  the  Union,  a  bet 
ter  claim  than  North  Carolina  or  Rhode  Island,  states 
that  had  yielded  but  a  tardy  and  grudging  consent  to 
the  Constitution.  It  is  a  pity  that  Texas  came  in  as 
a  slave  state,  but  this  was  inevitable,  and  with  slavery 
a  recognized  institution  in  the  United  States,  those 
who  fought  slavery  by  opposing  annexation  were 
neither  consistent  nor  wise.  The  annexation  of  Texas 
is  probably  the  most  irreproachable  episode  in  our 
long  record  of  imperialism. 

It  is  to  be  noted  also  that  this  victory  of  the  pro- 
slavery  party  was  so  much  less  than  they  had  hoped 
that  it  may  well  be  counted  a  defeat.  The  intention 
had  been  not  only  to  annex  Texas,  but  to  cut  up  its 
vast  territory, —  a  territory  as  large  as  the  German 
Empire, —  into  a  number  of  states,  thus  adding  a  con 
siderable  number  of  senators  to  the  pro-slavery  ranks 


76    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

and  maintaining  the  ascendancy  of  that  party  in  this 
citadel  of  its  power.  In  the  struggle  for  annexation 
they  won,  but  the  plan  of  division  failed.  Of  nearly 
a  million  square  miles  of  territory  acquired  from 
Mexico,  only  Texas  took  their  side,  and  that  only  as 
a  single  state.  The  gain  to  our  national  domain  was 
enormous,  but  the  gain  to  the  cause  of  slavery  was 
slight. 

For  the  war  which  followed,  Mexico  may  fairly  be 
held  responsible.  She  not  only  threatened  it  in  ad 
vance  and  technically  committed  the  first  overt  act,  but 
it  may  fairly  be  said  that  all  reasonable  effort  was 
made  to  secure  a  peaceable  settlement. 

The  war  having  resulted  in  defeat  for  Mexico,  the 
usual  forfeit  was  exacted.  Mexico  was  compelled  to 
cede  to  the  United  States  all  the  territory  north  of  the 
Rio  Grande  and  the  Gila  River,  including  most  of  the 
present  state  of  Arizona,  parts  of  New  Mexico,  Col 
orado,  Wyoming,  and  Idaho,  the  states  of  Utah  and 
Nevada,  and  above  all  the  imperial  state  of  California, 
still  prosy  and  Spanish,  but  destined  a  brief  year  later 
to  disclose  riches  such  as  Croesus  never  dreamed. 
The  whole  territory  had  but  the  scantiest  Mexican 
population,  and  had  already  begun  to  attract  Amer 
ican  settlers  whose  reports  had  aroused  the  interest 
of  the  American  people.  That  is  tantamount  to  say 
ing  that  we  had  begun  to  desire  the  land.  Efforts  had 
been  made  to  purchase  the  whole  territory  along  with 
Texas  at  an  earlier  date,  but  without  success.  Seiz 
ure  was  the  inevitable  if  unbeautiful  alternative. 
Yet  there  is  nothing  especially  heinous  in  this  acquisi 
tion,  as  such  things  go.  Mexico  had  no  idea  what  she 


DESPOILING  THE  LATIN  77 

was  losing,  but  equally,  we  had  no  idea  what  we  were 
getting.  It  is  true  that  no  account  was  taken  of  the 
wishes  of  the  inhabitants,  but  they  were  few  and  had 
little  right  to  determine  the  future  of  a  region  which 
under  any  arrangement,  was  certain  to  be  peopled  by 
others  than  their  posterity.  Mexico  lost  a  posses 
sion  of  immense  potential  value,  but  she  had  no  con 
ception  of  that  value  and  very  little  power  ever  to 
profit  by  it.  Of  present  hardship  there  was  little.  In 
one  important  respect  the  hardship  of  defeat  was  sig 
nally  lessened.  In  accordance  with  a  practice  already 
noted  as  characteristically  American,  the  victor  paid 
the  war  indemnity.  For  the  territory  thus  ceded,  the 
United  States  paid  Mexico  fifteen  millions  of  dol 
lars  besides  assuming  private  claims  against  the  Mexi 
can  government  amounting  to  three  and  a  quarter 
millions  more.  It  was  altogether  a  very  mild  case  of 
vae  victis. 

The  Mexican  war  is  an  odious  memory,  for  its 
backers  were  the  champions  of  slavery,  and  it  bulked 
large  in  their  schemes  for  the  extension  of  that  dis 
credited  institution.  Had  these  schemes  been  the  true 
cause  of  the  war,  as  is  sometimes  unwarrantably  as 
sumed,  that  would  be  its  sufficient  condemnation. 
But  it  is  difficult  to  believe  that  under  any  circum 
stances  Texas  would  have  remained  contentedly  out 
side  the  United  States,  or  that  seeking  admission  she 
could  have  been  permanently  refused.  Nor  is  there 
anything  in  the  subsequent  history  of  Mexico  to  war 
rant  the  belief  that  she  would  ever  have  acquiesced 
in  the  union  without  war.  Even  if  war  had  been 
averted  in  this  connection,  the  same  issue  must  have 


78     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

arisen  later  in  connection  with  California,  already 
filling  up  with  an  American  population  and  soon  to  be 
flooded  with  the  gold  seekers  of  forty-nine.  If  there 
had  been  no  slavery  question,  the  war  would  have 
come,  and  uncomplicated  by  slavery  it  would  have  had 
the  almost  unanimous  approval  of  the  American  peo 
ple.  Subsequent  developments  which,  it  must  be  re 
membered,  were  in  part  foreseen,  have  tended  to 
justify  that  approval. 

Extensive  as  was  the  territory  transferred  to  the 
United  States,  it  is  well  to  recall  that  it  represented  the 
moderate  rather  than  the  extreme  demands  of  the 
public  at  that  time.  The  entire  country  had  been  con 
quered  and  an  American  army  occupied  its  capital. 
Its  Spanish  population,  though  more  considerable  than 
that  of  Florida  or  California,  was  not  unassimilable. 
Its  capacity  for  self-government  was  far  from  demon 
strated.  What  wonder  that  a  strong  party  in  the 
Union  favoured  complete  annexation?  Indeed,  every 
member  of  the  cabinet  except  one,  and  many  Senators 
and  Congressmen  favoured  this  policy.  It  is  more 
than  likely  that  such  a  proposal  would  have  been  re 
ceived  with  favour  by  Congress.  But  President  Polk, 
despite  the  jingo  platform  upon  which  he  had  been 
elected,  was  moderate  in  this  case  as  in  that  of  Ore 
gon.  He  resolutely  resisted  the  extreme  counsels 
of  his  own  cabinet  and  took  from  Mexico  only  terri 
tory  that  was  unlikely  ever  to  be  Mexican  and  was  al 
ready  incipiently  American.  The  fact  that  it  was 
taken  in  the  interest  of  slavery,  is  a  damning  but  ir 
relevant  fact.  Judged  on  its  merits  and  apart  from 
this  unhappy  coincidence,  the  settlement  was  modera- 


DESPOILING  THE  LATIN  79 

tion  itself  as  compared  with  the  program  of  fifty-four 
forty  or  fight. 

But  the  rounding  out  of  our  continent  was  not  yet 
complete.  There  followed  an  insignificant  and  peace 
able  transaction  which  seems  never  to  have  attracted 
much  attention  and  which  has  since  been  well  nigh 
forgotten,  but  one  which,  for  several  reasons,  Ameri 
cans  must  contemplate  with  doubtful  satisfaction. 
The  boundary  as  fixed  by  treaty  followed  the  Rio 
Grande  and  Gila  rivers,  the  short  stretch  between 
them  being  covered  by  an  arbitrary  line.  This  in 
volved  some  uncertainty,  as  the  country  was  not  yet 
surveyed,  but  on  the  whole  it  was  an  exceptionally 
satisfactory  boundary.  Yet  the  Americans  did  not 
find  it  so.  The  project  for  a  trans-continental  rail 
road  was  broached  at  this  time,  and  this  route,  later 
followed  by  the  Southern  Pacific,  seemed  the  most 
feasible  one.  Unfortunately,  however,  the  feasible 
location  was  on  the  southern  or  Mexican  side  of  the 
Gila.  Thereupon  the  Americans  claimed  this  as  be 
longing  to  them.  This  could  be  done  only  by  draw 
ing  the  arbitrary  connecting  line,  not  from  the  head 
waters  of  the  Gila  to  the  nearest  point  on  the  Rio 
Grande,  but  between  points  far  down  the  two  rivers. 
This  made  a  very  long  arbitrary  line  and  a  very  short 
river  frontier  and  was  anything  but  a  plausible  inter 
pretation  of  the  treaty.  But  we  wanted  the  territory, 
and  a  way  had  to  be  found.  Our  claim  having  been 
asserted,  Mexico  forestalled  us  by  taking  armed  pos 
session.  War  again  became  imminent.  As  there 
were  other  matters  of  importance  between  the  two 
countries, —  heavy  claims  of  Mexico  on  account  of 


8o    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

Indian  raids  which  we  had  promised  to  prevent, — 
Mr.  Gadsden  was  sent  to  Mexico  to  negotiate  another 
treaty.  This  was  done,  and  a  treaty  laid  before  Con 
gress  which  ceded  a  large  territory  to  the  United 
States  in  return  for  which  United  States  was  to  pay 
:  Mexico  fifteen  millipnsof  dollars  and  satisfy  the 
claims  oTMexican  citizens  to  the  extent  of  five  mil- 
I  lions  more.  This  treaty  Congress  refused  to  ratify, 
/  and  a  new  one  had  to  be  made  which  ceded  much  less 
territory,  waived  all  Mexican  claims,  and  called  for 
a  payment  of  but  ten  millions.  As  this  sum  was  but 
a  fraction  of  the  damages  claimed  by  Mexico,  to  say 
nothing  of  the  territory  ceded,  and  as  the  treaty  fur 
ther  released  the  United  States  from  its  recent  con 
tract  pledge  to  restrain  the  Indians,  its  terms  were 
not  unnaturally  regarded  by  the  Mexicans  as  leonine, 
and  their  president  was  compelled  to  flee  the  country 
as  result  of  the  transaction.  Congress  was  thrifty. 

Never  did  thriftiness  so  overreach  itself.  The 
changes  forced  by  Congress  for  no  presentable  reason 
except  trifling  economy,  at  a  time  when  there  was 
virtually  no  public  debt  and  a  large  surplus  in  the 
treasury,  resulted  in  a  sacrifice  to  the  United  States 
which  was  little  less  than  a  calamity,  and  the  repair 
ing  of  which  is  now  an  urgent  and  unsolved  problem. 

The  southern  boundary  of  New  Mexico  follows  the 
parallel  of  thirty-two  to  the  Rio  Grande,  then  drops 
down  the  river  to  El  Paso  (the  Pass)  some  fifteen 
miles  below  the  parallel,  then  runs  west  again  for  a 
hundred  miles,  and  again  jogs  thirty  miles  to  the  south 
where  it  resumes  its  final  westerly  direction.  These 
jogs  to  the  south  carry  the  line  more  than  a  hundred 


DESPOILING  THE  LATIN  81 

miles  south  of  the  Gila  and  effectually  clear  the  moun 
tain  barriers  east  of  Tucson  which  were  an  obstacle  to 
railroad  building.  Once  past  these  barriers,  however, 
the  railroad  could  safely  turn  to  the  northwest,  as 
it  now  does,  and  enter  California  at  the  southeastern 
corner  some  hundred  miles  from  the  Gulf  of  Cali 
fornia. 

Gadsden's  original  plan  seems  to  have  been  to  carry 
this  southern  boundary  line  due  west  to  the  Gulf. 
The  Senate,  in  insisting  upon  modifications  to  the 
treaty,  seems  to  have  had  chiefly  in  mind  the  Mexican 
claims  and  the  necessity  of  avoiding  them.  In  the 
short  space  of  five  years  the  pledge  to  protect  Mexico 
from  the  Indians  had  laid  this  country  liable  to  the 
extent  of  fifteen  to  thirty  millions.  To  satisfy  this 
claim  and  secure  release  from  this  pledge  was  the  all 
important  thing.  The  only  farther  object  was  to  se 
cure  a  railroad  right  of  way  from  El  Paso  to  Cali 
fornia.  Gadsden's  proposal  accomplished  only  the  last 
of  these  objects.  The  Senate  therefore  cast  about  to 
find  some  harmless  concessions  which  could  be  made  as 
showy  offsets  for  the  very  substantial  benefits  which 
they  were  to  ask  of  Mexico.  The  decision  was  easy. 
West  of  Tucson  the  railroad  would  turn  north,  while 
Gadsden's  boundary  kept  on  due  west  thus  enclosing  a 
vast  area  of  perfectly  unnecessary  and  perfectly  worth 
less  territory.  Moreover  the  only  land  connection 
between  Mexico  and  her  province  of  Lower  Cali 
fornia  was  through  this  territory.  Such  a  concession 
ought  to  look  large  to  Mexican  eyes.  So  the  diagonal 
was  drawn  as  it  is  today,  from  meridian  1 1 1  to  a 
point  near  the  California  corner,  and  Mexico  waived 


82     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

her  claims  and  released  us  from  our  pledge  and  re 
duced  her  price  by  five  millions.  It  was  clever  bar 
gaining  with  a  weak  and  corrupt  government. 

But  he  laughs  best  who  laughs  last,  and  the  laugh  is 
decidedly  on  us.  The  mouth  of  the  Colorado  River 
is  wholly  Mexican,  and  commercial  and  irrigation 
schemes  are  subject  to  her  veto.  Above  all,  the  con 
trol  of  the  Gulf  of  California  looms  large  in  all  con 
siderations  of  national  defence.  Here  is  a  body  of 
water  at  our  very  borders  whose  strategic  possibilities 
are  hardly  second  to  any  other,  the  title  to  which  we 
have  voluntarily  relinquished  to  a  nation  that  is  neither 
able  nor  altogether  disposed  to  prevent  its  being  used 
against  us.  Access  to  the  Gulf  at  a  single  coast  point 
would  give  us  complete  defensive  control.  That  ac 
cess  was  offered  and  rejected  at  a  time  when  both 
parties  were  blind  to  its  value.  It  is  now  desired  and 
withheld  by  parties  who  are  both  thoroughly  awake. 

For  once  we  did  not  take  when  we  might  have 
taken.  We  refrained  from  no  altruistic  sentiment  or 
conscientious  scruple.  We  bargained  sharply  with 
ignorance  and  cupidity,  and  were  the  victims  of  our 
own  ignorance  and  cupidity  in  return. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE   BREAK   WITH   TRADITION 

THE  history  of  the  United  States  during  the  first 
half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  is  a  record  of  frank 
and  consistent  imperialism.  There  are  the  usual  af 
fectations  and  protestations  of  higher  purpose  which 
are  inseparable  from  the  struggle  for  existence  on  the 
part  of  peoples  and  individuals  whose  social  organiza 
tion  schools  them  to  the  law  of  deference,  but  these 
normal  concessions  to  the  social  instinct  are  not  ex 
cessive  and  never  degenerate  into  fawning  hypocrisy. 
Lacking  the  plausible  excuses  of  the  crowded  older 
nations,  we  have  been  rather  constrained  toward  can 
dour,  and  our  instinctive  imperialism  which  we  share 
with  all  normal  peoples,  has  been  comparatively  frank 
and  avowed. 

All  this  has  been  easier  because  of  our  situation. 
We  began  on  the  edge  of  a  great  empty  continent 
which  was  lying  fallow.  To  subdue  it  to  human  serv 
ice  was  obviously  beneficent.  There  was  no  other 
power  on  this  continent  which  could  for  a  moment  con 
test  our  claim.  To  us,  at  least,  it  seemed  reasonable 
that  European  powers  should  keep  out  of  America, 
since  America  was  content  to  keep  out  of  Europe.  It 
was  therefore  our  very  manifest  destiny  to  appropri 
ate  the  central  part  of  North  America  and  bring  it 

83 


84    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

under  cultivation  as  rapidly  as  possible.  To  the 
American  people,  consequently,  imperialism  had 
nothing  of  its  traditional  predatory  character.  It 
was  a  struggle  of  "  cosmos  against  chaos  "  in  which 
the  question  was  not,  how  much  do  we  need,  but  how 
much  can  we  manage.  It  would  have  meant  a  perver 
sion  of  all  wholesome  instincts  and  an  apathy  most  ig 
noble,  if  the  American  people  had  not  pushed  its  con 
trol  as  rapidly  as  possible  across  to  the  Pacific. 

How  far  considerations  of  strategy  entered  into 
American  calculations  it  is  difficult  to  determine.  The 
strategy  argument  was  of  course  urged,  and  in  certain 
cases  like  Florida,  which  thrust  itself  far  out  into  the 
pathway  of  our  well  developed  commerce  with  the 
West  Indies,  it  was  no  doubt  seriously  considered  and 
influential.  But  it  is  probable  that  even  here  Ameri 
cans  were  more  concerned  over  Indian  raids  into 
Georgia  than  over  foreign  menace  to  our  West  India 
trade.  On  the  New  Brunswick  border  it  is  doubtful 
whether  considerations  of  defence  had  any  influence. 
Webster's  defence  of  the  treaty  on  the  ground  that  it 
gave  the  mountains  to  New  Brunswick  and  the  good 
land  to  Maine,  does  not  sound  like  an  argument  of 
the  General  Staff.  Finally,  in  the  Gadsden  purchase, 
we  have  seen  our  Senate  completely  oblivious  of 
strategic  considerations  which  are  now  recognized  as 
of  the  highest  importance. 

This  early  period  is  in  fact  a  very  unmilitary  period. 
Political  expansion  is  always  a  concomitant  of  settle 
ment,  and  it  is  the  settler  rather  than  the  soldier  who 
appraises  the  lands  to  be  acquired.  Maine  is  ap 
peased  by  the  fact  that  she  gets  good  land,  and  Gads- 


THE  BREAK  WITH  TRADITION       85 

den's  purchase  is  rejected  because  the  land  secured  is 
worthless.  The  strategic  result  is  in  fact  anything 
but  ideal.  Aside  from  the  fact  that  our  territory  is 
utterly  at  the  mercy  of  Britain,  not  only  via  Canada, 
but  through  her  naval  bases  in  the  Caribbean, —  a 
danger  which  we  justly  regard  as  purely  theoretical, — 
our  relation  to  Mexico,  a  state  whose  persistent  jeal 
ousy  constantly  inclines  her  to  serve  as  a  base  for  our 
enemies,  is  one  that  no  strategist  can  contemplate  with 
satisfaction.  Such  strategical  advantage  as  our  terri 
tory  acquired  during  this  period  was  largely  acci 
dental.  Our  notion  of  metes  and  bounds  was  alto 
gether  naive.  From  our  starting  point  on  the  shores 
of  the  broad  Atlantic  the  untilled  lands  stretched  in 
unbroken  continuity  to  the  broad  Pacific,  our  clearly 
appointed  limit.  Never  was  manifest  destiny  quite  so 
manifest.  A  Webster  might  scoff  at  the  arid  lands 
beyond  the  mountains,  but  to  the  sense  of  the  common 
people  the  problem  was  simple  and  plain.  So  we 
moved  on  to  the  Pacific,  never  doubting  that  there  we 
should  catch  up  with  our  fleeting  horizon. 

Owing  to  these  peculiarities  of  our  situation  and  to 
certain  influences  derived  from  our  experience,  our 
imperialism  during  this  early  period  had  developed 
conservative  features  which  it  is  important  that  we 
should  note.  All  the  territory  that  we  had  appro 
priated  had  been  continuous  and  compactly  arranged. 
This  rounding  out  of  our  territory  was  in  itself  a  pow 
erful  argument  in  favour  of  annexation.  Who  can 
doubt  that  the  mere  looks  of  the  map  appealed 
strongly  to  the  American  imagination  as  a  reason  for 
the  annexation  of  Florida,  California  and  Oregon? 


86    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

But  concurrently  there  grew  up  a  feeling  against  the 
annexation  of  detached  territory.  Jefferson  and  his 
contemporaries  seem  to  have  felt  no  hesitation  about 
annexing  Cuba.  They  justly  felt  that  the  sea  with 
its  easy  pathway  united  us  to  Cuba  much  more  than 
it  separated  us  from  it,  and  that  Cuba  was  in  effect 
much  closer  to  the  colonies  than  Kentucky  whose  de 
fection  Washington  feared  on  account  of  the  dividing 
barrier  of  the  Blue  Ridge.  But  as  we  continued  our 
progress  by  land,  and  as  railroads  removed  land  bar 
riers,  while  the  sea  continued  to  be  the  symbol  of  po 
litical  separation,  the  annexation  of  overseas  terri 
tories  seemed  less  natural. 

Far  more  important,  however,  was  the  influence  of 
our  federal  development.  It  was  inevitable  that  the 
territories  acquired  in  our  westward  advance,  as  they 
filled  up  with  population  drawn  from  the  older  states, 
should  in  turn  become  states.  The  term,  "  terri 
tory,"  therefore  acquired  a  special  meaning,  as  an 
area  administered  by  the  federal  government  pending 
preparation  for  statehood.  Even  the  boundaries  of 
the  future  state  were  usually  determined  in  advance. 
"  Territories  "  were,  therefore,  merely  unripe  states, 
and  Americans  knew  no  other  status  for  territory  un 
der  the  control  of  their  government.  So  strong  was 
this  tradition  that  when  later  the  question  of  perma 
nent  dependencies  of  the  United  States  was  discussed, 
it  was  naively  objected  that  we  had  no  governmental 
machinery  suitable  for  governing  dependencies.  The 
fact  that  we  had  been  governing  dependencies  all  along 
and  doing  it  quite  as  successfully  as  we  did  anything 
else, —  doing  it  much  after  the  fashion  of  our  British 


THE  BREAK  WITH  TRADITION       87 

cousins,  by  the  way, —  all  this  quite  escaped  our  ob 
jector's  notice,  simply  because  he  had  thought  of  our 
territories,  not  as  dependencies,  but  as  states  in  the 
making.  He  was  quite  sure  that  we  had  no  place  in 
our  system  for  dependencies.  There  is  no  doubt  that 
he  reflected  the  almost  universal  American  feeling. 
Territories  must  become  states,  and  annexations  could 
only  be  made  with  this  expectation. 

Meanwhile  a  great  deal  had  happened  to  lessen  our 
naive  faith  in  the  capacity  of  all  peoples  for  democ 
racy.  Jefferson,  we  have  seen,  favoured  the  admis 
sion  of  Cuba  as  a  state.  He  seems  never  to  have 
questioned  the  fitness  of  its  people  for  participation  in 
the  responsibilities  of  popular  government.  But  the 
slavery  controversy,  with  its  race  to  add  slave  states 
and  free  states,  had  raised  the  issue  of  fitness,  and 
ultimately  discredited  all  communities  of  slavery  ante 
cedents.  Populations  akin  to  those  known  in  slavery 
naturally  lost  credit,  while  the  experience  of  alleged 
republics  in  Latin  America  was  far  from  reassur 
ing. 

It  is  plain,  therefore,  that  as  American  imperial 
ism,  toward  the  middle  of  the  century,  completed  its 
first  and  most  obvious  task,  it  was  confronted  by  very 
positive  barriers,  physical  and  psychological,  in  its 
farther  progress.  It  was  faced  on  the  east  and  the 
west  by  the  largest  seas  in  the  world,  on  the  north  by 
a  nation  that  it  could  not  affront  and  on  the  south  by 
a  nation  that  it  could  not  fear.  There  was  a  strong 
conviction  that  a  nation's  territories  should  be  con 
tinuous,  that  its  people  should  be  homogeneous,  that 
its  government  should  be  democratic,  that  it  should 


88     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

be  based  on  the  consent  of  the  governed,  that  all 
should  participate  in  its  responsibilities,  and  that  all 
its  territorial  units  should  have  a  uniform  status. 
Farther  territorial  expansion  could  hardly  meet  these 
conditions.  If  the  Americans  were  to  follow  further 
the  star  of  empire,  they  must  sacrifice  their  much  her 
alded  political  principles  and  the  most  distinctive  char 
acteristics  of  their  nation.  Nothing  could  better 
illustrate  the  dependence  of  political  convictions  on 
environment  and  their  subordination  to  the  deeper 
instincts  of  race  assertion,  than  the  ease  with  which 
America  made  this  momentous  transition. 

The  outstanding  fact  in  this  transition  was  the  civil 
war.  This  inexorable  struggle  not  only  made  serious 
inroads  upon  our  political  philosophy,  but  it  gave  us 
the  consciousness  of  military  power  and  directed  our 
attention  to  military  considerations.  An  increased  in 
terest  in  strategic  problems  is  at  once  apparent. 

The  most  important  episode  in  this  connection  re 
sulting  from  the  civil  war,  was  the  intervention  of 
France  in  the  affairs  of  Mexico  and  her  withdrawal 
when  peace  enabled  us  to  enter  an  effectual  protest. 
This  was  merely  a  new  assertion  of  an  old  doctrine, 
albeit  one  of  the  most  extreme  phases  of  American 
imperialism.  Hitherto  the  doctrine  had  not  been 
seriously  challenged  and  neither  we  nor  others  knew 
what  our  attitude  would  be  if  put  to  the  test.  Per 
haps  even  yet  the  issue  would  be  doubtful,  if  it  were 
sprung  upon  us  when  we  were  unprepared.  As  it 
was,  France  chose  the  one  moment  in  our  history  when 
we  were  fully  able  to  assert  our  will.  But  the  prob 
lem  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  belongs  not  to  the  nine- 


THE  BREAK  WITH  TRADITION        89 

teenth  century,  but  to  the  twentieth,  and  must  be  re 
served  for  later  discussion. 

The  conspicuous  event  of  the  time  was  the  purchase 
of  Alaska  from  Russia  for  the  sum  of  $7,200,000.  It 
is  the  more  conspicuous  because  it  was  not  preceded 
by  any  events  which  made  the  purchase  a  logical 
necessity.  Viewed  in  the  broad  perspective  of  his 
tory,  it  stands  as  a  more  or  less  isolated  and  gratuitous 
transaction.  There  was  no  public  demand  for  it, 
and  the  general  attitude  toward  it  seems  to  have  been 
one  of  good-natured  indifference.  No  immediate 
danger  was  averted  and  no  immediate  advantage 
gained.  Yet  when,  after  one  or  two  earlier  sugges 
tions,  the  transfer  was  finally  seriously  proposed,  the 
treaty  was  drawn  up  and  signed  the  same  night  and 
was  ratified  almost  without  opposition.  Yet  this  ter 
ritory  was  detached  and  the  most  sanguine  could  not 
expect  it  to  become  a  state.  Its  population  was  not 
American  and  was  guiltless  of  any  consent  to  the  trans 
fer.  It  is  amazing  to  see  the  easy  way  in  which 
American  traditions  went  by  the  board  in  this  epoch- 
making  annexation.  So  mystifying  is  the  whole  af 
fair  that  quite  a  mythology  has  grown  up  as  to  the 
motives  that  actuated  the  parties  to  it.  The  simpler 
reasons  are  the  more  plausible.  Russia  was  tired  of 
it.  She  had  meant  it  as  the  beginning  of  a  great 
American  empire,  and  Britain  had  headed  her  off. 
It  promised  nothing  now,  and  was  expensive.  Be 
sides,  the  next  war  with  Britain  (which  was  then  a 
foregone  conclusion)  would  see  it  annexed  to  the 
British  Empire  without  compensation.  Russia  was 
selling  what  she  did  not  want  and  could  not  keep. 


9o    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

On  the  other  hand,  Seward,  one  of  the  most  fearless 
expansionists  we  ever  knew,  wanted  to  get  Russia  out 
of  the  Western  Hemisphere  and  hoped  to  see  Alaska 
linked  to  the  United  States  later  by  the  annexation  of 
Canada,  a  scheme  to  which  he  was  frankly  committed. 
As  a  part  of  the  scheme  of  a  united  North  America 
the  acquisition  of  Alaska  is  consistent  and  intelligible. 
As  an  isolated  fact  it  would  not  have  seemed  so  to 
the  knowledge  and  the  reasoning  of  that  time.  All 
intimations  that  he  divined  Alaska's  wealth,  and  all 
complacent  references  to  the  hundreds  of  millions  that 
have  been  taken  from  her  mines,  are  beside  the  mark. 
He  did  not  know  her  wealth,  and  if  he  had,  he  would 
not  have  forgotten,  as  his  admirers  have  done,  that  it 
costs  something  to  get  those  hundreds  of  millions  out. 
Seward's  scheme  of  a  united  North  America  through 
the  union  of  Canada  with  the  United  States  has  not 
been  realized,  and  the  idea  is  now  nowhere  enter 
tained.  But  at  the  time  it  was  nowise  an  unreasonable 
plan.  It  coincided  with  a  very  low  ebb  of  imperial 
enthusiasm  in  the  British  Empire,  and  the  opinion  was 
widely  held  that  the  self  governing  dependencies  of 
Britain,  like  the  "  territories  "  of  the  United  States, 
were  merely  serving  a  probation  which  was  to  end  in 
complete  independence.  The  statement  was  made, 
even  in  official  circles,  that  whenever  Canada  wished 
to  sever  her  connection  with  the  mother  country,  she 
would  be  free  to  do  so, —  a  statement  which  is  doubt 
less  still  true,  but  with  this  important  difference,  that 
no  one  now  expects  that  that  time  will  come,  while 
then  it  was  quite  definitely  anticipated.  There  soon 
arose  an  agitation  headed  by  influential  Canadians, 


THE  BREAK  WITH  TRADITION       91 

for  separation  from  Britain  and  union  with  the  United 
States,  an  agitation  which  might  perhaps  have  been 
successful  if  it  had  been  earnestly  and  tactfully  sec 
onded  by  the  United  States.  In  this  connection,  how 
ever,  our  traditional  imperialism  has  always  been 
strangely  lacking,  a  phenomenon  which  will  later  call 
for  explanation.  We  have  steadily  refused  to  be 
anxious  about  Canada  or  territorially  covetous  toward 
her,  and  have  viewed  with  indifference  if  not  with  sym 
pathy,  the  confirmation  of  Canada's  unnatural  de 
pendence  upon  Europe  and  unnatural  separation  from 
ourselves. 

But  while  Seward's  larger  scheme  has  not  been 
realized,  the  exclusion  of  Russia  from  the  Western 
Hemisphere  is  so  important  as  a  measure  of  national 
security,  that  it  amply  justifies  the  annexation.  In 
this  connection,  the  importance  of  which  later  events 
have  done  so  much  to  emphasize,  the  great  secretary 
was  undoubtedly  far  in  advance  of  his  time.  Earlier 
American  imperialism  had  been  economic,  and  with 
most  Americans  it  remained  so,  as  the  jibes  at 
"  Seward's  icebergs  "  sufficiently  proved.  Seward's 
policy  was  essentially  strategic.  That  we  have  since 
found  wealth  there  is  pure  luck. 

The  nature  of  Seward's  policy  is  clearly  manifest 
in  his  next  move,  the  attempted  purchase  of  the  Dan 
ish  West  Indies.  Their  economic  value  is  insignifi 
cant,  but  their  strategic  importance  is  enormous,  as 
Seward  and  a  few  of  the  leaders  who  had  learned  the 
lessons  of  the  war  clearly  perceived.  But  he  was 
ahead  of  his  times,  and  the  earlier  easy  going  in 
dulgence  of  Congress  now  failed  him.  The  plain 


92    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

fact  is  that  he  was  tackling  a  twentieth  century  prob 
lem  in  the  intellectual  environment  of  the  nineteenth. 
The  political  imagination  of  the  American  people  was 
still  in  its  infancy,  and  Congress  seldom  fails  to  rep 
resent  faithfully  at  least  the  limitations  of  the  people. 
There  was  as  yet  no  appreciation  of  impending  pres 
sure  from  Europe  and  no  conception  of  annexation 
which  was  not  to  eventuate  in  statehood.  Proposals 
which  transcended  these  limits  in  both  respects  stood 
little  chance  of  acceptance. 

The  whole  matter  was  complicated  by  the  fact  that 
the  government  was  now  convulsed  by  the  fiercest  fac 
tional  fight  known  in  all  our  history,  a  struggle  be 
tween  the  President  and  Congress.  Matters  came  to 
such  a  pass  that  the  President's  recommendation  was 
sufficient  to  insure  the  opposition  of  Congress.  As 
Seward  supported  the  President,  he  naturally  shared 
the  bitter  hostility  of  Congress.  The  very  advan 
tageous  treaty  negotiated  by  Seward  would  hardly 
have  commended  itself  to  the  men  of  his  generation 
in  any  case.  As  it  was,  the  Senate  contemptuously 
refused  even  to  consider  it,  and  continued  in  that  re 
fusal,  even  though  Denmark  twice  obligingly  extended 
the  time  for  its  consideration. 

A  like  fate  overtook  the  effort  to  establish  a  pro 
tectorate  over  Santo  Domingo  under  the  next  adminis 
tration.  Here  again  factional  spirit  was  rife,  so 
much  so  as  to  elicit  from  President  Grant  a  digni 
fied  protest  in  his  last  communication  to  Congress  on 
this  subject.  But  while  personal  rancour  may  have 
turned  the  scale,  the  objections  to  the  new  imperial- 


THE  BREAK  WITH  TRADITION       93 

ism  already  cited  were  now  more  definitely  formulated 
and  strongly  urged.  The  uncertainty  as  to  the  atti 
tude  of  the  Dominican  people  and  above  all  the  unfor 
tunate —  yet  natural  —  recommendation  that  Santo 
Domingo  be  admitted  as  a  state,  were  made  the 
ground  of  earnest  and  sincere  objection.  A  protec 
torate  was  too  "  un-American  "  to  be  considered,  and 
no  other  way  out  of  the  difficulty  suggested  itself. 
The  strategic  argument,  on  the  other  hand,  was 
naturally  much  less  felt  by  Congress  than  by  Grant. 
So  the  proposal  was  decisively  negatived. 

It  seemed,  therefore,  that  in  1870  we  knew  where 
we  stood.  We  had  been  consistent  not  only  in  what 
we  had  done,  but  in  what  we  had  refused  to  do.  Ad 
jacent  territory  which  could  be  filled  with  our  kind  of 
people  and  made  into  states  we  wanted,  and  that  with 
out  assignable  limit.  But  we  did  not  want  territory 
that  could  not  be  made  into  states,  nor  did  we  want 
states  made  of  such  material  as  Santo  Domingo  had 
to  offer.  Our  apathy  toward  Canada  remained  a 
somewhat  puzzling  exception  to  the  first  proposi 
tion  and  our  acquisition  of  Alaska  a  nominal  exception 
to  the  second,  but  no  reasonable  person  could  doubt 
our  attitude  on  either.  American  imperialism  had 
reached  its  limit,  physical  and  psychological. 

But  though  we  may  halt  at  the  river's  brink  and 
turn  aside,  if  we  come  to  a  place  where  there  are  step 
ping  stones  and  half-way  points,  we  turn  again  and 
cross  to  the  other  side.  Traditional  American  policy 
was  separated  by  a  seemingly  impassable  gulf  from 
Santo  Domingo  as  a  perpetual  dependency,  and  still 


94     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

more  from  Santo  Domingo  as  a  state.  To  cross  this 
gulf  we  needed  a  midway  station  or  stepping  stone. 
Hawaii  furnished  the  midway  station. 

The  Hawaiian  Islands,  situated  a  third  of  the  way 
across  the  Pacific  and  peopled  by  an  alien  race,  were 
not  eligible  for  annexation  under  the  conditions  of  the 
early  conservative  program  we  have  been  consider 
ing.  But  commercial  relations  had  been  long  estab 
lished  and  had  become  very  extensive,  while  a  remark 
able  missionary  movement,  perhaps  the  wisest,  broad 
est,  and  most  successful  yet  to  be  recorded,  had  estab 
lished  a  close  bond  of  union  with  this  country.  Up 
until  the  middle  of  the  century  we  had  had  no  thought 
of  anything  but  the  independence  of  the  islands,  but 
there  were  unmistakable  signs  that  independence  could 
be  maintained  only  artificially  by  American  interven 
tion.  Britain  and  France  did  not  share  our  scruples 
about  annexing  distant  islands,  and  they  were  just  then 
engaged  in  making  a  clean-up  of  the  Pacific.  Once 
the  British  flag  had  been  hoisted  there  and  withdrawn 
only  at  the  strenuous  request  of  our  government,  and 
at  another  time  France  had  taken  practical  possession. 
Intervention  and  constant  championship  of  Hawaiian 
rights  became  a  settled  policy  of  the  United  States. 

Finally,  in  1853,  following  a  definite  request  of  the 
Hawaiian  government,  a  treaty  of  annexation  was  ne 
gotiated,  but  this  was  not  submitted  to  the  Senate  be 
cause  it  conferred  statehood  on  the  Islands,  a  policy 
to  which  our  Secretary  of  State  was  wisely  opposed. 
Fifteen  years  later  the  indefatigable  Seward  again 
urged  annexation,  but  finally  confessed  that  other  is 
sues  for  the  time  being  made  impossible  the  considera- 


THE  BREAK  WITH  TRADITION       95 

tion  of  "  the  higher  but  more  remote  questions  of  na 
tional  existence  and  aggrandizement."  These  two 
terms,  "  national  existence  and  aggrandizement,"  give 
the  key  to  Seward's  policy  and  to  the  imperialism  to 
ward  which  we  were  inexorably  moving. 

Whether  the  national  mind  moved  fast  or  slow,  it 
could  move  in  but  one  direction.  To  occupy  Hawaii 
would  carry  us  dangerously  far,  but  to  let  a  rival  oc 
cupy  it  would  be  to  bring  him  still  more  dangerously 
near.  We  were  beginning  to  hear  about  naval  de 
fence  and  were  learning  the  value  of  naval  bases.  If 
the  islands  of  the  sea  were  to  be  drawn  into  the  great 
scheme  of  things  and  to  find  their  allegiance,  Hawaii 
must  become  American. 

Meanwhile  American  commerce  and  American  in 
fluence  became  ever  more  preponderant.  The  gov 
ernment  was  avowedly  pro-American  and  dependent 
on  our  good  offices  for  its  maintenance.  Factions 
deepened  into  permanent  feuds,  and  sought  backing 
with  foreign  powers.  Disorder  finally  culminated  in 
revolution  and  in  a  request  from  the  Provisional  Gov 
ernment  thus  established  for  annexation  to  the  United 
States.  A  treaty  was  negotiated  and  signed  in  the 
last  days  of  President  Harrison's  administration,  but 
was  not  ratified  till  Cleveland  became  President, 
March  fourth,  1893. 

Cleveland  was  absolutely  opposed  to  the  new  im 
perialism.  What  he  would  have  done  with  Oregon 
and  California  if  he  had  been  in  Polk's  place  fifty  years 
earlier  it  is  interesting  to  speculate.  But  if  he  was 
reconciled  to  the  earlier  program,  he  was  uncom 
promisingly  opposed  to  the  new.  He  not  only  with- 


96    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

drew  the  treaty  from  the  Senate  but  even  attempted 
to  overturn  the  Provisional  Government  and  restore 
the  effete  monarchy  on  the  ground  that  the  revolu 
tion  had  been  effected  by  American  aid.  He  failed, 
however,  in  the  one  purpose  as  in  the  other.  The 
Provisional  Government  maintained  itself  and  con 
tinued  to  champion  the  cause  of  annexation  which  was 
accomplished,  not  without  a  bitter  struggle,  in  1897, 
early  in  the  administration  of  McKinley.  Even  then 
the  annexation  would  probably  have  been  defeated 
had  it  not  been  for  the  outbreak  of  the  war  with 
Spain  and  the  sudden  realization  of  the  necessity  of 
preventing  Spain  from  using  the  Islands  as  a  base  of 
operations  against  our  western  coast. 

But  the  die  was  cast.  The  tradition  of  continuous 
territory  was  broken  and  the  doctrine  of  ultimate 
statehood  challenged.  Would  Hawaii  ever  become  a 
state?  Perhaps,  if  Americans  kept  going  there  and 
multiplied  and  replenished  the  land.  It  was  a  mid 
way  station  from  which  champions  of  old  and  new 
might  look  hopefully  to  the  nearer  or  the  farther 
shore. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE   GREAT  INADVERTENCE 

IN  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century,  as  has 
been  noted,  the  United  States  seems  to  have  been 
pretty  definitely  committed  to  the  policy  of  limiting 
its  expansion  to  contiguous  territory  on  the  North 
American  continent.  We  had  annexed  no  detached 
territory,  and  despite  the  inclination  of  our  earlier 
statesmen  toward  the  West  Indies,  it  may  be  safely 
asserted  that  no  such  annexation  was  contemplated. 
The  annexation  of  Alaska  broke  the  tradition  of  con 
tiguous  territory,  but  it  was  not  intended  to  do  so. 
It  simply  represents  an  abortive  scheme  to  complete 
our  expansion  northward.  Whatever  precedent  it 
established,  counted  for  little  in  view  of  its  peculiar 
situation  and  character. 

The  annexation  of  Hawaii  makes  a  definite  break 
in  our  tradition,  but  one  which  can  be  plausibly  con 
strued  as  a  broader  application  of  the  accepted  prin 
ciple.  Islands  for  the  most  part  belong  to  one  conti 
nent  or  another,  and  in  carefully  considered  schemes 
of  development  and  defence,  must  be  so  included.  In 
the  age  of  naval  supremacy  in  particular,  outlying 
islands  become  matters  of  critical  importance,  and  a 
controlling  position  on  the  continent  implies  their  con 
trol.  To  include  these  island  outposts  is  merely  to 

97 


98     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

define  more  accurately  the  continent  itself.  No  sane 
American  strategist  can  consent  to  the  exclusion  of 
the  Hawaiian  Islands,  any  more  than  a  European 
strategist  could  yield  the  Azores  or  the  Canaries. 

But  clear  as  is  this  reasoning,  it  was  far  reaching  in 
its  implications.  If  Hawaii  was  necessary,  by  the 
same  token  Cuba  and  all  the  West  Indies  were  re 
quired  to  safeguard  our  position.  There  were  not 
wanting  those  who  perceived  the  logic  of  this  annexa 
tion,  and  thus  began  the  argument  which  culminated 
in  the  Treaty  of  Paris. 

The  American  people,  however,  did  not  at  once 
feel  it  necessary  to  be  logical.  Logic  is  at  best  usually 
an  afterthought  in  such  cases.  It  is  concrete  situ 
ations  that  count.  A  concrete  situation  had  arisen  in 
Hawaii,  and  something  had  to  be  done  about  it. 
Other  islands  might  be  the  same  logically,  but  they 
did  not  present  the  same  concrete  situation.  Perhaps 
they  never  would  do  so.  It  was  enough  to  deal  with 
such  situations  when  they  presented  themselves.  The 
American  people  do  not  cross  bridges  until  they  come 
to  them. 

But  once  the  barrier  of  our  continental  tradition 
was  broken  down,  our  farther  expansion  went  with 
a  rush.  In  principle,  every  vestige  of  conservatism 
was  thrown  to  the  winds  in  an  almost  unnoticed 
transaction  of  this  period,  the  annexation  of  Tutuila, 
one  of  the  Samoan  Islands.  It  would  be  difficult  to 
find  in  the  whole  history  of  imperialism,  American  or 
any  other,  a  more  unpremeditated  result  or  a  more 
flagrant  disregard  of  accepted  principles  or  even  of 
the  considerations  of  ordinary  prudence.  Through- 


THE  GREAT  INADVERTENCE         99 

out  the  whole  transaction  extending  over  more  than  a 
score  of  years,  we  were  represented  by  unauthorized 
persons,  or  by  persons  who  exceeded  their  authority. 
Yet  we  allowed  ourselves  to  be  bound  by  their  action, 
as  indeed  we  had  to  do,  piling  up  a  record  of  audaci 
ties,  outrages,  blunders,  and  reckless  ventures  in  in 
ternational  bluff  and  co-operation,  joining  with  Ger 
many  to  coerce  Britain,  and  then  with  Britain  to  co 
erce  Germany,  repeatedly  resorting  to  armed  inter 
vention,  even  against  European  powers,  till  the  tangle 
became  such  that  only  the  parcelling  out  of  the  islands 
and  their  full  annexation  could  extricate  us  from  con 
fusion,  and  save  the  one-time  peaceful  islands  from 
hopeless  anarchy.  The  incident  is  unique  in  our  own 
history,  but  fairly  typical  of  much  that  has  happened 
in  the  history  of  other  nations.  The  outsider  is  apt 
to  look  upon  such  transactions  as  deliberate  scheming, 
their  incidents  of  hesitation  and  protest  being  inter 
preted  as  hypocritical  dissembling.  In  fact  even  such 
deliberately  imperialistic  nations  as  Britain  and  Russia 
have  for  the  most  part  blundered  into  empire,  com 
mitted  to  unavoidable  lines  of  action  by  the  inconsid- 
erateness  or  the  unscrupulousness  of  their  subjects. 

Whatever  the  occasion,  the  result  is  a  radical  de 
parture  from  our  former  policy.  Hawaii  is  on  our 
side  of  the  Pacific,  Samoa  on  the  other.  It  is  some 
five  thousand  miles  from  our  nearest  home  port,  but 
about  two  thousand  from  New  Zealand  and  Australia. 
From  the  large  British  group  of  Fiji  it  is  only  a  few 
hundred  miles  distant,  and  other  British  islands  of 
less  note  are  still  nearer.  In  short,  it  is  in  the  midst 
of  an  essentially  British  area.  Furthermore  the  di- 


ioo    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

vision  of  the  islands  gave  the  remaining  and  larger 
portion  to  Germany  and  thus  made  her  our  next  door 
neighbour  in  a  remote  part  of  the  world  where  both 
countries  are  necessarily  represented  by  personal 
agents  exercising  large  discretionary  powers.  What 
that  may  mean  in  the  way  of  embroiling  the  two  coun 
tries  the  earlier  history  of  Samoa  should  teach  us. 

This  is  narrative,  not  criticism.  It  is  probable  that 
the  acquisition  in  this  remote  region  of  one  of  the 
most  splendid  naval  stations  in  the  world  was  a  piece 
of  great  good  fortune.  If  we  were  to  have  the  far- 
flung  battle  line,  it  was  certainly  desirable  that  our 
outposts  should  be  the  best  possible  —  as  Tutuila 
certainly  is, —  and  the  far-flung  battle  line  was 
already  a  foregone  conclusion. 

The  Samoan  annexation  was  indeed  but  a  minor 
episode  in  a  vast  imperialist  movement  which  sud 
denly  changed  the  whole  current  of  our  history.  In 
that  movement  our  war  with  Spain  naturally  held  the 
centre  of  the  stage  and  exercised  the  controlling  in 
fluence  over  our  policy.  That  policy  now  developed 
with  startling  rapidity.  July  7,  1898,  we  consented, 
not  without  sore  misgivings,  to  annex  Hawaii.  Five 
months  later  the  Treaty  of  Paris  with  its  epoch-mak 
ing  changes  of  policy  was  signed.  With  Guam  and 
the  Philippines  in  our  possession,  we  need  hardly 
wonder  that  the  annexation  of  Samoa  a  year  later, 
scarce  attracted  notice.  The  die  had  been  cast. 

We  are  now  sufficiently  removed  from  the  Spanish 
war  to  survey  it  more  broadly  and  see  it  in  truer  per 
spective.  Thus  viewed,  the  spectacle  is  not  entirely 
edifying.  Nominally,  Spain  was  at  war  with  a  re- 


THE  GREAT  iNADVEkTENefi        101 

bellious  colony,  and  we  were  a  neutral  state.  As  a 
people,  however,  we  were  not  neutral  but  aggressively 
partisan,  both  in  our  discussion  of  the  issue  and  in 
the  action  of  multitudes  "of  our  citizens.  Spain  was 
powerless  to  conquer  Cuba  and  equally  powerless  to 
bring  her  own  people  to  a  realizing  sense  of  their  im 
potence.  There  was  endless  accusation,  recrimina 
tion,  and  evasion  on  both  sides.  In  her  charges  of  un- 
neutrality  and  failure  to  restrain  our  citizens,  Spain 
had  a  clear  case.  In  our  lame  defence  we  urged  argu 
ments  which  we  had  repudiated  when  Britain  used 
them  a  generation  earlier.  On  the  other  hand,  when 
we  demanded  reforms,  Spain  was  no  less  evasive  and 
disingenuous.  It  was  in  fact  the  old  conflict  between 
legitimacy  and  efficiency,  a  conflict  as  old  as  history, 
but  one  which  curiously  enough  is  always  fought  under 
disguises.  Possession  is  normally  the  product  and 
the  record  of  past  efficiency,  and  present  efficiency  is 
always  challenging  that  record.  But  men  are  not 
philosophers  enough  to  plead  their  cause  in  terms  of 
ultimate  principles.  Hence  the  sophistries  and  pre 
texts  that  fill  the  air  with  dust  while  the  great  uncon 
scious  instincts  whose  bidding  we  are  wont  to  do, 
marshal  their  forces  for  the  fray.  It  is  useless  to 
talk  of  neutrality  in  such  cases.  Sympathy  owns  a 
higher  law.  Judged  from  the  standpoint  of  diplo 
matic  "  correctness,"  America  had  no  sort  of  a  case. 
Yet  her  mandate  was  one  that  she  could  neither  mis 
take  nor  resist.  Being  compelled  to  state  the  case  of 
ultimate  principles  in  terms  of  diplomatic  convention, 
her  apologia  sounds  specious  and  sophistical.  Fortu 
nately,  there  is  now  no  such  necessity.  We  can  put 


102    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

it  bluntly.  Spain  had  made  a  sorry  mess  of  it,  and 
we  had  lost  patience  and  were  determined  to  make  an 
end  of  her  rule.  That  is  a  dangerous  philosophy  for 
nations  to  talk  out  loud.  It  works  havoc  with  the 
instincts  of  courtesy  and  the  conventions  of  deference 
whose  restraints  are  vital  to  the  comities  of  men. 
But  as  a  mute  intuition  working  in  the  twilight  of  half 
consciousness,  it  is  the  instrument  of  the  great  re- 
newer.  Our  war  with  Spain  was  one  of  the  best  justi 
fied  of  all  wars. 

All  interest  centred  in  Cuba,  the  great  struggling, 
suffering,  half  human  thing.  Sympathy  was  hers, 
and  we  called  for  her  release.  Beyond  that  we 
neither  thought  nor  willed.  In  perfect  accord  with 
the  national  attitude  President  McKinley,  after  an 
exhausting  exercise  of  patience,  recommended  inter 
vention  in  behalf  of  Cuba  and  of  humanity,  and  the 
more  than  ready  Congress  declared  war  upon  Spain, 
taking  pains  to  stipulate  "  that  the  United  States 
hereby  disclaims  any  disposition  or  intention  to  ex 
ercise  sovereignty,  jurisdiction,  or  control  over  said 
island,  except  for  the  pacification  thereof,  and  asserts 
its  determination,  when  that  is  accomplished,  to  leave 
the  government  and  control  of  the  island  to  its  peo 
ple."  Despite  the  cynicism  of  foreign  critics,  there 
can  not  be  a  reasonable  doubt  that  this  declaration  was 
sincere  and  that  perfectly  sincere  efforts  have  been 
made  from  beginning  to  end  to  redeem  the  pledge. 
Strikingly  similar  was  the  action  and  the  intention  of 
Britain  when  Egypt  was  occupied  a  few  years  earlier. 
It  remains  to  be  seen  whether  Cuba  will  become  an 
other  Egypt. 


THE  GREAT  INADVERTENCE        103 

But  though,  in  beginning  the  war,  our  thought  and 
purpose  were  limited  to  Cuba,  it  was  quite  impossi 
ble  thus  to  limit  our  action.  We  were  at  war  with 
Spain,  and  war  knows  but  one  law.  The  enemy  must 
be  attacked  and  crippled  wherever  possible.  Spain 
had  other  possessions  in  the  Western  Hemisphere, 
notably  Porto  Rico,  and  to  leave  this  nearby  island 
in  the  enemy's  hands  as  a  base  of  operations  and 
source  of  supplies  was  not  to  be  thought  of.  Hence 
the  prompt  occupation  of  Porto  Rico,  and  following 
the  occupation,  the  inevitable  appeal  to  the  imagina 
tion  and  enlargement  of  the  imperial  horizon.  We 
had  not  thought  about  Porto  Rico  before,  but  now  that 
we  did  think  about  it,  what  should  be  done  with  it. 
The  inefficiency  and  mismanagement  which  were  the 
grounds  of  our  war  with  Spain,  were  quite  as  manifest 
in  Porto  Rico  as  in  Cuba,  and  there  was  as  little  hope 
of  amendment  in  the  one  case  as  in  the  other.  The 
smaller  island  had  not  revolted,  but  permanent  con 
tent,  the  only  guaranty  of  genuine  peace,  was  not  to 
be  thought  of.  If  disorder  had  forced  us  to  inter 
vene  in  Cuba,  it  would  force  us  to  intervene  in  Porto 
Rico.  To  expel  Spain  from  one  island  and  leave  her 
in  the  other  was  simply  to  do  the  thing  in  instalments, 
a  method  recommended  by  neither  economy  nor  hu 
manity.  The  logic  of  the  situation  was  inexorable. 

But  if  Spain  was  to  leave,  what  was  to  become  of 
Porto  Rico?  Cuba  was  to  be  independent.  We  had 
promised  that  in  the  days  of  our  liberty  enthusiasm. 
But  to  Porto  Rico  we  had  made  no  promises  and  were 
therefore  free  to  follow  our  bent.  Somehow  the 
analogy  of  Cuba  did  not  commend  itself.  The  island 


104    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

was  smaller;  there  had  been  no  revolt,  no  blow  for 
freedom;  our  occupation  had  been  welcomed;  we 
needed  a  naval  station  and  became  suddenly  aware 
that  Porto  Rico  was  a  strategic  site,  and  —  but  what 
need  to  enumerate?  The  inclination  to  annex  Porto 
Rico  was  overwhelming,  and  much  less  satisfactory 
reasons  would  have  sufficed.  Undoubtedly  it  was 
the  wise  thing  to  do,  the  only  thing  to  do,  the  thing 
that  any  nation  that  has  ever  commanded  the  respect 
of  posterity  would  have  done.  But  it  was  not  the 
less  an  innovation  and  an  inadvertence.  We  did  not 
enter  upon  the  war  for  the  sake  of  colonies  and  em 
pire,  but  the  war  brought  us  colonies  and  empire  just 
the  same.  That  is  the  way  that  empires  grow,  our 
empire  and  other  empires.  Premeditated  empires 
are  seldom  realized.  Nowhere  does  intention  count 
for  so  little. 

If  we  seek  a  more  striking  illustration  of  this  over 
mastering  power  of  the  logic  of  events,  this  same  war 
can  furnish  it.  It  was  quickly  realized  that  Spain's 
chief  power  to  injure  us  was  in  raiding  our  commerce. 
In  the  Far  East  where  our  commerce  was  considerable, 
she  had  both  ships  and  a  naval  base.  It  was  indis 
pensable  that  our  Pacific  squadron  should  if  possible 
destroy  the  Spanish  ships  at  Manila  before  the  raid 
ing  began.  This,  to  be  sure,  had  not  entered  into 
the  plans  of  those  who  had  summoned  us  to  put  an 
end  to  misgovernment  in  Cuba,  but  in  willing  the  end, 
they  could  hardly  be  expected  to  take  up  the  ques 
tion  of  the  ways  and  means.  It  was  easy  to  see,  how 
ever,  that  this  had  to  be  done.  We  had  not  thought 
about  the  Philippines,  scarcely  knew,  indeed,  that 


THE  GREAT  INADVERTENCE        105 

there  were  such  things,  but  when  a  study  of  the  map 
disclosed  the  fact  that  there  were  Spanish  possessions 
in  this  part  of  the  world,  and  that  there  were  cruisers 
there  ready  to  raid  our  commerce,  we  of  course  saw 
that  we  must  destroy  those  cruisers. 

So  the  cruisers  were  destroyed  and  then  we  were 
again  faced  with  a  situation  that  we  had  not  fore 
seen.  Spanish  rule  in  the  Philippines  was  not  es 
sentially  different  from  what  it  was  in  Cuba  and  not 
much  more  popular.  The  fleet  that  we  had  de 
stroyed  had  been  its  support.  Without  the  fleet  there 
could  be  no  Spanish  government,  and  under  the  cir 
cumstances,  no  government  of  any  kind.  Anarchy 
meant  massacre  and  all  the  horrors  that  come  when 
savagery,  long  held  in  leash,  again  has  its  chance  at 
those  it  hates.  We  had  not  thought  about  that  when 
we  destroyed  those  cruisers  to  protect  our  commerce. 
Some  of  us,  far  from  the  scene,  were  loath  to  think 
about  it  afterward.  But  those  who  were  there  had 
to  think  about  it,  and  could  do  only  one  thing.  They 
must  maintain  the  order  whose  support  they  had  de 
stroyed. 

For  this  reason  Dewey  remained.  For  this  reason, 
perhaps,  he  "  interrupted  "  the  cable  lest  unconscious 
Washington  should  veto  his  decision  or  call  him 
home.  For  this  reason  he  raised  our  flag  in  Manila. 
For  this  reason, —  and  for  other  reasons, —  we  are  in 
the  Philippines  today. 

It  was  only  a  question  of  giving  time  enough  for  the 
imagination  to  picture  that  battle  in  the  shimmering 
light  of  that  tropical  sea,  and  Old  Glory  waving  from 
the  venerable  ramparts  of  sleepy  Manila,  and  retreat 


106     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

became  impossible.  We  never  had  thought  about  it, 
surely,  but  now  that  we  did  think  about  it,  how  im 
portant  to  have  a  naval  station  in  the  Far  East  where 
our  cruisers  could  protect  our  commerce  and  be  on 
hand  for  other  possible  emergencies  such  as  this. 
How  plain  our  duty  to  redeem  these  islands  from 
Spanish  misrule  as  well  as  those  near  our  shores. 
How  providential  the  opportunity  which  brought  eight 
million  Asiatics  to  the  missionary  and  the  teacher  in 
stead  of  forcing  their  ministry  to  wait  for  a  grudging 
hearing.  What  possibilities  for  commerce,  for  ex 
ploitation,  for  organization,  for  philanthropy,  for  — 
In  short,  we  were  in  the  mood  to  stay,  and  we  drafted 
soldier,  ruler,  merchant,  and  priest  into  the  service 
of  justifying  our  choice. 

The  task  was  not  easy.  The  Philippines  do  not, 
like  Porto  Rico,  stand  guard  at  the  gateway  of  our 
homeland.  They  guard  the  entrance  to  a  remote  and 
different  world.  To  us  here  at  home  they  are  hardly 
a  defence.  They  are  rather  a  thing  to  be  defended, 
and  that  at  a  distance  and  against  possible  claimants 
near  at  hand.  Their  value  depends  all  upon  our 
farther  policy.  If  we  are  minded  to  push  our  battle 
line  out  to  this  front  of  the  far  eastern  world,  to  plant 
our  naval  stations  in  every  sea  and  police  the  planet 
with  our  sentinels,  then  the  Philippines  are  a  brave 
beginning.  But  we  had  not  planned  to  do  that. 
We  had  not  thought  we  wished  to  do  it.  Nay,  up  to 
the  very  time  when  it  all  happened,  we  had  not  wished 
it.  We  had  resolved  to  free  Cuba  and  to  abate  a 
standing  nuisance  in  our  neighbourhood.  And  lo, 
here  we  find  ourselves  in  Malay  land,  deep  enmeshed 


THE  GREAT  INADVERTENCE        107 

in  the  tangled  web  of  the  East.  It  may  all  be  fortu 
nate,  but  it  certainly  was  not  intended.  If  in  advance, 
any  one  had  proposed  to  annex  the  Philippines  we 
should  have  questioned  his  sanity. 

The  decision  once  reached  to  annex  the  Philippines, 
the  treaty  was  framed  with  intelligent  regard  to  the 
true  situation.  Manila  could  not  fail  to  be  a  naval 
station  of  importance,  and  all  precautions  were  taken 
against  its  isolation.  The  commercial  route  to  the 
Philippines  is  usually  a  roundabout  one,  for  ships  find 
it  advisable  to  touch  at  Japanese  and  Chinese  ports 
as  well  as  at  Manila.  But  for  naval  and  military  pur 
poses  a  direct  route  is  preferable.  Hawaii  lies  on 
this  direct  route  about  three  thousand  miles  from  our 
shores.  In  the  six  or  seven  thousand  miles  from 
Hawaii  to  Manila  an  intermediate  station  was  de 
sired.  This  was  supplied  by  the  island  of  Guam 
which  Spain  was  also  compelled  to  yield.  With  the 
annexation  of  Tutuila  a  year  later,  the  United  States 
completed  its  system  of  stepping  stones  across  the 
Pacific,  Hawaii  for  Japan,  Hawaii  and  Guam  for 
Manila,  and  Hawaii  and  Tutuila  for  New  Zealand 
and  Australia.  Britain  herself  could  not  have  chosen 
them  better.  She  had  been  our  teacher,  and  we  had 
not  sat  at  her  feet  in  vain. 

It  is  all  so  natural,  yet  all  so  unexpected,  so  mo 
mentous.  Two  years  before,  ours  was  a  republic, 
home  staying  and  with  no  thought  but  to  continue 
so.  And  now  an  empire  had  arisen,  an  empire  of 
which  we  had  been  the  builders,  but  not  the  architect. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

AFTERTHOUGHT  AND    EMPIRE 

THE  nineteenth  century,  which  had  witnessed  the 
expansion  of  the  American  Republic  from  the  At 
lantic  to  the  Pacific,  might  seemingly  have  been  con 
tent  to  leave  it  within  those  safe  limits.  Neverthe 
less  at  the  very  close  the  irrepressible  American  tem 
per  slipped  the  leash,  and  the  conservative  policy  of 
the  century  was  abandoned.  Hawaii  was  annexed 
July  6,  1898.  Seven  months  later  the  treaty  of  Paris 
gave  us  Porto  Rico,  Guam,  and  the  Philippines,  and 
suzerainty  over  Cuba.  On  January  16,  1900,  we 
were  formally  installed  in  Samoa.  Thus  in  the  short 
space  of  eighteen  months  we  had  pushed  our  frontier 
out  many  thousands  of  miles,  enmeshing  it  with  the 
frontiers  of  the  great  powers  of  Europe,  and  neces 
sarily  revolutionizing  our  relation  with  other  powers 
and  modifying  the  strategy  of  our  national  defence. 

But  changes  far  more  serious  than  those  of  bound 
ary  or  strategy  were  involved  in  these  annexations. 
Our  whole  political  philosophy  underwent  a  radical 
change.  We  had  believed  in  a  compact  territory, 
and  had  thought  to  stay  within  the  limits,  or  at  least 
within  the  lee,  of  our  continent,  but  we  had  annexed 
Samoa.  We  had  learned  to  prize  race  homogeneity, 
but  Porto  Rico  seemed  certain  to  remain  Spanish. 
We  averred  that  "  governments  derive  their  just 

108 


AFTERTHOUGHT  AND  EMPIRE     109 

powers  from  the  consent  of  the  governed,"  but  we 
had  coerced  the  Filipinos.  We  had  pinned  our  faith 
to  democracy,  the  government  of  the  people,  by  the 
people,  and  for  the  people,  but  we  refused  to  admit 
even  Hawaii  to  the  privileges  of  statehood.  We 
could  annex  Constantinople  or  Finland  on  the  strength 
of  such  analogies  as  these. 

These  things  are  not  said  in  criticism.  Philoso 
phies  have  no  prescriptive  rights  over  life.  They  are 
for  the  most  part  little  more  than  the  shadows  which 
events  cast  in  passing.  Our  earlier  philosophy  had 
been  simple  and  idyllic,  blissfully  unconscious  of  ne 
cessities  which  we  had  not  yet  experienced.  It  served 
us  till  our  broadening  life  brought  necessities  that  it 
could  not  meet,  and  then  with  but  moderate  protest  it 
released  us  from  our  allegiance. 

"  New  occasions  teach  new  duties, 

Time  makes  ancient  good  uncouth. 
They  must  upward  still  and  onward 
Who  would  keep  abreast  of  truth." 

There  is  no  saving  grace  in  an  inherited  rule  of  thumb. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  disintegration  of  this  early 
philosophy  had  begun  long  before.  We  had  never 
asked  the  consent  of  the  peoples  whom  we  had  an 
nexed,  and  in  the  only  case  where  such  consent  was 
clearly  expressed, —  that  of  the  Danish  West  Indies 
in  1868, —  we  had  refused  annexation.  Even  then, 
Seward  had  positively  refused  to  make  annexation  de 
pendent  on  consent  of  the  islands.  Possibly  he 
realized  that  after  our  reconstruction  of  the  South 
following  the  Civil  War,  the  less  said  about  consent 


no    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

of  the  governed  the  better.  Consent  is  the  reward 
of  just  government,  not  its  preliminary. 

Nor  had  we  shown  much  concern  about  race  homo 
geneity  when  we  annexed  Spanish  Florida  and  north 
ern  Mexico.  It  was  doubtless  realized  that  American 
immigration  would  assimilate  these  Spanish  popula 
tions,  but  there  is  little  evidence  that  this  was  felt  to 
be  necessary.  Similarly,  in  annexing  Alaska,  we  did 
violence  to  our  tacit  doctrine  of  continuous  territory, 
but  trusted  to  a  future  annexation  of  Canada  to  re 
establish  it. 

In  short,  we  had  always  taken  long  chances  with 
our  political  principles,  and  trusted  to  the  future  to 
restore  temporary  breaches.  Our  only  fixed  rule  of 
action  had  been  to  meet  each  situation  on  its  own 
merits.  This  we  kept  right  on  doing,  careless  of  out 
ward  consistency.  There  were  very  good  reasons 
for  our  action,  special  and  particular  reasons  in 
each  particular  case,  reasons  which  appealed  to  sane 
and  practical  men.  So  we  did  the  needful  each  time 
as  we  saw  it,  letting  our  philosophy  adjust  itself  to  the 
new  situation  as  it  had  previously  done  to  the  old. 
That  is,  we  gave  to  the  great  instincts  of  race  asser 
tion  and  human  sympathy,  precedence  over  traditions 
born  of  accidental  situation  and  local  experience. 
These  traditions  of  course  made  a  respectable  but  a 
rapidly  diminishing  protest.  It  took  years  of  bitter 
struggle  to  annex  Hawaii,  months  to  ratify  the  treaty 
of  Paris,  while  Samoa,  most  doubtful  of  them  all,  was 
a  matter  only  of  days,  time  enough  for  the  bare  neces 
sities  of  Senatorial  routine.  We  had  crossed  our 
Rubicon  and  America  was  an  empire. 


AFTERTHOUGHT  AND  EMPIRE     in 

These  things  accomplished,  there  is  little  occasion 
to  comment  on  subsequent  annexations.  The  Canal 
Zone  was  acquired  by  "  perpetual  lease  "  from  the 
Republic  of  Panama  by  treaty  signed  in  1903  and 
ratified  February  23,  1904.  This  insignificant  area 
probably  surpasses  in  value,  and  in  its  influence  upon 
our  national  policy,  all  other  acquisitions  since  1848, 
as  we  shall  soon  have  occasion  to  note.  It  bears 
somewhat  the  same  relation  to  the  American  empire 
that  Gibraltar  bears  to  the  British,  a  trifling  territory 
vital  to  our  very  existence,  the  object  of  intense  de 
sire  to  our  rivals  and  of  all  our  possessions  the  one 
where  our  right  is  most  likely  to  be  challenged.  No 
where  else  in  our  entire  domain  are  the  necessities  and 
the  responsibilities  of  empire,  and  the  inadequacy 
of  our  earlier  philosophy  so  manifest  as  in  Panama. 

Finally,  at  the  moment  of  writing,  we  have  to  note 
the  acquisition  of  the  Danish  West  Indies.  The 
price  is  large, —  far  larger  than  Seward  asked  us 
to  pay  half  a  century  ago, —  but  no  one  doubts  the 
wisdom  of  the  purchase.  We  have  at  last  become 
conscious  of  the  dangers  and  the  strategic  necessities 
of  our  position.  There  is  a  beginning  of  that  im 
perial  mind  without  which  an  imperial  domain  is  an 
anomaly  and  a  peril.  It  is  possible  that  we  shall  make 
little  use  of  the  magnificent  harbour  and  potential 
naval  station  which  the  Islands  offer,  but  we  must  at 
least  make  sure  that  no  enemy  uses  them  against  us. 
The  Canal  is  the  magnet  which  attracts  the  steel  of 
Europe  to  our  shores.  At  all  costs  it  must  be  pro 
tected  from  those  whose  ambitions  menace  our  exist 
ence.  So  reasons  our  newly  awakened  consciousness. 


ii2     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

Once  more,  expansion  seems  to  have  reached  its 
limit.  It  may  truthfully  be  said  that  no  further  an 
nexations  are  contemplated.  Nor  is  it  probable  that 
circumstances  will  again  force  our  hand.  All  thought 
of  union  with  Canada,  the  one  really  attractive  pros 
pect,  has  been  abandoned.  Acquisitions  of  territory 
in  the  old  world  are  almost  unthinkable,  despite  the 
possibilities  which  the  world  war  suggests.  Latin 
America  still  troubles  us,  but  if  the  present  war  fore 
stalls  European  intervention  there,  we  shall  have  as 
little  occasion,  as  we  now  have  inclination,  to  extend 
our  rule  in  this  quarter.  It  is  occasionally  proposed 
that  we  acquire  the  British  West  Indies  in  exchange 
for  the  Philippines,  but  in  this  matter  of  dependent 
peoples,  Britain  has  outlived  the  age  of  barter  if  we 
have  not.  It  is  altogether  possible  that  the  age  of 
annexation  is  at  an  end. 

The  age  of  annexation  but  not  the  age  of  imperial 
ism.  Imperialism  is  a  permanent  process,  annexation 
a  passing  phase.  Annexation  is  suitable  for  a  harsh 
and  primitive  age,  or  for  empty  territories,  or  for 
territories  favourably  disposed,  but  in  this  age  of  the 
world  the  empire  builder  who  knows  no  method  but 
annexation,  would  not  get  very  far.  If  we  are  done 
with  annexation,  that  only  means  that  we  have  learned 
a  subtler  art. 

As  the  nineteenth  century  exerted  itself  to  com 
plete  the  task  of  the  primitive  imperialist  era,  so  the 
twentieth  century  hastened  to  inaugurate  the  new  era. 
The  century  was  but  two  months  old  when  Congress 
on  March  i,  1901,  enacted  the  famous  "  Platt  Amend 
ment,"  defining  our  relations  with  Cuba.  The  act, 


AFTERTHOUGHT  AND  EMPIRE     113 

passed  under  this  unobtrusive  name,  was  destined  to 
become,  next  to  the  Federal  Constitution,  perhaps  the 
most  important  document  in  the  history  of  the  United 
States. 

It  has  been  noted  that  the  Cuban  struggle  for  in 
dependence  was  the  occasion  of  our  war  with  Spain, 
and  that  in  entering  the  conflict  we  pledged  ourselves  v 
to  establish  that  independence  and  to  hand  over 
Cuba  to  the  control  of  her  own  people  as  soon  as  con 
ditions  would  permit.  We  promised  this  readily  and 
sincerely,  and  quite  as  much  to  remove  our  own  appre 
hension  as  that  of  the  Cubans.  We  had  as  yet  no 
overseas  possessions,  and  had  just  rejected  with  em 
phasis  the  petition  of  the  Hawaiians  for  annexation, 
listening  the  while  to  words  of  scathing  denunciation 
from  President  Cleveland  on  this  and  all  similar  proj 
ects.  We  probably  thought  we  agreed  with  him. 
We  have  always  stoutly  maintained  such  principles 
except  when  circumstances  called  for  their  temporary 
abandonment.  We  distinctly  disapprove  of  crossing 
bridges  as  an  abstract  proposition.  It  is  only  when 
we  come  to  them  that  we  make  an  exception.  We 
came  to  the  Hawaiian  bridge  very  soon  after,  when 
war  was  really  upon  us,  and  we  crossed  it  without 
hesitation,  but  for  the  present  we  disapproved.  So 
much  the  more  the  Cuban  bridge  which  was  not  yet 
in  sight.  So  we  cheerfully  promised  never  to  cross 
it.  We  fully  meant  it.  We  sympathized  with  the 
sore-stricken  people,  and  we  still  had  something  of 
our  former  easy  faith  in  independence  as  a  panacea. 
Besides,  we  instinctively  felt  the  advantage,  before 
the  world  and  before  ourselves,  of  a  disinterested  pro- 


n4    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

gram.  Has  not  even  Germany  sought  the  role  of 
champion  of  the  independence  of  little  nations? 

There  can  be  little  question  that  the  acquisitions 
which  speedily  followed  effected  a  considerable  change 
in  American  sentiment  on  this  point.  There  was 
more  to  be  said  for  the  annexation  of  Cuba  than  for 
that  of  Porto  Rico,  and  vastly  more  than  for  that  of 
the  Philippines  or  Samoa.  Yet  all  these  were  an 
nexed,  while  Cuba  was  "  freed."  The  promise  stood 
in  the  way  of  annexation.  There  were  not  wanting 
those  who  saw  the  anomaly  and  favoured  the  repudi 
ation  of  the  pledge  on  the  plausible  ground  of  the 
welfare  of  Cuba  herself,  and  such  sentiments  were 
more  manifest  in  Havana  than  here.  European  ob 
servers  accepted  annexation  as  a  foregone  conclusion, 
remembering  Egypt,  Finland,  and  the  like.  Further 
protestations  of  our  purpose  were  the  subject  of 
cynical  levity.  Had  we  had  the  cynicism  so  frankly 
manifested  by  our  critics,  we  should  doubtless  have 
done  as  they  predicted.  We  have  done  things  quite 
as  bad  as  this, —  perhaps  should  have  done  this  under 
different  leadership, —  but  under  Roosevelt  we  kept 
our  promise  and  withdrew  from  Cuba. 

But  it  was  impossible  to  be  unconscious,  as  we  had 
formerly  been,  of  our  own  interest  in  Cuba.  The  war 
had  taught  us  that  Cuba,  feeble  as  she  was,  might  be 
our  undoing.  Moreover,  our  two  or  three  years  of 
military  occupation  had  been  years  of  busy  effort  and 
of  almost  magical  transformation.  The  dark  little 
land  of  a  few  years  before  was  now  illuminated  by  the 
play  of  our  national  imagination,  and  we  decided  to 
make  our  withdrawal  conditioned  upon  the  protection 


AFTERTHOUGHT  AND  EMPIRE     115 

of  our  interests  and  the  perpetuation  of  our  beneficent 
work.  This  was  putting  a  liberal  construction  on  our 
promise,  but  not  an  unplausible  one.  We  had  prom 
ised  to  leave  Cuba  to  her  own  people  when  her  "  paci 
fication  was  accomplished,"  an  elastic  condition  which 
it  necessarily  rested  with  us  to  define.  It  could  be  in 
terpreted  narrowly,  as  the  mere  suppression  of  dis 
order  in  the  island,  or  broadly,  as  the  establishment 
of  conditions  which  would  insure  permanent  peace  in 
Cuba  and  the  adjacent  territories  under  her  influence. 
There  was  the  usual  difference  of  opinion  between  the 
literalist  and  the  rationalist,  a  difference  that  has  al 
ways  been  with  us  and  which,  in  every  crisis  of  our 
history,  has  been  decided  in  favour  of  the  latter.  The 
decision  in  this  case  was  comparatively  easy.  To 
withdraw  as  soon  as  Cuba  was  quiet  but  while  condi 
tions  were  such  as  to  inspire  a  speedy  recurrence  of 
disorder,  would  be  crying  peace!  peace!  when  there 
was  no  peace.  Pacification  must  be  more  than  tem 
porary  quiet,  if  it  was  to  have  any  significance  as  a 
condition  of  self-government.  It  is  the  product  of 
slow  development,  economic,  social,  and  political,  as 
Britain  has  found  in  Egypt,  and  we  might  legitimately 
have  stayed  indefinitely  as  she  has  done,  waiting  for 
the  elusive  condition.  We  chose  a  unique  alternative. 
The  Amendment  provides,  ( i )  that  Cuba  shall 
enter  into  no  compromising  arrangements  with  foreign 
powers,  (2)  that  she  shall  contract  no  debt  which  can 
not  be  paid  out  of  current  revenues,  (3)  that  the 
United  States  may  intervene  to  preserve  Cuban  inde 
pendence,  enforce  treaty  obligations,  and  ensure  a 
government  able  to  protect  property  and  life,  (4)  that 


ii6    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

all  acts  of  the  American  government  be  validated, 
(5)  that  American  sanitary  regulations  be  enforced, 
and  (6)  that  Cuba  sell  or  lease  to  the  United  States 
sites  for  two  naval  stations.  The  requirements  were 
in  effect  somewhat  more  exacting  than  this  brief  sum 
mary  would  indicate,  paragraphs  i  and  3  being  par 
ticularly  comprehensive.  The  United  States  retains 
virtually  complete  control  of  foreign  relations,  and 
may  intervene  to  correct  almost  any  condition  which 
she  judges  to  be  seriously  unsatisfactory,  her  naval 
bases  on  opposite  sides  of  the  island  serving  practi 
cally  as  garrison  posts  for  the  exercise  of  her  control. 
That  these  provisions  were  seriously  meant  is  indi 
cated  by  the  fact  that  the  right  of  intervention  has 
been  exercised  repeatedly,  once  to  the  extent  of  super 
seding  the  regular  government  for  a  considerable 
period. 

Cuban  politicians  were  quick  to  see  the  purport  of 
the  Amendment  and  to  protest  that  it  destroyed  the 
independence  which  the  United  States  had  promised 
and  which  we  purported  to  be  giving.  With  great 
reluctance  they  accepted  the  unwelcome  conditions, 
appending  certain  "  interpretations "  thereto  which 
were  calculated  somewhat  to  lessen  their  rigour.  It 
was  all  in  vain.  They  were  informed  that  the  ac 
ceptance  must  be  unqualified,  and  they  finally  yielded 
with  bad  grace. 

There  were  not  wanting  objectors  at  home  who  de 
clared  that  under  the  Amendment  Cuba  would  not  be 
independent,  but  would  be  a  protectorate.  This  the 
author  of  the  Amendment  stoutly  denied.  Both  were 
right,  but  the  objector  had  the  better  case.  Techni- 


AFTERTHOUGHT  AND  EMPIRE     117 

cally  Cuba  is  not  a  protectorate,  for  protectorates  do 
not  ordinarily  define  and  limit  the  powers  of  suzerain 
and  dependent  as  is  done  in  this  case.  Nor  are  the  re 
lations  as  here  defined  altogether  such  as  are  tradi 
tional  in  cases  of  that  kind.  A  protectorate  governed 
by  a  written  constitution  is  in  a  sense  unique  and  per 
haps  marks  a  significant  advance  in  the  art  of  imperial 
organization. 

But  all  this  is  beside  the  mark,  however  important. 
In  his  main  contention  the  objector  was  right.  Cuba 
may  not  be  technically  a  protectorate,  but  Cuba  is  not 
independent.  She  can  not  negotiate  with  foreign 
powers,  she  can  not  borrow  money,  she  can  not  even 
manage  her  home  affairs  or  conduct  her  housekeeping, 
except  under  the  supervision  of  her  suzerain  and 
within  the  narrow  limits  prescribed  by  the  agreement. 
Her  territory  is  virtually  garrisoned  by  the  suzerain's 
forces  who  reserves  the  right  to  intervene  practically 
at  discretion.  We  may  not  join  in  the  objector's  pro 
test,  but  we  must  concede  the  essential  correctness  of 
his  analysis.  Cuba  inaugurates  a  new  era  in  Ameri 
can  imperialism. 

Before  considering  the  consequences  that  have  fol 
lowed  from  this  epoch  making  arrangement,  it  is  well 
to  consider  its  adaptation  to  the  conditions  with  which 
we  had  to  deal.  The  interests  of  the  United  States 
were  vital,  and  the  Platt  Amendment  shows  both  a 
clear  appreciation  of  them  and  a  rare  wisdom  in 
adapting  means  to  ends. 

It  was  first  of  all  necessary  that  Cuba  should  not 
be  occupied  or  in  any  way  controlled  by  a  foreign 
power  with  whom  America  might  be  at  war.  It  is 


n8     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

beyond  question  the  best  base  in  existence  for  an  at 
tack  upon  the  United  States  with  the  exception  of 
Canada.  There  are  many  ways  in  which  a  foreign 
power  might  get  a  foothold  in  such  a  country,  ways 
against  which  Cuba  unaided  would  be  quite  unable  to 
protect  herself.  There  was  indeed  much  reason  to 
fear  that  an  independent  Cuba  with  its  inevitable  mis- 
government,  would  be  in  more  or  less  constant  trouble 
with  the  United  States,  and  that  a  short  sighted  re 
sentment  would  lead  it  to  throw  itself  into  the  arms 
of  a  power  hostile  to  the  United  States.  This  possi 
bility,  so  painfully  suggested  by  recent  conditions  in 
Mexico,  was  foreseen  and  forestalled,  not  merely  by 
pledging  Cuba  to  a  policy  of  aloofness,  but  by  a  series 
of  provisions  calculated  to  secure  the  fulfilment  of  that 
pledge.  The  naval  stations  at  Guantanamo  and 
Bahia  Honda  undoubtedly  serve  general  naval  pur 
poses,  but  it  can  not  be  doubted  that  their  chief  pur 
pose  is  to  protect  Cuba  against  foreign  occupation. 
Similarly,  the  provision  that  Cuba  should  contract  no 
debts  which  she  could  not  pay  out  of  current  revenues, 
was  designed  to  avoid  occasions  for  foreign  inter 
vention.  Finally,  the  somewhat  extraordinary  pro 
vision  for  intervention  to  suppress  disorder,  though 
designed  in  part  to  protect  American  property  and 
prevent  friction  between  the  two  countries,  had  also 
as  its  chief  purpose  the  forestalling  of  foreign  inter 
vention. 

All  this  will  be  clear  if  we  note  the  way  things 
work  in  countries  similar  to  Cuba  where  no  such  safe 
guards  exist.  Let  us  suppose  such  a  country  or 
ganized  after  the  fashion  of  a  republic  and  influenced 


AFTERTHOUGHT  AND  EMPIRE     119 

by  its  example.  The  temptation  to  showy  public  ex 
penditure  and  unremunerative  public  works  is  strong. 
Even  if  honest, —  a  somewhat  rare  condition  in 
Caribbean  lands, —  the  government  soon  contracts 
debts  which  it  cannot  pay.  With  impaired  credit,  it 
now  begins  to  mortgage  its  revenues.  A  new  loan  is 
contracted  for  the  payment  of  which  the  customs  re 
ceipts  are  pledged.  Then  local  discontent  results  in 
a  revolution.  As  a  military  or  political  movement 
this  is  farcical,  but  its  financial  aspect  is  often  serious. 
The  revolutionists,  always  impecunious,  desire  to  fill 
their  war  chest  and  empty  that  of  their  enemies. 
The  favourite  move  is  to  seize  the  customs  house 
where,  of  all  places,  ready  money  is  most  likely  to 
be  found.  But  this  money  is  pledged  to  foreign 
creditors  whose  interests  the  government  is  under  ob 
ligation  to  protect.  If  in  addition  to  this  seizure  of 
funds,  citizens  of  the  same  country  have  had  their 
buildings  burned  and  have  perhaps  lost  their  lives  in 
the  disorders,  even  the  most  reluctant  government 
can  hardly  evade  the  obligation  to  intervene.  When, 
instead  of  being  reluctant,  the  government  in  ques 
tion  is  looking  eagerly  for  a  pretext  for  occupation, 
it  will  readily  be  understood  that  these  disorders  may 
have  the  gravest  political  consequences. 

Things  like  these  had  happened  time  and  again  in 
the  pseudo-republics  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Cuba, 
save  only  the  fatal  intervention,  and  this  had  been 
prevented  only  by  the  protest  of  the  United  States 
backed  up  by  favouring  conditions  in  Europe  of  which 
Americans  have  been  singularly  'unconscious.  In  a 
word,  we  had  again  and  again  been  threatened, —  and 


120    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

were  still  threatened, —  with  unwelcome  neighbours  in 
the  Caribbean,  when  the  problem  of  Cuban  inde 
pendence  came  before  us.  We  had  impulsively  de 
cided  to  free  Cuba,  and  had  pledged  ourselves  to 
grant  her  independence.  And  then,  with  the  reflec 
tion  that  follows  impulse,  it  became  clear  that  inde 
pendence  was  not  a  thing  to  be  granted  or  withheld, 
but  a  thing  dependent  upon  deep  underlying  condi 
tions.  Judged  by  this  deeper  test,  Cuba  was  not  and 
could  not  be  independent.  No  country  as  small  as 
Cuba  and  situated  as  Cuba  is,  could  be  independent, 
even  if  its  people  were  wholly  wise,  a  condition  which 
the  Cubans  hardly  fulfilled.  This  necessary  depend 
ence  of  Cuba  once  perceived,  it  was  merely  a  ques 
tion  upon  whom  Cuba  should  depend.  There  was  but 
one  sane  answer  to  such  a  question.  Cuba  must  be  de 
pendent  upon  the  United  States  and  independent  of 
other  powers.  To  this  end,  there  must  be  no  impru 
dent  debts,  no  alliances  or  treacherous  understandings, 
no  disorders  or  pretexts  for  intervention.  And  for 
the  attainment  of  these  ends  we  must  rely,  not  on 
promises  and  good  intentions,  but  upon  garrisoned 
posts  and  authorized  intervention.  The  Platt 
Amendment  was  merely  the  formal  recognition  of 
facts  which  none  had  created  and  which  none  had 
power  to  alter.  Our  only  choice  lay  between  frank 
recognition  and  the  ostrich  policy  of  voluntary  uncon 
sciousness,  a  policy  which  would  have  left  the  great 
necessities  unaltered,  but  would  have  resulted  in  end 
less  bickering,  heart  burning,  and  perhaps  in  irre 
trievable  disaster. 

One  provision  of  the  Amendment  stands  quite  apart 


AFTERTHOUGHT  AND  EMPIRE     121 

from  all  the  foregoing,  and  is  in  fact  hardly  relevant 
to  our  inquiry.  Our  temporary  occupation,  coincid 
ing  as  it  did  with  epoch-making  discoveries  concern 
ing  the  origin  and  nature  of  tropical  diseases,  had 
enabled  us  virtually  to  eliminate  yellow  fever,  one  of 
the  most  terrible  scourges  that  ever  devastated  our 
territories.  This  result  could  be  maintained  only  by 
the  vigilant  enforcement  of  regulations  then  in  force. 
With  any  people  competent  to  manage  their  own  af 
fairs  and  inherently  capable  of  independence,  such 
enforcement  would  have  been  a  matter  of  course. 
Our  Congress,  however,  deemed  it  necessary  to  stipu 
late  that  these  regulations  should  continue  in  force. 
It  is  significant  that  this  was  one  of  the  demands  to 
which  the  Cubans  took  exception.  Of  course  the  ob 
jection  was  based,  not  on  the  end  sought,  but  on  the 
method  adopted.  They  wished  to  reserve  the  right 
to  adopt  some  other  system  of  sanitation.  Stripped 
of  its  dissembling,  this  meant  that  they  were  willing 
to  will  the  end  but  not  the  means.  Sanitary  regula 
tions  are  notoriously  irksome  to  a  people  of  low  de 
velopment.  There  is  nothing  from  which  denizens 
of  the  tropics  suffer  so  much  as  from  filth,  but  there  is 
nothing  with  which  they  are  so  loath  to  part.  Clean 
liness  implies  thoughtfulness,  restraint,  and  sacrifice 
of  immediate  comfort.  Filth  is  the  concomitant  of 
careless  ease.  But  the  filth  of  the  tropics  means  the 
blight  of  the  world,  and  in  this,  as  in  so  much  else, 
the  men  of  the  tropics  must  forego  the  privileges  that 
are  congenial  to  their  nature. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE   AFTERMATH    OF    PANAMA 

THE  clear  perception  and  definition  of  our  relation 
to  Cuba  was  made  possible  by  our  military  occupa 
tion  of  that  country  and  the  obligation  thus  imposed 
upon  us  for  a  considerable  time  of  administering  the 
country  and  studying  its  needs.  But  for  this  war, 
while  the  problem  would  have  been  the  same,  there 
would  have  been  nothing  to  overcome  the  inertia 
which  always  retards  action  in  such  cases.  We  should 
have  allowed  Cuba  to  blunder  on,  compromising  her 
self  and  us  to  any  extent,  until  finally  the  presence  of 
imminent  peril  would  have  roused  us  to  a  tardy  recog 
nition  and  a  painful  assertion  of  our  inevitable  inter 
ests.  As  it  was,  the  relation  was  defined  and  estab 
lished  under  singularly  favourable  conditions. 

It  was  inevitable,  however,  that  this  arrangement 
should  suggest  the  problem  of  other  states  similarly 
situated.  For  instance,  if  it  was  all  important  that 
Cuba  should  not  become  a  base  for  German  hostility, 
or  a  breeding  ground  of  pestilence,  was  it  not  equally 
necessary  that  precautions  be  taken  regarding  Hayti 
or  the  Central  American  states  ?  A  yellow  fever  vic 
tim  would  derive  little  consolation  from  the  assurance 
that  his  germs  were  not  of  Cuban,  but  of  Haytian 
origin.  Conceivably,  too,  a  German  expeditionary 

122 


THE  AFTERMATH  OF  PANAMA     123 

force  might  reconcile  itself  to  temporary  exclusion 
from  Cuba,  if  a  convenient  base  were  available  in 
Santo  Domingo  or  Honduras. 

In  a  word,  the  policy  adopted  with  regard  to  Cuba, 
though  perfectly  sound  and  necessary  to  the  protec 
tion  of  our  most  vital  national  interests,  was  of  little 
value  unless  it  was  generally  applied.  The  perception 
of  this  fact  was  speedily  manifest  in  an  effort  to  ex 
tend  some  form  of  American  protectorate  over  the 
Caribbean  region. 

This  effort  was  immensely  stimulated  and  its  scope 
extended  by  the  decision  of  the  United  States  to  build 
the  Panama  Canal.  The  Canal  was  in  any  case  an 
inherent  necessity,  commercial  and  military,  of  our 
geographical  situation.  It  is  certain,  too,  that  in  its 
vast  influence  upon  our  national  and  commercial  de 
velopment,  shifting  the  centre  of  population  and  busi 
ness  enterprise,  as  all  such  things  do,  it  will  make  itself 
ever  more  necessary,  an  indispensable  condition  of  the 
life  that  it  will  create.  And  just  as  it  becomes  a 
necessity  to  us,  it  becomes  the  inevitable  objective  of 
any  attack  upon  us,  for  the  essence  of  attack  is  always 
to  strike  the  vital  necessities  of  the  enemy.  More 
over  the  international  character  of  the  canal  traffic 
makes  its  control  by  an  enemy  or  a  rival  a  matter  of 
immense  positive  advantage.  Imagine  the  possibili 
ties,  merely  from  a  business  standpoint,  of  German 
occupation  of  the  Canal  with  power  to  levy  discrimi 
nating  tolls  at  discretion. 

The  Canal  is  at  a  distance  from  our  borders,  and 
it  can  be  attacked  and  defended  only  by  sea.  It  can 
not  be  too  often  insisted  that  all  effective  naval  opera- 


i24     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

tions  are  short  range  operations.     It  is  possible  for  a 
European  navy  to  steam  to  the  Panama  Canal,  but 
unless  it  had  the  rare  good  fortune  to  meet  and  de 
stroy  its  antagonist  at  once,  it  would  quickly  exhaust 
its  coal  and  other  supplies  and  be   reduced  to  im 
potence.     Against  an  enemy  that  played  the  waiting 
game,  its  chances  would  be  small  unless  it  had  near 
by  a  vast  accumulation  of  coal,  food,  munitions,  and 
reserves  of  men,  with  opportunities  for  repair  and 
\  refitting,   all  accessible   and  under  protection.     This 
;  is  the  meaning  of  the  oft  mentioned  but  popularly  ig- 
!  nored  naval  base. 

It  is  therefore  the  obvious  policy  of  the  United 
States,  if  it  wishes  effectually  to  defend  the  Canal,  to 
prevent  the  establishment  in  its  vicinity,  of  hostile 
naval  bases.  This  can  mean  nothing  less  than  the 
control  of  the  entire  Caribbean  Sea  on  the  east, —  for 
any  one  of  its  myriad  islands  and  of  its  adjacent  coasts 
is  near  enough  to  serve  as  a  hostile  base, —  and  on 
the  west  to  control  the  few  neighbouring  islands  and 
the  adjacent  coasts  for  a  considerable  distance  to  the 
north  and  to  the  south  of  the  Canal.  This  control, 
of  course,  does  not  necessarily  imply  occupation.  It 
may  take  any  form  which  we  can  be  sure  will  guar 
antee  the  result.  Occupation  by  a  powerful  and 
friendly  power  may  conceivably  be  satisfactory.  It 
is  in  any  case  our  necessary  reliance  in  the  case  of 
Jamaica  and  a  large  number  of  other  islands  under 
British  rule.  But  where  we  doubt  the  power  of  a 
nation,  however  friendly,  as  in  the  case  of  Denmark, 
or  where  we  doubt  both  power  and  good  will,  as  in 
the  case  of  some  of  these  local  independent  states,  we 


THE  AFTERMATH  OF  PANAMA     125 

are  constrained  to  seek  other  guaranties  or  incur  the 
obvious  risk. 

It  was  quickly  perceived  that  the  Platt  Amendment 
was  the  ideal  thing  for  the  safeguarding  of  our  inter 
ests  in  this  region.  To  prohibit  foreign  alliances, ' '  | 
debts,  and  revolutions,  and  insure  their  elimination  by 
a  limited  occupation,  was  at  once  the  adequate  pro 
vision  for  our  needs  and  the  irreducible  minimum  of 
our  requirement.  This  involved  no  interference  in 
legitimate  internal  affairs,  and  at  the  same  time  it 
offered  the  priceless  advantage  of  our  protection. 

But  the  application  of  the  new  principle  to  coun 
tries  recognized  as  completely  independent  presented 
serious  difficulties.     Outside  control  is  not  a  thing  that  1 
is  welcomed  by  even  the  weakest  and  most  incompetent  l 
of  peoples.     Much  more  serious,  however,  was  the 
reluctance  of  our  own  people  to  assume  the  responsi-  j 
bilities  involved,  and  above  all,  deliberately  to  impair  •' 
the  seeming  independence  of  peoples  long  recognized 
as  free.     It  was  the  conflict  between  the  early  ideals 
of  our  people  and  the  new  born  consciousness  of  their 
vital  needs.     Unfortunately  this  conflict  of  ideas  and 
of  temperaments,  difficult  to  manage  at  the  best,  was 
complicated  by  its  coincidence  with  other  issues  on 
which  parties  had  divided  with  extreme  bitterness. 
As  in  Johnson's  and  Grant's  administrations,  feeling 
had  become  so  bitter  that  men  were  willing  to  defeat 
measures  which  they  approved,  merely  to  checkmate 
the    administration.     The    vote    on    the    Caribbean 
treaties,  in  some  cases  at  least,  did  not  reflect  the  feel 
ing  of  either  Congress  or  the  country. 

But  the  objections  of  the  one  side  and  of  the  other 


126    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

to  the  establishment  of  formal  relations  of  dependence 
with  certain  of  these  countries  were  soon  overborne 
by  the  development  of  perilous  conditions  arising 
from  their  helplessness  and  demoralization.  Santo 
Domingo,  whose  request  for  annexation  as  a  state 
had  been  refused  in  Grant's  time,  proceeded  rapidly 
to  force  our  hand.  The  republic  became  hopelessly 
bankrupt,  while  petty  revolutions  continually  robbed 
industry  of  its  fruits.  An  acquaintance  of  the  writer 
who  lived  long  in  Santo  Domingo,  thus  relates  his 
experiences.  "  I  have  lived  through  five  of  these 
revolutions  and  have  never  heard  a  shot  fired.  I 
knew  the  leader  of  one  of  them.  He  confided  in  me 
that  he  had  gotten  three  thousand  dollars  and  was 
going  to  start  a  revolution.  Later  he  and  his  army 
made  me  a  call.  There  were  thirty-one  of  them,  five 
of  them  being  generals.  I  treated  them  all  to  coffee, 
and  after  that,  when  they  robbed  the  mails,  they  al 
ways  sent  me  my  letters."  It  would  be  difficult  for 
burlesque  to  go  much  farther,  but  in  a  country  whose 
military  defences  were  on  much  the  same  scale,  and 
where  the  soldiers  of  the  realm  were  likely  to  join  the 
revolution  if  it  promised  excitement,  such  disturbances 
were  a  fatal  obstacle  to  industrial  and  political  de 
velopment. 

In  1904  an  American  company  in  Santo  Domingo 
was  awarded  large  claims  against  the  government  by 
an  arbitration  commission  and  a  lien  on  the  customs 
receipts.  This  at  once  brought  up  other  claims,  until 
in  1905  the  United  States  was  compelled  to  intervene 
or  permit  other  nations  to  do  so.  The  affairs  of  the 
country  were  taken  in  hand  exactly  like  those  of  a 


THE  AFTERMATH  OF  PANAMA     127 

defunct  railway  company,  a  receiver  being  appointed 
who  collected  the  revenues,  gave  the  government  a 
stipulated  allowance,  and  devoted  the  balance  to  pay 
ing  the  nation's  debts.  Its  authority  was  at  first  noth 
ing  more  than  the  moral  backing  of  the  United  States. 
It  was  immensely  successful,  the  natural  resources  of 
the  country  being  rapidly  developed  under  these  whole 
some  conditions. 

On  its  face,  this  arrangement  was  altogether  unlike 
that  with  Cuba.  It  said  nothing  about  relations  with 
foreign  powers,  asked  for  no  naval  station,  did  not 
mention  intervention,  and  required  nothing  with  re 
gard  to  sanitation.  It  was  purely  financial  and  tem 
porary.  Our  Senate  would  not  have  sanctioned  any 
thing  more  at  this  time.  It  would  not  have  sanc 
tioned  even  this  if  it  had  not  been  rather  drawn  into 
it  in  an  effort  to  redress  the  extensive  grievances  of 
an  American  company.  But  it  seems  to  be  a  law  of 
international  relations  that  these  things  never  stop 
where  you  intend  them  to  stop.  The  financial  ar 
rangement  worked  beautifully.  The  revenues  in 
creased,  legitimate  requirements  were  met,  and  rapid 
progress  was  made  toward  payment  of  the  debt. 
But  with  the  elimination  of  revolutions  and  plunder, 
life  seemed  to  have  lost  its  zest  for  Dominicans  of  a 
certain  type.  Smouldering  discontent  broke  forth 
into  revolution  in  1912,  the  custom-house  being  as 
usual  the  storm  centre,  and  the  difficulties  were  ad 
justed  only  with  great  difficulty  and  with  the  aid  of  a 
special  commission.  The  storm  broke  again  in  1914 
and  more  seriously.  This  time  a  German  cruiser  was 
hurried  to  the  scene  to  "  protect  German  interests," 


128     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

a  purpose  which  it  was  already  suspected  was  suscepti 
ble  of  broad  interpretation.  In  alarm,  our  govern 
ment  hurried  a  considerable  fleet  of  warships  to 
Dominican  waters,  and  order  was  restored  by  a  sub 
stantial  intervention  with  bombardment  of  rebel  bat 
teries. 

It  was  clear  that  something  more  than  a  peaceful 
receivership  was  needed,  but  it  was  with  extreme  and 
perilous  reluctance  that  we  at  last  faced  the  situation. 
It  had  long  been  our  policy  to  soothe  Latin-American 
sensibilities.  And  besides,  we  had  our  prepossession 
in  favour  of  independent  republics.  In  1911  Presi 
dent  Taft  had  negotiated  treaties  similar  to  the  then 
flourishing  Santo  Domingo  arrangement,  with  Hon 
duras  and  Nicaragua,  countries  utterly  bankrupt  and 
threatened  with  foreign  intervention,  but  the  Senate 
refused  to  ratify  them.  The  rejection  of  an  even  more 
advantageous  treaty  with  Nicaragua  in  1913  was 
followed  by  a  disastrous  revolution.  While  the  re 
jection  of  these  treaties  was  largely  a  matter  of  that 
factional  spite  which  has  so  often  complicated  our 
foreign  policy,  there  can  be  no  question  that  it  im 
plied  an  unreadiness  on  our  part  to  embark  deliber 
ately  upon  a  protectorate  policy.  We  had  made  a 
start  in  Cuba  and  in  Santo  Domingo,  both  rather  un 
wittingly,  and  we  consented  to  see  the  thing  through, 
but  to  adopt  the  general  policy  of  managing  the  affairs 
of  all  neighbour  peoples  who  did  not  know  how  to 
manage  their  own  was  something  for  which  we 
were  emphatically  unprepared.  There  remained,  of 
course,  the  embarrassing  question.  "  If  they  can't 
manage  them  and  we  don't  manage  them,  what 


THE  AFTERMATH  OF  PANAMA     129 

then?"  It  is  our  way  not  to  answer  such  questions 
Uflfll  "We  have  to.  When  the  German  cruiser  came, 
we  had  to  answer. 

But  the  cruiser  was  not  all.  An  announcement  was 
made  at  this  time  in  a  joint  note  from  Germany  and 
France  which,  though  almost  unnoticed  by  our  care 
free  people,  must  have  given  our  government  food 
for  thought.  Hayti,  like  all  her  sister  pseudo-repub 
lics,  was  bankrupt,  and  a  receivership  was  plainly  im 
pending.  This  announcement  was  to  the  effect  that 
if  intervention  in  the  affairs  of  Hayti  should  become 
necessary,  the  intervention  of  a  single  'power  would 
not  be  satisfactory.  This  was  the  most  direct  chal 
lenge  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  had  received  in  the 
ninety-one  years  since  its  proclamation.  The  Ameri 
can  receivership  in  Santo  Domingo  had  been  a  con 
spicuous  success,  and  save  for  our  reluctance  to  inter 
vene  by  force  of  arms,  it  would  be  difficult  to  allege 
a  reason  why  it  should  not  be  extended,  if  need  be,  to 
the  Haytian  end  of  the  island.  The  only  possible  con 
clusion  is  that  the  protesting  powers  regarded  the  re 
ceivership  as  likely  to  lead  to  something  more,  and 
they  were  right.  But  the  clear  intimation  that  they 
claimed  a  share  in  these  perquisites  of  West  Indian 
reconstruction,  had  far  reaching  implications.  The 
incident  was  speedily  lost  sight  of  in  the  infinite  calam 
ity  of  the  world  war,  and  we  have  scarcely  realized 
how  narrow  was  our  escape  from  complications  that 
now  appal  the  imagination. 

The  danger  has  passed  for  the  moment.  Germany 
and  France  are  not  sending  joint  notes  just  now,  and 
they  have  other  cares  than  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 


130    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

But  the  incident  has  effected  a  change  in  our  attitude 
which  nothing  else  could  have  brought  about.  This 
is  reflected  in  our  latest  Caribbean  treaties,  treaties 
that  are  the  result,  not  of  military  occupation  like 
that  with  Cuba,  nor  of  a  financial  arbitration  like  that 
with  Santo  Domingo,  but  of  a  clear  recognition  of 
standing  peril  such  as  confronted  us  in  Hayti  at  the 
time  of  the  joint  note. 

Appropriately  enough,  the  chief  of  these  treaties  is 
with  Hayti.  This  treaty,  combining  the  essential  fea 
tures  of  the  Dominican  receivership  and  of  the  per 
manent  relation  with  Cuba,  adds  certain  important 
features  which  mark  a  great  advance  and  greatly  en 
hance  our  control.  The  treaty  is  furthermore  a 
masterpiece  of  diplomacy  in  its  handling  of  Haytian 
susceptibilities.  It  contains  the  now  familiar  pro 
visions  regarding  alienation  of  territory  to  foreign 
powers,  the  contracting  of  debts,  and  the  maintenance 
of  sanitary  conditions.  It  also  establishes  a  receiver 
ship  but  this  is  a  somewhat  more  elaborate  affair  than 
that  of  Santo  Domingo,  and  plainly  recalls  British 
example.  There  is  to  be  a  "  receiver  "  and  also  a 
"  financial  adviser "  to  the  administration.  The 
function  of  the  one  would  seem  to  be  to  collect  and 
disburse  revenue,  that  of  the  other  to  "  advise  "  the 
government  as  to  all  investments,  taxes,  expenditures, 
and  so  forth,  it  being  stipulated  that  the  expenses  of 
the  receivership  are  to  be  paid  first,  and  debts  next, 
the  native  government  being  provided  for  out  of  the 
remainder. 

The  most  important  innovation,  however,  is  the 
establishment  of  a  native  constabulary,  urban  and 


THE  AFTERMATH  OF  PANAMA     131 

rural,  under  American  officers  for  the  maintenance  of 
order.  Experience  has  abundantly  proved  that  such 
a  constabulary  in  the  hands  of  British  or  American 
officers,  can  be  made  absolutely  loyal  to  the  dominant 
race.  It  rapidly  acquires  a  prestige  and  caste  char 
acter  of  which  it  is  immensely  proud,  and  which  makes 
any  collusion  with  its  own  race  for  purposes  subver 
sive  of  the  established  order,  altogether  unlikely. 
This,  therefore,  is  tantamount  to  full  American  police 
control.  All  the  officials  thus  provided  for  are  to  re 
port  to  "  the  presidents  of  both  republics."  Finally, 
both  countries,  separately  and  specifically,  pledge  their 
"  aid  "  to  any  extent  that  may  be  required,  to  the 
authorities  thus  established. 

A  most  important  feature  of  this  treaty,  and  one 
which  shows  both  the  progress  made  since  Cuban 
days  and  the  unconscious  acceptance  of  our  larger  re 
sponsibility,  is  the  diplomatic  form  of  its  phraseology. 
The  Platt  Amendment  is  brutally  frank.  Cuba  must 
and  shall,  or  we  will  "  intervene."  No  wonder  the 
Cubans  saw  in  this  the  negation  of  their  independence. 
But  in  Hayti  the  two  governments  "  co-operate  "  to 
establish  the  necessary  institutions.  All  functionaries 
are  "  appointed "  by  the  Haytian  government  on 
"  recommendation  "  of  the  President  of  the  United 
States.  The  United  States  will  not  "  intervene,"  but 
will  "  aid," —  both  governments  will  aid, —  the  newly 
established  authorities.  The  American  government 
will  assert  no  authority,  but  its  representatives  will 
"  advise  "  the  Haytian  government.  It  is  easy  to  see 
in  the  American  officered  Haytian  constabulary  some 
thing  very  like  the  native  troops  of  India  and  Egypt, 


132     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

while  the  "  financial  adviser  "  is  obviously  the  "  resi 
dent,"  so  familiar  in  the  native  principalities  of  India 
or  in  the  Federated  Malay  States.  But  these  British 
terms,  though  originally  chosen  for  their  innocuous- 
ness,  are  avoided.  The  secret  is  out  that  these  terms 
connote  real  authority.  That  might  alarm  the  Hay- 
tians.  It  would  alarm  Americans  still  more. 

This  latest  development  of  American  imperialism  is 
therefore  in  many  ways  sharply  contrasted  with  our 
earlier  timid  ventures.  It  is  the  first  frank  recogni 
tion  of  the  inability  of  such  countries  as  Hayti  to  gov 
ern  themselves,  of  the  necessity  of  preserving  order 
and  security  in  territories  so  situated  under  existing 
world  conditions,  and  the  Jnadmissibility  of  allow 
ing  any  nation  but  ourselves  to  undertake  the  task, 
propositions  hardly  to  be  questioned  save  by  those 
who  reject  all  the  principles  upon  which  the  present 
world  order  is  based.  The  treaty  not  only  recog 
nizes  the  essential  principles  of  the  Platt  Amendment, 
now  become  the  constitution  of  the  American  empire, 
but  it  establishes  American  control,  not  potential  as 
,;in  the  case  of  Cuba,  but  actual  and  comprehensive,  not 
only  over  the  finances  and  general  policy  of  the  gov 
ernment,  but  even  over  its  local  police.  Cuba  is  al 
lowed  to  appoint  her  own  officials,  to  collect  and  dis 
burse  her  own  revenues,  and  to  police  her  own  terri 
tories,  with  only  the  warning  that  we  shall  "  inter 
vene  "  if  she  does  not  do  these  things  satisfactorily. 
And  since  intervention  is  a  very  cumbersome  and  costly 
expedient,  and  one  which  is  highly  distasteful  to  both 
parties,  Cuba  is  in  fact  free  to  indulge  to  a  consider 
able  extent  in  tropical  politics  without  feeling  our 


THE  AFTERMATH  OF  PANAMA     133 

heavy  hand.  She  has  neither  the  annoyance  nor  yet 
the  assistance  of  an  "  adviser,"  though  we  may  per 
haps  assume  that  the  position  of  American  repre 
sentative  in  Cuba  is  one  of  delicate  responsibility. 
Our  relation  with  Cuba  thus  insures  only  an  emergency 
control,  a  disadvantage,  beyond  doubt,  as  regards  the 
immediate  ends  of  government,  but  possibly  an  ad 
vantage  in  the  end.  In  any  case  the  freer  relation 
was  appropriate  to  the  conditions  under  which  it  was 
established.  Cuba  did  not  come  to  us  bankrupt, 
mortgaged  to  foreign  creditors,  and  demoralized  by 
a  century  of  independence.  No  doubt  these  condi 
tions  would  have  appeared  promptly  if  Cuba  had  been 
free  to  do  as  she  chose.  But  as  they  were  not  pres 
ent,  and  as  our  obvious  concern  was  to  protect  our 
selves  and  avoid  foreign  complications  for  our  neces 
sary  protege,  we  have  wisely  limited  ourselves  to  the 
attainment  of  these  objects.  We  could  undoubtedly 
manage  Cuban  affairs  better  than  the  Cubans  do,  but 
the  world  has  learned  that  local  administration  is 
not  the  function  of  empire. 

We  had  a  different  problem  in  bankrupt  Santo  Do 
mingo  and  Hayti.  We  tried  to  meet  the  situation  in 
Santo  Domingo  by  the  simple  business  device  of  a  re 
ceivership,  only  to  find  the  financial  situation  compli 
cated  by  revolution  and  the  dreaded  foreign  interven 
tion.  With  the  distinct  warning  of  the  two  greatest 
military  powers  of  the  world  that  in  case  of  further 
disturbances,  we  must  share  with  them  the  privilege  of 
intervention,  we  wisely  decided  that  there  must  be  no 
further  disturbances.  Foreign  entanglements,  bank 
ruptcy,  revolution  and  pestilence  must  cease  in  these 


134    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

neighbour  lands.  How  could  we  have  willed  less 
than  this?  And  since  who  wills  the  end  must  will  the 
means,  we  embodied  our  decision  in  this  treaty  with 
Hayti.  What  else  could  have  provided  the  means? 
Lingering  hopes  that  Hayti  may  sometime  be  self- 
sufficient,  or  perhaps  just  another  concession  to  Hay- 
tian  susceptibilities,  limited  the  duration  of  the  treaty 
to  ten  years  with  privilege  of  renewal  if  necessary. 
Renewal  may  be  taken  for  granted.  Hayti  will  be 
independent  as  Egypt  will  be  independent,  when  the 
empire  that  now  exercises  control  as  a  condition  of  its 
own  existence,  shall  have  ceased  to  exist. 

In  the  treaty  with  Hayti  the  great  principles  of 
Caribbean  protection  are  definitely  recognized  and 
formulated.  Further  application,  however,  though 
plainly  inevitable,  must  await  favourable  opportunity. 
One  case  of  peculiar  urgency  required  immediate  at 
tention  and  was  settled  almost  simultaneously  with 
that  of  Hayti.  Nicaragua  was  the  most  troubled 
state  in  Central  America.  In  ten  years  there  were 
sixteen  revolutions.  Finances,  it  is  needless  to  say, 
were  in  a  most  deplorable  state.  All  parties  had 
come  to  realize  the  desperate  condition  of  affairs  and 
were  praying  for  intervention.  Nevertheless,  treaties 
after  the  Santo  Domingo  pattern  providing  for  a  re 
ceivership  under  American  control  had  been  twice 
ignored  by  the  United  States  Senate.  The  inertia  of 
our  continental  tradition  still  continued,  even  in  the 
face  of  the  most  imminent  peril.  Once  more,  too,  the 
spirit  of  faction, —  a  quarrel  between  the  President 
and  a  section  of  his  own  party, —  complicated  the 
issue.  But  for  the  war  who  knows  what  German 


THE  AFTERMATH  OF  PANAMA     135 

cruisers  might  have  appeared  upon  the  scene,  and 
what  complications  might  have  arisen  from  our  re 
fusal  to  look  this  perilous  situation  in  the  face? 

But  as  the  terrible  reality  of  this  struggle  of  the 
nations  became  apparent  and  we  slowly  perceived  our 
closer  relation  to  it,  the  thoughts  of  the  nation  inevit 
ably  turned  toward  the  problem  of  national  defence, 
and  in  particular  toward  the  Canal,  that  most  vital 
yet  most  exposed  part  of  our  defensive  system.  It 
was  remembered  that  Nicaragua  offered  an  alterna 
tive  route  which  we  had  long  considered.  The  pos 
sibility  that  some  other  power  might  secure  this  route 
and  construct  a  competing  canal,  meanwhile  getting 
firm  lodgment  on  the  territory  of  helpless  Nicaragua, 
like  so  many  possibilities  hitherto  ignored,  now  be 
came  a  disturbing  reality.  For  such  a  transaction  the 
avowed  bankruptcy  of  Nicaragua  and  our  own  refusal 
to  come  to  her  relief  furnished  ample  excuse,  while 
our  hesitation  in  fulfilling  our  pledge  about  the  canal 
tolls  furnished  the  sufficient  pretext.  Such  a  canal 
would  be  fortified  like  our  own  and  would  thus  be 
come  automatically  a  double  naval  base. 

Prompted  by  such  considerations  as  these  we  nego 
tiated  and  ratified  in  1916,  a  treaty  conveying  to  the 
United  States  in  perpetuity  each  and  every  canal 
route  across  Nicaragua  and  leasing  for  ninety-nine 
years  with  option  of  ninety-nine  more,  two  islands  on 
the  east  coast  and  a  naval  base  to  be  chosen  at  will  in 
the  Gulf  of  Fonseca  on  the  Pacific  side.  In  return  the 
United  States  was  to  pay  to  Nicaragua  the  sum  of  $3,- 
000,000,  but  it  was  prudently  stipulated  that  the 
money  was  to  be  deposited  in  an  American  bank 


136    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

chosen  by  our  Secretary  of  State  and  devoted  to  the 
payment  of  Nicaraguan  debts  under  his  supervision. 

The  strange  thing  about  this  treaty  is  its  silence  on 
the  familiar  principles  of  the  Platt  Amendment, — 
foreign  entanglements,  contracting  debts,  sanitation, 
and  intervention.  The  explanation  is  to  be  found  in 
the  fact  that  Nicaraguan  affairs  were  already  in  our 
hands.  American  troops  had  occupied  Nicaragua  for 
several  years,  while  an  American  bank,  formed  for 
the  purpose  with  the  consent  of  our  government,  had 
gotten  complete  control  of  the  finances  and  the  pro 
ductive  assets  of  the  hopelessly  disordered  state. 
The  $3,000,000  paid  by  this  government  had  mostly 
been  advanced  by  this  bank,  and  the  arrangement  men 
tioned  above  was  merely  one  of  reimbursement.  It 
would  seem  in  effect  that  the  administration,  balked  by 
a  factious  Senate,  yet  compelled  to  act  to  avert  na 
tional  disaster,  had  resorted  to  the  device  of  creating 
a  private  receivership  to  do,  under  governmental  coun 
tenance  and  guaranty,  the  work  which  the  government 
was  not  permitted  to  do  itself,  and  which  it  was  yet 
impossible  to  neglect.  Be  this  as  it  may,  the  work 
was  done,  and  America  was  in  control,  unofficially  if 
not  officially.  The  treaty  and  its  stipulated  payment 
redeemed  the  obligation  of  the  government  to  those 
who  had  done  its  work. 

But  the  question  naturally  arises  why  the  govern 
ment  did  not  at  the  same  time  assume  its  further 
functions  and  provide,  as  in  Hayti,  for  the  inevitable 
and  necessary  protectorate.  The  conditions  prevail 
ing  in  Central  America  apparently  furnished  the  an 
swer.  Nicaragua  is  not  an  isolated  island,  but  one  of 


THE  AFTERMATH  OF  PANAMA     137 

a  group  of  little  states  habitually  jealous  and  often  at 
war  with  one  another.  The  necessity,  both  local  and 
international,  of  bringing  order  out  of  this  chaos,  is 
apparent  to  all,  but  American  opinions  —  the  reflec 
tion  for  the  most  part,  of  individual  temperament, — 
naturally  differ  as  to  the  remedy.  The  one  party  sees 
hope  only  in  a  foreign  protectorate, —  necessarily  that 
of  the  United  States, —  and  vast  and  manifold  are  the 
influences  constantly  at  work  for  that  end.  Property 
in  particular,  whether  in  citizen  or  alien  hands,  re 
fuses  to  believe  in  the  capacity  of  peoples  so  small,  so 
crude,  and  so  unfavourably  situated,  to  provide  the 
protection  which  it  requires.  Those  also  who  are 
chiefly  concerned  with  the  fate  of  greater  nations  and 
who  see  the  strategic  position  of  these  unconscious  little 
states,  naturally  incline  to  an  American  protectorate 
as  the  only  adequate  safeguard  of  its  vast  interests. 
But  there  is  another  temperament, —  one  possibly 
less  impressed  with  actualities  and  more  liberally  en 
dowed  with  imagination, —  which  seeks  a  remedy  in 
political  rehabilitation  and  real  independence.  If 
these  people  are  ignorant,  they  must  be  educated;  if 
they  are  thriftless,  they  must  learn  thrift  in  the  hard 
school  of  experience ;  if  they  are  small,  they  must  gain 
consequence  by  union.  A  federated  Central  America 
with  possible  inclusion  of  other  Latin  peoples,  is  the 
logical  program  of  this  party.  The  practicability  of 
this  program  and  its  relation  to  the  problem  of  our 
national  interest  we  have  to  consider  in  connection 
with  the  larger  subject  of  Pan- Americanism.  For  the 
moment  we  are  concerned  only  with  its  bearing  on  the 
treaty  with  Nicaragua. 


138     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

An  important  step  was  taken  in  the  direction  of 
federation  when  in  1907,  on  the  initiative  of  Mexico 
and  the  United  States,  a  Central  American  court  of 
justice  with  one  representative  from  each  Central 
American  state,  was  established  to  decide  the  ques 
tions  which  had  kept  these  little  states  in  turmoil.  It 
was  fondly  hoped  that  the  existence  of  such  a  tribunal 
would  make  these  incessant  wars  unnecessary,  and 
by  establishing  peace,  lead  to  ultimate  union.  These 
hopes  were  far  from  realized,  but  something  was  ac 
complished. 

It  will  be  plain  that  if  these  states  were  to  arbitrate 
their  quarrels  among  themselves,  they  must  be  free 
to  do  so.  If  one  of  them  were  made  a  protectorate, 
it  would  lose  all  freedom  of  action  in  foreign  relations, 
and  the  others  would  have  to  deal  with  the  big  suzerain 
state  rather  than  with  an  equal.  Moreover  it  would 
put  an  end  to  all  possibility  of  federation  so  far  as  the 
protected  state  was  concerned.  Since  this  experiment, 
begun  at  the  instance  of  our  government  and  under  its 
patronage,  was  still  in  progress  with  some  prospect  of 
successful  results,  the  protectorate  must  be  held  in 
abeyance.  More  exactly,  since  bankruptcy  had  made 
a  receivership  inevitable,  the  protectorate  must  re 
main  unofficial. 

But  the  great  question  of  the  canal  with  its  pre 
destined  defences  of  island  and  bay,  could  not  be 
thus  risked.  To  these  our  government  must  have  a 
title  which  no  rival  among  the  great  powers  could 
question.  Hence  these  were  conveyed  by  treaty,  while 
the  more  general  interests  of  foreign  occupation,  debt, 


THE  AFTERMATH  OF  PANAMA     139 

sanitation,  and  intervention  were  not  u  nominated  in 
the  bond  "  but  were  quietly  assured  in  fact. 

With  all  this  deference,  however,  the  treaty  at  once  j 
dealt  a  staggering  blow  to  this  system  of  incipient! I 
federation.     It  excited  the  jealousy  of  neighbouring 
states  who  vaguely  saw  in  it  advantages  to  Nicaragua 
which  they  did  not  share.     Two  of  them,  Salvador 
and  Honduras,  shared  with  Nicaragua  the  coast  of  the 
Gulf  of  Fonseca,  and  consequently  had  joint  rights  to 
its  waters,  while  a  third,  Costa  Rica,  had  for  one  of 
its  boundaries  the  river  which  was  to  be  utilized  in 
part  for  the  proposed  canal.     These  states  protested  | 
that  Nicaragua  had  sold  what  she  did  not  possess,  and  1 
that  the  establishment  of  a  naval  base  in  the  Gulf  of 
Fonseca  gave  control  of  their  adjacent  coasts.     Sal 
vador  and  Costa  Rica  brought  suit  against  Nicaragua 
for  damages  before  the  Central  American  court  al 
ready  mentioned  and  won  by  the  predestined  majority 
of  four  to  one.     Nicaragua  promptly  ignored  the  de 
cision.     The  authority  of  the  court  was  plainly  at  an 
end  as  regards  matters  to  which  the  United  States 
was  a  party. 

These  protests  seem  to  have  been  technically  justi 
fied.  Our  Senate  took  no  notice  of  them  beyond  as 
serting  that  it  had  no  intention  of  violating  the  neutral 
ity  of  the  protesting  states.  The  procedure  was 
rather  summary  and  our  action  possibly  precipitate. 
It  may  be  questioned,  too,  whether  a  joint  treaty  with 
the  four  powers  concerned  would  not  have  given  us 
a  technically  better  title.  But  it  may  also  be  ques 
tioned  whether  such  a  treaty  would  have  been  prao 


140    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

ticable  and  whether  the  attempt  to  secure  it  would  not 
have  resulted  in  a  series  of  hold-ups  eventuating  in 
extortion  or  in  the  failure  of  the  treaty.  Meanwhile 
Nicaragua  was  the  all  important  party.  If  her  con 
sent  was  not  enough  to  build  a  canal,  it  was  at  least 
enough  to  prevent  any  one  else  from  doing  so.  And 
Nicaragua  was  necessitous  and  in  our  power.  It  was 
a  very  human  transaction,  but  then,  who  expects  our 
Senate  to  be  superhuman? 

Whatever  the  merits  of  this  discussion,  it  only  ob 
scures  the  larger  question  at  issue.  The  conflict  is 
between  opposed  principles  and  temperaments.  The 
one  takes  seriously  the  nominal  independence  of  such 
countries  and  esteems  as  of  primary  importance  their 
regulation  of  their  own  affairs.  The  other  recog 
nizes  them  as  dependent,  not  by  choice  of  ourselves  or 
others,  but  necessarily  and  inherently  dependent,  be 
cause  of  their  smallness,  their  location,  their  climate, 
and  the  resulting  race  characteristics.  To  the  inde 
pendence  party,  Central  America  is  its  own  little 
world.  To  the  imperialist  party,  it  is  but  a  pawn  on 
the  mighty  chess  board  of  world  empire.  We  may 
sympathize  with  the  one  or  the  other,  but  we  must  not 
judge  the  one  by  the  standards  of  the  other.  The 
United  States  plays  the  vaster  game,  must  play  it  and 
play  it  well,  for  the  stake  is  its  existence. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE    UNFINISHED   TASK 

IT  is  difficult  to  follow  the  expansion  of  America  in 
the  Caribbean  without  feeling  that  it  will  go  farther. 
Whether  it  should  go  farther  is  not  the  question. 
This  is  neither  an  indictment  nor  a  propaganda,  but  a 
study.  No  more  is  assumed  than  that  national  char 
acter  shows  a  certain  continuity,  and  that  incentives 
which  have  been  potent  in  the  past  are  likely  to  be 
potent  in  the  future.  If  so  much  be  conceded,  then 
the  further  development  of  Caribbean  domination 
seems  assured.  If  the  considerations  which  have  im 
pelled  us  to  restrict  the  liberty  of  Cuba,  to  take  over 
the  financial  problems  of  Santo  Domingo  and  to  as 
sume  the  management  of  Hayti,  are  legitimate,  then 
there  is  more  work  of  this  kind  for  us  to  do.  Condi 
tions  were  no  worse  in  Hayti  than  in  other  Caribbean 
countries.  Utter  recklessness  and  incompetency  have 
characterized  the  management  of  every  one  of  these 
pseudo-states  which  the  preoccupations  of  the  real  na 
tions  have  temporarily  abandoned  to  independence. 
It  was  a  matter  of  chance  which  one  of  the  dancers 
should  first  pay  the  piper,  but  all  have  danced  and 
all  must  pay.  As  each  faces  in  turn  the  inevitable 
crisis,  the  same  problem  presents  itself.  What  reason 
is  there  to  believe  that  we  shall  not  meet  it  in  the 
same  way? 

141 


142     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

Indeed,  the  chief  reasons  rather  gain  in  force  as 
the  process  is  continued.  As  regards  its  own  pros 
perity,  to  be  sure,  and  its  economic  serviceableness  to 
mankind,  each  territory  redeemed  from  chaos  to  order 
is  so  much  clear  gain.  But  in  the  matter  of  protect 
ing  our  health  against  tropical  diseases,  or  preventing 
the  lodgment  of  hostile  powers  near  our  coasts,  our 
work  in  rehabilitating  these  countries  is  largely  thrown 
away  unless  we  complete  it.  It  is  like  the  building  of 
a  wall  which  is  useless  until  the  last  breach  is  closed. 
The  nearer  we  come,  therefore,  to  completing  the 
wall,  the  more  compelling  the  motive  to  close  any 
breaches  that  remain.  There  is  strong  reason  to  be 
lieve,  therefore,  that  the  impulse  to  dominate  the 
Caribbean  and  the  Pacific  coast  within  the  same  lati 
tudes,  will  be  not  only  continuous  but  cumulative  as  a 
factor  in  future  American  policy.  Doubtless  this 
domination  will  assert  itself  in  various  ways,  some 
overt  and  complete  as  in  the  case  of  Porto  Rico,  others' 
indirect,  unofficial,  perhaps  merely  moral.  The  only 
requisite  will  be  real  control.  This  control  it  can 
hardly  be  doubted  that  America  will  insist  upon  ac 
quiring. 

Before  considering  the  question  of  form  and 
method,  it  may  be  well  to  inquire  what  the  limits  of 
American  control  are  seemingly  destined  to  be.  We 
will  confine  ourselves  first  to  the  problem  of  defence. 

It  hardly  need  be  said  that  we  have  little  to  fear 
from  these  countries  themselves.  Military  operations 
which  may  be  necessary  to  restore  order  in  these 
regions  may  prove  troublesome  and  expensive,  and 
certain  of  these  countries  in  the  hands  of  a  foreign 


THE  UNFINISHED  TASK  143 

enemy  might  be  a  serious  danger,  but  left  to  them 
selves  they  will  hardly  endanger  the  United  States  by 
military  aggression.  Mexico  might  conceivably  have 
the  rashness  to  attack  us  and  the  brief  good  fortune 
to  achieve  temporary  successes,  but  the  certainty  of 
the  ultimate  outcome  is  likely  to  deter  her  from  ag 
gression,  unless  backed  by  foreign  powers.  Unfortu 
nately  there  is  much  reason  to  believe  that  in  the 
event  of  a  strong  combination  of  European  powers 
against  us,  the  sympathies  of  Mexico,  with  her  old 
grievances,  and  perhaps  of  all  the  Caribbean  states, 
would  be  with  our  enemies.  This  would  not  neces 
sarily  be  due  to  any  injustice  on  our  part,  though  our 
record  is  doubtless  far  from  perfect  in  this  respect, 
but  to  the  simple  fact  that  they  are  smaller  and  weaker 
than  ourselves  and  to  their  consciousness  that  no  mat 
ter  what  our  deference  to  their  pride,  their  fate  is  in 
our  hands. 

It  is  Europe,  therefore,  that  we  have  to  fear, 
Europe  that  surpasses  us  in  need  and  in  power  to  take, 
Europe  that  alone  has  the  power  to  make  these  help 
less  neighbours  formidable,  Europe  and  Japan,  for 
outside  of  America  there  is  only  Europe  and  Japan. 
They  hold  Asia  and  Africa, —  and  they  are  not  satis 
fied.  Our  problem  is  therefore  to  hold  them  at  a 
distance.  Even  at  a  distance  they  are  terrible. 
Planted  near  our  shores  they  would  be  irresistible. 
These  powers  of  whose  friendship  we  have  no  suffi 
cient  guaranties,  must  have  no  colonies  or  naval  sta 
tions  in  the  Caribbean.  They  must  have  with  these 
irresponsible  states,  no  relations  of  intimacy  or  obli 
gation  which  in  an  emergency  might  be  transmuted  into 


144    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

the  thing  we  fear.  That  is  the  irreducible  minimum 
of  our  demand,  and  whatever  the  means  chosen  to  se 
cure  this  end,  there  is  no  indication  that  the  American 
people  will  relax  its  effort  or  lessen  its  demand. 

One  exception  must  be  made  to  this  veto  upon 
Europe.  We  have  nothing  to  gain  by  vetoing  Brit 
ish  expansion  in  the  Caribbean,  at  least  as  regards  our 
national  defence,  for  the  simple  reason  that  she  is 
there  already  in  positions  as  strategic  as  any  that  she 
is  likely  to  acquire.  Beginning  within  a  hundred 
miles  of  the  Florida  coast,  her  islands  stretch  in  an 
almost  unbroken  outer  chain  to  Trinidad  in  the  ex 
treme  southeastern  corner  where  the  chain  links 
solidly  with  the  mainland,  while  the  bulwark  of  British 
Guiana  is  only  a  few  miles  away.  In  the  middle  of 
the  area  and  absolutely  commanding  the  chief  en 
trance,  Britain  holds  Jamaica  with  the  Caymans  far 
ther  west.  Finally,  on  the  Central  American  main 
land  at  the  western  boundary  of  the  Caribbean,  is 
British  Honduras.  There  may  be  reasons  why 
Britain  should  not  acquire  farther  possessions  here 
and  should  have  no  part  in  the  necessary  work  of 
redeeming  these  forfeit  states,  but  these  reasons  can 
hardly  have  to  do  with  our  national  defence.  It  is 
to  be  hoped  that  we  have  other  guaranties  against 
harm  at  the  hands  of  Britain,  but  if  not,  we  shall 
hardly  find  safety  in  limiting  her  acquisitions  in  the 
Caribbean.  Her  present  possessions  are  sufficient  to 
meet  all  military  and  naval  requirements. 

The  proposal  that  the  United  States  acquire  these 
possessions  in  exchange  for  the  Philippines  has  al 
ready  been  mentioned.  The  reasons  urged  concern 


THE  UNFINISHED  TASK  145 

the  Philippines  rather  than  the  West  Indies.  Those 
who  make  the  proposal  are  apparently  anxious  to  get 
rid  of  the  former  rather  than  to  acquire  the  latter. 
They  believe  the  possession  of  the  Philippines  exposes 
us  to  grave  dangers,  yet  do  not  feel  that  we  are  at 
liberty  to  dispose  of  them  without  regard  to  the  wel 
fare  of  the  inhabitants.  The  problem  of  the  Philip 
pines  will  be  discussed  in  its  place.  For  the  present 
we  have  only  to  note  that  such  an  exchange  would 
contribute  nothing  to  our  safety  in  the  Caribbean.  It 
would  give  us  more  naval  bases,  but  we  have  enough 
already.  Meanwhile,  if  there  are  those  whose  imagi 
nation  suggests  a  possible  attack  from  Britain,  it  may 
suffice  to  reflect  that  Canada  would  furnish  the  neces 
sary  base. 

The  case  of  France  is  slightly  similar.  By  her 
possession  of  Guadeloupe  and  Martinique  together 
with  several  smaller  islands  in  the  eastern  Caribbean, 
with  French  Guiana  farther  east  on  the  South  Amer 
ican  mainland,  France  occupies  a  strong  strategic  situ 
ation  which  an  aggressive  power  might  use  effec 
tively  as  a  base  for  a  farther  advance.  The  question 
naturally  arises,  is  France  such  a  power?  Have  we 
anything  to  fear  from  her  presence  in  the  Caribbean? 
We  may  safely  assume  that  all  powers  that  are  real 
powers  and  have  some  degree  of  liberty  of  action 
are  aggressive  powers.  On  this  point  France  has  left 
us  in  no  doubt.  No  people  has  cherished  the  dream 
of  empire  more  fondly  than  France  or  made  greater 
sacrifices  to  realize  it.  It  would  be  a  mistake  to  as 
sume  that  as  a  republic  her  temper  has  seriously 
changed.  Never  has  French  imperialism  been  more 


i46    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

zealous  and  seldom  has  it  been  more  successful  than 
in  these  recent  years  of  the  Republic. 

It  would  also  be  hazardous  to  count  on  the  senti 
ment  of  the  present  moment  as  offering  permanent 
guaranties  for  the  United  States.  That  sentiment  is 
certainly  one  to  be  carefully  conserved,  an  asset  of 
possible  inestimable  value.  But  sentiment  undergoes 
surprising  changes  with  changing  circumstances,  and 
nowhere  more  so  than  in  France.  The  French  are 
today  the  allies  of  the  people  whom  they  have  hated 
longest  of  any  in  Europe.  We  share  at  present  and 
are  likely  to  share  increasingly  their  cordial  good  will, 
but  changed  conditions  and  new  conflicts  of  interest 
may  quite  destroy  this  safeguard. 

There  is  reason  to  believe,  however,  that  the  ad 
vance  of  France  will  not  be  in  this  direction.  Her 
vast  designs  in  both  America  and  Asia  have  proved 
abortive  and  have  seemingly  been  abandoned.  On 
the  other  hand  France  now  has  possessions  in  Africa 
which  are  of  enormous  extent  and  value,  and  the  de 
velopment  of  which  makes  heavy  demands  on  both  her 
enthusiasm  and  her  resources.  It  is  probable  that  as 
the  result  of  the  present  war  these  possessions  will 
be  still  farther  increased.  With  every  step  of  her 
advance  challenged  by  jealous  and  powerful  rivals, 
France  seems  little  likely  to  hazard  her  African  em 
pire  in  an  imprudent  American  venture. 

In  another  respect  the  problem  of  the  French 
colonies  is  less  reassuring.  France  will  not  use  them 
to  our  hurt,  but  can  France  hold  them?  Had  France 
and  Britain  been  beaten  in  the  present  war,  it  is  wholly 
conceivable  that  such  colonies  might  have  been  part 


THE  UNFINISHED  TASK  147 

of  the  price  that  France  would  have  to  pay  for  peace. 
That  opens  another  line  of  thought.  It  is  conceivable, 
too,  that  with  but  slight  commercial  interests  in  this 
part  of  the  world  and  a  limited  merchant  marine  more  , 
profitably  employed  elsewhere,  France  might  consent  ,j 
to  sell  the  islands.  There  can  be  little  question  who 
the  most  eager  customer  would  be.  For  these  and 
similar  reasons  it  may  well  be  the  policy  of  the  United 
States  to  acquire  the  French  possessions  if  possible  as 
we  have  recently  acquired  the  Danish  Islands,  not 
because  we  need  them  or  because  of  their  intrinsic 
value,  but  because  their  possession  by  Germany  or 
some  power  similarly  disposed  might  be  fatal  to  our 
security.  Still  another  power  presents  a  similar  prob 
lem.  Between  French  Guiana  and  British  Guiana  lies 
Dutch  Guiana,  and  the  same  power  possesses  Cur- 
ac,ao,  a  group  of  islands  off  the  coast  of  Venezuela. 
Holland  as  a  neighbour  we  may  view  with  perfect  tran 
quillity.  But  Holland  is  one  of  the  little  countries  of 
Europe  whose  existence  depends  on  the  maintenance 
of  the  present  balance  of  power  between  Britain  and 
Germany.  Were  Britain  to  be  crippled  ever  so 
briefly,  Holland  would  become  a  part  of  Germany, 
and  her  vast  island  empire  would  automatically  pass 
under  German  control.  This  union  might  be  overt 
in  the  form  of  annexation,  or  concealed  under  the 
form  of  an  entente  or  an  alliance.  It  would  make 
little  difference.  Holland  would  be  compelled,  no 
matter  how  unwillingly,  to  place  her  possessions  at 
Germany's  disposal.  It  is  precisely  this  which  we 
have  feared  in  the  case  of  Denmark.  The  danger 
in  this  case  was  perhaps  a  little  greater,  for  it  is  pos- 


i48     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

sible  that  Britain  would  stake  less  to  maintain  the 
independence  of  Denmark  than  that  of  Holland,  but 
the  cases  are  not  greatly  different.  In  both  cases 
these  West  Indian  possessions  are  remote  from  the 
chief  centre  of  national  interests  and  are  unprofitable. 
To  Germany  they  would  have  a  value  not  measured 
by  their  balance  of  trade.  Holland  is  less  likely  to 
sell,  and  her  posessions  are  perhaps  less  available  for 
the  purchaser's  purpose,  but  the  reasons  for  the  one 
purchase  hold  in  a  degree  for  the  other,  and  make  it 
a  seeming  necessity  of  ultimate  American  policy. 

But  our  chief  danger  lies,  not  in  the  possessions  of 
other  powers,  but  in  the  so  called  independent  states. 
These  offer  in  abundance  not  only  the  naval  stations 
required,  but  valuable  resources  in  tropical  products 
and  in  some  cases  populations  capable  of  efficient  use 
under  foreign  training.  They  are  one  and  all  in 
capable  of  protecting  themselves  against  foreign  ag 
gression,  while  their  recklessness  and  incapacity  in 
volves  them  in  obligations  to  foreign  powers  which  at 
times  compel  intervention  and  always  furnish  its 
plausible  pretext.  All  are  of  the  lowest  political 
morality  and  susceptible  to  bribes  as  well  as  to  flat 
tery.  Finally,  the  disparity  between  them  and  the 
United  States  and  the  frequent  necessity  of  unwel 
come  action  on  the  part  of  the  latter  naturally  results 
in  jealousy  and  ill-will  on  their  part.  No  doubt  all 
these  regrettable  conditions  can  be  modified  and  possi 
bly  eliminated  in  time  by  patience  and  wisdom  on  our 
part.  No  doubt  every  reasonable  effort  should  be 
made  to  that  end.  But  that  is  not  the  question.  The 
fact  to  be  noted  here  is  that  the  character  and  temper 


THE  UNFINISHED  TASK  149 

of  these  states  makes  them  subservient  to  the  purposes 
of  a  hostile  power.  Germany  (for  the  moment  neces 
sarily  the  type  of  such  a  power)  can  find  in  any  one  of 
these  states  the  site  that  she  wishes  and  in  their  dis 
honourable  policy  the  excuse  for  seizing  it.  Against 
such  action  these  states  could  oppose  no  force  what 
ever,  and  in  the  face  of  so  plausible  an  excuse  it  would 
be  most  embarrassing  for  a  foreign  power  to  protest. 
That  this  is  not  mere  imagination  recent  events 
have  clearly  shown.  German  intervention  in  Vene 
zuela  was  prevented  in  1908  only  by  a  direct  threat 
of  war,  coupled  with  the  greatest  tact  on  the  part  of 
President  Roosevelt.  A  German  cruiser  at  Santo 
Domingo  forced  us  to  violent  and  precipitate  inter 
vention.  During  the  period  of  the  war  and  probably 
before  it,  German  intrigue  has  been  busy  in  Cuba  and 
Mexico  with  results  not  yet  wholly  manifest.  And 
within  the  year  have  come  reports  of  German  nego 
tiations  for  a  submarine  base  in  Venezuela,  a  country 
whose  policy  seems  to  have  become  definitely  pro- 
German,  and  of  German  intrigues  in  Yucatan  to  pre 
vent  the  customary  sale  to  the  United  States  of  the 
sisal,  a  monopoly  product  indispensable  to  the  har 
vesting  of  our  grain  crop  in  this  year  of  need.  These 
interferences,  ranging  from  petty  annoyance  to  deadly 
peril,  are  but  suggestions  of  an  ever  present  possi 
bility  of  unlimited  scope  against  which  these  states 
have  neither  the  power  nor  the  moral  character  neces 
sary  to  protect  us.  It  is  easy  to  minimize  the  signifi 
cance  of  German  intervention  in  Santo  Domingo  and 
Venezuela.  Perhaps  Germany  would  have  with 
drawn  when  her  grievances  were  redressed.  But 


1 50     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

such  incidents  tend  to  recur,  and  repeated  intervention 
usually  ends  in  occupation.  Nor  is  Germany  the  only 
danger.  It  is  certain  that  Japan  has  sought  a  naval 
base  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Canal  and  has  made  over 
tures  to  disaffected  powers  regarding  it. 

Whatever  the  actual  danger  involved  in  these  condi 
tions,  there  can  be  no  question  that  the  government  of 
the  United  States  judges  it  to  be  serious  and  that  the 
acquisition  of  the  Danish  West  Indies,  the  protector 
ate  over  Hayti,  and  the  various  arrangements  with 
Cuba,  Santo  Domingo,  Panama,  and  Nicaragua  have 
had  as  their  chief  purpose  the  defence  of  the  nation 
against  this  danger. 

How  far  will  the  United  States  go?  It  is  impos 
sible  to  say,  but  it  is  possible  to  say  how  far  this  policy 
may  go.  The  object  is  to  protect  the  southern  ap 
proaches  to  the  United  States  and  above  all  the  ap 
proaches  to  the  canal  and  the  traffic  routes  between 
the  Americas.  Through  the  Caribbean  passes  all  the 
traffic  between  our  eastern  coast  and  the  eastern  coast 
of  South  America,  between  our  eastern  coast  and 
western  South  America,  between  our  eastern  coast  and 
our  own  western  coast,  between  the  entire  Atlantic 
basin  and  the  vast  Pacific  world.  The  Caribbean  is 
in  the  Western  Hemisphere  what  the  Mediterranean 
is  in  the  Eastern,  the  jugular  vein  through  which  passes 
the  life  blood  twixt  heart  and  head.  Imagine  the  re 
sult  of  submarines  sheltered  by  careless  or  jealous  peo 
ples  along  a  route  like  this. 

What  did  those  nations  who  were  vitally  interested 
in  the  safety  of  the  Mediterranean  think  necessary  to 
its  defence?  Nothing  less  than  the  direct  control  of 


THE  UNFINISHED  TASK  151 

its  entire  irresponsible  coast.  The  northern  coast 
was  held  by  responsible  powers,  powers  if  not  wholly 
trustworthy,  at  least  to  be  dealt  with  as  independents 
rather  than  as  dependencies.  The  southern  coast 
was  helpless  and  irresponsible.  The  power  that  all 
dreaded  might  buy  or  seize  at  will.  France,  long 
established  in  Algeria,  seized  Tunis,  Britain  seized 
Egypt,  a  world  war  was  risked  to  save  Morocco,  and 
last  of  all  Tripoli  was  seized  with  incontinent  haste, 
lest  a  lodgment  of  Germany  at  Benghazi  bring  all 
their  work  to  naught.  Even  outside  the  sea  the  same 
anxieties  were  felt.  Within  a  year  after  England 
captured  Gibraltar,  she  brought  Portugal  under  her 
control  lest  danger  should  lurk  around  the  corner,  and 
the  attempt  of  Germany  to  establish  herself  at  Agadir, 
some  five  hundred  miles  down  the  outside  African 
coast  was  resisted  at  the  risk  of  war. 

It  will  be  easy  here  for  our  minds  to  go  off  on  a 
tangent  and  lose  themselves  in  the  query  whether 
Britain  and  France  had  a  right  to  assert  control  of  the 
Mediterranean  against  Germany.  That  is  not  the 
question.  We  are  interested  solely  in  seeing  what 
they  regarded  as  necessary  to  that  end.  There  can 
be  very  little  doubt  that  we  have  decided  to  keep 
Germany  and  all  similar  powers  from  getting  a  foot 
hold  in  the  Caribbean.  What  is  necessary  to  accom 
plish  our  purpose?  Britain  and  France  have  told  us. 
There  must  be  no  Barbary  Coast  left  for  Germany 
and  her  like  to  appropriate.  But  the  Caribbean 
coast  is  all  Barbary  Coast.  Then  there  must  be  no 
Caribbean  coast  left  open  to  appropriation.  This 
means  some  form  of  effective  control  over  all  the 


152     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

islands  not  in  responsible  hands  (a  control  already 
assured) ,  over  all  of  Central  America  (a  control  more 
nearly  assured  than  official  reports  would  suggest), 
and  over  at  least  Venezuela  and  Colombia.  This 
need  not  mean  annexation  or  even  a  protectorate. 
There  are  many  ways,  and  any  way  is  good  which 
will  insure  that  these  people  shall  not  dare,  if  possible 
that  they  shall  not  wish,  and  above  all  that  they  shall 
not  be  able  to  serve  the  purposes  of  the  enemies  of  the 
United  States. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  since  the  Canal  is  the 
vital  organ,  the  paralysis  of  which  might  be  ruin  to 
the  United  States,  the  adjacent  Pacific  Coast  is  hardly 
less  important  than  the  Caribbean.  Here  again  Co 
lombia  has  the  power,  as  she  at  present  has  the  in 
clination,  to  do  us  harm.  It  is  desirable  to  remove 
the  inclination,  though  whether  apology  and  penance 
for  a  much  provoked  and  justified  offence  would  effect 
the  desired  propitiation  may  be  doubted.  A  pur 
chased  good  will  resting  upon  a  foundation  of  jealous 
weakness  and  low  political  morality,  is  a  feeble  guar 
anty  against  the  bribes  of  our  rivals.  We  shall 
hardly  be  safe  while  Colombia  retains  her  power  to 
harm  us,  with  Germany  on  the  one  side  and  Japan  on 
the  other  to  put  her  friendship  and  her  probity  to  the 
test. 

One  state  remains  which  presents  a  different  and 
a  more  difficult  problem.  In  her  situation  Mexico 
is  to  be  grouped  with  the  powers  just  considered. 
Her  proximity  to  the  Canal,  though  not  so  immediate 
as  that  of  Colombia  or  Central  America,  is  sufficient  to 
give  us  every  concern,  while  her  extension  to  the  north- 


THE  UNFINISHED  TASK  153 

west  and  her  monopoly  of  the  Gulf  of  California 
gives  to  every  indentation  in  her  long  Pacific  Coast 
a  strategic  value  of  which  we  are  becoming  increas 
ingly,  not  to  say  anxiously,  conscious.  Meanwhile 
Mexico  is  too  large,  too  populous,  too  rich,  and  too 
advanced,  to  permit  of  the  summary  treatment  meted 
out  to  Hayti  and  Nicaragua.  She  is  able  to  harm  us, 
able  to  resist  our  control.  Is  she  able  to  protect  us 
against  the  dangers  which  her  very  existence  in  this 
quarter  involves?  In  some  other  part  of  the  world 
she  might  reasonably  aspire  to  independence  and  self- 
direction.  It  is  the  emphatic  determination  of  the 
American  people  that  that  shall  be  her  privilege. 
Rarely  has  such  a  provocation  to  intervention  been 
resisted  as  that  which  Mexico  has  given  to  the  United 
States  during  the  last  five  years.  While  official  for 
bearance  has  at  times  belied  the  impatience  of  the 
people,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  it  represents  their 
settled  determination  to  assume  no  responsibility  for 
the  internal  affairs  of  Mexico.  So  far  as  these  af 
fairs  can  be  isolated  from  the  tangle  of  world  affairs 
in  which  our  own  destiny  is  inextricably  involved, 
Mexican  independence  rests  upon  the  foundation,  not 
only  of  American  conviction,  but  of  the  deepest 
American  sentiment.  If  interference  were  necessary, 
Americans  would  detest  the  job. 

But  this  fact  remains,  a  fact  which  no  man  can 
alter  and  which  must  become  greater  and  plainer  with 
the  passing  years.  Mexico  lies  between  us  and  our 
most  vital  possession.  In  no  way,  direct  or  indirect, 
can  she  be  allowed  to  jeopardize  its  safety  or  to 
weaken  control  of  those  seas  and  those  coasts  upon 


154    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

which  its  safety  depends.  And  in  no  way  could  this 
so  easily  happen  as  by  indiscreet  relations  with  nations 
capable  of  challenging  our  control.  Nor  are  these 
relations  to  be  feared  merely  in  the  form  of  hostile 
alliances  such  as  that  insanely  proposed  by  Germany 
between  Mexico  and  Japan.  It  is  not  even  voluntary 
relations  that  menace  us  most,  but  relations  forced 
upon  Mexico  by  her  own  recklessness,  incompetency 
and  injustice.  If  Mexico  were  differently  situated,  a 
wronged  nation  might  be  slow  to  punish  her,  and  other 
nations  slow  to  intervene,  but  when  powerful  nations 
are  looking  for  pretexts  to  intervene,  and  their  rivals 
see  in  their  moves  a  menace  to  their  own  safety,  Mex 
ico  must  walk  straight.  If  Mexico  is  to  escape  a  pro 
tectorate,  it  must  be  by  voluntarily  assuming  its  es 
sential  limitations.  She  is  not  free, —  no  nation  so 
situated  can  ever  be  free, —  to  live  unto  herself.  It 
is  to  be  feared  that  the  Mexican  people  have  not  the 
capacity  permanently  to  maintain  real  independence  of 
action  in  a  situation  exposed  to  the  full  impact  of  the 
mightiest  forces  of  world  imperialism.  To  steer  an 
even  course  twixt  such  a  Scylla  and  Charybdis  would 
imply  a  skill  to  which  no  people,  Anglo-Saxon  or  any 
other,  can  yet  lay  claim.  Failing  this  absolute  cor 
rectness  of  procedure,  Mexico  seemingly  must  pass 
under  the  effectual  control  of  the  greater  power  that 
is  doomed  to  depend  upon  her  loyalty  and  trustworthi 
ness. 

'It  remains  to  be  considered  what  change  if  any,  is 
likely  to  take  place  in  the  form  of  our  Caribbean  con 
trol.  Present  forms  show  a  wide  range.  There  is 


THE  UNFINISHED  TASK  155 

the  broad  autonomy  of  Cuba,  tempered  only  by  inter 
vention  in  rare  emergencies.  There  is  the  private  re 
ceivership  of  Nicaragua  with  its  official  connivance, 
then  the  official  receivership  of  Santo  Domingo,  and 
finally  the  full  protectorate  of  Hayti.  Which  will  be 
the  preferred  form  and  ultimate  model? 

It  is  unlikely  that  any  one  type  will  prevail  through 
out  our  "  sphere  of  influence."  Practical  empire 
builders  are  not  misled  by  any  love  for  the  logical  or 
the  symmetrical,  into  strained  efforts  for  uniformity. 
They  care  nothing  for  symmetries  and  everything  for 
adaptations.  The  countries  in  question  differ  widely 
in  character,  and  very  different  circumstances  are  re 
sponsible  for  our  intervention.  The  working  ar 
rangements  decided  upon  will  differ  accordingly,  and 
that  perhaps  increasingly  with  the  varying  character 
of  their  development. 

Yet  there  is  a  tendency  toward  the  more  complete 
control,  a  tendency  which  may  go  farther.  The 
earlier  interventions  were  the  more  timid,  the  later 
the  more  resolute  and  complete.  Cuba  comes  first, 
Hayti  last.  The  difference  is  not  an  accident.  Half 
measures  have  been  disappointing.  The  Cuban  ex 
periment  did  not  save  us  from  the  necessity  of  a  costly 
military  reoccupation.  The  well  managed  receiver 
ship  of  Santo  Domingo  did  not  avert  revolution,  or 
save  the  island  from  German  cruisers  and  American 
occupation.  If  we  are  compelled  to  occupy  Cuba 
again,  we  shall  probably  stay.  If  our  work  in  Santo 
Domingo  continues,  we  shall  doubtless  have  a  con 
stabulary.  The  half  measure  is  easier  to  introduce. 


156     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

It  is  less  repugnant  to  the  natives  and  to  ourselves. 
But  it  has  thus  far  failed  to  accomplish  its  purpose 
without  the  supplement  of  violent  and  costly  military 
intervention.  It  is  probable,  therefore,  that  the  more 
partial  forms  of  control  will  evolve  into  more  com 
plete  forms  if  control  is  continued,  and  that  subse 
quent  occasions  for  the  exercise  of  control  will  be  in 
fluenced  by  these  experiences. 

In  particular  it  may  be  doubted  whether  the  system 
of  private  control  so  successfully  introduced  in  Nica 
ragua  and  doubtless  extensively  developed  in  other 
Central  American  countries,  can  persist.  The  su 
perior  efficiency  of  such  a  system  may  be  conceded, 
and  the  informality  with  which  it  may  be  introduced  is 
a  great  advantage.  The  resort  to  such  an  expedient 
when  government  ignores  a  situation  which  will  not 
suffer  neglect,  may  be  a  patriotic  duty.  But  such  a 
system,  involving  as  it  needs  must  do,  the  backing  of 
government,  has  all  the  disadvantages  to  the  nation  of 
direct  governmental  intervention  without  the  advan 
tage  of  publicity  and  effective  responsibility.  Above 
all,  it  is  impossible  to  imagine  such  a  control  unin 
fluenced  by  considerations  of  private  profit  which  ex 
perience  warns  us  to  keep  away  from  the  administra 
tion  of  dependencies.  If  American  control  is  neces 
sary  in  the  Caribbean,  it  should  be  the  control  of  the 
American  government,  and  not  the  control  of  private 
interests  for  whose  sins  we  must  answer  and  whose 
acts  we  can  not  determine.  This  is  written  in  no  un 
sympathetic  spirit  toward  those  interests.  They  are 
needed  and  should  be  encouraged.  But  they  furnish 


THE  UNFINISHED  TASK  157 

additional  occasion  for  national  control,  not  a  substi 
tute  for  it. 

It  may  be  expected  that  American  control  in  the   t 
Caribbean  will  become  more  avowed,  more  compre 
hensive,  and  more  extensive  as  time  goes  on. 


CHAPTER  XI 

PAN-AMERICANISM 

THE  progress  of  our  inquiry  has  brought  us  at  last 
to  the  continent  of  South  America  and  to  the  much 
advocated  policy  of  Pan-Americanism.  Indeed,  from 
the  moment  that  we  crossed  the  Rio  Grande  we  have 
been  upon  the  domain  of  this  attractive  doctrine. 
The  discussion  of  its  proposals  has  been  purposely  de 
ferred.  It  has  seemed  necessary  first  to  trace  the  de 
velopment  of  American  imperialism  from  its  begin 
nings  on  our  far  eastern  frontier  westward  across  the 
continent  and  out  to  its  farthest  battle  line,  to  take 
account  of  its  conquests,  to  note  its  habitual  attitude, 
and  to  project  into  the  immediate  future  the  resultant 
of  its  temper  and  its  opportunity.  That  temper  has 
been  and  still  is  one  of  instinctive  assertion.  Though 
occasionally  balked  by  domestic  faction,  the  imperial 
ist  impulse  has  never  long  been  held  in  check.  Coun 
sels  of  prudence  have  been  occasionally  heard,  but 
to  those  who  recall  our  acquisition  of  Samoa  and  the 
Philippines  it  would  be  absurd  to  claim  that  these  coun 
sels  had  prevailed.  The  American  empire  has  grown 
with  prodigious  and  incontinent  rapidity.  The  Ro 
man  Empire  did  not  grow  so  fast.  The  British  Em 
pire  did  not  grow  so  fast.  Neither  of  them  took 
such  long  chances  or  so  often  did  the  unintended  and 
unconsidered  thing. 

158 


PAN-AMERICANISM  159 

There  is  no  evidence  that  this  temper  has  changed. 
If  we  have  committed  follies,  as  the  prudent  assert,  we 
have  not  yet  been  punished.  We  have  learned 
subtler  ways  of  winning,  more  varied  ways  of  ruling. 
We  have  found  new  reasons  for  old  impulses,  and  old 
impulses  have  renewed  their  youth. 

Finally,  we  are  still  confronted  with  opportunity. 
More  than  any  other  people,  we  have  prizes  within 
our  grasp.  And  we  are  grasping  them.  Never  was 
our  frontier  more  alive  than  it  is  today.  Acquisition 
of  new  territory  has  become  a  commonplace  and  passes 
unnoticed.  Not  one  American  in  a  hundred  realizes:1 
that  we  have  a  protectorate  over  Hayti  and  that  ourj 
control  is  creeping  out  through  all  these  southern  seas.l 
If  he  knew,  his  only  reaction  would  probably  be  a* 
slightly  increased  complacency.  The  door  is  thus 
opened  wide  for  a  government,  embarrassed  by  the  • 
mischievous  irresponsibility  of  these  petty  make-be-  • 
lieve  states,  to  take  refuge  in  an  ever  broadening  im 
perialism.  Unless  the  leopard  changes  his  spots,  this 
must  carry  our  frontier  to  the  limits  we  have  men 
tioned. 

Will  it  carry  us  farther?  There  is  plausibility  in 
the  suggestion.  In  the  full  sense  of  the  word  nature 
furnishes  no  absolute  boundaries.  If  we  could  cross 
the  Pacific,  we  may  cross  anything.  Incentives  to 
the  control  of  the  American  tropics  are  likely  to  be 
found  in  the  world's  growing  need  of  their  products, 
the  necessity  of  more  intensive  exploitation,  the  inef 
ficiency  of  their  peoples,  and  the  incompetency  of  their 
governments  to  encourage  and  protect  foreign  enter 
prise.  It  would  be  rash  to  predict  that  this  inherent 


160     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

conflict  between  northern  energy  and  tropical  lethargy 
will  not  result  in  farther  extensions  of  northern  control 
over  the  American  tropics. 

But  equally,  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  assume  that 
such  an  appeal  will  come  from  the  American  tropics 
alone.  Geographical  propinquity  will  count  for  very 
little  beyond  the  limits  of  the  Caribbean.  Indeed 
South  America  offers  no  such  propinquity.  If  it  is 
a  question  merely  of  exploiting  the  tropics  and  not  of 
vital  defensive  strategy,  the  pathway  of  the  sea  may 
lead  us  to  Asia  as  easily  as  to  South  America,  and  the 
Philippines  may  as  easily  be  the  base  for  a  farther 
advance  as  Hayti  or  Panama. 

Nor  is  the  call  of  the  tropics  the  only  one.  The 
war  upon  which  we  have  now  embarked  has  incalcula 
ble  possibilities.  We  are  committed  not  merely  to  the 
redressing  of  our  grievances  to  date,  but  to  the  vastly 
larger  program  of  settling  such  difficulties  as  the  war 
itself  may  create.  Without  taking  too  seriously  the 
fascinating  program  of  "  making  the  world  safe  for 
democracy,"  it  is  well  to  remember  that  the  war  is  to 
be  fought  on  European  soil  and  in  conjunction  with 
nations  having  possessions  in  every  part  of  the  world. 
When  the  peace  conference  meets  we  shall  hear  very 
little  of  the  sonorous  slogans  which  heralded  the 
war's  beginning  and  much  of  the  concrete  problems 
for  which  these  phrases  suggest  no  very  tangible  solu 
tion.  Taken  in  the  aggregate,  it  will  be  the  problem 
of  policing  a  troublesome  world  and  maintaining  and 
improving  its  productive  activities.  Who  knows 
where  these  police  duties  may  call  us?  Present  in 
clination  and  intention  in  the  matter  will  have  very 


PAN-AMERICANISM  1 6 1 

little  influence  on  the  result.  There  will  be  new  in 
terests  to  consider,  world  interests  and  local  interests, 
interests  of  our  allies,  interests  of  humanity's  help 
less  wards,  and  new  and  unforeseen  interests  of  our 
own.  And  along  with  all  this  there  will  be  new  pas 
sions  and  new  visions  which  will  have  tremendous 
power  over  us  to  determine  our  decisions.  Who 
knows  what  these  decisions  will  be?  Is  it  certain  that 
we  can  get  out  of  the  old  world  when  once  we  have 
gotten  in  ? 

Of  course  we  do  not  intend  any  such  enlargement 
of  our  program.  We  can  not  conceive  of  circum 
stances  which  should  induce  us  to  make  the  Philippines 
a  base  for  further  advance.  But  then,  we  did  not  in 
tend  to  take  the  Philippines  and  could  not  have  con 
ceived  beforehand  of  circumstances  which  would  in 
duce  us  to  do  so.  Our  study  of  American  imperialism 
has  been  in  vain  if  we  have  not  learned  that  it  is  not 
premeditated  but  essentially  inadvertent.  Perhaps 
this  is  the  normal  character  of  imperialism.  The 
plea  of  Demosthenes  to  the  Athenians  that  they  should 
cease  to  be  led  by  circumstances  and  should  learn  to 
lead  circumstances,  was  unavailing.  It  may  be  ques 
tioned  whether  any  people  can  learn  the  difficult  art 
of  leading  circumstances.  There  are  vital  processes 
in  national  as  in  individual  life  that  seem  able  to  func 
tion  only  when  unconscious.  One  nation  in  our  day 
has  adopted  the  program  of  deliberate  and  conscious 
imperialism,  with  results  not  encouraging  to  the  pol 
icy  of  leading  circumstances. 

It  seems  quite  impossible,  therefore,  to  forecast 
with  any  certainty  the  future  of  American  expansion 


1 62     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

beyond  the  limits  of  the  Caribbean.  Not  that  the 
American  advance  can  go  no  farther,  or  that  it  will 
go  no  farther,  but  that  there  is  no  telling  at  present 
where  that  farther  going  will  be.  L  If  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  seems  to  imply  for  us  predominantly  Ameri 
can  interests,  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  mainte 
nance  of  that  doctrine  is  as  likely  to  lead  us  into  war 
in  the  old  world  as  in  the  new,  and  that  war  tends  to 
create  local  attachments  and  interests,  wherever  it 
goes.  We  were  fighting  for  purely  American  inter 
ests  when  we  sent  Dewey  to  the  Philippines,  and  forth 
with  our  interests  ceased  to  be  purely  American. 
Moreover,  doctrines  do  not  determine  destiny,  but 
destiny  determines  doctrines. 

In  considering  a  program  which  is  to  be  conscious 
and  deliberate  rather  than  instinctive,  it  is  important 
to  remember  what  manner  of  men  we  are.  The  adop 
tion  of  a  policy  at  variance  with  our  temperament  will 
not  change  our  temperament,  or  at  best  it  will  change 
it  but  very  slowly.  The  imperialist  instinct  is  strong 
in  us  by  nature,  and  it  has  been  strengthened  by  three 
centuries  of  intrepid  assertion  unrebuked  by  a  single 
serious  mischance.  We  have  profound  faith  in  our 
capacity  and  in  the  universal  adaptation  of  our  institu 
tions  to  human  wants.  Our  capacity  for  forbearance 
is  therefore  slight. 

But  important  as  it  is  to  see  ourselves  as  we  are, 
it  is  even  more  important  to  see  ourselves  as  others 
see  us.  It  is  a  peculiarity  of  this  unintentional  im 
perialism  that  we  are  largely  unconscious  of  our  own 
attitude.  As  we  are  never  aggressive  until  circum 
stances  suddenly  coerce  us,  we  live  in  constant  mood  of 


PAN-AMERICANISM  1 63 

fancied  deference  which  overshadows  all  else  in  our 
experience.  Outsiders  ^are  quite  uninfluenced  by  our 
consciousness  of  innocence  of  which  they  have  no  ex 
perience.  They  see  only  our  acts  which  have  been 
consistently  aggressive,  and  from  which  they  not  un 
naturally  infer  a  consistent  purpose  of  aggression. 
Their  attitude  seems  to  us  one  of  unworthy  suspicion, 
and  ours  to  them  one  of  designing  hypocrisy.  The 
relation  is  natural  and  is  not  to  be  conjured  away. 
It  must  be  with  consciousness  of  our  character  and 
our  reputation  that  we  confront  the  proposed  policy. 

The  term,  Pan-Americanism,  though  seemingly  self-  ^ 
explanatory,  is  but  vaguely  defined.  It  suggests  the 
analogy  of  Pan-Germanishi  and  Pan-Slavism^but  a 
comparison  reveals  only  contrasts.  They  seek  the 
union  of  all  members  of  'a  single  race  under  a  single 
government.  But  Pan-Americanism  implies  neither  a 
single  race  nor  a  single  government.  A  single  govern 
ment  for  all  the  Americas  could  only  be  our  own. 
Such  an  extension  of  our  rule  is  certainly  not  to  be 
predicted  in  the  light  of  our  present  knowledge. 

So  far  from  advocating  this  policy  of  ultra-impe 
rialism,  the  advocate  of  Pan-Americanism  is  usually  a 
pronounced  anti-imperialist.  He  deprecates  above 
all  things  the  extension  of  anything  like  sovereignty 
over  the  lesser  American  states.  He  would  have  us 
not  only  scrupulously  respect  their  independence,  but 
defend  it  against  all  comers.  He  would  recognize 
not  only  the  independence  of  these  nations,  small  and 
great,  but  their  equality  with  each  other  and  with  our 
selves.  No  paramountcy  and  no  patronage  would 
find  a  place  in  such  a  program.  Studied  deference, 


1 64    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

frequent  intercourse,  and  arbitration  of  difficulties  are 
of  course  urged. 

Turning  from  these  generalities,  emphasis  is  usually 
laid  upon  the  importance  of  South  American  com 
merce,  and  Americans  are  urged  to  exploit  this  market 
more  wisely.  We  are  reminded  of  the  great  wealth 
of  the  more  progressive  of  the  Latin-American  coun 
tries,  their  culture,  their  tastes  and  their  peculiar  re 
quirements,  and  are  mildly  chided  for  our  apathy  and 
our  ignorance  regarding  these  our  American  neigh 
bours.  The  facts  cited  in  some  of  these  earnest  ap 
peals  are  startling  and  quite  justify  the  reproach  which 
they  occasionally  imply. 

Every  appeal  for  international  amity,  for  mutual 
acquaintance  and  friendly  intercourse  is  deserving  of 
sympathy  and  support.  There  seems  to  be  no  doubt, 
too,  that  American  enterprise  has  been  less  awake  to 
its  opportunities  in  this  part  of  the  world  than  in  al 
most  any  other.  For  a  nation  so  familiar  with  the 
world  as  we  are,  it  is  difficult  to  account  for  our  mis 
conceptions  regarding  South  America,  while  our  slip 
shod  business  methods  there  are  hard  to  reconcile  with 
our  efficiency  elsewhere.  These  conditions  are  hardly 
creditable  to  us,  and  the  effort  to  correct  them  deserves 
unqualified  support. 

There  is  a  possibility,  to  be  sure,  that  our  advo 
cates  have  overlooked  certain  facts  and  that  the  most 
sanguine  expectations  may  not  be  realized.  The  more 
developed  parts  of  South  America  are  climatically 
much  like  our  own  country,  and  the  most  of  their  ex 
ports  are  commodities  which  we  produce  in  sufficiency. 
We  are  therefore  less  able  to  be  useful  to  each  other 


PAN-AMERICANISM  165 

than  are  countries  of  a  more  complementary  character. 
Tropical  South  America  is  different,  since  the  tropics 
and  the  temperate  zone  are  permanently  necessary 
to  each  other.  But  tropical  America  is  as  near  to 
Europe  as  it  is  to  us,  while  Africa,  its  great  com 
petitor,  is  not  much  farther  away.  There  is  little 
natural  basis  for  mutual  monopoly  in  the  trade  of  the 
Americas. 

Ethnically,  too,  the  bond  of  kinship,  a  bond  which 
affects  all  customs  and  the  whole  fabric  of  economic 
and  political  life,  is  not  between  the  Americas, 
but  between  Latin  America  and  Latin  Europe  on  the 
one  hand,  and  Anglo-Saxon  America  and  Anglo-Saxon 
Europe  on  the  other.  It  must  be  remembered,  too, 
that  this  nearness  of  kin  is  also  nearness  in  space. 
The  great  Latin  countries  are  all  nearer  to  Latin 
Europe  than  they  are  to  New  York,  and  New  York 
is  nearer  to  Liverpool  than  Latin  America  is  to  either. 

Too  much  importance  should  not  be  attached  to 
these  facts.  They  perhaps  explain  present  trade  re 
lations,  but  they  do  not  explain,  much  less  justify,  our 
ignorance  and  apathy  regarding  this  vast  field  of  op 
portunity.  The  advocacy  of  closer  trade  relations 
with  Latin  America  is  amply  justified  and  deserving 
of  success. 

But  there  is  nothing  in  all  this  to  justify  the  name, 
Pan-Americanism.  There  is  nothing  that  is  exclu 
sively  or  even  pre-eminently  applicable  to  the  Western 
Hemisphere.  Does  not  every  argument  that  is  urged 
in  favour  of  closer  commercial  relations  with  South 
America  apply  equally  to  Australia,  to  China,  to  every 
country?  The  gospel  of  Pan- Americanism  is  thus 


1 66    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

far  but  the  gospel  of  world  intercourse  and  amity 
given  a  specious  particularity  in  this  somewhat  neg 
lected  field  by  the  use  of  a  pretentious  and  misleading 
name.  Pan-Americanism  stands  for  no  natural  unity 
that  is  relevant  to  our  discussion.  If  historic  accident 
had  not  applied  a  single  name  to  two  rather  excep 
tionally  separated  grand  divisions  of  the  globe,  the 
concept  like  the  name  would  never  have  come  into 
existence. 

Beyond  this  doctrine  of  commercial  intimacy  and 
international  amenity,  there  have  been  no  very  sig 
nificant  developments  of  the  Pan-American  idea. 
Suggestions  have  been  made,  however,  that  something 
of  political  co-operation  might  result  as  commercial 
and  other  bonds  were  developed,  and  the  Latin  coun 
tries  came  into  their  own  through  the  exploitation  of 
their  great  natural  resources.  The  idea  is  an  attrac 
tive  one,  and  there  are  not  wanting  those  who  see  in  a 
Pan-American  league  the  one  hope  of  effectively  en 
forcing  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Such  a  league  seems 
to  some  to  be  foreshadowed  in  the  ABC  conference 
summoned  by  Mr.  Bryan  for  the  settlement  of  Mexi 
can  difficulties.  This  won  for  its  author  numerous 
plaudits,  not  because  of  its  achievements  which  were 
disappointing,  but  because  of  the  principle  involved 
which  seemed  to  be  the  harbinger  of  a  happier  time. 
It  is  important  to  consider  the  possibilities  of  a  Pan- 
American  league  since  in  spite  of  its  vagueness, —  or 
possibly  because  of  its  vagueness, —  it  appeals  to  cer 
tain  minds.  Is  such  a  league  possible,  and  if  possible, 
would  it  be  efficient? 

The  Latin  Americans  are  not  of  our  race  and  dp 


PAN-AMERICANISM  1 67 

not  speak  our  language.  That  is  not  an  insuperable 
obstacle  to  co-operation,  but  it  has  invariably  pre 
vented  co-operation  in  the  past  except  in  cases  of  con 
quest  or  the  menace  of  extreme  danger.  But  the 
greater  difficulty  lies  in  the  fact  that  these  countries  are 
small  and  weak  as  compared  with  our  own.  They 
perceive  perfectly  that  a  league  of  nominal  equals 
would  be  in  fact  a  league  dominated  by  a  single  power 
and  that  alliance  could  only  mean  subordination.  It 
is  here  that  our  imperialist  temper  and  record,  so  per 
fectly  visible  to  others  and  so  blandly  ignored  by  our 
selves,  come  in  to  complicate  the  situation.  £Tear  of 
American  aggression  is  the  outstanding  fact  in  Latin 
America,  a  fear  varying  in  inverse  ratio  to  their  near 
ness  to  ourselves.  We  protest  with  all  sincerity  that 
we  have  no  hostile  designs.  If  they  concede  our  sin 
cerity,  they  see  in  it  no  protection.  We  had  no  de 
signs  against  Porto  Rico  or  the  Philippines  or  Cuba  or 
Hayti,  yet  they  have  one  after  another  fallen  under 
our  control.  Our  intentions  interest  them  little  in  the 
face  of  our  remorseless  advance.]  That  we  have  had 
compelling  reasons  for  each  forward  step  is  poor  con 
solation.  There  are  more  such  reasons  waiting  to  jus 
tify  the  steps  they  fear.  Each  step  is  a  trifle  to  us,  too 
small  an  item  in  the  day's  work  to  disturb  the  com 
placency  of  our  conscious  good  intentions.  To  them 
it  is  momentous,  the  shaping  of  a  people's  destiny. 

The  important  thing  to  note  is  that  neither  party 
can  help  it.  It  inheres  in  the  situation.  They  have 
had  to  give  ground  before  us,  and  they  will  have  to 
give  ground  again,  no  matter  what  forbearance  we 
manifest.  They  see  it, —  or  rather  they  feel  it,  which 


1 68     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

means  much  more.  We  should  feel  it  if  we  were  the 
under  dog.  Tact  and  forbearance  on  our  part,  and 
wisdom  on  theirs  will  lessen  the  difficulty,  but  nothing 
can  remove  the  fundamental  relation  between  the  two 
Americas. 

Why  not? 

There  are  three  reasons,  all  of  them  inherent  and 
measurably  permanent.  These  deserve  our  careful 
consideration. 

Anglo-Saxon  America  is  united  and  Latin  America 
is  divided  and  must  stay  so.  Mexico,  though  phys 
ically  joined  to  Central  America,  and  through  it  and 
the  Isthmus  with  South  America,  is  permanently  sepa 
rated  from  her  Latin  kin.  If  union  is  in  store  for  her, 
it  can  hardly  be  other  than  union  with  the  great  neigh 
bour  to  the  north,  with  all  that  such  union  portends  to 
a  Latin  state.  Even  union  with  Central  America 
would  modify  her  situation  but  little  and  that  is 
seemingly  blocked  by  the  rapidly  developing  system  of 
protectorates  and  is  almost  certain  to  be  opposed  in 
the  interest  of  the  protection  of  the  Canal.  Central 
America  may  conceivably  become  a  single  state,  but 
even  so  only  an  insignificant  one  and  one  inevitably 
under  our  protection.  Union  across  the  barrier  of 
the  Canal  is  unthinkable,  unless  in  the  form  of  loose 
confederation  under  our  auspices. 

South  America  is  divided  from  end  to  end  by  one  of 
the  mightiest  mountain  barriers  in  the  world,  one 
which  separates  adjacent  countries  more  effectively 
than  the  widest  ocean  could  do.  The  western  slope 
is  narrow,  too  arid  to  develop  more  than  a  scanty 
population,  and  too  long  to  be  administered  from  a 


PAN-AMERICANISM  169 

single  centre.  The  broader  eastern  slope  is  divided 
in  its  turn  into  distinct  political  units  differentiated  by 
climate  and  race,  factors  of  the  greatest  importance 
which  we  shall  soon  be  called  upon  to  consider. 

Those  who  are  hopeful  of  a  political  union  in 
South  America  will  of  course  urge  that  railroads  and 
commercial  intercourse  tend  to  lower  these  barriers 
and  so  make  union  possible.  They  will  perhaps  cite 
the  example  of  the  United  States  whose  population 
is  not  divided  by  the  Rocky  Mountains,  as  an  argu 
ment  that  the  union  of  South  American  states  is  not 
impossible.  Such  an  analogy  is  wholly  misleading. 
Under  a  single  government  our  eastern  population 
expanded  into  the  western  territory  which  had  been 
acquired  by  conquest.  There  was  no  federation  be 
tween  separately  developed  states.  In  other  words 
there  was  union  before  there  was  any  barrier.  That 
makes  all  the  difference  in  the  world.  So  obvious 
are  the  obstacles  to  union  in  the  present  instance  that 
its  most  sanguine  advocates  hardly  hope  for  a  consoli 
dation  of  Latin  America  into  less  than  seven  distinct 
nations.  So  partial  a  unification  would  hardly  affect 
the  problem  with  which  we  are  concerned. 

In  considering  the  possibilities  of  such  a  union,  we 
can  not  safely  ignore  the  teachings  of  experience. 
There  can  be  no  question  as  to  what  the  teachings  of 
history  are  in  this  connection.  Peoples  thus  sepa 
rated  never  unite  unless  compelled  to  do  so.  This 
compulsion  may  come  in  various  ways.  For  instance, 
one  of  these  countries,  let  us  say  Argentina,  might 
conceivably  conquer  the  rest,  advancing  step  by  step 
as  we  have  done  in  the  north.  But  her  task  would  be 


170    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

immensely  more  difficult  than  ours  has  been,  and  these 
difficulties  are  increasing.  No  one  thinks  that  such  a 
conquest  is  contemplated,  still  less  that  it  will  be  ef 
fected. 

Or  an  outside  power  might  conquer  South  America 
and  unite  it,  or  what  amounts  to  the  same  thing,  force 
it  to  unite  in  self  defence  as  the  American  colonies 
were  united  by  war  with  England.  Such  a  unification 
is  more  probable,  but  it  is  the  avowed  policy  of  the 
United  States  to  prevent  an  attack  on  Latin  America, 
and  it  is  probable  that  with  the  aid  of  European 
/  jealousies,  we  shall  succeed.  South  America  will  thus 
be  spared  the  pressure  necessary  to  unite  her.  To 
that  type  of  mind  to  whom  history  is  irrelevant,  such 
reasoning  will  no  doubt  seem  inconclusive.  Such 
persons  can  see  no  reason  why  the  obvious  advantages 
of  federation  should  not  lead  intelligent  men  to  adopt 
it.  To  all  of  which  it  may  be  pertinent  to  reply  that 
men  are  neither  wholly  intelligent  nor  wholly  disin 
terested,  and  that  to  such,  the  advantages  of  federa 
tion  are  not  entirely  obvious,  while  the  sacrifices  and 
painful  adjustments  which  it  requires  are  usually  very 
much  so.  The  enthusiast  is  confident  that  growing 
intelligence  will  reveal  these  advantages  which  short 
sightedness  now  overlooks.  It  is  possible  that 
intelligence  would  reveal  to  the  enthusiast  ob 
stacles  which  enthusiasm  has  overlooked.  There  is 
much  reason  to  fear  that  if  we  wait  for  intelligence 
to  make  this  nice  calculus  of  advantage  which  is  to 
overcome  our  narrowness  and  reconcile  us  to  irksome 
readjustments,  we  shall  wait  long  for  union  among 
men.  Such  union  as  we  have  thus  far  achieved  has 


PAN-AMERICANISM  171 

been  the  result  of  compulsion  which  has  enforced  the 
necessary  sacrifice  pending  the  realization  of  ultimate 
advantages.  This  historic  method  will  not  be  ap 
plied  in  South  America, —  certainly  not  if  we  can  help 
it, —  and  as  a  consequence  South  America  will  seem 
ingly  remain  divided. 

The  second  reason  for  disparity  between  the  two 
Americas  is  the  character  of  their  populations.  That 
of  Anglo-Saxon  America  is  European  and  efficient; 
that  of  Latin  America  largely  Indian.  This  is  un 
equally  true  in  different  parts.  The  population  of 
Argentina  is  largely  European,  a  fact  to  which  the 
remarkable  prosperity  of  that  progressive  country 
may  be  largely  attributed.  In  other  parts  of  the 
temperate  zone  something  the  same  is  true.  But 
through  the  broad  tropical  belt  of  South  America  and 
in  the  Caribbean  countries  and  Mexico,  Indian  blood 
predominates,  the  European  population  being  in  some 
cases  not  over  one  eighth  of  the  whole.  An  extensive 
admixture  of  negro  blood,  sometimes  completely  dis 
placing  the  Indian,  still  further  complicates  the  situa 
tion.  Serious  as  is  the  negro  problem  with  us,  it  bears 
no  resemblance  to  the  race  problem  in  some  of  these 
states,  and  the  different  solution  reached  in  the  two 
Americas  is  not  the  least  of  the  permanent  barriers 
between  them. 

With  all  deference  to  the  claims  of  these  races,  we 
must  recognize  that  Anglo-Saxon  America  has  an  im 
mense  advantage  over  Latin  America  in  the  character 
of  its  population,  and  that  this  advantage  can  not  but 
be  disturbingly  apparent  to  the  latter.  It  is  a  source 
of  weakness  to  Latin  America  and  an  additional  oc- 


172     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

casion  of  division  among  its  peoples.  For  the  Euro 
pean  population  of  progressive  Argentina  is  as  little 
inclined  to  merge  with  the  negroid  population  of  trop 
ical  Brazil  as  we  would  be  in  like  case. 

This  brings  us  to  the  third  reason  for  the  political 
weakness  of  Latin  America,  namely  its  tropical  cli 
mate.  For  purposes  of  racial-political  inquiry  it  is 
customary  to  broaden  the  zone  of  the  tropics  to  thirty 
degrees  on  either  side  the  equator.  The  assertive  na 
tions  of  the  world  have  been  located  outside  these 
limits  during  all  the  historic  period.  The  peoples 
within  this  zone  have  almost  invariably  been  ruled  by 
peoples  outside  it.  The  reason  for  this,  though  fam 
iliar  in  a  partial  way,  is  of  so  much  importance  and 
has  so  direct  a  bearing  upon  questions  of  modern 
statecraft  that  it  must  receive  careful  consideration 
later.  For  the  present  we  have  only  to  note  the  rela 
tion  of  the  two  Americas  to  this  zone. 

Anglo-Saxon  America  lies  almost  wholly  in  the 
temperate  belt.  Only  peninsular  Florida  and  part  of 
Texas  drop  below  the  parallel  of  thirty.  Latin 
America  lies  almost  wholly  in  the  tropical  belt.  Only 
Uruguay  and  the  main  parts  of  Argentina  and  Chile 
lie  outside  of  latitude  thirty  south.  It  is  in  these 
countries  and  in  the  adjacent  highlands  of  southern 
Brazil  that  are  found  the  wealth  and  enterprise  of 
Latin  America.  Possibly  something  of  the  same 
energy  and  wealth  may  appear  in  the  higher  table 
lands  of  the  tropics,  but  these  regions  in  South  Amer 
ica  are  largely  arid  and  therefore  unsuited  to  the 
maintenance  of  a  considerable  population.  The  great 
bulk  of  Latin  America  is  tropical  and  must  perma- 


PAN-AMERIC  ANISM  1 73 

nently  accept  the  limitations  of  a  tropical  climate. 

The  climate  of  the  tropics  is  not  only  a  limitation 
in  itself,  but  it  accentuates  the  other  limitations  al 
ready  noted.  A  mountain  chain  is  much  more  of  a 
barrier  in  the  tropics  than  in  a  temperate  clime,  for 
tropical  peoples  do  not  build  railroads  and  bore  tun 
nels.  Political  union  is  also  more  difficult  to  tropical 
peoples  on  account  of  their  feebler  initiative.  Nor 
is  it  in  the  tropics  that  energetic  peoples  displace 
feebler  folk  by  their  greater  power  of  multiplication 
and  survival. 

The  limitations  of  Latin  America  are  inherent. 
These  limitations  are  susceptible  of  slow  modification, 
and  Latin  America  will  undoubtedly  progress.  But 
Anglo-Saxon  America  must  also  progress,  and  cer 
tainly  under  more  favourable  conditions.  Concede 
such  rate  of  progress  as  we  will,  the  disparity  re 
mains,  must  remain,  so  long  as  the  one  is  predomi 
nantly  tropical  and  the  other  temperate,  the  one  di 
vided  and  the  other  united,  the  one  fundamentally 
Indian  and  the  other  Anglo-Saxon. 

In  considering  the  prospective  relation  between  the 
two  Americas  it  is  further  to  be  remembered  that  it 
is  the  tropical  end  of  Latin  America  with  which  we 
are  in  contact.  The  prospect  would  be  entirely  dif 
ferent  if  Argentina  were  our  next  door  neighbour  and 
therefore  the  natural  sponsor  to  us  for  the  Latin  peo 
ples.  But  it  is  the  most  irresponsible  of  the  Latins 
whom  nature  has  made  custodians  of  Panama  and  who 
have  the  guardianship  of  our  citadel.  Unconscious 
of  the  interests  with  which  they  trifle,  provocative  and 
venal  in  their  relations  with  nations  whom  we  can  not 


i74    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

permit  to  have  pretexts  for  aggression,  and  tempting 
with  their  unguarded  wealth  the  cupidity  of  a  grasping 
world,  how  can  we  consort  with  Latin  America  as  a 
trusted  equal,  or  show  to  her  irresponsible  peoples 
that  forbearance  and  disinterested  recognition  which 
Pan- Americanism  enjoins?  Failing  this  studied  re 
straint,  there  can  be  no  genuine  mutuality  between  the 
Americas.  The  relation  is  inherently  that  of  a  pro 
tectorate,  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  the  recognition 
of  that  relation.  This  the  Latin  nations  perfectly 
understand  and  deeply  resent.  Like  most  of  the  raw 
material  of  nations  yet  to  be  which  makes  up  so  large 
a  part  of  our  half  baked  world,  Latin  America  has 
yet  to  learn  that  relations  of  dependence  are  writ  in 
the  constitution  of  the  planet.  It  is  perhaps  well 
that  susceptibilities  should  be  soothed  by  diplomatic 
disavowals,  but  such  efforts  should  be  limited  to  the 
amenities  of  life.  All  attempts  to  remove  the  un- 
acceptableness  of  this  relation  by  the  fiction  of  a 
league  of  equals  will  but  advertise  the  disparity  which 
is  the  ground  of  the  offence.  Pan-Americanism  as  a 
policy  of  commercial  enterprise  and  international 
good  will  is  commendable  and  important.  But  as  a 
project  of  political  co-operation  in  an  age  when  such 
co-operation  has  become  essential  to  national  exist 
ence,  Pan-Americanism  is  a  delusion.  In  the  stern 
race  rivalry  of  our  time  Latin  America  is  one  of  the 
least  eligible  of  all  the  candidates  for  our  alliance. 
She  comes  to  us  not  as  an  additional  protection,  but  as 
an  added  and  difficult  interest  to  protect.  In  the  great 
problem  of  national  defence  Latin  America  stands, 
not  as  an  asset,  but  as  a  liability  in  our  account. 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE   DEPENDENCE    OF   THE   TROPICS 

ALLUSION  has  been  made  in  the  preceding  chapter 
to  the  conditions  of  tropical  life  as  a  handicap  to  na 
tional  development.  This  assumption  is  not  likely 
to  be  challenged  in  view  of  the  facts  of  common 
knowledge  in  the  world  about  us,  and  the  uniform 
testimony  of  history.  It  may  be  questioned,  however, 
whether  there  is  any  general  appreciation  of  the  rea 
son  for  this  fact  and  of  its  significance  to  our  present 
inquiry.  No  government  of  tropical  origin  com 
mands  the  respect  and  confidence  of  mankind,  nor  has 
the  modern  world  any  faith  that  the  people  of  the 
tropics  are  capable  of  organizing  a  stable  and  equit 
able  government.  We  accept  submissively  enough 
the  dictum  of  the  historian  that  no  satisfactory  gov 
ernment  in  the  modern  sense  was  ever  yet  organized 
by  a  tropical  people  and  tacitly  admit  the  inference 
that  none  ever  will  be  or  can  be.  Yet  these  passive 
admissions  find  no  recognition  in  our  political  philoso 
phy  where  we  still  love  to  attribute  universality  to  our 
favourite  propositions.  We  believe  that  the  neces 
sity  of  order  and  justice  is  universal  and  that  govern 
ment  is  everywhere  needed  to  secure  them.  We  as 
sert  that  democracy  or  self  government  is  a  universal 
right  and  that  "  governments  derive  their  just  powers 

175 


176     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

from  the  consent  of  the  governed."  And  along  with 
our  unhesitating  assertion  of  these  universal  principles 
we  tacitly  recognize  the  permanent  inability  of  two 
thirds  of  the  human  race  to  provide  for  themselves 
that  order  and  justice  which  we  have  declared  to  be 
indispensable  and  yet  to  be  unobtainable  in  any  other 
way.  We  have  thus  one  more  example  of  that  men 
tal  hospitality  which  welcomes  impartially  the  most 
antagonistic  propositions. 

With  such  a  conflict  in  our  philosophy,  it  is  not  sur 
prising  that  our  practical  policy  betrays  something  of 
inconsistency  and  hesitation,  and  that  whichever  way 
we  decide,  the  reproach  of  inconsistency  is  ready  for 
us.  This  conflict  of  principles  is  especially  marked 
in  a  nation's  earlier  experiences.  After  a  time  we  get 
used  to  being  inconsistent  and  accept  it  as  a  normal 
condition,  as  indeed  it  is.  It  is  none  the  less  im 
portant  that  we  should  attain,  if  not  to  consistency, 
at  least  to  a  judicious  inconsistency  in  our  attitude  to 
ward  tropical  peoples.  To  this  end  it  may  be  well  to 
inquire  somewhat  more  carefully  into  the  grounds  of 
their  peculiarities. 

The  prominent  characteristic  of  the  tropics  is  heat. 
To  this  is  added,  in  a  large  part  of  the  tropics,  a  com 
paratively  high  degree  of  humidity.  It  is  this  com 
bination  of  excessive  heat  with  excessive  humidity  that 
is  especially  trying.  Heat  alone,  if  not  aided  by  hu 
midity,  is  not  incompatible  with  human  efficiency,  as 
witness  Arabia  whose  population  has  been  one  of  the 
most  aggressive  and  efficient  in  the  world.  But  un 
fortunately  a  dry  climate  is  usually  an  arid  climate  and 
the  result  is  a  subsistence  too  scanty  to  support  the 


THE  DEPENDENCE  OF  THE  TROPICS     177 

numerous  and  concentrated  population  required  for 
political  organization.  So  the  Arab  has  become  a 
marauder,  spending  his  energies  on  the  richer  fields 
outside  his  habitat.  Egypt,  with  its  dry  climate  and 
its  valley  watered  by  the  silent  river,  forms  a  unique 
and  wonderful  exception. 

But  in  the  humid  tropics,  where  heat  and  moisture 
push  nature  into  overpowering  exuberance,  man  with 
his  commission  to  subdue  the  earth,  is  reduced  to  help 
less  impotence.  For  all  men,  Hottentot  and  Esqui 
mau  alike,  are  compelled  to  keep  their  blood  at  about 
ninety-eight.  A  couple  of  degrees  more  or  less,  if 
continued  long  enough,  would  kill  them.  To  main 
tain  this  uniform  temperature  under  wide  variations 
of  outside  heat,  nature  has  installed  a  heating  plant 
and  a  refrigerating  plant  based  on  exactly  the  same 
principles  as  the  artificial  constructions  that  bear  these 
names.  We  keep  warm  by  burning  fuel  and  insulat 
ing  the  exposed  surfaces.  We  keep  cool  by  evaporat 
ing  fluid  and  thus  absorbing  superfluous  heat.  If  the 
air  is  dry  and  thirsty,  the  fluid  evaporates  readily  and 
the  refrigerating  plant  works  well.  If  the  air  is 
humid,  the  fluid  refuses  to  evaporate  and  the  plant 
refuses  to  refrigerate. 

But  we  are  supplied  with  a  power  plant  as  well,  and 
this  burns  fuel  and  generates  heat.  If  we  work,  we 
"  get  hot."  The  locomotive  has  to  have  a  fire  in  the 
firebox  even  on  the  hottest  days.  In  cold  weather  this 
comes  in  handy,  and  we  kill  two  birds  with  one  stone. 
We  even  exercise  to  keep  warm.  But  in  hot  weather 
when  we  are  trying  to  keep  cool,  this  extra  heat  is 
an  extra  burden  for  the  refrigerating  plant,  and  if  it 


178     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

is  hampered  by  humidity,  it  is  quickly  taxed  beyond 
its  capacity.  The  man  must  cease  exertion  or  die. 
The  capacity  for  exertion  is  therefore  the  capacity  of 
the  refrigerating  plant,  and  this  in  turn  is  directly  de 
termined  by  the  heat  and  moisture  of  the  air. 

We  must  be  careful  to  avoid  the  assumption  that 
this  limitation  of  tropical  character  is  a  moral  defect. 
We  say  the  man  is  "  lazy."  But  he  has  to  be  lazy, 
which  means  that  "  lazy  "  is  not  the  right  word.  The 
inactive  man  in  a  cool  climate  is  a  misfit;  in  a  hot  cli 
mate  he  is  the  only  fit.  Equally  erroneous  is  the  no 
tion  that  the  defect  is  intellectual,  that  education  and 
intelligence  will  make  him  efficient  and  give  him  the 
mastery  over  nature  which  is  the  condition  of  a  self- 
supporting  civilization.  But  intelligence  and  thought 
come  under  the  same  great  taboo.  They  require 
energy.  Not  to  mention  the  dependence  of  intelli 
gence  upon  the  vast  outfit  of  physical  appliances, — 
books,  schoolhouses,  apparatus,  and  the  like,  the  pro 
duction  of  which  implies  highly  organized  physical 
activities,  it  must  be  remembered  that  even  psychic 
activity  requires  energy.  When  it  is  too  hot  it  is  irk 
some  to  think. 

But  the  all  important  fact  is  that  intellectual  ac 
tivities  are  in  themselves  a  by-product  of  physical  ex 
ertion.  The  dependence  may  not  be  immediate  in  the 
life  of  each  individual,  but  in  the  aggregate  the  de 
pendence  is  absolute.  A  man  who  never  works  may 
possibly  do  a  good  deal  of  thinking,  but  a  race  never. 
It  is  the  struggle  with  physical  environment  that  is  the 
source  of  all  the  primary  problems  of  the  mind.  If 
that  struggle  is  casual  and  spiritless,  these  problems 


THE  DEPENDENCE  OF  THE  TROPICS     179 

make  no  effectual  appeal.  The  seeming  exceptions  to 
this  principle  are  only  seeming.  There  is  intellectual 
life,  sometimes  of  great  subtlety,  in  the  tropics,  but  it 
usually  proves  on  investigation  to  be  an  exotic,  and  in 
variably  shows  a  tendency  to  detach  itself  from  the 
concrete  realities  which  are  its  natural  counterpart. 
The  tropics  may  produce  a  mystic,  but  hardly  a  scien 
tist. 

It  is  therefore  in  this  broader  sense,  physical  and 
psychic,  that  we  are  to  conceive  the  great  ban  of  the 
tropics.  Condemned  to  inactivity,  man  lacks  the 
stimuli  which  elsewhere  develop  the  powers  of  his 
mind.  Physical  and  mental  torpor  broken  by  spurts 
of  feebly  co-ordinated  action  and  short-range,  shallow 
cunning,  are  his  usual,  perhaps  his  inevitable  charac 
teristics. 

From  these  basic  defects  derive  others  which  still 
further  limit  his  efficiency.  He  is  the  victim  of  mal 
nutrition  because  too  ignorant  to  choose  and  too 
thoughtless  to  conserve  the  proper  food.  Parasites 
and  micro-organisms  with  which  the  tropics  abound, 
find  him  an  easy  mark.  It  is  said  on  the  highest  au 
thority  that  ninety-five  per  cent,  of  the  inhabitants  of 
the  Philippines  are  infested  with  intestinal  parasites 
which  enormously  deplete  their  limited  energy.  Con 
tagious  diseases  rage  unchecked  with  little  exercise  of 
the  simplest  precautions.  And  all  this  apparently 
without  hope  of  cure  from  within,  for  nature  has  here 
denied  to  man  the  energy  needed  to  control  the  com 
peting  forms  of  life. 

It  is  important  here  to  notice  certain  propositions 
which  hover  vaguely  in  the  western  mind.  One  is  that 


180    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

the  tropical  peoples  are  young  peoples  and  that  these 
limitations  will  disappear  as  development  proceeds. 
But  they  are  not  young.  The  evidence  is  convincing 
that  some  of  these  races  are  among  the  oldest  that  we 
know,  and  that  their  present  condition  is  the  result  of 
a  development  far  longer  and  more  unhindered  than 
our  own.  Nay  more,  the  extremely  imperfect  devel 
opment  of  the  tropical  man,  as  judged  by  our  stand 
ards,  is  in  effect  an  adaptation.  He  is  a  fit,  not  a  mis 
fit.  Nature's  criterion  of  fitness  is  not  the  ability  to 
enjoy  Browning  or  Beethoven.  She  shows  no  prefer 
ence  for  what  we  call  higher  types  and  is  perhaps  as 
much  concerned  for  her  parasites  as  for  her  humans. 
We  may  therefore  picture  her  as  viewing  her  tropical 
types  with  as  much  complacency  as  any  other.  If  we 
do  not  like  them,  it  is  we  who  must  change  them,  not 
nature. 

But  why  should  we  change  them  if  they  fit  the  con 
ditions  of  their  environment?  Why  disturb  nature's 
adaptations? 

The  answer  is  simply  that  the  tropics  are  necessary 
to  our  own  civilization.  The  most  remarkable  phe 
nomenon  in  modern  economic  development  is  the  util 
ization  of  tropical  products  and  the  discovery  of  their 
serviceableness  to  non-tropical  civilization.  Our  de 
pendence  upon  certain  of  these  products,  as  tea,  coffee, 
and  spices,  is  seemingly  arbitrary.  We  have  come  to 
care  much  for  these  things,  almost  to  require  them, 
and  are  deeply  concerned  with  the  development  of  the 
tropics  in  consequence,  but  it  is  not  clear  that  they 
meet  a  vital  need  of  our  civilization.  Others  like 
sugar  are  products  of  both  temperate  and  tropical 


THE  DEPENDENCE  OF  THE  TROPICS     181 

zones,  and  the  value  of  the  tropics  is  merely  as  an  ex 
tension  of  our  productive  domain.  We  can  raise  our 
sugar  in  the  north,  but  only  by  displacing  something 
else.  The  more  sugar  we  can  get  from  Cuba,  the 
more  wheat  we  can  raise  at  home. 

But  there  are  still  other  products  which  only  the 
tropics  can  produce  and  which  are  indispensable. 
Chief  of  these  and  type  of  all  the  rest  is  rubber,  which 
has  become  a  necessity  of  our  civilization.  The  list 
of  these  indispensable  tropical  products  is  a  long  one, 
and  one  that  constantly  increases,  while  the  number  of 
their  uses  and  the  amount  required  for  our  needs  is 
increasing  by  leaps  and  bounds.  The  demands  made 
by  a  single  invention  like  the  automobile  are  revolu 
tionary  in  our  relation  to  the  tropics. 

These  demands,  the  tropics  in  the  hands  of  their 
own  people  and  managed  in  the  true  tropical  way 
are  utterly  unable  to  supply.  Yet  there  is  almost  no 
limit  to  their  productivity  if  their  exuberant  nature 
forces  can  be  brought  under  human  control. 

This  is  the  modern  problem  of  the  tropics.  The  in 
creased  yield  of  tropical  products  which  our  present 
civilization  demands  is  something  which  their  own  peo 
ples  can  not  be  depended  upon  to  furnish  voluntarily 
and  unaided.  Attempts  to  extort  this  increased  yield 
by  force  have  produced  in  the  Putumayo  and  the 
Congo  the  most  ghastly  horrors  which  have  ever 
blackened  the  records  of  civilization.  Yet  our  civil 
ization  is  unrelenting  in  its  demands.  Can  we  im 
agine  that  the  modern  world  will  limit  its  use  of  au 
tomobiles,  telephones,  ocean  cables,  and  the  like  out 
of  deference  to  native  preferences  or  nature's  adjust- 


1 82     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

ments?  It  has  no  power  to  impose  upon  itself  such 
limitations  if  it  chose  to  do  so.  This  modern  world 
does  not  act  as  a  unit.  If  one  part  refrains,  another 
seizes  the  advantage,  and  woe  to  the  victim  of  forbear 
ance. 

Nor  is  there  anything  sacred  about  nature's  adapta 
tions.  All  human  progress  consists  in  the  modifica 
tion  of  these  adaptations.  Our  idea  of  a  wheat  head 
or  a  potato  or  an  apple  or  a  pig  is  not  nature's  original 
idea  at  all.  Her  problem  was  to  adapt  them  to  their 
environment.  Our  problem  is  to  adapt  them  to  our 
use.  If  it  seem  presumptuous  for  us  to  take  our  own 
fellow  men  in  hand  to  adapt  them  in  turn  to  our  pur 
pose,  we  may  remember  that  we  are  doing  the  same 
with  ourselves,  forcing  new  adaptations,  crushing  old 
instincts,  with  no  small  cost  in  suffering  and  loss,  all 
in  the  interest  of  this  pitiless  civilization  which  coerces 
us  into  its  service  in  order  that  it  may  serve  us  in  re 
turn. 

If  we  are  on  safe  ground  thus  far,  certain  farther 
conclusions  will  not  be  difficult.  The  first  requisite 
of  this  indispensable  exploitation  of  the  tropics  is  the 
establishment  of  a  government  such  as  tropical  men 
never  establish.  It  must  be  capable  not  only  of  main 
taining  order  and  administering  justice  of  quite  an 
untropical  sort,  but  also  of  executing  public  works  and 
developing  natural  resources  in  a  way  which  to  them 
is  unthinkable.  Such  a  government  and  such  an  or 
ganization  of  forces  of  control  can  come  only  from 
the  temperate  zone.  It  is  only  there  that  conditions 
have  made  possible  their  development.  To  impose 
them  upon  the  tropics,  involves  no  more  necessary 


THE  DEPENDENCE  OF  THE  TROPICS     183 

hardship  than  is  involved  in  imposing  them  upon  our 
selves. 

Nor  does  this  intervention  of  alien  energy  involve 
a  violation  of  precedent  or  an  "  interruption  of  evolu 
tion  "  as  a  recent  pseudo-scientist  has  called  it.  Such 
interruptions  are  one  of  evolution's  chief  agencies. 
They  have  been  going  on  ever  since  there  were  men 
capable  of  migration,  and  to  them  the  tropics  owe  the 
very  characteristics  in  whose  behalf  modern  inter 
vention  is  asked  to  forbear.  The  tropics  have  always 
drunk  deep  draughts  of  energy  from  the  cool  foun 
tains  of  the  north. 

The  dependence  between  the  temperate  and  tropical 
zones  is  not  new,  though  it  has  acquired  new  and  un 
precedented  importance.  It  is  permanent  and  mu 
tual.  We  need  their  rubber,  their  spices,  their  sugar, 
a  thousand  things  which  nature  has  bestowed  upon 
them  with  lavish  hand,  and  we  pay  for  them  with  the 
energy  and  brains  of  our  manhood  which  is  their  per 
petual  need.  The  traffic  is  based  on  permanent  dif 
ferences  of  vital  condition  and  can  never  cease.  Nay, 
rather,  with  the  improvement  of  the  means  of  com 
munication  it  must  steadily  increase,  this  eternal  bar 
ter  of  men  for  things.  Progress  can  consist  only  in 
facilitating  the  exchange,  assuring  its  mutuality,  elim 
inating  its  over-reaching  and  sharp  practice,  and  con 
serving  the  element  of  human  energy  on  the  one  hand 
while  stimulating  that  of  tropical  production  on  the 
other. 

If  the  control  of  the  tropics  by  the  temperate  zone 
is  to  be  accepted  in  principle  as  it  has  been  adopted  in 
practice,  a  certain  revision,  or  at  least  re-interpreta- 


1 84    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

tion,  of  familiar  political  principles  is  plainly  called 
for.  Self-government  may  be  a  principle  of  universal 
application,  but  the  only  kind  that  will  answer  the  re 
quirements  of  the  modern  world  will  have  to  be  im 
ported  for  the  tropics.  It  is  not  native  there.  It  may 
be  established  there  with  the  consent  of  the  governed, 
but  that  consent  will  be  neither  intelligent  nor  spon 
taneous.  Civilized  government  must  be  with  them  an 
acquired  taste.  For  that  matter  it  is  so  with  us. 
The  blessings  of  order  and  co-ordinated  activities  are 
nowhere  seen  and  greeted  from  afar,  but  are  accepted 
at  best  with  sullen  acquiescence,  and  at  the  worst,  only 
under  dire  compulsion.  Imagination  can  not  picture 
in  advance  the  results  of  experience.  Consent  comes 
only  as  the  result  of  tedious  adaptation.  If  the  doc 
trine  of  consent  of  the  governed  is  construed  as  requir 
ing  consent  in  advance,  then  there  is  scarce  a  govern 
ment  on  earth  that  can  claim  legitimacy. 

The  case  of  the  tropics  is  peculiar  only  in  the  sense 
that  the  kind  of  government  which  both  the  necessities 
and  the  conscience  of  the  great  outside  world  imposes 
upon  them,  transcends  both  their  intelligence  and  their 
local  requirements  far  more  than  is  the  case  in  the 
temperate  zone.  They  are  not  more  unwilling  than 
we  have  been, —  rather  less  so.  The  Hindu  has  ac 
cepted  British  rule  far  more  willingly  than  the  Scotch 
clansman.  But  if  not  less  willing  they  are  far  less 
able  to  understand.  The  requirements  of  sanitation, 
for  instance,  so  necessary  for  the  safety  of  both  them 
selves  and  the  great  outside  world,  are  to  them  as 
mysterious  as  they  are  irksome.  The  mysteries  of 
sound  finance  and  of  carefully  maintained  public  works 


THE  DEPENDENCE  OF  THE  TROPICS     185 

are  hardly  less  so.  Not  only  do  these  requirements 
transcend  their  present  intelligence,  but  in  a  sense  they 
must  always  lack  the  sanction  of  their  own  experience, 
for  some  of  these  requirements  are  not  their  require 
ments  at  all,  but  requirements  of  the  great  world  which 
has  no  option  but  to  make  the  tropics  take  their  place 
in  a  world  scheme  of  things.  The  consent  of  the 
tropics  must  therefore  always  imply  to  a  larger  degree 
than  in  the  temperate  zone,  an  attitude  of  docility  and 
submission  rather  than  of  intelligent  appreciation. 
This  attitude  is  readily  enough  secured, —  is  indeed 
characteristic  of  the  tropics.  It  is  of  course  capable 
of  frightful  abuse  and  perversion.  It  induces  a  sub 
missive  people  to  submit  to  the  tyranny  of  the  alien  or 
of  their  own  leaders.  It  rallies  the  docile  around  a 
Mahdi  or  an  Aguinaldo  as  readily  as  around  the  most 
beneficent  of  governments.  In  this  it  is  like  all  other 
human  characteristics.  If  condemned  because  liable 
to  abuse,  no  human  virtue  and  no  faculty  will  stand. 
Whether  the  tropics  having  once  consented  to  such 
government  as  the  conscience  and  the  necessities  of  the 
larger  world  demand,  can  be  depended  on  to  be  loyal 
to  it  thereafter  is  a  question  still  at  issue.  Not  a  few 
fondly  hope  that  once  enlightened  by  experience  of  the 
benefits  of  civilized  government  and  instructed  in  its 
management,  the  tropics  will  gladly  maintain  its  neces 
sary  institutions.  It  is  easy  to  believe  that  they  will 
gladly  will  to  do  so.  But  the  matter  is  not  merely  one 
of  volition.  Whether  they  will  perceive  the  means 
necessary  to  that  end  and  will  to  adopt  irksome  meas 
ures  whose  necessity  is  not  very  obvious,  is  not  so  clear. 
We  are  too  apt  to  forget  that  we  have  experience  on 


1 86    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

this  point  to  enlighten  us.  Santo  Domingo,  Hayti,  the 
Central  American  states,  Liberia,  are  all  cases  in  point, 
—  if  not  ideal  cases,  just  the  kind  of  real  cases  which 
constitute  our  problem.  To  say  that  they  have  met 
or  are  learning  to  meet  the  conditions  which  the  neces 
sities  and  the  conscience  of  the  civilized  world  impose 
would  be  grotesque.  Not  one  has  succeeded;  scarcely 
one  is  even  approaching  success;  most  have  practically 
ceased  to  function  and  have  accepted  foreign  control. 
These  experiences  are  perhaps  not  conclusive,  but  they 
establish  a  presumption  which  is  not  doubtful.  The 
possibility  of  civilized  government  becoming  acclim 
ated  in  the  tropics  is  not  yet  demonstrated. 

It  is  perhaps  appropriate  to  notice  here  that  the 
principle  of  self  government,  whether  in  the  tropics 
or  elsewhere,  is  necessarily  modified  in  certain  cases 
by  strategic  considerations.  To  take  an  extreme  case, 
who  would  suggest  that  Gibraltar  should  have  the 
privilege  of  self  government.  Its  mongrel  popula 
tion  might  vote  to  unite  with  Spain,  or  more  likely, 
to  form  an  independent  republic.  Those  who  are 
hostile  to  British  rule  might  favour  such  an  arrange 
ment,  but  obviously  for  ulterior  reasons.  So  tremen 
dous  is  the  strategic  importance  of  "  the  Rock  "  and 
so  incapable  its  inhabitants  of  understanding  it  or 
maintaining  it,  that  no  one  has  suggested  that  its  gov 
ernment  should  be  based  on  other  than  strategic  con 
siderations.  Yet  the  plea  for  self-government  is 
continually  made  for  Egypt  which  holds  an  exactly 
similar  and  hardly  less  important  place  in  the  great 
artery  of  Britain's  life  blood.  A  recent  writer  es 
pouses  the  cause  of  the  Egyptians  with  naive  uncon- 


THE  DEPENDENCE  OF  THE  TROPICS     187 

sciousness  of  this  vital  fact.  "  They  are  like  every 
other  nation  in  the  world  in  wanting  to  run  their  own 
affairs.  They  grant  that  they  may  run  them  badly 
for  a  while.  But  their  argument  in  unanswerable. 
They  ask  you  to  point  out  a  single  nation  in  history 
that  has  evolved  into  a  self-governing  community 
without  having  gone  through  a  long  period  of  imper 
fection,  mistakes,  and  errors,  even  of  revolution  and 
anarchy."  For  New  Zealand  or  Argentina  that  ar 
gument  might  be  "  unanswerable,"  but  not  for  Egypt. 
There  must  be  no  revolution  and  anarchy  in  Egypt. 
It  would  be  like  a  street  fight  in  lower  Broadway.  If 
they  were  somewhere  else,  perhaps  we  might  let 
them  fight  it  out,  but  not  here.  It  is  safe  to  say  that 
if  Britain  were  willing  to  grant  to  the  Egyptians  the 
privilege  of  working  out  their  own  salvation  through 
revolution  and  anarchy,  the  rest  of  the  world  would 
refuse  its  consent.  It  simply  must  not  be. 

The  bearing  of  this  principle  upon  our  own  prob 
lems  in  the  Caribbean  is  obvious.  Cuba,  Panama, 
and  Nicaragua  can  not  be  allowed  the  privilege  of 
anarchy  which  in  another  situation  they  might  claim. 
Situated  as  they  are,  they  must  walk  straight.  Theirs 
is  the  irksome  honour  of  children  born  to  the  purple. 
Less  obviously  but  not  less  really,  the  same  is  true  of 
Mexico.  It  simply  is  not  true  that  it  is  no  concern 
of  ours  how  long  Mexico  takes  to  secure  her  free 
dom  or  what  means  she  uses  in  securing  it.  We  are 
very  much  concerned  with  the  means,  nor  can  we  wait 
for  ever.  The  futility  of  mere  waiting  is  further  em 
phasized,  by  the  fact,  if  it  be  a  fact,  as  we  have  seen 
reason  to  believe,  that  tropical  peoples  are  not  merely 


1 88     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

immature,  but  that  there  are  inherent  limitations  to 
their  capacity  for  unaided  development.  It  is  some 
times  impossible  to  wait  till  they  have  reached  this 
limit.  It  is  folly  to  wait  beyond  it. 

Recognizing,  then,  the  inevitable  dependence  of  the 
tropics  upon  the  energy  of  the  temperate  zone  for 
their  guidance  and  constructive  development,  certain 
dangers  and  certain  requisites  call  for  consideration. 

The  tropics  must  be  developed.  That  is  what  our 
trusteeship  is  for.  If  we  were  not  compelled  to 
seek  their  products,  we  might  leave  them  in  contented 
lethargy.  They  would  never  disturb  us.  But  we 
need  their  full  service  if  we  are  to  build  up  the  world 
civilization  to  which  we  have  now  set  our  hand. 
The  native  unaided  can  not  assure  us  this  service. 
The  trustee  must  do  so  if  he  is  to  justify  his  trustee 
ship.  Mere  occupation,  without  constructive  organ 
ization  and  development,  forfeits  all  claims  to  pos 
session.  That  was  our  indictment  of  Spain.  It  is 
still  more  the  indictment  of  Portugal  in  her  rich  but 
neglected  African  dominions. 

On  the  other  hand,  experience  has  demonstrated 
the  futility  of  brute  coercion.  The  trouble  with  the 
native  is  not  perversity  but  helplessness.  He  lacks 
not  only  force,  but  intelligence,  imagination,  and  fore 
sight.  Mere  pressure  brings  but  meagre  returns  and 
at  ghastly  cost.  The  Belgian  Congo,  the  Putumayo 
in  Brazil,  and  some  of  the  French  colonies  are  morally 
forfeit  on  this  ground. 

The  world  is  not  quite  clear,  it  would  seem,  as  to 
the  perquisites  of  trusteeship  in  the  tropics.  The 
tendency  at  first  was  to  regard  tropical  dependencies 


THE  DEPENDENCE  OF  THE  TROPICS     189 

as  private  estates  or  preserves  to  be  monopolized  by 
the  owner.  Exclusive  privileges  of  trade  or  ex 
ploitation  were  reserved  to  the  controlling  nation,  or 
conferred  upon  a  trading  company  or  other  beneficiary 
at  its  discretion.  This  traffic  was  then  worked  for  all 
it  was  worth,  the  price  being  forced  up  by  all  the  de 
vices  known  to  the  modern  trust,  even  including  de 
struction  of  part  of  the  product.  With  the  disap 
pearance  of  the  trading  company  and  the  admission  of 
the  general  trader,  the  same  result  was  sought  by 
differential  duties  favouring  the  citizens  of  the  pos 
sessing  country,  and  by  export  duties,  a  favourite  in 
stitution  of  the  tropics.  The  earlier,  direct  monopo 
lies  are  now  obsolete,  but  discriminating  duties  and 
like  devices  implying  rights  of  private  exploitation 
are  still  common. 

There  is  plainly  a  tendency,  however,  toward  the 
view  that  the  tropics  are  world  property  and  not 
open  to  commercial  appropriation  by  a  single  people. 
In  not  a  few  cases,  some  product  which  all  require, 
is  to  be  obtained  from  only  a  single  district.  To 
hold  up  the  world  by  demanding  an  exorbitant  price 
for  such  a  monopoly  product,  is  a  risky  game  for  any 
single  nation  to  play.  It  accentuates  in  the  extreme 
the  anxiety  of  the  dispossessed  to  challenge  the  right 
of  possession  of  the  more  fortunate,  and  is  one  of  the 
most  serious  causes  of  modern  wars.  To  permit 
trade  on  equal  terms  and  levy  only  such  duties  as  are 
required  to  defray  expenses  of  administration,  is 
the  probable  policy  of  all  tropical  dependencies  in 
the  not  distant  future.  In  the  home  country,  the 
economic  argument  for  free  trade  is  less  conclusive. 


1 9o    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

We  must  consider  the  needs  of  varied  culture  and 
national  self-sufficiency  in  wartime  isolation.  But 
neither  of  these  arguments  apply  with  any  such  force 
to  tropical  dependencies.  Such  an  open  door  policy 
may  seem  to  remove  all  incentive  to  bear  the  white 
man's  burden  in  this  onerous  trusteeship,  but  this  is 
far  from  the  case.  Men  like  to  see  their  flag  wave 
over  distant  lands  and  their  civilization  extended  to 
alien  peoples.  For  this  they  are  willing  to  incur  large 
costs  and  forego  all  material  remuneration.  There 
is  in  this  unreasoned  ambition,  a  desire  to  make  pre 
vail  that  order  that  we  have  learned  to  value  and 
love,  a  desire  which  is  as  nearly  altruistic  as  any  that 
men  ever  know.  It  is  only  the  self  styled  idealist  who 
assumes  that  men  seek  dominion  for  pay. 

There  still  remains,  however,  a  tangible  profit  in 
the  trusteeship  of  the  open  door.  If  we  can  not 
shut  others  out,  they  at  least  can  not  shut  us  out.  And 
the  exploitation  of  our  tropics,  if  it  does  not  inure 
solely  to  our  benefit,  at  least  includes  us  in  its  bene 
fits  by  broadening  the  market  for  tropical  products 
and  giving  added  assurance  that  the  needful  shall 
not  fail. 

It  should  hardly  be  necessary  to  add  that  tropical 
dependencies  require  a  degree  of  disinterestedness 
on  the  part  of  their  administration  which  puts  the 
nation  to  its  severest  test.  At  home  the  self-seeking 
and  corrupt  are  restrained  by  the  watchfulness  of 
their  peers  and  the  scourge  of  social  ostracism.  The 
tropics  have  no  such  defence.  They  are  unable  to 
locate  the  evils  of  maladministration  from  which 
they  suffer.  Their  opinion  counts  for  nothing  with 


THE  DEPENDENCE  OF  THE  TROPICS     191 

the  corrupt  administrator,  and  those  who  alone  can 
hold  him  responsible  are  unconscious  and  far  away. 
Any  tendency  to  make  such  a  dependency  a  perquisite 
of  "  deserving  "  candidates  for  official  favour  is  repre 
hensible  in  the  highest  degree.  If  there  is  any  place 
where  the  office  should  seek  the  man  and  not  the 
man  the  office,  it  is  here.  So  obvious  is  this  danger 
that  it  has  been  urged  as  a  sufficient  reason  for  con 
demning  the  whole  policy  of  dependencies.  But  it  is 
a  danger  which  the  world  must  risk,  and  a  danger 
which  can  be  successfully  met.  In  nothing  has  the 
political  evolution  of  the  world  shown  more  progress 
in  the  last  three  hundred  years  than  in  the  govern 
ment  of  dependencies.  Doubtless  much  remains  to 
be  accomplished,  but  a  comparison  of  the  Spanish 
government  of  Peru  with  the  British  government  of 
the  Federated  Malay  States  or  the  American  govern 
ment  of  the  Philippines  should  reassure  even  the  most 
confirmed  pessimist.  Nor  is  the  difference  one  of 
race  alone.  Conceding,  as  we  are  perhaps  too  will 
ing  to  do,  the  superior  aptitude  of  the  Anglo-Saxon 
for  the  government  of  dependencies,  it  must  be  recog 
nized  that  he  has  had  much  to  learn  and  that  he  has 
been  much  indebted  to  favouring  conditions.  His 
early  ventures  were  not  so  different  from  those  of 
Spain,  and  would  perhaps  have  turned  out  no  better  if 
he  had  begun  his  colonizing  with  the  treasure  trove 
of  Mexico  and  Peru  instead  of  making  terms  with 
grudging  nature  in  austere  New  England.  He  has 
learned, —  the  world  has  learned, —  much,  and  can 
learn  the  more  that  is  needful. 

It  may  be  noted  in  closing  this  chapter  that  the 


192     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

policy  of  permanent  trusteeship  of  the  tropics  is  a 
comparatively  recent  reaction  against  a  view  once 
widely  prevalent  that  all  dependencies  were  but  ap 
prentices  in  the  art  of  self-government,  and  that 
graduation,  even  an  early  graduation,  into  independ 
ent  self-government  was  in  store  for  them.  So  gen 
eral  was  this  expectation  that  government  policy  was 
shaped  by  it  at  times  to  a  degree  that  it  is  difficult  for 
us  to  realize.  It  is  stated  on  reliable  authority  that 
Britain  at  one  time  had  reached  the  decision  to  with 
draw  from  Jamaica  and  her  other  West  Indian  pos 
sessions,  leaving  them  to  manage  their  own  affairs  as 
they  seemed  able  to  do  after  their  long  tuition.  Even 
the  date  had  been  set  and  the  orders  issued.  Some 
change  in  the  personnel  of  the  British  government  was 
doubtless  responsible  for  averting  this  disaster,  for 
a  disaster  it  would  certainly  have  been.  Since  then 
the  steady  decline  of  Hayti,  Santo  Domingo,  and 
other  independent  states  whose  case  seemed  fairly 
analogous,  has  applied  the  necessary  correction  to  a 
hasty  and  sanguine  generalization. 

A  similar  precipitate  decision  of  the  United  States 
regarding  the  Philippines  has  likewise  been  recon 
sidered,  at  least  for  the  present.  In  this  case,  how 
ever,  the  problem  has  been  complicated  by  considera 
tions  of  national  security,  the  conviction  being  widely 
held  that  the  Philippines  were  not  defensible  and 
therefore  a  source  of  danger.  This  is  an  important 
question  which  will  demand  our  later  consideration, 
but  for  the  present  it  is  sufficient  to  note  that  this 
conviction  greatly  strengthened  the  argument  of  those 
who  were  predisposed  by  their  political  philosophy  to 


THE  DEPENDENCE  OF  THE  TROPICS     193 

recognize  the  capacity  of  the  Filipinos  for  self-gov 
ernment.  That  capacity  is  now  being  put  to  a  re 
markable  test.  The  result  of  that  test  will  be  of  un 
usual  interest.  Present  workings  are  too  much  the 
result  of  recent  American  management  to  be  con 
clusive.  It  is  a  nice  task  to  distinguish  between  mo 
mentum  and  active  energy,  and  only  long  experience 
can  show  how  far  present  Filipino  achievements  are 
due  to  the  dying  and  how  far  to  the  living  force. 


PART  TWO 
AMERICA  AMONG  THE  WORLD  POWERS 


CHAPTER  XIII 

THE    GREATER    POWERS 

OUR  inquiry  has  led  us  from  the  early  and  forma 
tive  period  of  American  imperialism  to  its  inevitable 
sequel  in  the  problems  which  now  confront  us  on  the 
American  continent.  This  continent  is  obviously  our 
chief  field  and  possibly  our  only  field  of  legitimate 
political  activity.  But  as  we  have  considered  our 
relation  to  the  various  American  countries,  we  have 
been  conscious  at  every  step  of  the  existence  of  other 
and  greater  countries  whose  interests  and  ambitions 
in  this  part  of  the  world  are  the  chief  factor  in  our 
problem.  It  is  to  these  countries,  therefore,  that  we 
now  turn,  inquiring  more  definitely  as  to  their  inter 
ests  and  ambitions,  and  also  as  to  other  relations 
which  we  may  sustain  to  them  and  which  must  needs 
further  complicate  our  problem. 

Our  problem  now  becomes  a  very  different  one.  In 
our  own  hemisphere  we  are  plainly  the  paramount 
power.  The  Latin  American  countries  are  all  in 
ferior  to  us  in  size,  population,  wealth,  and  organ 
ization.  This  fact,  taken  in  connection  with  their 
situation  and  our  mutual  necessities,  makes  them 
more  or  less  dependent  upon  us.  The  dependence 
varies  greatly,  from  a  case  like  Argentina  where  it  is 
a  remote  contingency,  to  that  of  Hayti  or  Panama, 

197 


198    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

where  it  amounts  to  permanent  control,  but  in  one 
important  respect  all  are  alike.  If  they  need  help, 
they  must  come  to  us.  Other  nations  are  not  likely 
to  help  them,  and  those  that  might  be  disposed  to  do 
so  are-precisely  the  ones  whose  assistance  we  can  not 
permit.  This  is  the  meaning  of  the  Monroe  Doc 
trine,  and  if  there  were  no  Monroe  Doctrine,  it  is 
the  meaning  of  the  situation.  If  we  keep  our  leader 
ship  in  American  affairs,  we  keep  our  independence. 
If  we  lose  that  leadership  to  a  stronger  power,  we 
necessarily  become  subservient  in  turn  to  that  power. 
That  power  might  be  very  forbearing, —  as  we  are 
trying  to  be  in  our  own  exercise  of  leadership, —  but 
that  power  would  be  paramount.  There  is  reason 
to  fear  that  certain  powers  in  that  position  might  not 
be  forbearing. 

The  problem  of  American  relations  is  therefore  the 
problem  of  maintaining  this  paramount  position,  the 
problem  of  calculating  the  amount  of  control  required 
in  a  given  case  and  considering  the  form  which  that 
control  should  take.  Hence  the  Platt  Amendment, 
the  Nicaraguan  and  Dominican  receiverships,  and 
the  Haytian  protectorate,  with  more  in  the  making. 
Hence,  too,  the  policy  of  conciliation,  with  its  watch 
ful  waiting  and  its  A  B  C  conference.  The  problem 
is  that  of  a  vast  protectorate  with  infinite  complexities 
of  physical  and  psychological  condition  which,  amid 
constant  change,  must  be  kept  in  constant  equilibrium. 

Turning  to  the  old  world  the  problem  is  changed, 
—  almost  reversed.  A  number  of  the  nations  of 
Europe  are  more  powerful  than  we  are.  While 
great  changes  are  probably  in  store  for  some  of  these 


THE  GREATER  POWERS  199 

powers,  and  our  own  growth  in  population,  wealth, 
and  organization  tends  constantly  to  give  us  the  ad 
vantage,  it  seems  likely  that  some  of  these  powers 
will  always  surpass  us.  If  there  is  to  be  a  paramount 
world  power,  it  must  be  in  the  old  world,  not  in  the 
new.  That  was  settled  when  the  shrinking  planet 
sent  up  the  wrinkled  outlines  of  the  continents. 
Americans  are  fond  of  contrasting  complacently  their 
own  vast  domain  with  the  little  countries  of  western 
Europe,  but  they  forget  that  one  European  country 
which  has  not  yet  reached  its  probable  limits,  already 
has  a  population  nearly  twice  as  large  as  our  own  in 
a  territory  three  times  as  large  as  our  own  and  on 
the  average  more  productive.  Add  Canada  and 
Mexico  and  the  West  Indies  to  our  present  terri 
tory  and  we  should  still  be  inferior  in  population, 
in  area,  and  in  life  sustaining  power.  Moreover  this 
country  is  far  more  likely  than  we  are  to  extend  its 
territory,  and  its  population  is  increasing  at  a  more 
capid  rate.  Nor  is  this  the  largest,  the  most  popu 
lous,  or  the  most  powerful  of  old  world  powers. 

But  this  is  not  all.  America  may  conceivably  hold 
her  own  against  any  old  world  power,  either  now  or 
later,  but  she  can  never  do  so  against  a  combination 
of  European  powers.  It  is  occasionally  argued  that 
these  great  powers  will  break  up  and  so  their  menace 
will  disappear.  The  tendencies  are  all  the  other  way. 
For  many  centuries  political  aggregation  has  gone 
steadily  on,  and  even  where  it  seems  to  have  reached 
its  limits  as  in  the  countries  of  western  Europe,  it  is 
still  going  on  in  the  form  of  ententes,  alliances,  etc., 
which  tend  more  and  more  to  harden  into  permanency. 


200    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

For  the  moment  our  safety  lies  in  the  division  of  the 
the  old  world,  but  that  protection  is  diminishing.  An 
active  combination  of  old  world  powers  to  extend 
their  influence  in  America  is  no  longer  a  mere  possi 
bility;  it  is  a  certainty,  and  we  are  protected  from  it 
only  by  a  counter  combination  among  these  same 
powers. 

As  we  look  beyond  the  American  continent,  there 
fore,  our  relation  is  one  of  inferiority,  present  and 
presumably  permanent.  No  doubt  we  are  very  pow 
erful,  quite  the  superior  of  many  European  countries, 
and  further  favoured  to  some  extent  by  our  posi 
tion.  But  even  in  dealing  with  the  lesser  countries 
of  Europe,  we  are  seldom  privileged  to  use  our 
strength.  These  countries  are  quite  as  dependent  as 
those  of  Latin  America,  but  their  dependence  is  not 
upon  us.  Any  effort  to  assert  our  will  against  them 
tends  to  line  up  Europe  in  their  defence,  a  combina 
tion  against  which  we  are  powerless.  Our  only  re 
course  is  to  line  up  Europe  or  part  of  it  on  our  side. 
Europe  is  the  arbiter.  We  control  America,  but 
Europe  controls  the  world, —  controls  it  and  must 
continue  to  control  it  unless  present  indications  de 
ceive  us.  It  is  of  course  the  larger  Europe  that  we 
have  in  mind,  not  merely  the  little  area  arbitrarily 
set  off  by  the  Urals  and  the  Caucasus,  but  the  Europe 
which,  originating  here,  has  spread  resistlessly  across 
the  white  man's  land  of  Asia  and  the  island  continents 
of  the  southern  seas,  while  reducing  tropical  Asia  and 
Africa  to  unquestioned  vassalage.  It  would  be  blind 
ness  not  to  see  that  the  centre  of  gravity  of  things 
human  lies  in  this  vast  aggregate. 


THE  GREATER  POWERS  201 

This  then  is  our  problem.  How  shall  we  make 
terms  with  those  that  are  stronger  than  we, 
stronger  for  the  moment  in  their  local  intensive  de 
velopment,  stronger  for  the  morrow  in  their  resources 
and  their  power  of  growth,  and  always  and  for  ever 
stronger  in  combination?  Obviously  the  problem  of 
today  is  different  from  that  of  tomorrow  or  the  ulti 
mate  future.  Europe  is  now  divided  and  incapable 
of  united  action.  Even  so  her  several  parts  are  re 
doubtable  and  partial  combination  is  becoming  ha 
bitual  if  not  permanent.  We  must  therefore  con 
sider  our  relation  to  these  parts  in  succession,  both 
individually  and  in  their  possible  combinations. 
Only  upon  a  study  of  actual  national  relations  can  we 
base  such  slight  forecast  of  a  remoter  future  as  pres 
ent  knowledge  warrants. 

It  may  be  prefaced  that  the  United  States  is  rather 
a  novice  in  these  matters.  We  have  had  intercourse 
with  the  powers  of  Europe  from  the  first,  but  for 
the  most  part  of  a  very  minor  and  incidental  sort. 
The  relation  has  been  like  that  of  casual  acquaintances 
rather  than  of  working  partners  or  active  and  close 
competitors.  The  early  life  of  our  nation  was  in 
fact  one  of  isolation,  and  when  our  severance  from 
Europe  was  once  thoroughly  effected,  we  fell  into  a 
way  of  assuming  that  nothing  that  happened  there 
really  concerned  us.  Meanwhile,  as  has  been  seen, 
we  carried  things  over  here  with  a  high  hand.  The 
result  was  that  we  learned  to  be  a  little  high-handed. 
Our  attitude  in  such  matters  as  the  Behring  Sea  con 
troversy,  the  Nicaragua  boundary  dispute,  and  the 
Manchurian  Railway  scheme,  was  curiously  out  of 


202     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

proportion  to  the  force  at  our  disposal.  It  reflected 
in  the  sphere  of  diplomacy  something  of  the  popular 
conviction  that  we  can  "  lick  creation,"  which  was  only 
a  way  of  saying  that  we  thought  creation  safely  dis 
tant  and  barked  at  it  like  a  puppy  from  behind  a  high 
fence.  The  fence  is  gone  now,  at  least  in  places, 
but  we  have  not  yet  come  to  realize  that  any  one  may 
come  over.  It  is  a  truism  that  our  national  isolation 
has  vanished,  that  it  is  now  possible  to  cross  the  ocean 
in  force,  and  that  the  real  frontier  of  every  nation  is 
now  the  ocean's  farther  shore.  We  have  a  new  situ 
ation  and  new  knowledge,  but  not  yet  the  new  in 
stincts  to  serve  our  new  needs.  So  we  have  been 
incredulous  and  even  impatient  with  those  who  have 
warned  us  of  possible  trouble  with  Japan  or  other 
powers.  We  admit  that  they  might  attack  us,  but 
we  do  not  believe  they  will.  As  our  chief  representa 
tive  put  it  a  couple  of  years  ago,  there  was  "  no  ob 
jection  to  the  discussion  of  preparedness  as  a  purely 
academic  question."  Even  now  that  war  has  come, 
we  hardly  realize  that  it  is  a  case  in  point  or  that  it 
has  any  real  bearing  on  the  general  question.  It  is 
one  of  the  small  compensations  for  the  world's  calam 
ity  that  it  seems  likely  to  awaken  us  to  a  realizing 
sense  of  our  place  among  the  nations.  We  shall 
never  realize  that  position  or  be  alive  to  our  real 
danger  until  we  can  believe  that  a  nation, —  almost 
any  nation, —  when  tempted  by  a  great  opportunity 
or  driven  by  a  great  need,  will  despoil  its  neighbour. 
Perhaps  it  should  not  be  so,  perhaps  it  will  not  al 
ways  be  so,  but  it  is  so  now,  and  if  we  would  play 
safe,  we  must  assume  that  it  will  continue  to  be  so. 


THE  GREATER  POWERS  203 

The  incorrigible  optimism  of  our  race  which  is  at 
once  the  hope  of  the  future  and  the  danger  of  the 
present,  lures  us  again  with  the  promise  of  a  false 
security.  There  are  fond  dreamers  who  believe  that 
this  will  be  the  last  war.  There  have  been  such  after 
every  war  for  the  last  three  hundred  years.  Let  us 
hope  if  we  can,  but  let  us  not  stake  our  all  on  so  un 
certain  a  prospect.  There  are  no  adequate  moral 
safeguards  against  war.  It  is  vain  to  invoke  the 
analogy  of  individual  relations.  Seemingly  the  anal 
ogy  does  not  fit;  certainly  it  does  not  appeal.  Nor  is 
the  spell  to  be  wrought  by  paper  formulas  or  verbal 
incantations.  Even  aversion  to  war  is  no  safeguard, 
as  our  own  case  proves,  nor  is  our  case  peculiar  among 
present  belligerents. 

And  there  are  new  straws  to  grasp  at.  It  is  labori 
ously  demonstrated  that  war  does  not  pay,  that  no 
resulting  economic  advantage,  even  in  the  event  of 
victory,  can  compensate  for  its  costs,  the  hope  being 
that  such  a  demonstration  will  dissuade  men  from  it. 
There  is  not  a  belligerent  in  the  present  war  that  did 
not  know  this  in  advance.  Again  free  trade  is  urged 
as  the  panacea,  the  opening  of  all  doors  to  the  com 
merce  of  all  nations,  that  the  temptation  to  force 
these  doors  may  be  removed.  How  strange,  in  the 
light  of  such  a  proposal,  that  the  one  free  trade  coun 
try  in  the  world  should  have  been  for  decades  the 
chief  object  of  hostility! 

But  dearest  of  all  these  illusions  to  the  American 
heart  is  the  belief  that  democracy  is  the  one  safeguard 
against  war,  and  that  our  task  in  the  present  strug 
gle  is  to  destroy  the  autocracy  of  the  Central  Powers 


204     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

and  so  banish  war  for  ever.  No  better  illustration 
could  be  given  of  the  vice  of  unhistoric  thinking. 
During  the  last  hundred  years  the  two  most  imperial 
istic  nations  of  the  world,  those  that  have  expanded 
most  incontinently,  encroached  most  often  upon  their 
neighbours,  and  oftenest  grasped  the  sword  for  this 
purpose,  have  been  the  world's  two  great  democra 
cies,  Britain  and  the  United  States.  Their  nearest 
rival  has  been  France,  a  country  intermittently  demo 
cratic  throughout  the  period,  and  never  more  ag 
gressive  than  under  the  present  republic. 

There  is  a  momentary  plausibility  in  this  assump 
tion  that  democracies  are  pacific.  In  every  democ 
racy  of  the  world  today  there  is  in  progress  a  violent 
class  struggle,  a  struggle  as  bitter,  as  destructive  and 
as  painful  as  any  war  we  have  known  until  the  pres 
ent.  The  aggressive  party  in  this  struggle  grudge 
their  powder  for  any  other  cause.  They  hate  the 
opposing  class  far  more  than  they  hate  any  opposing 
nationality.  In  the  autocratic  countries  this  struggle 
is  more  or  less  repressed  and  the  nation  is  thus  able 
to  exert  its  force  as  a  unit  in  pursuance  of  its  designs. 
Germany  was  able  to  attack  her  neighbours;  France 
and  Britain  were  not.  This  in  itself  is  a  sufficient 
refutation  of  Germany's  claim  that  she  is  fighting  only 
to  defend  herself  against  aggression.  The  radical 
democracy  of  France  and  Britain  was  too  intent  upon 
its  home  struggle  to  consent  to  a  war  of  foreign  ag 
gression,  as  the  last  election  in  France  preceding  the 
war  abundantly  proved. 

But  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  assume  that  democra 
cies  are  peaceful.  They  are  ultra  belligerent.  If 


THE  GREATER  POWERS  205 

we  assume  that  democracy  means  perpetual  war  at 
home,  it  is  conceivable  that  it  may  mean  perpetual 
peace  abroad.  That  would  be  a  huge  assumption  for 
a  slender  hope,  an  assumption  as  unplausible  as  it 
is  unpalatable.  No,  if  democracy  ever  settles  its 
quarrel  at  home,  it  will  show  the  old  masterful  tem 
per  in  the  field  from  which  it  has  been  temporarily 
diverted.  The  world  may  become  pacific,  but  not 
through  democracy.  The  slogan,  "  down  with  autoc 
racy,"  serves  the  present  purpose,  and  ultimate  pur 
poses  can  wait, —  must  wait. 

The  causes  of  war  are  more  vague  and  more  com 
prehensive  than  any  of  these  remedies  imply.  Na 
tions  do  not  fight  to  make  money,  nor  to  force  open 
the  doors  of  trade.  Nor  do  they  rally  as  slaves  to 
serve  the  ambitions  of  an  autocrat.  They  are  moved 
by  great  common  impulses,  which  individually 
they  do  not  understand,  to  do  things  which  in 
dividually  they  do  not  enjoy,  and  to  seek  ends  from 
which  individually  they  do  not  profit.  If  this  seems 
irrational,  it  is  because  our  reasoning  has  taken  ac 
count  only  of  the  individual  life, —  its  detachable  fea 
tures,  so  to  speak.  No  matter  what  our  sympathies, 
it  is  the  beginning  of  wisdom  in  these  matters  to  recog 
nize  the  existence  of  something  more  than  this,  some 
thing  for  which  men  have  always  been  willing  to  sacri 
fice  this.  All  attempts  to  translate  this  "  oversoul  " 
of  the  nation  into  terms  of  the  individual  life  have 
been  in  vain  and  must  always  be  in  vain.  To  give  it 
tangibility  and  substance  is  to  degrade  and  falsify  it. 
It  envelopes  us  as  an  intangible  atmosphere  of  emo 
tion  which  expresses  itself  only  in  symbols.  Its  vast 


206    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

expanse  and  length  of  days,  however  finite,  mean 
more  to  our  finite  minds  than  universality  and  eter 
nity.  In  comparison,  our  lives  of  the  moment  forget 
to  assert  their  little  claims.  The  materialistic  paci 
fist  may  jeer  and  argue,  but  men  will  worship  still. 
The  cult  may  be  folly,  but  it  is  folly  to  forget  that  it 
is  a  cult. 

And  this  thing  that  we  reverence  may  suffer  harm. 
Through  the  violence  of  war  or  the  insidious  en 
croachments  of  peace  its  votaries  may  be  scattered, 
its  symbols  dishonoured,  and  its  temples  profaned. 
There  may  be  strange  accents,  uncongenial  customs 
and  unwelcome  ideals  instead  of  those  we  have 
learned  to  love.  The  prospect  is  repugnant  to  our 
inmost  souls.  It  was  this  instinctive  revulsion  of 
feeling  rather  than  any  reasoned  estimate  that 
prompted  a  recent  distinguished  utterance  that  "  if 
Germany  wins  the  war,  the  world  will  not  be  fit  to 
live  in." 

And  conversely,  all  may  be  exalted,  enlarged,  and 
glorified.  Votaries  may  be  more  numerous,  reverence 
more  profound,  homage  more  heartfelt,  and  symbols 
more  sacred,  if  we  will  pay  the  price,  perhaps  the 
uttermost  price.  Do  not  say,  I  shall  not  see  it. 
Foolish  words!  Do  I  not  foresee  it?  Object  not, 
my  good  is  no  better  than  another.  Who  knows 
but  me?  Or  that  my  good  is  unsubstantial,  no  good 
at  all,  that  it  does  not  pay.  Think,  man,  how  many 
good  things  in  our  world  would  perish  if  such  argu 
ments  were  held  conclusive. 

In  some  such  way  the  men  about  us  might  reason, 
were  it  a  thing  to  reason  out.  They  guard  as  a 


THE  GREATER  POWERS  207 

sacred  trust  the  nationality  in  which  their  lot  is  cast, 
and  count  no  price  too  dear  to  pay  for  its  defence, 
its  aggrandizement,  and  its  exaltation.  It  is  vain  to 
tell  them  that  it  is  worthless.  The  argument  strikes 
equally  at  all  intangible  good. 

But  why  can  not  each  nationality  keep  its  place, 
recognizing  its  limits  and  respecting  the  boundaries  of 
its  neighbours?  There  are  two  reasons. 

The  first  reason  is  that  the  present  limits  of  na- 
tional  territory  are  arbitrary  and  unsatisfactory. 
Whether  we  regard  them  from  the  standpoint  of 
commercial  convenience,  or  national  defence,  or  eth 
nic  unity,  or  all  three  together,  the  same  conclusion  is 
inevitable.  No  rational  finality  has  been  reached. 
Perhaps  none  can  be  reached,  but  improvement  seems 
possible.  There  is  not  a  nation  that  does  not  see 
some  particular  excrescence  that  it  would  like  to  have 
removed.  The  result  might  be  merely  to  make  new 
ones,  but  it  is  the  present  ones  that  irritate.  The 
result  is  that  present  national  arrangements  suit  no 
body.  The  situation  is  one  of  unstable  equilibrium. 

The  second  reason  is  that  a  particular  equilibrium, 
if  ever  so  satisfactory  for  the  moment,  is  continually 
disturbed  by  the  silent  forces  of  growth.  Nations 
change  in  their  inner  substance  as  the  result  of  the 
situation.  The  progressive  nations,  having  dis 
tanced  their  competitors,  become  unprogressive  and 
are  distanced  in  turn.  Whole  nations  lose  their 
imagination  and  become  automatic  and  unadapt 
able.  It  is  impossible  that  this  should  not  react 
upon  the  tenure  of  territory,  and  especially  upon 
that  penumbra  of  tropical  and  island  dependencies 


208     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

which  surrounds  every  great  empire  and  which,  we 
have  seen  reason  to  believe,  has  its  basis  in  permanent 
condition.  Nothing  could  have  been  more  natural 
or  just  than  that  Portugal  under  Henry  the  Navigator 
should  bring  the  islands  and  helpless  lands  which  he 
discovered  under  the  sway  of  his  organizing  genius. 
Nothing  could  be  more  unfortunate  than  to  have  that 
sway  continue  today.  It  was  precisely  such  consider 
ations  as  this  that  justified  the  expulsion  of  Spain 
from  Cuba,  of  Mexico  from  California,  and  of 
Turkey  from  the  Balkans.  Yet  there  were  some  of 
these  Balkan  States  that  three  centuries  before  had 
thrown  themselves  into  the  arms  of  Turkey  as  an  en 
lightened  power  to  escape  the  miseries  of  Christian 
misrule. 

Industrial  changes  are  potent  in  effecting  this 
change  in  the  national  temper,  and  these  again  are 
affected  by  discoveries  and  inventions.  The  discov 
ery  of  the  route  round  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  ruined 
Venice  and  destroyed  the  reason  for  the  allegiance  of 
her  manifold  dependencies.  The  discoveries  con 
nected  with  the  utilization  of  coal  made  modern  in 
dustrial  England  and  reduced  artisan  Italy  and  Flan 
ders  to  hopeless  inferiority.  And  now  again  the  de 
velopment  of  electrical  transmission  harnesses  the 
rushing  streams  of  Italy  and  makes  her  aspire  to  a 
larger  "  place  in  the  sun." 

The  impatient  objector  will  ask:     "  But  why  fight 

about  it?  "     We  would  gently  remind  him  once  more 

,,  of  the  purpose  of  our  study,  not  propaganda  but  in- 

'  quiry.     Perhaps  men  should  not  fight  about  it,  but 

they  do.     The  growing  and  virile  peoples  get  restive 


THE  GREATER  POWERS  209 

at  seeing  their  seedy  neighbours  in  the  enjoyment  of 
imperial  sinecures.  Yet  these  latter  think  it  pre 
posterous  that  they  be  asked  to  give  up  that  which 
is  theirs  just  because  upstarts  covet  it.  There  is  no 
arbitrating  this  conflict  between  prescriptive  right  and 
presumptuous  innovation. 

The  point  of  it  all  is  that  our  world  is  in  flux. 
Nothing  is  fixed,  no  arrangement  is  guaranteed.  The 
subtle  forces  of  change  are  always  at  work,  not  less 
in  the  quiet  than  in  the  stormy  days.  Just  as  the 
forces  of  nature,  working  silently  through  the  years, 
loosen  the  stones  in  the  structure  that  our  hands  have 
reared  until  at  last  it  falls  with  a  crash,  so  the  forces 
of  growth  and  decay,  the  ebb  and  flow  of  virile  power, 
the  wax  and  wane  of  imagination,  slowly  disturb  the 
balance  of  forces  in  our  human  scheme  of  things,  until 
with  a  crash  the  old  order  collapses  and  a  new  order 
begins. 

Into  this  troubled  world  we  must  venture  with  wary 
feet.  It  is  ours,  not  to  expostulate  and  inveigh,  but 
to  acquaint  ourselves  with  these  powers  that  may 
make  us  or  be  our  undoing,  to  learn  which  of  the 
nations  has  become  cautious  through  great  posses 
sions,  and  which  is  aggrieved  by  reason  of  disinher 
itance,  to  see  which  is  menaced  with  a  great  danger 
or  confronted  with  a  great  need  from  which  aggres 
sion  seems  to  promise  escape,  and  above  all,  which 
are  impelled  by  the  pressure  of  rivals  or  of  environ 
ment  to  cross  our  pathway  and  to  seek  safety  or  ad 
vantage  at  our  expense.  We  need  spend  little  time  in 
discussing  promises,  obligations,  or  sensibilities.  No 
nation  will  ever  attack  us  because  we  have  been  ill- 


210    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

mannered  or  refrain  because  we  have  been  polite. 
Remembrance  of  past  favours  or  resentment  for  past 
injuries  will  count  and  should  count  for  little.  As 
the  generations  succeed  one  another,  there  always 
arises  a  Pharaoh  that  knew  not  Joseph.  These  con 
siderations  of  affront  or  injury  or  gratitude  for  past 
favours  will  loom  large  in  the  manifestos  of  hos 
tility  or  alliance,  but  it  will  be  the  necessities  of  our 
rivals  that  decide  their  action.  It  should  be, —  must 
be, —  the  necessities  of  America  that  decide  our  own. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

THE    MONGOLIAN   MENACE 

AMONG  the  great  powers  with  which  we  have  to 
deal,  one,  and  only  one,  is  not  European.  Japan  is 
oriental.  In  a  sense  even  Japan  is  European,  for  her 
political  and  military  organization,  her  science,  and 
all  the  enginery  of  her  national  life  are  borrowed 
from  Europe.  Both  her  imperial  constitution  and 
her  military  organization  are  modelled  on  those  of 
Germany  and  work  much  the  same  in  practice.  The 
government  is  essentially  autocratic  as  in  Germany, 
but  the  autocracy  is  of  the  European  rather  than  of 
the  oriental  type,  and  it  has  learned,  as  in  Germany, 
how  to  make  parliamentary  institutions  both  subser 
vient  and  useful.  The  spirit  and  ideals  of  the  two 
countries  are  similar  in  many  ways. 

But  the  Japanese  people  are  not  European,  and 
their  thoughts  are  not  as  our  thoughts,  nor  their  ways 
as  our  ways.  Their  history  nowhere  touches  our  own 
until  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century.  Their 
religion  is  markedly  different  from  ours,  and  while 
they  are  as  little  inclined  as  we  are  to  make  crusades 
on  behalf  of  religion,  neither  they  nor  we  can  help 
taking  the  shape  that  the  religious  mould  has  given 
us.  Finally,  their  social  and  domestic  life  has  been 
developed  along  lines  so  different  from  our  own  as 
to  be  almost  incomprehensible  to  us,  as  ours  to  them. 

211 


212     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

These  things  do  not  make  peoples  enemies,  but  they 
make  it  easy  for  other  things  to  make  them  so.  Peo 
ples  thus  separated  are  curiosities  to  each  other  rather 
than  kindred,  and  if  occasions  of  conflict  arise,  the 
restraining  scruples  are  few. 

This  segregation  of  the  Japanese  people  from 
those  of  European  stock  (and  with  them,  of  course, 
the  Chinese  and  other  Asiatic  peoples)  is  most  im 
portant  to  our  inquiry.  There  can  be  no  question 
that  our  relations  with  European  nations  have  been 
much  influenced  by  the  fact  that  we  are  related  to 
them.  We  have  been  most  reluctant  to  restrict  our 
hospitality  to  their  peoples,  even  after  that  hospitality 
had  become  embarrassing  to  us,  and  we  have  married 
and  given  in  marriage  with  them  freely  and  without 
reproach.  Not  so  with  the  Oriental.  We  slammed 
the  door  in  the  face  of  the  Chinese  long  years  ago, 
and  would  have  done  the  same  with  Japan  had  she 
not  hastened  to  save  us  the  trouble  by  closing  the  door 
herself.  Intermarriage  with  the  Oriental  is  re 
garded  with  extreme  aversion.  The  instinct  of  race 
integrity  here  asserts  itself  with  great  positiveness, 
refusing  to  reason,  as  is  the  way  with  instincts. 

All  this  is  familiar,  much  of  it  a  fact  of  our  own 
conscious  experience,  but  perhaps  we  have  not  fully 
realized  that  the  Oriental  feels  the  same  way  toward 
us.  He  is  curious,  interested,  and  not  unfriendly, 
but  he  knows  that  between  our  race  and  his  own  there 
is  a  great  gulf  fixed  which  neither  will  ever  cross. 
He  bears  us  no  ill-will,  for  the  most  part,  but  if  his 
interests  conflict  with  ours  he  will  not  hesitate  as  to 
which  to  sacrifice.  No  more  would  we.  Indeed  he 


THE  MONGOLIAN  MENACE         213 

is  conscious  that  we  have  not  hesitated,  that  with  the 
first  brush  of  conflicting  interest  we  have  uncere 
moniously  thrust  him  aside.  We  need  fear  no  worse 
from  him, —  and  expect  no  better.  The  Japanese  is 
not  worse  than  other  men.  We  may  dismiss  at  once 
the  charges  of  trickiness  and  untrustworthiness  which 
we  have  unconsciously  trumped  up  against  him  in 
defence  of  our  race  exclusiveness.  Such  charges  have 
the  usual,  and  no  more  than  the  usual,  justification. 
The  salient  facts  are  that  the  Japanese  are  in  the 
ascending  phase  of  race  assertion,  that  they  are  led 
with  singular  sagacity,  that  they  have  certainly  no 
more  and  possibly  somewhat  less  scruple  about  race 
encroachment  than  other  civilized  races  of  our  day, 
and  finally  that  there  is  between  us  no  cushion  of 
kinship  or  common  culture  to  lessen  the  shock  of  race 
collision. 

What  reason  have  we  to  fear  such  a  collision? 

Japan  has  a  population  nearly  double  that  of  the 
whole  United  States  west  of  the  Mississippi,  all  in 
an  area  somewhat  less  than  the  state  of  California. 
Although  she  has  a  vast  urban  population,  she  man 
ages  by  her  intensive  agriculture  to  raise  nearly  all 
her  own  food,  while  England,  similarly  situated  im 
ports  half  to  three  fourths  of  her  own.  Yet  only 
one  sixth  of  the  surface  of  Japan  is,  or  ever  can  be, 
cultivated.  Despite  the  amazing  frugality  and  ad 
mirable  simplicity  of  Japanese  life,  Japan  suffers 
acutely  from  congestion  of  population.  Yet  that 
population  is  on  the  increase,  and  the  efforts  of  a  so 
licitous  government  have  thus  far  not  availed  to 
check  the  increase.  Here  is  the  first  and  most 


2i4    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

fundamental  problem  of  the  Japanese  people. 
There  are  too  many  for  their  little  land,  and  place 
and  food  must  be  found  for  the  growing  surplus. 

Overpopulation  is  one  of  the  most  serious  dangers 
that  ever  confronts  a  nation.  People  do  not  know 
what  is  the  matter.  They  are  conscious  of  a  vague 
malaise  which  expresses  itself  in  many  different  forms 
and  lends  itself  to  the  most  diverse  interpretations. 
Lack  of  employment,  low  wages,  high  cost  of  living, 
and  burdensome  taxes,  necessary  concomitants  of 
overpopulation  are  charged  to  the  iniquities  of  the 
industrial  order,  the  rapacity  of  dealers,  and  the 
corruption  of  government.  No  social  order  is  per 
fect  enough  wholly  to  refute  such  charges,  or  strong 
enough  to  ignore  them.  All  disturbing  and  dis 
ruptive  forces  are  accentuated  by  this  most  funda 
mental  of  maladies.  Relief  in  some  form  is  a  con 
dition  of  national  tranquillity  if  not  of  national  exist 
ence. 

In  an  early  stage  of  social  development,  relief  is 
found  in  chronic  warfare  whose  conscious  purpose  is 
feud  or  conquest,  but  whose  function  is  to  relieve  con 
gestion  by  a  crude  blood  letting,  always  reckless  and 
often  disastrous,  but  perhaps  preferable  to  its  fa 
miliar  alternatives,  pestilence  and  famine.  But  civ 
ilized  society  seeks  milder  means  of  maintaining  the 
equilibrium  between  population  and  sustenance,  and 
no  nation  is  seeking  these  means  more  earnestly  or 
more  intelligently  than  Japan.  More  efficient  meth 
ods  of  economic  production  and  more  effective  re 
straining  instincts  are  of  the  very  essence  of  civiliza 
tion,  but  these  develop  slowly  and  do  not  afford  im- 


THE  MONGOLIAN  MENACE         215 

mediate  relief.  This  can  be  found  for  the  moment 
only  in  emigration,  the  means  by  which  Europe  has 
for  three  centuries  preserved  the  equilibrium  which 
has  made  the  development  of  civilization  possible, 
eliminating  famine  altogether  and  restricting  war  to 
other  functions. 

Strangely  enough,  this  recourse  is  denied  to  Japan. 
There  are  still  many  parts  of  the  world  where  popula 
tion  is  not  congested,  many  even  where  it  is  insuffi 
cient,  but  for  one  reason  or  another  none  are  fully 
available  for  Japanese  colonization. 

There  is  first  of  all  the  adjoining  Asiatic  main 
land,  the  only  part  of  the  world  that  is  peopled  by 
kinsmen  of  the  Japanese.  This  field  has  the  great 
advantage  that  no  fundamental  race  antagonism  sep 
arates  the  two  peoples.  Not  only  are  the  peoples 
more  or  less  akin,  the  Japanese  having  been  recruited 
from  time  immemorial  by  Chinese,  Mongol,  and 
Korean  immigrants,  but  the  Japanese  civilization  is 
founded  on  the  Chinese,  and  the  Chinese  sages  are 
quoted  in  Japanese  literature  almost  as  freely  as  the 
prophets  of  Judea  in  our  own. 

But  much  of  this  area  is  densely  peopled  and  suffers 
from  overpopulation  even  more  acutely  than  Japan. 
To  emigrate  to  such  districts  would  be  to  jump  from 
the  frying  pan  into  the  fire.  There  are  other  parts, 
it  is  true,  like  Korea  and  Manchuria,  which  are  not 
overpeopled,  as  the  Oriental  counts  such  things,  and 
which  are  under  Japanese  control,  and  therefore 
doubly  open  to  Japanese  colonization.  But  here  a 
new  barrier  exists,  the  nature  of  which  it  is  most  im 
portant  to  understand. 


216     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

Colonization  in  the  true  sense  of  the  word,  the  only 
sense  which  affords  sensible  relief  to  a  congested 
population  and  promises  to  propagate  a  people's  life 
and  culture,  must  be  the  migration  of  all  classes  and  in 
particular  of  the  humbler  and  more  numerous  classes, 
the  classes  that  most  feel  the  pressure  and  most  require 
relief.  These  classes  must  go  as  workers,  to  earn 
their  living.  They  know  how  to  live  only  in  their 
own  way.  Going,  not  to  an  empty  land,  but  to  a  land 
where  fields  are  owned  and  industries  are  organized, 
they  must  compete  as  wage  earners  or  as  tillers  of 
the  soil  with  those  on  the  ground.  If  these  live  more 
wretchedly  than  they  have  been  accustomed  to  do, 
no  matter  how  needless  their  poverty  may  be  and  how 
due  to  sloth  and  waste,  the  new  comers  must  for  a 
time  accept  their  condition  of  life.  Of  course  if 
they  would  do  this  and  stick  it  out,  they  would  ulti 
mately  find  their  native  thrift  and  skill  better  re 
warded  in  this  less  congested  land,  but  people  who 
leave  their  own  land  to  better  their  own  condition, 
will  not  ordinarily  accept  a  worse  condition  for  their 
whole  individual  lifetime,  in  the  interest  of  these  ulti 
mate  results. 

On  the  contrary,  such  countries  soon  develop  a 
different  tendency  which  often  acts  as  a  bar  to  coloni 
zation.  Instead  of  the  settler  goes  the  exploiter,  the 
man  of  larger  means  and  superior  abilities.  He  buys 
estates,  develops  specialized  plantations,  builds  mills, 
factories,  and  the  like,  employing  cheap  native  labour 
under  improved  methods  and  with  the  more  perfect 
implements  of  his  own  civilization,  a  combination 
which  is  often  very  profitable  and  which  the  foreign 


THE  MONGOLIAN  MENACE         217 

organizer  has  no  inclination  to  disturb.  The  inev 
itable  result  of  this  system  is  the  development  of  a 
race  caste.  The  countrymen  of  the  exploiter  soon 
find  themselves  socially  barred  from  native  occupa 
tions.  This  is  not  gratuitous  snobbishness,  but  a  vir 
tual  necessity  for  the  maintenance  of  the  prestige  upon 
which  the  success  of  the  new  and  mutually  beneficial 
relation  depends. 

India  furnishes  a  perfect  illustration  of  this  system. 
British  exploitation  has  transformed  the  country  in 
a  manner  incalculably  valuable  to  its  inhabitants  as 
well  as  profitable  to  its  organizers.  No  form  of 
human  co-operation  is  more  legitimate  or  less  open  to 
criticism.  There  is  none  whose  benefits  are  so  mutual 
or  whose  services  to  humanity  in  general  are  so  cer 
tain.  But  certain  results  are  inevitable.  There  is 
no  caste  in  India  like  the  caste  of  British  blood,  and 
none  so  likely  to  persist.  And  the  British  are  not 
colonizing  India.  The  race  that  in  this  sense  ex 
ploits  a  country  can  never  colonize  it. 

The  Japanese  are  exploiting  Korea,  Manchuria, 
and  China.  In  the  first  they  have  a  free  hand,  for  it 
is  theirs,  and  the  immigration  of  Japanese  is  every 
way  encouraged.  But  the  traveller  landing  in  Fusan, 
a  city  which  has  been  a  Japanese  headquarters  for 
many  centuries,  finds  all  the  humbler  occupations  in  the 
hands  of  Koreans.  The  Japanese,  more  numerous 
here  than  elsewhere  in  the  province,  already  form 
a  caste  in  which  the  Japanese  coolie  can  find  no  place. 
In  Manchuria  the  same  is  true  in  a  more  pronounced 
degree.  In  China,  the  Japanese  compete  with  many 
other  nations  for  the  privilege  of  organizing  its  vast 


218     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

human  energies  and  developing  its  illimitable  re 
sources.  The  purpose  of  the  recent  unprecedented 
demands  of  Japan  was  to  secure  a  paramount  posi 
tion  in  China  in  this  important  work. 

But  Japan  is  not  colonizing  China  or  Manchuria  or 
even  Korea  to  any  appreciable  extent.  Her  position 
as  exploiter  is  one  of  immense  significance  to  her,  to 
China,  to  the  world  at  large,  and  to  ourselves,  as  we 
shall  have  occasion  to  note,  a  position  comparable  to 
that  of  Britain  in  India,  and  perhaps  destined  to  be 
as  influential,  but  it  does  not  solve  the  problem  of 
Japan's  redundant  population.  The  Japanese  or 
ganizer  and  the  Japanese  capitalist  find  their  oppor 
tunity,  but  the  coolie  must  look  elsewhere. 

And  that  great  elsewhere  is  mostly, —  almost 
wholly, —  in  control  of  one  powerful  and  jealous  race, 
the  Anglo-Saxon.  He  has  room  and  opportunity  in 
plenty,  but  he  reserves  them  for  himself.  Against 
the  thrifty  Japanese  every  door  is  closed.  The 
American  has  spoken  unmistakably.  The  Japanese 
may  not  come  here  as  a  labourer,  or  own  land,  or 
settle  among  us.  Not  less  plainly  has  spoken  the 
Australian  or  will  speak  the  others  as  occasion  arises. 

The  reasons  alleged  are  partly  true,  partly  specious 
and  disingenuous.  The  assertion  is  that  he  is  an 
"  unfair  "  competitor.  Unfair  is  a  euphemism  the 
world  over  for  dangerous.  When  tacit  agreement 
has  established  a  level  of  prices  or  wages,  it  is 
"  unfair  "  to  disturb  it.  Possibly  unlovely  traits  of 
Japanese  character  lend  countenance  to  the  charge, 
but  they  are  hardly  more  than  pretexts.  The  real 
objection  to  the  Japanese  is  that  he  is  willing  to  ac- 


THE  MONGOLIAN  MENACE         219 

cept  life  and  labour  on  less  favourable  terms  than 
we  are.  If  he  stays,  he  gets  our  job,  our  farm,  our 
place  in  the  sun,  by  the  working  of  an  inexorable 
economic  law,  and  the  instinct  of  self-preservation 
compels  us  to  resist.  The  more  of  a  case  we  can 
make  out  against  him,  the  easier  it  is  to  rouse  the 
necessary  spirit  of  opposition.  So  he  is  "  dishonest," 
"  tricky,"  "  un-American,"  "  immoral,"  objections  too 
often  urged  by  those  not  qualified  to  cast  the  first 
stone,  and  not  more  true  of  him  than  of  other  men. 
But  the  one  thing  that  is  true,  and  that  is  enough,  if 
not  to  justify  our  opposition,  at  least  to  create  it 
among  any  virile  people  on  earth,  is  the  fact  that  he 
can  underbid  us  and  so  displace  us  and  take  our  birth 
right.  Perhaps  this  does  not  justify  us  in  excluding 
him,  but  the  point  is  not  worth  discussing.  We  shall 
exclude  him, —  if  we  can. 

The  one  remaining  possibility  for  Japanese  emi 
gration  is  in  Latin  America,  and  this  opening  has  not 
been  overlooked.  Nevertheless  the  opportunity  is 
more  restricted  than  it  might  seem.  Most  of  Latin 
America  is  tropical  and  therefore  little  suited  to 
Japanese  colonization.  Very  much  of  it  is  peopled 
by  an  inferior  race,  and  is  therefore  a  field  for  ex 
ploitation  rather  than  for  colonization,  for  the  same 
reasons  that  hold  in  China  and  Korea.  The  most  at 
tractive  part  of  it,  on  the  other  hand,  is  in  the  pos 
session  of  Europeans  who  will  almost  inevitably  have 
the  Anglo-Saxon's  reasons  for  excluding  the  Oriental. 
Possibly  Mexico  offers  the  most  favourable  oppor 
tunity,  and  possibly  here  or  elsewhere  in  Latin  Amer 
ica  Japanese  settlement  may  be  attempted. 


220    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

Curiously  enough,  even  here  the  Anglo-Saxon  in 
terposes  his  veto.  There  can  be  no  question  that 
the  American  people  would  look  with  extreme  dis 
favour  upon  the  establishment  of  Japanese  colonies 
anywhere  in  the  Western  Hemisphere  and  especially 
in  any  proximity  to  our  own  boundaries.  Nothing 
could  at  first  sight  seem  more  churlish  than  this  atti 
tude  of  universal  opposition  to  the  Oriental.  Not 
content  with  keeping  him  out  of  our  own  territory, 
we  threaten  to  pursue  him  far  beyond  it.  We  segre 
gate  him  as  we  do  the  pestilence,  drawing  our  cordon 
around  his  narrow  domain.  Yet  there  is  a  reason 
which  is  perhaps  quite  as  imperative  as  that  already 
noted.  This  reason  is  to  be  found  in  the  connection 
which  exists  between  emigration  and  political  'expan 
sion.  We  object  to  the  Japanese  in  California  on 
economic  and  social  grounds.  In  Mexico  that  objec 
tion  does  not  hold.  If  the  Mexicans  do  not  object 
to  Japanese  competition,  that  is  quite  their  affair. 
We  do  not  object  to  the  Japanese  in  Mexico. 

But  we  do  object  to  Japan  in  Mexico.  If  we  knew 
that  the  Japanese  settler  in  Latin  America  did  not  in 
any  sense  bring  his  country  with  him,  that  he  would 
never  claim  its  aid  and  it  would  never  claim  his  al 
legiance,  any  objection  on  our  part  to  his  settling 
there  would  be  an  unpardonable  impertinence.  But 
there  is  an  increasing  tendency  on  the  part  of  modern 
nations  to  retain  the  allegiance  of  those  born  under 
their  flag,  who  take  up  their  abode  in  other  lands. 
The  doctrine  that  the  fatherland  has  a  perpetual  claim 
upon  the  allegiance  of  its  sons,  even  when  permanently 
domiciled  under  a  foreign  flag,  has  been  asserted 


THE  MONGOLIAN  MENACE         221 

of  late  with  growing  emphasis,  and  has  given  to  emi 
gration  a  sinister  political  significance.  A  settlement 
of  aliens  therefore  becomes  a  foreign  outpost  and  po 
tentially  a  foreign  fortress.  All  this  is  perfectly  in 
keeping  with  the  instinct  of  nationality  which  we  have 
already  considered.  There  is  something  that  is 
dearer  than  the  welfare  of  the  individual, —  dearer 
to  those  who  stay,  and  dearer  to  those  who  go, —  and 
that  is  the  welfare  of  the  nation  and  of  the  culture  and 
life  of  the  race.  It  is  a  degenerate  and  unworthy  peo 
ple  that  can  expatriate  itself  without  a  pang, —  with 
out  serious  reservations.  As  the  culture  and  spiritual 
life  of  the  race  find  more  and  more  perfect  expres 
sion  in  the  developing  organ  of  the  nation,  we  must 
expect  the  nation  to  make  an  ever  stronger  appeal  to 
the  individual  whose  spiritual  heritage  it  holds  in  its 
keeping.  We  must  expect,  too,  that  the  nation,  ever 
more  delicately  equipped,  will  grapple  to  itself  with 
hooks  of  steel  all  those  who  can  serve  its  purpose  in 
the  strenuous  competition  of  civilization  with  civiliza 
tion.  Each  culture  will  claim  its  own  and  seek  its  own 
over  land  and  sea.  With  the  new  facilities,  none  can 
elude  its  search,  none  can  be  deaf  to  its  daily  and 
hourly  appeal.  Increasingly,  therefore,  emigration 
loses  its  individual  character  and  takes  on  the  char 
acter  of  the  national  life.  Every  community  in  whose 
population  a  single  alien  element  predominates,  be 
comes  a  pawn  on  the  political  chessboard  not  to  be 
overlooked  by  the  master  player.  It  is  therefore  with 
perfect  reasonableness  that  we  regard  with  interest, 
not  to  say  with  alarm,  the  establishment  of  Japanese 
communities  in  our  neighbourhood. 


222     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

But  meanwhile  the  world  is  closed  to  the  Japanese 
and  to  their  neighbours  and  kin.  It  is  a  startling  fact 
that  they  alone  among  civilized  races  are  not  wel 
comed  in  any  part  of  the  civilized  world  or  its  un 
civilized  dependencies.  Every  other  expanding  race 
is  free  to  expand  in  any  part  of  the  world  on  condi 
tion  of  accepting  foreign  allegiance.  The  German, 
the  Syrian,  the  Russian,  the  Jew,  may  settle  and  la 
bour  among  us,  may  buy  and  sell  and  get  gain,  but 
not  the  Mongolian.  This  race  alone,  expanding  in 
response  to  that  universal  pressure  which  so  few  races 
have  been  able  to  resist,  and  which  they  resist  seem 
ingly  at  their  peril,  must  contain  itself.  Will  it  do 
so?  Can  it  do  so?  Dull  indeed  must  be  the  man 
who  can  not  see  in  this  repression  of  the  irrepressible 
a  mine  laid  for  the  explosion. 

In  the  face  of  this  world-wide  ostracism  of  the  most 
numerous  and  the  most  prolific  of  the  races  of  men, 
how  trivial  seem  the  remedies  so  confidently  urged. 
We  should  soothe  and  conciliate  the  Japanese.  We 
should  send  visitors  back  and  forth  and  exchange  pro 
fessors  and  promote  an  "  understanding."  Yes,  of 
course.  But  this  is  no  question  of  Japanese  sensibili 
ties.  The  trouble  is  due  to  no  misunderstanding. 
The  cause  lies  deeper  and  deeper  must  go  the  cure. 


CHAPTER  XV 

GREATER   JAPAN 

IN  considering  the  possibility  of  collision  between 
America  and  the  Mongolian  East,  we  have  thus  far 
confined  our  attention  to  the  physical  or  biological 
problem.  This  is  primarily  a  problem  of  numbers, 
room,  and  sustenance.  An  excessive  birthrate,  for 
which  satisfactory  restraints  are  not  yet  available, 
produces  a  surplus  which,  unlike  that  of  other  over- 
populated  countries,  is  debarred  by  a  world-wide  op 
position,  from  seeking  relief  in  migration  and  assimi 
lation  into  other  races. 

But  Japan  would  not  be  satisfied  with  such  a  solu 
tion  of  her  problem  even  if  the  world  would  allow  it. 
Even  Europe  is  beginning  to  realize  that  it  is  not  sat 
isfactory,  and  the  present  war  is  primarily  a  protest 
on  the  part  of  Germany  against  this  method  of  main 
taining  the  equilibrium.  This  surplus  population  is 
after  all  the  growth  of  the  people.  To  dispose  of  it 
by  emigration  to  other  countries  is  simply  to  give 
away  and  waste  what  ought  to  make  the  home  country 
great.  It  costs  a  great  deal  to  raise  a  man  from  in 
fancy  to  manhood,  and  when  he  is  grown  and  able  to 
work,  he  ought  to  be  worth  something  to  his  own 
people.  It  is  quite  a  wrong  view,  so  these  reasoners 
tell  us,  to  regard  such  a  man  as  a  burden,  and  his  de 
parture  to  another  country  as  a  good  riddance.  The 

223 


224     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

power  of  a  race  to  maintain  itself  against  the  mani 
fold  forces  that  threaten  its  integrity  and  its  existence, 
is  not  alone  its  power  to  multiply,  or  to  conquer  ter 
ritory,  or  to  acquire  wealth.  It  depends  quite  as 
much  on  its  ability  to  hold  on  to  its  offspring,  to  stamp 
them  indelibly  with  its  own  character,  and  to  retain 
their  persistent  allegiance.  The  race  that  consents 
easily  to  expatriation  and  assimilation  may  multiply 
and  replenish  the  earth,  but  as  a  race  and  as  the  expo 
nent  of  a  distinctive  culture,  it  will  perish.  Tenacity 
of  race  character  and  allegiance  is  therefore  quite  as 
important  as  numbers  or  extent  of  territory.  As  the 
nations  become  more  conscious  of  this  fact,  they  show 
increasing  solicitude  for  those  who  go  out  from  them, 
striving  to  discover  some  way  by  which  their  strength 
may  still  inure  to  the  benefit  of  their  race. 

All  this  rests  back  upon  the  truth  with  which  we  are 
already  familiar,  a  truth  which  we  ought  constantly  to 
recall  and  emphasize,  but  which  we  are  prone  to  over 
look,  that  our  human  problem  is  very  much  more  than 
a  problem  of  the  individual.  There  is  for  every  peo 
ple  something  much  greater  and  more  precious  than 
the  individual.  There  is  the  great  structure  of  race 
custom,  slowly  built  through  the  patient  ages.  There 
are  sentiments  and  ideals  which  fill  life  with  music 
and  bathe  with  sunset  glories  the  threshold  of  the  in 
evitable  night.  There  are  symbols  of  faith  and  fam 
ily  and  race,  the  cross,  the  flag,  the  marriage  ring,  by 
which  the  heart  declares  its  allegiance  and  in  which  it 
recognizes  its  own.  There  are  the  laws,  those  curb 
stones  which  line  the  traffic  routes  of  life  and  keep 
men  safe  in  their  goings.  All  this  and  more,  that  un- 


GREATER  JAPAN  225 

counted  wealth  of  the  race  which  we  call  its  culture, 
each  race  builds,  enlarges,  and  protects  as  the  heritage 
of  the  individual.  He  is  nothing  without  it.  He 
may  perish  and  others  will  take  his  place,  but  if  it  per 
ishes,  all  that  is  of  value  to  him  and  to  others  perishes 
with  it.  Like  a  child  born  of  a  naked  savage  upon  a 
barren  heath  he  enters  upon  a  life  without  content  or 
rational  justification. 

Hence  it  comes  that  the  object  of  supreme  concern 
to  every  people  is  not  its  individuals  but  its  civiliza 
tion.  If  that  is  menaced,  any  number  of  individuals 
will  be  sacrificed  unhesitatingly  for  its  preservation. 
This  is  merely  their  emergency  contribution  to  that 
which  is  their  all.  And  for  precisely  similar  reasons 
the  normal  contribution  of  the  individual, —  of  every 
individual, —  is  service,  service  to  the  limit  of  his 
powers  and  under  the  widest  possible  range  of  condi 
tions.  What  more  natural  than  that  any  surplus  of 
individuals  above  what  can  be  accommodated  in  its 
present  establishment  and  employed  for  its  mainte 
nance,  should  be  utilized  for  its  enlargement  and  ex 
altation  ! 

Along  some  such  line  as  this  the  half  unconscious  in 
stincts  of  a  people  grope  toward  their  goal,  a  goal 
which  can  never  be  mere  provision  for  the  individual, 
but  must  always  have  for  its  paramount  aim  the  main 
tenance  and  aggrandizement  of  the  culture  of  the  race. 
And  since  race  culture  uses  as  its  chief  and  most  tangi 
ble  agency  the  organization  of  the  state,  the  race  will 
always  be  jealous  among  other  things  for  the  power 
and  extension  of  the  state. 

There  can  be  no  question  that  this  conception  of 


226     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

race  interest  has  grown  rapidly  in  recent  years.  Half 
a  century  ago  the  older  peoples  viewed  with  little  ap 
parent  concern  the  wastage  of  their  human  surplus, 
and  even  encouraged  it  by  fostering  emigration.  To 
day  scarce  one  of  them  is  doing  so.  A  few  decades 
since  Englishmen  discussed  with  unconcern  the  prob 
able  graduation  of  the  British  colonies  into  inde 
pendence.  Today  such  opinions  would  seem  almost 
treasonable.  The  race  consciousness  of  all  peoples 
now  has  the  wider  horizon  of  the  imperial  state.  The 
old  wasteful  days,  when  nations  looked  on  with  indif 
ference  at  the  loss  of  the  most  enterprising  of  their 
citizens,  are  past  and  an  era  of  culture  thrift  has  be 
gun.  The  emigrant  goes  out  with  a  string  to  him. 
The  nations  are  looking,  not  for  the  place  where  their 
colonist  will  be  best  off,  but  for  the  place  where  he 
will  be  worth  most  to  them,  a  place  where  he  can  be 
come  a  paramount  influence,  a  country  which  he  can 
make  subservient,  if  possible  a  country  which  he  may 
sometime  bring  under  the  control  of  his  nation. 

And  for  precisely  this  reason,  the  nations  are 
watching  immigration  with  a  new  solicitude.  They 
see  unpleasant  possibilities  in  the  presence  in  particu 
lar  localities  of  aliens  of  a  single  nation  so  numerous 
as  to  keep  one  another  in  countenance  and  preserve 
their  alien  culture  intact.  Above  all  they  watch  with 
anxiety  the  formation  of  such  alien  communities  in 
neighbouring  and  weakly  governed  states  where  the 
power  to  assimilate  is  small  and  pretexts  for  interven 
tion  are  frequent.  Our  objection  to  the  Japanese  as 
individuals  is  thus  reinforced  by  our  objection  to  Japan 
as  a  colonizing  and  expanding  state. 


GREATER  JAPAN  227 

Any  nation  which  is  really  alive  and  enterprising  is 
in  this  sense  a  potential  menace  to  other  nations,  but 
this  menace  is  immensely  increased  if  the  nation  in 
question  is  hard  pressed.  The  Spartans  were  a  harm 
less  folk  until  driven  from  their  earlier  home  and 
threatened  with  destruction.  A  nation  menaced  with 
political  extinction  or  with  serious  curtailment  of  in 
fluence,  will  take  risks  in  order  to  strengthen  its  posi 
tion,  which  under  other  circumstances  would  be  the 
height  of  imprudence.  A  nation  so  menaced  thus 
becomes  in  its  turn  a  menace  to  other  nations. 

Japan,  like  England,  is  situated  close  to  the  main 
land  in  a  position  of  wonderful  strength.  But  even 
more  than  in  the  case  of  England,  the  disparity  in  size 
between  the  little  island  state  and  the  mainland  is 
enormous  and  is  not  offset  by  the  divisions  in  the  lat 
ter  which  have  so  long  been  England's  protection. 
Japan  faces  on  the  continent  only  a  single  modern 
power  whose  area  is  nearly  sixty  times  her  own. 
Her  relation  to  Russia  well  illustrates  the  complexity 
of  modern  international  relations.  There  is  little 
race  antipathy  between  them,  and  Russia  suffers  from 
dearth  rather  than  from  congestion  of  population. 
Yet  the  conflict  of  interests  between  them  is  as  marked 
and  as  irreconcilable  as  any  in  the  world.  So  long  as 
the  control  of  necessary  gateways  is  a  part  of  the  pol 
icy  of  enterprising  nations,  Russia  will  be  impelled  by 
the  strongest  considerations  of  commercial  conven 
ience  and  national  defence  to  force  her  way  through  to 
the  eastern  sea.  At  present  she  has  no  satisfactory 
outlet.  There  is  indeed  but  one  really  available  out 
let,  alike  serviceable  to  commerce  and  capable  of  de- 


228     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

fence,  the  Gulf  of  Pechili  with  its  great  harbour  at 
Dairen,  its  Gibraltar  at  Port  Arthur,  and  its  impreg 
nable  outposts  in  Korea  and  Shantung.  Toward 
these  Russia  was  pressing  with  all  the  force  of  her 
mighty  energy  when  the  nineteenth  century  closed. 

Japan  viewed  this  advance  of  Russia  with  the  ut 
most  solicitude.  It  is  most  important  that  we  should 
understand  the  reasons  for  her  anxiety.  These  are 
essentially  two,  political  and  cultural,  though  as  we 
have  seen,  they  are  but  different  aspects  of  a  single 
interest. 

If  Russia  should  advance  a  solid  front  clear  out  to 
the  Japan  Sea  and  intrench  herself  in  Korea  and  Port 
Arthur,  while  ample  communications  were  established 
with  the  populous  districts  of  Western  Russia  and  the 
regions  of  eastern  Siberia  were  filled  with  Russian  set 
tlers,  there  could  be  no  question  but  that  Russia  would 
dominate  the  entire  East.  China,  for  an  indefinite 
period,  would  be  unable  to  oppose  any  effectual  oppo 
sition,  and  against  a  power  so  vast  as  Russia  Japan 
could  not  protect  herself.  It  is  of  course  possible 
that  Russia  would  never  have  attacked  Japan,  but  the 
mischief  would  nevertheless  be  done.  Between  two 
countries  so  situated  there  are  sure  to  be  numerous 
questions  on  which  interests  and  opinions  would  differ, 
questions  of  their  commerce  with  China  and  with  each 
other,  questions  of  naval  and  maritime  privilege,  ques 
tions  of  every  conceivable  sort,  the  decision  of  which 
would  make  a  great  deal  of  difference  to  both  citizens 
and  state.  Against  this  greater  Russia  little  Japan 
could  never  make  her  will  prevail.  If  she  accepted 
in  every  case  Russia's  view  of  the  situation,  she  would 


GREATER  JAPAN  229 

be  unmolested  but  would  dwindle  into  insignificance. 
If  she  resisted  she  would  be  coerced  and  probably 
annexed  and  assimilated.  Her  fate  would  be  that 
of  docile  Denmark  or  devastated  Serbia.  This  was 
the  political  danger. 

But  something  far  worse  menaced  little  Japan. 
The  Japanese  culture  is  one  of  the  daintiest  and  most 
exquisite  in  the  world.  There  is  a  porcelain-like 
delicacy  and  fragility  to  the  wondrously  beautiful  civ 
ilization  which  the  Japanese  have  inherited  from  old 
Japan  and  to  which  they  are  attached  with  passionate 
devotion.  What  would  happen  to  this  civilization  if  it 
were  lined  up  in  helpless  subserviency,  to  the  huge  raw- 
boned  might  of  Russia?  We  will  suppose  the  most 
favourable  conditions,  that  Japan  remains  unmolested, 
that  Russia  is  friendly  and  sympathetic,  and  even  that 
Japanese  culture  becomes  the  object  of  patronizing 
recognition  on  the  part  of  Russian  aesthetes  who 
should  worship  at  the  shrine  of  Kyoto  as  Cicero  did 
at  the  shrine  of  Athens.  What  would  come  of  it? 
Undoubtedly  Japanese  culture  would  enjoy  a  certain 
dilettante  distinction  and  attain  a  wide  vogue  abroad, 
but  it  would  die  at  home.  It  would  still  have  par 
tisans  who  would  extol  its  merits  and  speak  with 
fine  scorn  of  its  parvenu  patrons,  but  the  eyes  of  the 
people  would  turn  with  admiration  to  the  culture  of 
the  race  that  had  the  power  to  do  the  thing  that  it 
willed.  Nothing  discredits  a  culture  like  impotence. 
Indeed  the  first  marked  effect  of  the  opening  of  Japan 
and  the  revelation  to  her  people  of  the  power  of  the 
western  nations,  was  an  almost  tragic  disparagement 
of  their  own  civilization  accompanied  by  a  domestic 


230    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

vandalism  and  a  tasteless  foreign  craze  the  results  of 
which  a  generation  of  restored  sanity  has  not  been  able 
to  obliterate.  No,  it  needed  no  invasion  or  conquest 
to  destroy  Japan  as  her  wise  leaders  knew  and  loved 
her.  Only  let  Russia  build  out  in  fulness  of  strength 
on  the  nearby  mainland  and  the  mischief  was  wrought. 
Little  Japan  could  never  exist  alongside  of  Greater 
Russia. 

What  was  the  way  of  escape?  There  was  but  one 
possible  answer.  There  must  be  no  Greater  Russia, 
and  there  must  be  a  Greater  Japan.  This  is  the 
program  of  Japan. 

The  first  part  of  the  program  was  simple  if  not 
easy.  Russia  must  be  checked  in  her  advance,  kept 
out  of  the  mountain  fastnesses  of  Korea,  expelled 
from  her  naval  base  at  Port  Arthur  and  driven  back 
from  the  sea.  That  has  been  momentarily  accom 
plished.  Beginning  by  brushing  out  of  her  path  the 
complacent  Chinese  suzerainty,  Japan  fell  upon  over 
confident  Russia  with  blows  so  sudden  and  so  stinging 
that  the  colossus  reeled  back  from  Korea  and  Port 
Arthur,  and  the  coveted  Manchurian  outlet  was  lost. 
The  victory  was  indubitable  but  it  was  not  decisive. 
It  was  a  victory  of  Japan's  uttermost  against  a  frac 
tion  of  Russia's  strength.  It  was  plain  that  Russia 
could  and  would  and  must  come  back,  for  the  Man 
churian  outlet  was  as  near  a  necessity  to  Russia  as  such 
things  can  ever  be.  Japan  had  taken  successfully 
the  first  step  toward  Greater  Japan,  but  now  more 
than  ever  she  needed  to  be, —  must  be, —  Greater 
Japan. 

The  stars  in  their  courses  have  fought  for  her,  and 


GREATER  JAPAN  231 

her  momentary  gain  has  been  prolonged  beyond  her 
hope.  Other  and  mightier  enemies  have  smitten  Rus 
sia  and  called  all  her  forces  into  the  supreme  struggle 
for  existence.  The  truce  with  Japan  has  been  pro 
longed  indefinitely  and  even  masked  with  an  alliance. 
And  now  revolution,  with  its  orgy  of  destruction  and 
fantastic  reorganization  completes  the  paralysis  and 
prolongs  the  truce  from  which  Japan  profits  so  much. 
It  may  be  long  before  Russia  renews  the  challenge,  but 
her  need  remains.  In  her  moment  of  carnival  she 
may  forget  it,  but  not  for  long.  Japan  does  not  for 
get  it,  does  not  forget  that  when  that  challenge  comes 
she  will  need  to  be  Greater  Japan. 

To  be  Greater  Japan  she  must  have  more  territory, 
more  population,  and  more  wealth.  Where  are  these 
to  be  obtained? 

There  is  first  of  all  the  Asiatic  mainland.  Of  this 
she  now  holds  Korea,  is  in  virtual  control  of  Man 
churia  through  her  ownership  of  the  railroad  and  her 
possession  of  its  terminals  and  defences,  and  last  but 
not  least,  is  in  a  position  of  paramount  influence  in 
China.  Unless  Japan  suffers  a  great  military  reverse 
or  fails  in  her  far-sighted  vision,  her  hold  upon  all 
these  territories  is  likely  to  increase.  She  has  re 
cently  protested  in  no  uncertain  terms  against  our 
sending  a  note  to  China  without  first  consulting  her, 
claiming  thus  a  "  paramount  position  "  in  China  as 
a  "  necessity  of  her  national  defence."  Having 
forced  back  Russia  and  expelled  Germany,  she  openly 
asserts  a  protectorate  over  the  entire  East.  She  has 
thus  taken  a  very  tangible  and  considerable  step  to 
ward  Greater  Japan,  albeit  a  step  which  like  the  pre- 


232     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

ceding,  is  immensely  hazardous,  and  requires  more 
than  ever  that  she  become  Greater  Japan. 

What  advantage  can  Japan  hope  to  derive  from 
her  paramount  position  in  the  East  if  she  can  main 
tain  it? 

The  first  and  most  tangible  advantage  is  that  of 
defence.  Japan  has  the  same  advantage  from  keep 
ing  Germany  out  of  Shantung  that  we  have  in  keeping 
her  out  of  Cuba.  She  now  holds  Korea  and  Man 
churia  against  Russia,  and  Kiaochow  in  the  Shantung 
Peninsula  against  Germany,  while  her  great  island  of 
Formosa  further  south  (taken  from  China  in  1895) 
now  guards  the  coast  of  Southern  China  where  she 
has  put  the  Chinese  government  under  bonds  never  to 
allow  a  foreign  establishment.  Finally,  in  these  last 
days,  she  has  acquired  the  famous  Portuguese  settle 
ment  of  Macao,  an  island  near  Hong  Kong.  She 
thus  has  stations  along  the  whole  eastern  coast  which 
is  brought  under  her  effective  control  to  the  exclusion 
of  all  European  rivals  except  her  ally,  Britain.  The 
possession  of  defence  stations  does  not  insure  de 
fence,  but  it  gives  an  advantage  so  enormous  that  it 
may  be  questioned  whether  any  power  is  now  able 
to  challenge  her  control  save  only  the  single  power 
with  which  she  at  present  shares  it. 

As  a  refuge  for  her  surplus  population,  we  have 
seen  that  this  great  territory  is  poorly  available.  It 
has  a  vast  population  of  its  own  which  can  not  be 
displaced  and  which  is  yet  but  little  likely  to  become 
Japanese.  There  are  two  requirements  in  this  con 
nection  which  must  be  separately  considered.  In  the 
first  place  room  is  needed  for  Japanese  who  have 


GREATER  JAPAN  233 

no  place  and  whose  coming  Japan  can  not  hinder. 
In  the  second  place,  Japan  needs  more  Japanese  to 
fill  her  armies,  industrial  and  military,  if  she  is  to 
become  Greater  Japan.  Neither  of  these  are  here 
satisfactorily  secured.  There  is  little  room  for  the 
Japanese  who  are  unprovided  for.  It  may  be 
doubted,  too,  whether  the  time  will  come  in  any  near 
future  when  Koreans  and  Chinese  can  be  trusted  to 
fight  the  battles  of  Japan.  So  long  as  this  is  true, 
Japan  can  not  be  satisfied  with  a  position,  no  matter 
how  paramount,  on  the  mainland  of  Asia. 

One  object,  however,  and  that  of  great  importance, 
Japan  seems  likely  to  realize  in  Manchuria  and 
China.  If  she  can  not  colonize  them  she  can  ex 
ploit  them,  and  the  yield  should  be  enormous. 
Poor  as  they  now  are  through  ignorance  and  mis 
management,  their  mineral  resources  are  among  the 
richest  in  the  world,  while  they  teem  with  an  in 
dustrious  population  capable  of  indefinite  production 
under  proper  leadership,  a  population  which  furnishes 
from  the  outset  one  of  the  richest  markets  in  the 
world  for  the  varied  industries  of  new  Japan.  These 
advantages,  of  course,  Japan  can  not  monopolize, 
but  her  nearness  and  the  low  cost  of  her  labour  give 
her  advantages  which  come  dangerously  near  to  mo 
nopoly.  These  advantages  she  perfectly  appreciates 
and  seizes  with  disquieting  alacrity. 

But  all  this  necessarily  depends  for  its  guaranty 
of  final  success,  upon  securing  a  broader  basis  for 
her  own  population  whose  patriotism  must  be  the 
support  of  the  imperial  structure  of  Greater  Japan. 
We  may  rest  assured  that  Japan  will  not  willingly 


234     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

abandon  the  hope  of  finding  a  place  where  her  peo 
ple  can  multiply,  and  where  they  can  still  be  her  peo 
ple.  It  is  difficult  to  see  where  she  can  find  that  ter 
ritory  in  the  Eastern  Hemisphere. 

One  more  opening  remains  for  Greater  Japan,  and 
this  perhaps  the  greatest  of  all.  As  she  becomes 
more  and  more  conscious  of  the  similarity  of  her  posi 
tion  to  that  of  Britain,  she  naturally  inquires  where  the 
British  live  who  back  this  tremendous  power  and  on 
what  fields  they  reap  their  harvests.  The  answer  is 
the  sea.  The  British  red  upon  the  map  tinges  the 
ocean's  blue  from  pole  to  pole  and  drowns  all  other 
tints.  Upon  the  sea  many  millions  of  Britons  win 
their  livelihood,  and  here  are  invested  thousands  of 
millions  of  British  capital  whose  dividends  put  the 
world  under  tribute  to  Britain.  Why  may  not  Japan 
share  this  opportunity?  This  is  in  fact  her  most 
hopeful  outlook  and  her  most  immediate  ambition. 
It  is  one,  too,  which  we  have  unintentionally  done 
all  we  could  to  help  her  to  realize.  Driven  by  the 
clamour  of  a  bullying  minority  of  labour,  we  have  en 
acted  legislation  which  has  handed  our  Pacific  com 
merce  to  Japan  on  a  silver  platter.  The  commerce 
of  Japan  has  gone  forward  by  leaps  and  bounds, 
profiting  enormously  by  her  shrewd  rather  than  dis 
interested  attitude  in  the  present  struggle.  Her  vast 
fleet,  supplemented  by  recent  acquisitions  from  our 
own,  is  kept  in  safe  and  lucrative  employment  which 
it  will  doubtless  continue,  to  enormous  advantage  in 
the  early  years  of  peace.  There  seems  to  be  no 
reason  why  Japan  should  not  dominate,  not  to  say 
monopolize,  the  trans-Pacific  commerce. 


GREATER  JAPAN  235 

It  seems  a  legitimate  ambition,  and  if  Japan  can 
be  bound  over  to  keep  the  peace  on  such  terms  as 
this,  America  and  the  rest  of  the  world  may  have 
reason  to  think  the  bargain  a  good  one.  But  does 
it  bind  her  to  keep  the  peace?  And  if  she  breaks  the 
peace,  what  of  her  ships  in  such  an  event? 

We  need  not  emphasize  the  obvious  fact  that  as 
land  empires  are  subject  to  attack  by  their  land 
neighbours,  so  maritime  empires  are  subject  to  attack 
by  their  maritime  neighbours.  If  France  has  to  be 
on  her  guard  against  the  German  army,  so  Japan 
has  to  be  on  her  guard  against  the  German  navy. 
Thus  the  maritime  state  naturally  becomes  a  naval 
state,  developing  her  navy  part  passu  with  her  mer 
chant  marine  and  using  it  for  defence  or  for  offence 
as  inclination  or  necessity  may  prompt.  If  any  one 
doubts  the  necessity  of  this  parallel  development,  it 
is  sufficient  for  our  purpose  to  note  that  Japan  does 
not  doubt  it,  and  that  her  policy  in  these  matters  is 
not  at  all  a  matter  of  question.  There  are  farther 
factors  which  tend  in  the  same  direction.  A  great 
maritime  power  implies  great  shipbuilding  plants,  and 
these  can  be  turned  to  the  building  of  ships  of  war 
when  occasion  demands.  It  implies  the  existence  of 
large  numbers  of  sailors,  navigators,  engineers  and 
so  forth  who  can  be  drawn  upon  in  an  emergency 
for  naval  warfare.  It  implies  a  vast  transport  serv 
ice,  for  a  merchant  ship  is  at  the  call  of  its  flag  in 
case  of  war.  When  the  present  war  broke  out,  the 
Allies  are  said  to  have  commandeered  thirty-two 
hundred  ships  of  their  several  flags  for  the  trans 
portation  of  troops  and  munitions.  What  would 


236     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

have  happened  if  they  had  sold  all  their  ships  to 
Germany  a  few  years  before? 

Most  important  of  all,  a  naval  and  maritime  state 
must  have  its  stations  scattered  through  the  seven 
seas.  Enough  has  been  said  to  make  clear  the  need 
of  such  stations  for  the  navy  in  time  of  war.  For 
reasons  not  so  obvious  but  which  are  said  to  be  quite 
as  decisive,  maritime  commerce  seems  to  require 
them  in  time  of  peace.  A  nation  trading  all  over 
the  world  may  theoretically  have  the  facilities  of  all 
foreign  ports  at  its  disposal,  but  practically  its  ships 
are  at  a  certain  disadvantage  in  ports  which  are  un 
der  the  control  of  a  rival  trading  power.  The  flag  of 
the  port  will  have  precedence  in  numberless  ways 
which  in  the  end  are  apt  to  tip  the  scale  against  the 
stranger,  not  to  mention  the  ever  present  possibility  of 
national  rupture  when  exclusion  means  capture  and 
ruin.  A  chain  of  naval  stations  is  therefore  the 
necessary  concomitant  of  maritime  development. 
And  once  more,  if  we  do  not  believe  it,  Japan  does. 
She  views  with  admiration  and  envy  the  wonderful 
chain  of  posts  which  like  a  string  of  jewels,  Britain  has 
flung  around  the  neck  of  the  world.  She  is  duplicat 
ing  it  as  fast  as  she  can.  Already  her  island  empire 
stretches  in  unbroken  chain  from  the  tip  of  Kam 
chatka  down  to  the  southern  tip  of  Formosa,  and  now 
by  her  latest  acquisition,  on  to  Hong  Kong.  It  will 
go  farther  if  Japan  is  able  to  carry  it  farther.  There 
will  be  counterparts  for  Singapore  and  Colombo  and 
more,  if  Japan  can  find  them  while  England  has  her 
busy  day.  The  highway  of  Suez  from  Yokohama  to 
London  will  be  dotted  with  her  caravanseries. 


GREATER  JAPAN  237 

But  there  is  another  route  hardly  less  important, 
perhaps  destined  to  be  more  important,  a  route  that 
leads  from  Yokohama  straight  as  the  arrow  flies  to 
Honolulu  and  on,  glancing  along  the  Mexican  coast, 
to  Panama  and  past  the  Virgin  Isles  to  our  busy  East 
and  the  great  centres  of  European  industry  and  trade. 
Oh,  for  stations  along  this  route !  And  nature  has 
been  so  thoughtful  in  the  matter  of  Hawaii.  Yes, 
and  so  has  Japan,  for  she  has  peopled  it  with  her  chil 
dren.  And  Mexico !  Think  of  it.  Colony,  naval 
station,  all  she  needs.  And  Colombia,  sullen  and 
venal,  with  harbours  of  refuge  at  the  very  gates  of 
the  Canal.  Japan  has  thought  of  all  this  and  has 
acted  on  the  thought.  She  has  no  naval  station  in 
Mexico  or  Colombia  as  yet?  Who  knows?  She 
has  certainly  negotiated  for  such,  and  if  she  has  not 
yet  succeeded,  it  is  not  from  lack  of  desire,  nor  from 
fear  of  us  or  regard  for  us,  nor  from  any  love  that 
our  sister  republics  bear  us. 

This  one  fact  must  be  borne  in  mind  in  discussing 
our  relation  to  Japan.  Japan  is  neither  more  hostile 
nor  more  unscrupulous  than  other  nations,  but  she  is 
a  hungry  nation,  hungry  beyond  the  measure  of  most. 
With  a  people  banned  by  a  world  ostracism  which  the 
world  has  no  power  to  lift,  crowded  into  an  inade 
quate  territory  which  greater  neighbours  are  forced 
to  covet,  and  charged  with  the  defence  of  a  fragile 
and  exquisite  civilization  which  has  no  kindred  among 
the  civilizations  of  men,  her  course  is  dictated  by  an 
imperious  necessity  which  laughs  at  our  puny  expedi 
ents  and  bids  us  look  to  our  goings.  We  have  not 
comprehended  the  problem  before  us  unless  we  have 


238     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

perceived  that  even  a  friendly  Japan  is  still  a  men 
ace. 

Does  this  mean  war  with  Japan?  Not  if  we  do 
our  part  like  men.  The  push  of  life  is  eternal,  but 
its  power  is  finite.  The  greater  power  of  growth 
will  grow  the  lesser  to  a  standstill.  If  we  perceive 
the  impact  of  Japanese  growth  and  the  direction  of 
Japanese  need,  and  stand  stiffly  over  against  them, 
opposing  growth  with  growth,  and  claiming  our  rea 
sonable  heritage  upon  the  sea,  out  to  where  we  have 
placed  our  outposts  in  the  Philippines  and  Samoa, 
Japan  will  not  challenge  our  position  alone. 

Alone !  Ay,  there's  the  rub.  When  the  pain 
ful  pressure  of  her  manifold  need  forces  her  to 
knock  with  importunity  at  our  gates,  will  she  knock 
alone? 

NOTE.  As  these  pages  go  to  press  come  several  significant  utter 
ances  from  the  head  of  the  Japanese  Mission  to  the  United  States, 
utterances  the  most  authoritative  possible,  since  the  head  of  this 
Mission  is  both  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Empire  and 
Minister  Plenipotentiary  to  the  United  States.  The  most  noted  of 
these  utterances  is  a  categorical  announcement  that  Japan  will  tol 
erate  no  aggression  of  the  western  powers  upon  China.  This 
statement  to  which  certain  organs  of  public  opinion  here  have  had 
the  bad  taste  to  take  exception,  is  a  commonplace  of  the  existing 
situation,  and  the  only  startling  thing  about  it  is  its  admirable  candour. 
With  it  was  coupled  the  pledge  that  Japan  would  adhere  to  the  policy 
of  the  open  door.  This  we  may  assume  to  be  sincere.  Japan  is 
not  generous  but  prudent.  She  could  not  close  the  door  without 
immense  difficulty  and  danger.  Moreover,  she  is  perfectly  safe  in 
leaving  it  open. 

A  far  more  significant  statement,  however,  seems  to  have  attracted 
little  attention.  This  was  to  the  effect  that  Japan  had  cast  in  her 
lot  with  the  English  speaking  nations  of  the  world.  This  statement, 
if  true,  is  perhaps  the  most  important  that  a  Japanese  statesman 
could  utter.  It  is  probably  true.  The  supreme  political  fact  of  the 
twentieth  century  is  the  struggle  between  the  Teuton  and  Anglo- 
Saxon  for  world  leadership.  That  is  the  meaning  of  the  present 
war,  the  meaning  of  the  scheming  and  manoeuvring  of  the  last  half 


GREATER  JAPAN  239 

century.  Many  things  incline  Japan  to  take  the  Teuton's  side, — 
similarity  of  organization  and  political  faith,  similarity  of  need,  etc. 
If  Japan  has  cast  in  her  lot  with  us,  it  is  not  because  she  loves  us 
or  hates  our  enemies,  but  because  she  judges, —  and  none  judge  more 
shrewdly  than  she, —  that  we  are  to  be  the  winners  in  the  contest. 

These  statements  were  apparently  intended  to  prepare  the  public 
for  the  announcement  which  followed  a  few  days  later,  that  the  two 
governments  had  reached  a  definite  understanding  and  embodied  it 
in  an  exchange  of  notes.  In  this  understanding  we  recognized  for 
the  first  time  the  paramount  position  of  Japan  in  the  Far  East  and 
entered  into  a  virtual  undertaking  to  cooperate  with  her  in  main 
taining  the  integrity  of  China  and  guaranteeing  the  open  door,  an 
undertaking  in  which  China  not  unnaturally  sees  more  of  menace 
than  protection. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

THE    UNFEARED    POWERS 

IT  has  been  the  declared  policy  of  the  United  States 
from  the  first  to  minimize  political  relations  with 
Europe.  Washington's  farewell  advice  to  avoid  en 
tangling  alliances  with  European  nations,  though 
aimed  at  a  particular  danger  which  quickly  passed 
away,  has  received  the  broadest  interpretation  and 
the  sincerest  recognition  as  the  foundation  of  our 
national  policy.  /This  policy  was  really  reflected  in 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  which  was  in  essence  a  declara 
tion  of  the  policy  of  America  for  the  Americans,  the 
negative  implications  being  hardly  less  definite  than 
the  positive  assertion.  J 

This  conservative  political  policy  was  paralleled 
and  in  some  sense  reinforced  by  our  commercial  pol 
icy  of  protection,  a  policy  largely  fortuitous  in  its 
origin,  but  speedily  confirmed  by  the  industrial  condi 
tions  which  it  created.  It  can  not  be  said  that  this 
policy  has  smoothed  the  pathway  of  our  international 
intercourse,  but  it  has  had  two  important  results 
which  have  coincided  with  our  separatist  policy  in 
politics. 

In  the  first  place  it  has  been  in  general  non-dis 
criminatory.  Whatever  tax  was  levied,  was  levied 
upon  all  producers  alike.  We  did  not  charge  more 
duty  upon  French  woollens  than  upon  British  wool- 

240 


THE  UNFEARED  POWERS  241 

lens  of  like  quality.  To  be  sure,  if  we  chose  to  levy  a 
heavy  duty  on  silk  and  a  light  duty  on  chemicals  we 
could  hit  France  and  favour  Germany,  and  such  con 
siderations  were  by  no  means  always  absent  in  fram 
ing  our  tariff  laws,  especially  when  we  found  it  neces 
sary  to  coerce  a  refractory  nation  into  admitting  our 
goods  on  more  favourable  terms.  But  the  possibili 
ties  of  discrimination  in  such  ways  were  always  limited 
by  the  exigencies  of  home  industries.  They  have  been 
as  nothing  to  the  discrimination  practised  under  the 
system  of  commercial  treaties  where  a  country  dick 
ers  with  each  country  separately,  granting  better 
rates  to  one  than  to  another,  in  return  for  like  con 
cessions.  Such  treaties  come  perilously  near  being 
national  alliances  and  easily  provoke  military  re 
prisals,  as  they  are  in  turn  the  frequent  result  of  mili 
tary  operations.  The  much  talked  of  Economic  Con 
ference  of  the  Allies  and  its  alleged  policy  of  "  War 
after  the  War  "  illustrates  this  intimate  connection. 
The  United  States  has  pretty  uniformly  held  aloof 
from  this  policy  of  commercial  alliance  and  in  so 
doing  has  undoubtedly  confirmed  its  policy  of  politi 
cal  aloofness. 

A  second  result  of  our  policy  of  protection  has  been 
to  lessen  trade  relations  with  other  countries,  to  force 
the  development  of  industries  temporarily  and  even 
permanently  unprofitable  at  home,  and  so  to  foster 
the  economic  independence  of  the  country.  The 
economic  advantage  of  this  independence  may  well 
be  doubted.  Economic  efficiency  is  attained  by  spe 
cialization,  not  by  all-roundness,  and  there  is  no  rea 
son  to  believe  that  this  law  holds  less  of  the  nation 


242     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

than  of  the  individual.  But  economic  efficiency  is 
very  different  from  human  efficiency,  and  the  advan 
tage  to  the  latter  of  this  policy  of  national  self-suffi 
ciency  is  more  plausible.  In  any  case  there  can  be 
little  doubt  that  it  has  contributed  to  the  policy  of 
political  aloofness  which  Washington  enjoined,  both 
by  equipping  us  for  a  self-sufficient  life  and  still  more 
by  creating  a  mental  attitude  favourable  to  it. 

It  is  suggestive  of  the  nature  of  the  relations  with 
which  we  have  to  deal,  that  despite  the  exceptionally 
favourable  conditions,  geographical,  economic,  and 
historic,  under  which  this  experiment  of  national 
aloofness  has  been  tried,  we  are  today  active  partici 
pants  in  the  most  stupendous  European  struggle  ever 
known  and  in  full  alliance  with  nations  whose  im 
mediate  objectives  have  to  do  wholly  with  the  East 
ern  Hemisphere.  By  almost  universal  consent,  too, 
this  participation  was  unavoidable.  It  is  true  that 
in  deference  to  our  tradition  we  have  avoided  the 
formalities  of  alliance,  but  we  have  not  avoided  its 
substance.  We  have  refused  to  commit  ourselves 
to  the  concrete  objects  of  the  various  allies, —  the 
restoration  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  the  independence  of 
Belgium  and  Serbia,  the  reconstitution  of  the  Balkan 
States  and  Poland  and  the  like,  and  have  substituted 
glittering  generalities  instead.  We  are  fighting  "  to 
make  the  world  safe  for  democracy."  "  We  are 
fighting  for  the  liberty,  the  self-government,  and  the 
undictated  development  of  all  peoples."  How  dif 
ferent  from  those  peoples  who  are  fighting  for  prov 
inces  and  strategic  frontiers!  Yet  it  must  be  ap 
parent  to  the  thoughtful  that  this  program  of  gener- 


THE  UNFEARED  POWERS  243 

alities  must  resolve  itself  into  a  program  of  con 
crete  arrangements.  The  undictated  development  of 
all  peoples  will  in  the  end  depend  on  frontiers  and 
other  concrete  arrangements  of  the  sort  that  the 
Allies, —  our  allies, —  are  fighting  for.  And  since 
they  are  our  allies  and  the  parties  most  immediately 
concerned  in  all  these  concrete  matters,  it  is  obviously 
impossible  that  our  ultimate  concrete  program  should 
be  other  than  theirs.  Equally,  too,  though  we  have 
not  signed  a  treaty  pledging  us  to  make  peace  in  com 
mon  with  the  Allies  (no  entangling  alliances  for  us) 
it  is  demonstrably  impossible  for  us  to  do  otherwise. 
We  can  not  secure  anything  approximating  to  our  de 
clared  aims  until  Germany  submits  to  the  Allies. 
We  therefore  cannot  quit  the  war  a  day  sooner  than 
the  Allies  and  we  manifestly  cannot  continue  it  a  day 
longer. 

Then  away  with  all  illusions.  We  are  back  in 
Europe,  back  despite  our  stern  resolve,  our  long  tra 
dition,  our  commercial  aloofness,  and  our  proud  self- 
sufficiency.  This  is  no  excursion.  We  are  back  with 
bag  and  baggage,  and  back  to  stay.  If  we  win  what 
we  are  fighting  for,  we  shall  have  to  guard  what  we 
win.  If  Europe  needs  us  now,  she  will  always  need 
us,  and  if  we  can  not  resist  her  appeal  as  an  alien, 
how  much  more  prompt  our  response  when  the  graves 
of  our  soldiers  have  made  her  soil  our  shrine ! 
What  then  of  the  new  life  in  the  old  homestead  of 
our  race? 

We  may  safely  assume  at  the  outset  that  with  all 
their  jealousies  and  grudges,  the  nations  of  Europe 
are,  one  and  all,  minded  to  be  our  friends.  A  single 


244     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

prominent  exception  seems  to  exist  at  present,  but 
it  may  be  doubted  whether  even  in  this  case  the  hos 
tility  is  representative  and  ineradicable.  Most  of 
the  European  nations  are  conscious  of  certain  un 
lovely  traits  in  American  character  which  they  make 
the  occasional  object  of  criticism  and  ridicule,  over 
looking  meanwhile,  as  is  men's  wont,  some  of  our 
better  characteristics,  but  these  doubtful  amenities  do 
not  mean  hostility,  and  both  the  desire  for  our  lucra 
tive  commercial  patronage  and  a  wholesome  respect 
for  our  power  incline  them  to  friendship.  In  most 
cases,  and  especially  in  the  case  of  the  nations  we  are 
about  to  consider,  hostility  is  a  remote  contingency. 
But  that  contingency,  never  quite  excluded,  is  the  sub 
ject  of  our  present  inquiry. 

Of  the  score  or  more  of  countries  which  make  up 
modern  Europe,  the  majority  are  popularly  regarded 
as  negligible  in  any  consideration  of  our  national  de 
fence.  They  are  too  small,  too  poor  in  resources, 
or  too  handicapped  by  situation  or  other  circum 
stance  to  give  us  any  concern.  Such  are  the  Scandi 
navian  countries,  the  Balkan  States,  Portugal,  Bel 
gium,  Holland,  and  perhaps  Italy  and  Spain.  Our 
peaceable  relations  with  these  countries  are  impor 
tant  and  mutually  profitable.  But  if  these  relations 
should  be  strained  to  the  breaking  point,  the  ad 
vantage  would  seem  to  be  overwhelmingly  with  us. 
No  doubt  this  is  the  prevailing  opinion  in  America. 
Our  relation  to  the  minor  powers  of  Europe,  as  re 
gards  problems  of  national  defence,  gives  us  no  con 
cern. 

It  may  be  doubted,   however,  whether  this  com- 


THE  UNFEARED  POWERS  245 

placency  is  justified.  It  is  based  on  the  mistaken  as 
sumption  that  these  nations  are  separate  units  and  to 
be  dealt  with  singly  in  any  emergency  which  may 
arise.  They  are,  on  the  contrary,  nearly  all  of  spe 
cial  strategic  importance  in  the  European  scheme  of 
things.  We  have  to  deal,  not  with  them  alone,  but 
with  their  backers.  As  regards  the  problem  of  our 
national  defence,  our  interest  in  these  powers  lies 
in  their  relation  to  these  backers,  into  whose  plans 
they  enter  and  whose  bidding  they  are  likely  to  do. 
Such  states  as  Belgium,  Portugal,  Albania,  and 
Turkey,  are  not  natural  states  at  all,  but  artificial 
creations  or  unnatural  survivals  maintained  by  the 
great  powers  in  the  interest  of  their  national  defence. 
The  same  is  true,  if  in  less  degree,  of  nearly  all  the 
lesser  powers  of  Europe.  We  are  stronger  than 
they,  but  we  have  not  to  deal  with  them  alone.  By 
themselves  they  are  negligible,  but  as  auxiliaries  of 
the  greater  powers,  willing  or  unwilling,  they  may 
turn  the  scale.  Was  not  Belgium  Germany's  un 
doing?  Did  not  Greece  thwart  the  plans  of  the 
Allies? 

There  is  more  than  one  way  in  which  a  little  na 
tion  may  play  the  decisive  role  in  great  events.  It 
may  be  the  protege  of  a  great  power,  voluntarily 
making  common  cause  with  it.  Such  is  Portugal  in 
relation  to  Britain,  such  Germany  asserts  Belgium  to 
be  in  regard  to  Britain  and  France.  Again,  it  may 
be  an  inevitable  victim  in  the  line  of  imperialist  ag 
gression,  and  may  yield,  be  it  ever  so  unwillingly,  a 
strategic  site  which  is  vital  to  the  great  schemes  to 
which  it  itself  is  sacrificed.  Such  is  the  relation  of 


246     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

Belgium  and  Holland  to  Germany,  of  Serbia  to 
Austria,  and  of  Turkey  to  Russia.  And  finally,  to 
vary  slightly  the  case  last  mentioned,  it  may  possess 
dependencies  which  it  can  not  defend  and  which, 
when  seized  by  a  greater  power,  quite  change  the  re 
lation  of  the  latter  to  other  powers.  Thus  Den 
mark,  though  completely  helpless  as  against  Russia 
or  Britain,  was  none  the  less  their  deadly  menace  by 
virtue  of  her  possession  of  Schleswig-Holstein,  so 
vital  to  Germany's  schemes.  Similarly,  moribund 
Turkey  held  Egypt,  and  China  held  Korea,  each  in 
dispensable  to  the  supremacy  of  the  powers  into 
whose  hands  they  have  since  fallen. 

Are  there  more  possibilities  of  this  kind?  Are 
any  of  these  little  countries  that  we  do  not  fear, 
proteges  of  big  countries  whose  purposes  they  are 
likely  to  serve?  Are  there  any  that  are  likely  to  be 
forcibly  annexed  and  to  furnish  thus  new  avenues  of 
aggression  to  the  great?  Above  all,  are  there  pow 
ers  that  hold  in  feeble  hands  weapons  which  may  be 
taken  from  them  and  used  in  stronger  hands  to  our 
undoing?  In  one  or  another  of  these  ways,  every 
minor  power  in  Europe  is  for  us  a  potential  menace. 

The  problem  here  suggested  is  illustrated  by  our 
recent  acquisition  of  the  Virgin  Isles,  or  the  Danish 
West  Indies.  They  are  of  insignificant  extent  and 
of  no  direct  value.  They  give  us  nothing  that  we 
did  not  already  possess  in  sufficiency.  In  the  hands 
of  Denmark  they  were  innocuous.  But  it  was  all 
but  certain  that  the  islands,  if  left  in  possession  of 
Denmark,  would  ultimately  come  under  the  control 
of  Germany.  This  might  happen  by  means  of  an 


THE  UNFEARED  POWERS          247 

alliance  based  on  some  form  of  mutual  interest,  an 
alliance  for  which  Germany  could  afford  to  offer 
Denmark  large  inducements.  Or  the  islands  might 
be  ceded  to  Germany,  either  under  compulsion,  or 
for  the  large  inducements  which  might  be  offered. 
Finally,  and  most  likely  of  all,  Denmark  herself 
might  be  annexed,  either  abruptly,  as  in  the  case  of 
Silesia  or  Alsace-Lorraine,  or  gradually,  by  the  se 
ductive  method  of  a  slowly  tightening  alliance.  The 
method  would  matter  little.  The  result  would  mat 
ter  much,  and  we  have  wisely  decided  to  forestall  its 
possibilities.  We  are  on  the  best  of  terms  with  Den 
mark,  but  Denmark  can  not  be  trusted  with  the  cus 
tody  of  anything  which  Germany  can  not  be  per 
mitted  to  acquire.  The  example  of  Schleswig-Hol- 
stein  has  not  been  forgotten. 

It  may  be  useful  at  a  time  like  this  to  recall  this 
famous  case.  In  1852  the  five  great  powers,  Eng 
land,  France,  Russia,  Prussia,  and  Austria,  at  the 
Conference  of  London  pledged  themselves  to  re 
spect  the  integrity  of  Denmark  and  to  defend  it 
against  attack.  Later,  Prussia,  till  then  without  a 
navy,  conceived  the  idea  of  becoming  a  naval  power, 
and  at  once  perceived  that  a  canal  across  the  neck  of 
Denmark  was  necessary  to  enable  her  to  use  her 
navy  as  a  whole  against  either  a  Baltic  power  like 
Russia  or  a  western  power  like  England  or  France, 
for  the  Danish  straits  would  inevitably  be  blocked  in 
case  of  war,  and  their  navy  would  thus  be  divided  and 
comparatively  helpless  in  either  direction.  Schles- 
wig-Holstein,  the  neck  of  land  which  joins  Denmark 
to  the  mainland,  must  be  secured.  When,  on  a 


248     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

trumped  up  charge,  Denmark  was  attacked  by  Prussia 
and  Austria,  France,  much  occupied  elsewhere,  de 
clined  to  interfere  in  a  matter  that  interested  her  but 
little,  England,  much  more  concerned,  threatened 
but  at  the  last  moment  (as  Bismarck  had  predicted) 
refused  to  go  to  war  without  France,  and  Russia, 
vitally  affected  by  this  project  which  transferred  the 
control  of  the  Baltic  to  Prussia,  was  helpless.1 

The  menace  of  the  Danish  islands  has  been  re 
moved,  but  other  possibilities  remain.  A  similar  but 
far  more  important  case  is  that  of  Holland,  the  in 
corporation  of  which  is  a  well  known  part  of  German 
policy.  It  is  true  that  the  Dutch  do  not  share  this 
ambition,  and  they  have  powerful  backers,  but  it  is 
by  no  means  sure  that  Germany  can  be  prevented 
from  acquiring  control  of  some  sort  over  the  little 
neighbour.  It  must  be  remembered  that  avowed  an 
nexation  is  not  the  only  nor  the  most  feasible  method. 
Commercial  dependence  making  it  impossible  for 
Holland  altogether  to  oppose  German  designs,  may 
be  all  that  is  necessary.  It  is  perfectly  possible,  too, 
that  a  difference  between  the  United  States  and  Hol 
land  might  find  the  latter  the  willing  ally  of  Germany. 
In  such  a  combination  the  weight  of  Holland  would 
be  tremendous.  It  is  true  that  the  menace  would  be 
much  less  to  us  than  to  a  country  like  Britain  which 
would  be  at  the  mercy  of  Germany,  attacking  through 
Holland,  while  the  Dutch  East  Indies  would  present 
a  like  menace  to  almost  the  whole  British  Empire. 
But  while  we  should  face  no  such  menace,  a  Dutch- 

iThis  case  is  commended  to  the  attention  of  the  League  to  En 
force  Peace. 


THE  UNFEARED  POWERS  249 

German  combination  has  its  possibilities  for  us  also. 
Dutch  Guiana  is  not  the  equal  of  Danish  St.  Thomas, 
but  it  is  not  a  place  where  we  could  see  German  power 
established  without  serious  misgivings. 

More  general  but  not  less  real  are  the  dangers  in 
volved  in  all  those  minor  countries  which  are  factors 
in  the  problem  of  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe. 
Belgium  does  not  threaten  us,  nor  would  her  union 
with  Germany  give  to  the  latter  power  any  point  of 
immediate  vantage  in  a  struggle  with  America.  But 
the  possession  of  Belgium  would  give  Germany  so 
great  an  advantage  over  France  and  England  as  to 
make  her  the  paramount  power  in  Europe  and  make 
it  impossible  for  other  powers  effectually  to  oppose 
her  designs.  Such  being  the  situation  in  Europe,  it 
would  be  still  more  impossible  for  America  to  oppose 
her.  What  country  could  be  more  remote  from 
American  interests  than  Bulgaria?  Yet  the  control 
of  Bulgaria  by  Germany  is  an  important  link  in  the 
continuous  chain  which  she  expects  to  extend  through 
the  Balkans  and  across  Asia  Minor  and  Mesopo 
tamia  to  the  Persian  Gulf.  Once  again,  the  realiza 
tion  of  such  a  scheme  would  leave  Europe  helpless 
and  ourselves  still  more  helpless  to  resist  schemes 
the  extent  of  which  has  never  yet  been  fully  realized. 
Bulgaria  may  be  our  undoing.  Equally  and  more, 
Turkey  has  sites  in  her  possession  which  are  the  key 
to  the  entire  balance  of  the  modern  world.  Our  in 
terests  in  Turkey  are  more  than  mission  schools. 

Broadly  stated,  the  minor  powers  of  Europe  hold 
the  balance  of  power  in  the  world.  Powerless  for 
independent  action,  they  are  capable  of  tipping  the 


250    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

scale  into  which  their  weight  is  thrown  either  by 
choice  or  compulsion.  In  but  few  cases  is  it  possi 
ble  to  anticipate  their  action,  the  more  so  as  their 
freedom  of  choice  is  so  limited.  They  remain  as 
residual  unorganized  material  among  the  growing 
aggregations  of  Europe.  For  the  moment  they  are 
the  object  of  the  knight-errantry  of  Europe,  guided, 
as  humanity  loves  to  be,  by  the  instinct  of  self-pres 
ervation  and  the  sincere  pretext  of  generous  chivalry. 
Their  independence,  tenaciously  maintained  and  chiv 
alrously  upheld,  has  its  place,  but  it  can  hardly  con 
tinue.  Slowly,  involuntarily,  imperceptibly,  half  un 
consciously,  it  may  be,  these  little  peoples,  scarce  one 
of  whom  represents  an  ethnic  unity  or  a  seriously  dis 
tinctive  culture,  will  range  themselves  under  the 
larger  banners.  The  result  is  likely  to  be  momen 
tous.  It  is  one  to  which  we  can  not  be  indifferent. 

Hardly  to  be  classed  among  minor  powers,  yet  far 
from  attaining  to  the  first  rank,  is  Spain,  a  power 
with  whose  decadence  we  have  had  much  to  do. 
With  her  final  expulsion  from  the  Western  Hemi 
sphere  our  political  relations  with  Spain  are  popularly 
supposed  to  have  terminated.  There  can  be  no 
doubt  that  Spain  has  accepted  her  defeat  in  good  part 
and  that  she  meditates  no  reprisals,  either  alone  or 
in  alliance  with  others.  If  she  finally  decides  to  en 
ter  the  present  war,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that 
it  will  be  as  our  ally. 

But  concurrently  with  her  humiliation  as  a  military 
and  colonial  power,  Spain  began  to  feel  the  stirrings 
of  a  new  life  which  her  humiliation  did  much  to  ac 
centuate.  It  is  the  first  condition  of  efficiency  in  the 


THE  UNFEARED  POWERS  251 

nation  as  in  the  individual  that  it  should  be  forced 
to  earn  its  own  living.  For  nearly  four  hundred 
years  Spain  had  lived  a  parasitic  existence.  She  had 
known  the  whole  range  from  stifling  affluence  to  ab 
ject  squalor,  but  still  clung  to  her  choice  to  be  minis 
tered  unto  rather  than  to  minister.  With  the  final 
loss  of  her  colonies  came  the  final  emancipation  from 
her  parasitic  ideal.  Forces  already  in  operation  now 
became  the  nation's  chief  reliance,  and  she  joined  the 
ranks  of  the  renewed  and  progressive  lands.  There 
can  be  no  doubt  that  her  progess  has  since  been  steady 
and  that  it  will  continue. 

If  so,  Spain  can  hardly  fail  to  come  again  into  re 
lation  with  the  many  states  to  which  she  has  given 
birth,  a  relation  more  vital  than  any  she  has  hitherto 
known.  As  an  absentee  landlord  rack-renting  the 
country,  Spain  was  odious,  but  as  an  intelligent  indus 
trial  state  she  would  be  welcome  in  a  way  that  we 
can  never  be.  Community  of  civilization  would  be 
an  immense  advantage  in  commerce,  for  after  all 
commerce  and  industry  are  only  purveyors  to  civiliza 
tion,  and  the  stranger  is  much  at  a  disadvantage  as 
compared  with  one  to  the  manor  born.  No  doubt 
this  tendency  of  the  Spanish  world, —  or  shall  we  say 
the  Latin  world?  —  to  draw  together  again  is  incipi 
ent  as  yet,  and  other  influences  may  neutralize  it,  but 
it  is  a  factor  not  to  be  ignored.  It  must  be  remem 
bered  too  that  geography  favours  it.  Spain  is  nearer 
to  South  America  than  New  York.  If  ambitious 
projects  lately  attributed  to  the  king  and  his  advisers 
to  tunnel  the  Strait  of  Gibraltar  and  carry  a  railway 
through  Morocco  to  Dakar  (all  in  Latin  territory) 


252     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

are  completed,  Latin  Europe  will  be  but  three  days 
by  fast  steamer  from  Latin  America.  It  would  be 
strange  if  so  great  an  advantage  were  without  sub 
stantial  results. 

There  is  in  such  a  development  nothing  necessarily 
inimical  to  American  interests.  In  her  own  way  the 
United  States  would  doubtless  profit  by  so  great  an 
improvement  in  communication.  Yet  it  can  not  es 
cape  the  thoughtful  mind  that  such  a  development 
would  tend  to  make  Latin  Europe  the  ally  of  Latin 
America  in  more  than  a  sentimental  and  cultural 
sense.  It  is  much  to  be  hoped  and  not  unreasonable 
to  expect  that  relations  between  the  United  States  and 
the  Latin  world  will  remain  friendly.  But  if  our 
necessary  domination  of  the  Caribbean  and  the  jeal 
ousy  which  the  divided  condition  of  Latin  America 
tends  to  produce,  should  result  in  serious  friction  be 
tween  these  countries  and  ourselves,  the  backing  of 
Latin  Europe  with  its  renewed  energy  and  its  closer 
communications  would  quite  change  the  problem  for 
us.  The  concept  of  a  Latin  Europe  again  making 
common  cause  with  Latin  America  and  working  out 
a  Latin  destiny  in  common  is  an  imposing  one  and  one 
not  to  be  dismissed  as  of  no  concern  to  ourselves. 

The  position  of  Italy  in  such  a  combination  is  less 
easy  to  forecast.  That  position  would  naturally  be 
less  central  and  significant.  Italy  is  not  in  the  direct 
line  of  communication,  and  her  ambitions  have  of  late 
turned  in  an  opposite  direction.  Her  first  ambition 
is  to  dominate  the  Adriatic  by  controlling  its  head 
and  its  mouth,  and  to  this  end  she  is  now  bending  all 
her  energies.  She  has  very  declared  ambitions  how- 


THE  UNFEARED  POWERS  253 

ever,  in  the  ^Egean,  while  her  seizure  of  Tripoli,  and 
earlier,  of  Eritrea  and  Somaliland  indicate  an  east 
ward  trend  of  her  development.  The  French  seiz 
ure  of  Tunis  in  1881  perhaps  determined  this  trend. 
Tunis  is  the  natural  point  of  contact  for  Italy  with 
Africa,  but  a  point  from  which  the  natural  line  of 
least  resistance  is  toward  the  west  as  the  history  of 
Rome  illustrates.  Perhaps  the  fear  of  such  an  ad 
vance  of  Italy,  impelled  France,  already  in  Algeria, 
to  forestall  Italy  whose  aspirations  toward  Tunis 
were  well  known.  The  forestalling  was  complete, 
for  an  advance  westward  from  Tripoli  is  seemingly 
impossible.  All  later  developments  have  accentu 
ated  this  trend  of  Italy  toward  the  east,  a  direction 
farthest  from  our  own  interests. 

But  the  possibility  of  political  complications  with 
Italy,  though  slight,  is  not  excluded.  The  Italians 
have  become  one  of  the  great  migratory  peoples  of 
the  world.  Immense  numbers  flock  to  our  shores 
where  their  presence  has  already  caused  grave  com 
plications.  Other  streams  go  to  South  America 
where  they  are  rapidly  becoming  a  prominent  ele 
ment  in  the  scantily  Europeanized  population.  Re 
calling  what  has  been  said  about  the  increasingly 
political  character  of  immigration,  it  will  be  seen 
that  here  too  is  a  potential  protector  of  Latin 
America. 

All  such  suggestions  seem  fanciful,  and  taken  by 
themselves  they  are  so.  No  country  which  is  other 
wise  well  disposed,  will  go  to  war  or  risk  war  on  be 
half  of  emigrant  subjects.  Nor  yet  will  Italy,  if 
ever  so  inclined  to  war,  make  war  on  us  alone  for  any 


254    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

pretext  or  any  reason,  even  the  most  urgent.  But 
there  are  other  possibilities  outside  these.  Excess 
population,  dynastic  embarrassments,  entangling  al 
liances,  any  number  of  things,  may  predispose  Italy 
to  action  in  conjunction  with  other  nations,  action  of  a 
kind  for  which  the  interests  of  her  immigrant  sub 
jects  would  furnish  the  occasion.  Suppose,  for  in 
stance,  that  we  had  incurred  the  wrath  of  Germany  at 
a  time  when  the  mob  killed  Italian  subjects  in  New 
Orleans  and  Louisiana  refused  redress.  What 
would  Italy,  at  that  time  the  ally  of  Germany,  have 
done?  It  will  certainly  be  a  clumsy  statesmanship 
which  makes  Italy  our  enemy,  but  then, —  we  might 
have  clumsy  statesmanship. 

The  case  of  France,  while  suggesting  little  save 
the  association  with  Latin  America  already  indicated, 
brings  us  into  the  class  of  the  great  imperial  powers. 
No  nation  in  any  age  has  had  vaster  ambitions  or 
seemed  so  often  near  to  their  realization.  When 
we  remember  that  her  "  sphere  of  influence  "  has  at 
one  time  or  another,  included  not  only  the  great  ter 
ritories  she  now  holds, —  territories  twenty  times  the 
area  of  France  —  but  Egypt,  Palestine,  India,  numer 
ous  islands  in  the  East  and  West  Indies  and  nearly  all 
of  North  America,  while  under  Napoleon  nearly  all 
Europe  except  England  owned  her  suzerainty,  it  is 
hardly  too  much  to  say  that  France  is  historically  the 
world  power. 

But  equally,  no  nation  has  known  such  fluctuations 
of  fortune.  Her  Napoleonic  empire  dissolved  as 
quickly  as  it  was  formed.  In  the  wars  of  the  eight 
eenth  century  she  lost  her  entire  colonial  empire,  and 


THE  UNFEARED  POWERS  255 

was  obliged  to  build  another  in  the  nineteenth  out  of 
the  left-overs,  spacious  but  mostly  inferior  territories. 
There  was  a  momentary  vista  of  supreme  opportun 
ity  when  she  recovered  Louisiana,  but  she  did  not  hold 
it  long  enough  to  raise  her  flag  there.  Not  till  the 
audacious  Napoleonic  attempt  to  dominate  Europe 
was  over  did  the  work  of  patient  imperial  construc 
tion  begin. 

In  the  course  of  this  arduous  task  several  vast  proj 
ects  have  been  undertaken  with  varying  degrees  of 
failure  and  success.  The  most  ambitious  of  these 
and  the  one  which  most  concerns  ourselves  was  the 
attempt  to  re-establish  French  rule  in  America  by 
the  occupation  of  Mexico.  This  was  based  on  the 
belief,  for  a  time  general  in  Europe,  that  our  own 
state  was  to  be  dismembered  and  so  rendered  power 
less  to  protest.  The  occasion  of  our  civil  war  there 
fore  seemed  opportune.  It  proved  most  inoppor 
tune.  Had  the  attempt  been  made  before  the  war 
our  proverbial  unpreparedness  might  have  given  a 
chance  of  success.  But  the  war  did  not  dismember 
us  and  it  did  prepare  us.  So  when  it  was  finished 
France  recognized  the  hopelessness  of  the  attempt 
and  withdrew  her  army,  leaving  her  chivalrous  pup 
pet  emperor  to  his  fate.  There  seems  little  likeli 
hood  that  the  attempt  will  be  repeated.  France  has 
since  become  a  republic,  and  while  this,  as  we  have 
seen,  offers  no  guaranty  of  a  peaceable  disposition,  it 
perhaps  does  insure  a  more  serious  estimate  of  our 
selves.  Furthermore  the  development  of  every  part 
of  America  steadily  lessens  the  likelihood  of  success 
in  such  an  undertaking.  Finally,  as  we  shall  see, 


256     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

France  has  found  other  opportunity  and  has  been 
obliged  to  concentrate  her  energies  elsewhere. 

The  second  great  attempt  was  in  southeastern 
Asia.  After  losing  India,  France  looked  around  for 
another  like  opportunity.  China  was  the  only  pos 
sible  chance.  The  prospect  was  good  that  China 
would  go  the  way  of  India.  France  determined  to 
post  herself  in  a  position  of  vantage.  In  co-opera 
tion  with  Britain  she  humbled  China,  meanwhile 
establishing  herself  in  Tongking  and  Cambodia. 
This  was  very  strategic  ground,  adjoining  the  most 
populous  part  of  China  on  the  north  and  the  rich 
Siamese-Burmese  peninsula  on  the  west.  The  "  for 
ward  "  policy  was  quite  frankly  inaugurated.  Ag 
gression  on  the  west  prompted  Britain  to  precipitate 
annexation  of  Burma  to  her  Indian  empire.  On  the 
north  it  provoked  bitter  opposition  from  China  at 
whose  hands  France  suffered  unexpected  humiliation. 
Progress  was  stayed,  and  slowly  it  developed  that 
China  was  not  to  fall  an  easy  victim  to  Europe,  but 
that,  taking  advantage  of  European  jealousies,  she 
was  going  to  be  modernized  and  possibly  maintain 
her  independence.  With  this  decision  of  destiny, 
the  great  French  scheme  of  an  Asiatic  empire  mis 
carried.  Tongking,  splendid  domain  as  it  is,  is  but 
the  wreck  of  an  abandoned  enterprise.  Testimony 
from  all  sides  is  to  the  effect  that  the  Frenchman  no 
longer  sees  visions  and  dreams  dreams  of  Tongking. 

Throughout  the  century  as  in  all  preceding  im 
perial  periods,  Africa  has  attracted  the  attention  of 
the  French.  Napoleon's  dream  of  an  empire  in  the 
nearer  East  is  well  known.  From  an  early  date  the 


THE  UNFEARED  POWERS  257 

claim  of  France  to  Egypt  was  generally  recognized, 
a  claim  forfeited  to  Britain  in  1882  by  the  almost  in 
credible  caprice  of  France.  Aside  from  this,  how 
ever,  and  Britain's  resolute  exclusion  of  France  from 
the  upper  Nile  valley,  her  progress  in  Africa  has 
been  steady  and  substantial  from  her  seizure  of  Al 
geria  in  1827  to  her  final  acquisition  of  Morocco  in 
1911.  Broadly  speaking,  she  has  acquired  in  that 
period  the  great  island  of  Madagascar  and  the  great 
hump  of  western  Africa  with  the  seacoast  nearly  all 
the  way  from  Tunis  round  to  the  Congo.  As  we 
round  into  the  Gulf  of  Guinea,  it  is  true,  French  occu 
pation  becomes  intermittent.  Her  frontage  upon  the 
coast  alternates  with  that  of  Britain,  as  formerly  with 
that  of  Germany,  thus  making  incomplete  her  occu 
pation  of  this  vast  West  African  domain  which  she 
would  fain  call  her  own  and  in  which  she  is  plainly 
the  dominant  power.  But  if  other  nations  hold  por 
tions  of  her  Africa,  she  holds  portions  of  theirs,  while 
the  reversion  of  the  huge  Belgian  Congo  is  promised 
to  France  if  Belgium  parts  with  it. 

This  African  domain  is  the  living  part  of  the 
French  colonial  empire,  the  part  where  France  has 
her  visions,  and  spends  her  enthusiasm  and  her 
money.  It  is  well  that  it  is  so.  It  is  the  colonial 
possibility  that  is  nearest  to  her  shores.  The  coast 
from  Tunis  to  Morocco  gives  her  absolute  control 
of  the  great  western  basin  of  the  Mediterranean, — 
her  Mediterranean, —  and  the  resources  of  her  trop 
ical  territories  are  illimitable. 

And  what  of  us?  We  had  well-nigh  forgotten 
America  in  this  development.  So  has  France. 


25 8     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

There  is  but  one  country  from  which  we  have  less 
to  fear  than  France.  As  one  already  largely  en 
dowed,  she  has  much  to  lose  and  little  to  gain  from 
territorial  readjustments.  It  is  the  dispossessed  who 
make  trouble.  The  possessors  have  given  bonds  to 
keep  the  peace.  France,  too,  has  demonstrated  that 
she  has  but  little  aptitude  for  general  commerce  and 
maritime  power.  She  helped  Britain  force  open  the 
ports  of  China  to  western  trade,  but  the  steamers  she 
built  to  ply  on  the  busy  Yangtse  now  fly  the  British 
flag.  An  empire  scattered  across  the  seven  seas  would 
require  a  temperament  and  a  navy  which  she  does  not 
possess.  The  vast  domain  bulked  near  her  doors, 
furnishing  alike  the  indispensable  tropical  products 
and  the  indispensable  national  defence,  is  the  appro 
priate  outcome  of  her  four  centuries  of  effort. 

France  still  owns  French  Guiana  and  a  few  islets  in 
the  Caribbean.  What  is  our  interest  in  them? 
Will  she  use  them  against  us?  It  is  difficult  to  see 
her  advantage  in  so  doing  under  present  or  prospec 
tive  conditions.  Will  she  dispose  of  them  to  some 
one  who  will?  Probably  not,  but  it  is  a  possibility. 
They  can  have  neither  economic  nor  political  value 
to  her,  considering  her  other  interests.  The  likeli 
hood  that  she  will  transfer  them  to  an  unwelcome 
party  despite  our  protests  seems  slight  at  present. 
But  circumstances  might  change.  She  might  have  in 
ducements  to  make  the  transfer.  She  might  con 
ceivably  be  compelled  to  make  it.  It  behooves  us  to 
avoid  the  transfer,  to  avoid  the  compulsion,  possibly 
to  forestall  it  by  their  acquisition  or  by  their  trans 
fer  to  our  unavoidable  partner  in  these  parts. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

THE    BACKGROUND    OF    EUROPE 

There  are  two  countries  which  we  seldom  think 
of  when  considering  the  problem  of  our  relation  to 
Europe,  Austria  and  Russia.  They  are  geographi 
cally  remote  from  us,  and  though  both  are  credited 
with  unscrupulous  ambitions,  the  policy  of  each  is  so 
directed  that  it  seems  little  likely  to  conflict  with  our 
own  interests.  Yet  the  nations  are  today  so  closely 
related  that  it  can  hardly  be  said  that  any  move,  even 
the  most  remote  and  unrelated,  is  a  matter  of  indif 
ference  to  us.  Interests  that  do  not  concern  us  di 
rectly,  often  affect  us  vitally  through  some  inter 
mediary  whom  they  touch.  This  is  peculiarly  the 
case  with  both  the  countries  in  question. 

AUSTRIA 

Austria  (by  which  is  here  meant  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  Empire)  is  not  one  country  but  two,  each  as 
distinct  as  it  is  possible  for  clever  political  device  to 
make  it,  though  the  two  confer  their  crowns  upon  a 
single  person.  In  these  days  when  even  in  auto 
cratic  states,  monarchs  are  a  very  small  part  of  the 
machinery  of  government,  two  states  that  refuse  to 
combine  in  anything  except  the  monarch,  are  very 
much  apart,  the  more  so,  when,  as  in  the  present  case, 
they  cordially  dislike  each  other. 

259 


26o     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

But  the  anomaly  does  not  end  here.  Each  of  the 
two  countries  is  composed  of  several  smaller  coun 
tries,  united,  to  be  sure,  as  regards  government,  but 
divided  in  everything  else.  All  told,  there  are  ten 
fairly  distinct  units, —  we  can  not  do  better  than  to 
call  them  countries, —  in  this  partnership  empire. 
There  is  a  distressing  diversity  in  this  heterogeneous 
group.  Thus,  the  Bohemians  and  the  Galicians  are 
racially  close  kin  and  they  are  all  Catholics,  but  they 
are  geographically  very  poorly  united,  and  they  have 
a  separate  history  which  they  stubbornly  refuse  to  for 
get.  They  both  make  fairly  good  connections  terri 
torially  with  Austria  to  whose  empire  they  belong, 
and  together  with  Hungary,  they  round  out  the  Dual 
Empire  nicely,  but  they  could  not  make  any  sort  of  a 
working  team  themselves,  even  if  they  were  so  in 
clined,  which  they  are  not.  They  are  equally  disin 
clined  toward  the  union  with  Austria  to  which  they 
consent  for  the  simple  reason  that  they  can  not  help 
it. 

Or  again,  take  Slavonia,  Croatia,  and  Bosnia. 
These  are  all  Serbian  in  race  and  language,  and  it 
is  on  this  fact  that  Serbia  bases  her  hope  of  a  greater 
Serbia.  But  Slavonia  and  Croatia  are  Catholic, 
Serbia  is  Orthodox,  i.e.  adherent  of  the  Greek  or 
Russian  faith,  while  Bosnia,  or  at  least  its  aristocratic 
and  influential  element,  is  Mohammedan  and  very 
reactionary  at  that.  So  the  Slavonians  and  Croa- 
tians  are  ruled  by  the  Hungarians  who  make  the  most 
of  their  privilege,  while  the  Bosnians,  whom  neither 
of  the  great  partners  dared  to  take  lest  they  have 
more  aliens  than  they  could  handle,  are  managed  by 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  EUROPE     261 

a  Bosnian  Bureau  connected  with  the  joint  army  ad 
ministration  of  the  Dual  Empire,  and  the  Serbians 
maintain  a  precarious  independence.  Still  other 
alien  elements,  like  the  Roumanians  and  Italians, 
present  like  problems  of  incompatibility  and  subjec 
tion. 

Finally,  it  is  to  be  noted  that  the  two  dominant 
races,  the  Austrians  (who  are  Germans)  and  the 
Hungarians  or  Magyars,  who  glare  at  each  other  and 
yet  co-operate  with  each  other  in  order  to  hold  down 
the  others,  are  both  in  a  minority  in  their  respective 
countries.  The  Austrians  number  only  about  a  third 
of  the  inhabitants  of  Austria,  and  the  Hungarians 
are  in  much  the  same  plight.  And  since  neither  of 
these  races  has  the  slightest  intention  of  relinquishing 
control,  various  devices  are  adopted  to  maintain  it. 
The  other  races  are  partially  disfranchised  and 
played  off  one  against  another  with  a  skill  which  natu 
rally  develops  under  these  conditions. 

The  empire  thus  created  is  in  a  sense  an  anomaly. 
We  usually  think  of  a  nation  as  the  political  organiza 
tion  of  people  who  are  drawn  together  by  some  con 
scious  bond  of  race,  religion  or  common  purpose. 
That  is  what  a  nation  should  be,  and  that  is  what 
the  nations  of  the  world  for  the  most  part  now  are. 
Nobody  imagines  for  a  moment  that  any  part  of  the 
United  States  or  of  France  or  of  Germany  would 
withdraw  if  it  could.  It  is  probable  that  no  part 
even  of  the  vast  British  empire  would  vote  to  sever 
its  connection  with  the  empire  if  given  the  oppor 
tunity,  though  a  noisy  element  in  a  single  small  part 
vociferates  its  desire  to  do  so.  But  it  is  doubtful 


262     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

whether  a  single  one  of  the  ten  race  elements  in 
Austro-Hungary  would  vote  for  real  union  with  any 
other  on  a  basis  of  fair  and  equal  privilege. 

All  this  tends  to  alienate  the  sympathy  of  other 
nations,  and  more  particularly  of  those  that  recog 
nize  more  fully  the  principle  of  the  rule  of  the  people. 
The  feeling  is  natural  that  a  government  based  on 
universal  constraint  rather  than  on  universal  consent 
is  illegitimate.  It  is  well  to  recall,  however,  that 
this  anomalous  government  represents  an  anomalous 
situation  and  that  a  change  in  the  government  might 
not  help  matters  if  the  situation  remained  unchanged. 
There  is  much  talk  of  dissolving  this  unhappy  combi 
nation  and  giving  self-government  to  each  of  its  dis 
satisfied  elements.  But  the  trouble  is  that  what  these 
various  peoples  want  is  not  to  govern  themselves  but 
to  govern  one  another.  Thus,  there  are  no  peoples 
in  the  world  that  talk  more  of  race  integrity  than 
the  Serbians  and  Roumanians,  since  a  large  part  of 
their  people  are  under  Austro-Hungarian  rule,  and 
they  would  like  to  add  them  to  their  own  states. 
But  neither  of  these  territories  hesitated  a  moment, 
at  the  close  of  the  Balkan  wars,  to  annex  territory 
peopled  almost  exclusively  by  Bulgarians.  There  is 
every  reason  to  fear,  therefore,  that  if  these  people 
were  given  self-government,  they  would  at  once  be 
gin  to  encroach  upon  one  another,  for  which  the 
mixed  character  of  the  population,  the  strategic  neces 
sities  of  national  defence  and  the  convenience  of  com 
merce  would  furnish  unlimited  pretexts.  The  best 
thing  that  can  be  said  of  the  Austrian  government, — 
and  that  is  very  much, —  is  that  it  maintains  a  degree 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  EUROPE     263 

of  order  and  peace  among  peoples  so  divided  and  so 
circumstanced  that  they  can  hardly  maintain  those 
conditions  for  themselves.  There  is  much  talk  just 
now  of  a  different  arrangement  for  maintaining  order 
in  this  sorely  divided  region,  but  no  proposal  has  yet 
been  made  which  to  the  present  writer  seems  very 
promising. 

The  peculiar  character  of  the  Austrian  state  has 
quite  naturally  prevented  the  development  of  a 
colonial  empire  along  French  or  British  lines.  If 
foreign  dependencies  were  acquired,  the  question 
would  at  once  come  up  whether  they  should  belong 
to  Austria  or  Hungary,  and  with  the  jealousy  be 
tween  the  partners,  such  a  question  might  not  be  easy 
to  settle.  But  more  important  than  this  is  the  fact 
that  Austria  has  had  her  hands  full  at  home.  Not 
only  has  there  been  endless  difficulty  inside  the  jar 
ring  empire,  but  Austria  has  been  deeply  interested 
in  the  smaller  countries  to  the  south,  all  of  them  need 
ing  the  same  strong  handling  as  her  own  trouble 
some  family  to  keep  them  from  flying  at  one  another's 
throats.  The  relations  between  Serbia  and  Bulgaria 
in  recent  years  help  to  reconcile  us  to  the  harsh 
measures  by  which  Austria  keeps  her  Balkan  cousins 
in  decent  shape.  Whatever  we  may  think  of  it, 
that  is  the  way  Austria  thinks  of  it.  The  Balkan 
States  are  to  her  just  so  much  unfinished  work.  She 
has  her  hands  full  now  and  isn't  looking  for  more 
trouble,  but  she  undertakes  the  new  task  as  oppor 
tunity  offers.  Serbia  was  next  on  her  docket  and  the 
case  in  many  ways  was  urgent.  She  set  her  hand  to 
the  task,  and  the  world  protested;  even  we  protested. 


264    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

Why? 

The  answer  is  to  be  found  in  one  more  peculiarity 
of  this  most  peculiar  situation.  The  Austrian*  are 
Germans.  We  have  seen  how  the  two  great  part 
ners  in  the  Dual  Empire  have  each  undertaken  to 
hold  down  a  lot  of  lesser  peoples,  more  numerous 
in  the  aggregate  than  themselves.  And  as  each  has 
built  his  inverted  pyramid  about  as  high  as  he  can 
manage,  and  still  there  is  more  balancing  to  be  done, 
the  two  have  joined  in  the  farther  task  which  neither 
dares  undertake  alone.  Every  precaution  has  been 
taken  throughout  to  maintain  the  strict  equality  of 
the  partner  states. 

But  there  is  one  fatal  inequality  which  upsets 
everything.  The  one  partner  has  powerful  family 
connections,  so  to  speak,  and  the  other  has  none. 
Hungary  has  no  backer,  while  Austria  has  a  backer 
of  overwhelming  power.  For  a  time  this  difference 
did  not  count,  and  the  two  partners  managed  their 
affairs,  each  in  his  own  way.  But  slowly  this  condi 
tion  changed.  The  big  German  family  came  to  have 
need  of  the  partnership  to  accomplish  its  purposes, 
and  simultaneously  the  partners  found  themselves  in 
need  of  backing.  There  was  much  reluctance  to 
make  the  necessary  bargain.  The  Hungarian  part 
ner  was  not  at  all  happy  that  the  backing  should  come 
wholly  from  his  partner's  family,  for  he  distrusted 
his  partner  and  detested  the  partner's  family.  The 
Austrian  partner,  too,  was  hardly  less  reluctant,  for 
he  was  not  in  good  standing  with  his  family  of  which 
he  represented  the  decaying  aristocracy  and  they  the 
parvenu  branch,  but  need  deepened  into  necessity, 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  EUROPE     265 

and  the  necessity  was  not  otherwise  to  be  met.  So 
the  Austro-Hungarian  partnership  passed  under  the 
control  of  the  younger  but  more  vigorous  branch  of 
the  German  family  whose  purposes  it  was  hence 
forth  to  serve. 

It  is  this  fact  that  makes  Austrian  affairs  of  in 
terest  to  us.  The  maintenance  of  the  Austro-Hun 
garian  Empire  is  indispensable  to  the  success  of  the 
German  schemes  which  seem  to  menace  our  safety. 
As  matters  now  stand  Germany,  through  the  agency 
of  some  ten  million  Austrian  Germans,  controls  four 
or  five  times  that  number  of  aliens  who  are  in  no 
sympathy  with  her,  and  keeps  open  the  road  to  the 
Balkans  and  the  Dardanelles.  If  the  Dual  Empire 
were  broken  up,  its  Bohemians  freed,  and  its  Poles, 
Roumanians,  Serbs  and  Italians  united  with  the  out 
side  representatives  of  those  races  to  form  substan 
tial  independent  states,  all  hope  of  uniting  them  in 
the  interest  of  German  expansion  would  be  at  an 
end.  Fighting  for  Germany  is  the  very  last  thing 
that  Bohemians,  Poles,  Roumanians,  Serbs,  or  even 
Hungarians  would  willingly  do.  But  that  is  what 
they  are  doing  today,  thanks  to  the  peculiar  organiza 
tion  of  the  Austrian  Empire.  And  if  the  issue  of  the 
present  war  is  favourable  to  Germany,  this  system 
will  be  carried  farther, —  no  one  knows  how  far. 
Austria  is  thus,  in  the  hands  of  Germany,  a  net  that 
gathers  fish  of  every  kind,  all  for  the  German  basket. 
If  we  are  concerned  with  German  plans  of  world  do 
minion,  we  are  concerned  with  Austria  as  the  indis 
pensable  instrument  of  their  realization. 


266    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 


RUSSIA 

Even  more  remote  from  our  national  interests  may 
seem  to  be  the  great  Slav  nation.  It  is  true  that  in 
Behring's  Sea  we  face  each  other  across  a  compara 
tively  narrow  body  of  water,  but  since  the  acquisition 
of  Alaska,  the  division  is  a  natural  one,  and  as  these 
territories  seem  destined  never  to  have  a  considerable 
population,  a  clash  at  this  point  or  on  grounds  re 
lating  thereto  seems  most  unlikely.  Although  Rus 
sia  has  been  notoriously  aggressive,  her  program 
seems  to  have  to  do  exclusively  with  Europe  and  Asia, 
and  nowhere  threatens  us.  Probably  no  great  power 
has  of  late  given  us  so  little  concern.  There  have 
been  strained  relations,  to  be  sure,  about  minor  mat 
ters  such  as  the  validity  of  American  passports,  the 
Russian  limitations  upon  Jewish  citizens  being  in  con 
flict  with  treaty  guaranties  between  the  two  countries. 
As  is  well  known,  Russia  formerly  excluded  all  Jews 
from  her  dominions.  When  Poland  was  partitioned 
and  the  major  portion  assigned  to  Russia,  it  proved 
to  be  impossible  to  extend  this  exclusion  to  the  new 
territory,  one  of  the  most  Jewish  in  all  Europe. 
Jews  were  therefore  tolerated  here  but  were  not  al 
lowed  outside  of  certain  set  limits.  This  was  the 
origin  of  the  famous  "  pale."  The  temptation  to 
enter  Russia  and  take  advantage  of  its  rich  oppor 
tunities  for  gain  constantly  appealed  to  the  Jews,  and 
the  alternate  relaxation  and  enforcement  of  the  rule 
led  to  those  outrages  upon  the  Jews  which  have 
shocked  humanity. 

When  we  negotiated  with  Russia  the  usual  treaty 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  EUROPE     267 

of  amity  and  commerce  with  the  standard  proviso 
that  citizens  of  each  country  should  have  the  right 
to  reside,  travel,  and  do  business  in  the  other,  the 
Jew  saw  his  opportunity.  He  came  to  America, 
naturalized  himself  as  an  American  citizen,  and  then 
returned  to  Russia  armed  with  an  American  pass 
port  and  demanded  the  privileges  guaranteed  by 
treaty.  The  situation  was  awkward.  Russia  re 
garded  the  device  as  a  bare-faced  evasion  of  her 
laws,  as  in  many  cases  it  was.  If  the  Jew  were  al 
lowed  thus  to  get  over  the  barrier  by  turning  its 
flank,  this  road  was  likely  to  be  a  much  travelled  one, 
and  the  barrier  would  soon  become  useless.  The 
United  States,  too,  had  reason  to  object  to  this  abuse 
of  its  citizenship.  But  on  the  other  hand,  the  Jew 
ish  citizen  had  a  legal  right  to  demand  a  passport, 
and  our  passport  and  our  treaty  were  not  things  to  be 
lightly  flouted.  Moreover,  American  sentiment  was 
much  aroused  against  Russia  on  account  of  her 
"  pogroms  "  and  flagrant  injustices  against  the  Jews. 
Last  but  not  least,  there  was  the  American  Jewish 
vote  to  consider.  Neither  side  could  very  well  yield 
and  neither  did  yield.  The  treaty  was  abrogated  and 
our  relations  with  the  great  empire  remained  with 
out  its  valuable  guaranties.  The  revolution  which 
seems  to  have  removed  the  restrictions  against  the 
Jews,  has  apparently  made  possible  the  renewal  of 
treaty  relations,  but  that  remains  for  the  future,  with 
all  its  difficult  problems,  to  determine.  It  is  utterly 
fatuous  to  assume  that  the  destructive  triumph  of 
democracy  has  removed  the  causes  of  friction  be 
tween  Russia  and  other  democratic  states. 


268    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

But  it  never  entered  into  the  head  of  any  one, 
Russian  or  American,  that  a  difficulty  like  this  could 
be  a  cause  of  war  between  the  two  countries.  Na 
tions  do  not  go  to  war  thus  lightly.  If  either  were 
vitally  menacing  the  interests  of  the  other,  a  quarrel 
like  this  would  have  furnished  an  excellent  pretext 
for  war.  Such  pretexts  as  this,  tangible  and  concrete 
things,  though  often  inconsequential,  are  flaunted  at 
the  outbreak  of  every  war.  The  superficial  take 
them  seriously,  often  decrying  war  on  grounds  so 
trivial,  and  devising  elaborate  peace  programs  de 
signed  to  eliminate  these  baneful  pretexts.  It  is  only 
necessary  to  refer  to  a  situation  like  this  to  see  that 
the  pretext  is  harmless  unless  it  coincides  with  a 
deeper  predisposition  to  war  based  on  a  fundamental 
menace,  perhaps  unconscious  and  instinctively  re 
sisted.  When  these  great  intangible  issues  call  forth 
our  instinct  of  self  preservation,  and  yet  fail  to  de 
fine  themselves  to  our  provincial  thinking,  these  small 
grievances  do  duty  in  satisfying  our  minds  as  to  the 
justice  of  our  instincts. 

The  American  people,  as  yet  unconscious  of  any 
menace  from  Russia,  has  not  felt  the  least  disposi 
tion  to  resort  to  the  ultimate  argument.  No  num 
ber  of  passport  quarrels  is  likely  to  incline  us  to  do 
so  until  that  menace  appears.  Is  there  a  likelihood 
of  such  a  menace? 

Of  direct  conflict  between  the  United  States  and 
Russia  there  seems  to  be  no  prospect.  For  a  very 
long  time  to  come  at  least,  neither  country  can  plausi 
bly  claim  or  covet  anything  that  belongs  to  the  other. 
We  may  reasonably  assume  that  Russia  has  no  de- 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  EUROPE     269 

signs  upon  the  American  continent  and  that  we,  even 
in  our  wildest  moments  of  inadvertence,  are  not  likely 
to  extend  our  sway  over  any  part  of  the  Asiatic  or 
European  mainland.  There  is  no  easier  line  of  de 
marcation  in  the  world  than  this.  The  ocean,  to  be 
sure,  is  no  longer  a  barrier  that  armed  nations  can 
not  across,  but  it  is  a  barrier  that  they  need  not  cross, 
which  is  saying  much  for  the  possibility  and  the  prob 
ability  of  peace.  To  be  sure,  as  our  thought  reverts 
to  the  Philippines,  it  gives  pause  to  these  easy  con 
clusions.  The  Philippines  remain  the  one  conspicu 
ous  anomaly  in  our  present  geographical  position,  an 
anomaly  which  we  must  carefully  consider  in  due  time. 
But  despite  this  seeming  anomaly,  the  general  rela 
tion  is  plain  and  as  far  as  Russia  is  concerned,  ab 
solute.  We  belong  to  the  Western  Hemisphere,  Rus 
sia  to  the  Eastern,  and  if  we  clash  it  will  be  when  the 
two  Hemispheres  clash.  Will  they  clash? 

It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  vast  as  are  Russia's 
territories,  she  is  under  the  imperative  need  of  further 
expansion.  She  is  still  an  interior  country  with  no 
access  to  the  sea  under  her  control.  Of  the  four  nat 
ural  gateways  to  her  territory,  the  Baltic,  the  Dar 
danelles,  the  Persian  Gulf,  and  the  Gulf  of  Pechili, 
not  one  is  controlled  by  Russia.  Even  with  these 
fully  under  her  control,  Russia  would  still  be  at  a 
disadvantage  in  her  industrial  and  commercial  devel 
opment  and  in  her  civilizing  intercourse  with  na 
tions.  The  expense  of  getting  to  the  gateway  from 
interior  Russia  is  necessarily  great,  owing  to  the  vast- 
ness  of  the  land.  To  have  this  handicap  increased 
by  barriers  at  the  gateway,  by  arbitrary  closings, 


27o    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

formalities  and  the  like  is  to  increase  her  disad 
vantage  into  a  guaranty  of  permanent  backward 
ness  and  inferiority.  No  people  has  felt  more  deeply 
than  Russia  this  need  of  national  expansion.  It  is 
an  absurd  caricature  of  the  national  ambition  to  char 
acterize  it  as  "  land  hunger."  Russia  has  land  and 
to  spare.  What  she  seeks  is  certain  points  of  vitally 
necessary  control,  points  even  more  obviously  neces 
sary  than  those  we  seek  to  dominate  in  the  Carib 
bean.  The  necessity  of  these  points  is  more  real  and 
more  obvious  than  those  required  by  any  other  na 
tion.  That  revolutionary  and  mob-ruled  Russia  that 
has  "  tasted  of  liberty  and  been  made  drunk,"  should 
momentarily  renounce  these  national  ambitions  is  not 
strange.  The  incredible  thing  is  that  the  sober  by 
standers  among  the  nations  should  take  these  drunken 
protestations  seriously.  Granted  that  circumstances 
may  possibly  make  this  renunciation  permanent,  we 
can  not  build  our  safety  on  possibilities.  It  is  pos 
sible,  even  probable,  that  my  house  will  not  burn,  but 
until  it  is  sure,  I  must  in  simple  prudence,  insure 
against  that  catastrophe.  The  Russian  is  not  done 
with  imperialism,  that  impulse  which  in  all  ages  and 
all  lands  has  survived  every  change  of  government 
and  resisted  every  appeal  of  sentiment  and  philoso 
phy.  Imperialism  may  learn  to  accomplish  its  pur 
poses  without  war,  but  not  to  relinquish  its  pur 
poses. 

Unfortunately  Russia  can  not  obtain  control  of  the 
desired  gateways  without  virtually  destroying  cer 
tain  nations  and  seriously  menacing  others.  We 
have  seen  this  in  the  case  of  Japan.  It  is  even  more 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  EUROPE     271 

obvious  in  the  case  of  Europe.  The  control  of  the 
Dardanelles  means  the  annihilation  or  subjection  of 
Turkey  and  the  permanent  subordination  of  a  number 
of  other  nations  in  or  near  the  Balkans.  The  control 
of  the  Baltic  means  the  absorption  of  the  Scandinavian 
countries  and  of  all  Germany  east  of  the  Elbe.  Such 
programs  seem  utterly  preposterous,  but  it  is  known 
that  they  have  been  long  entertained  and  openly 
avowed.  The  worst  of  it  is  that  if  they  were  re 
nounced  and  forgotten,  the  situation  would  of  itself 
revive  them.  The  present  geographical  situation  of 
Russia  is  one  of  such  very  real  helplessness  that  no 
year  of  national  life  could  pass  without  suggesting  the 
desirability, —  the  necessity  —  of  escaping  from  these 
bonds. 

To  both  Turkey  and  Germany,  therefore,  the 
menace  of  Russian  aggression  is  a  spectre,  an  obses 
sion.  The  one  is  already  helpless,  the  other  is  sure 
to  become  so  if  the  forces  of  peace  are  allowed  un 
hindered  to  build  out  the  Russian  people  to  anything 
like  the  measure  of  their  territory  and  their  re 
sources. 

Why  is  the  world  fighting  Germany  today?  Not 
because  she  is  an  autocracy;  not  because  she  has  sunk 
merchant  ships;  not  because  she  has  done  this  or  done 
that.  Germany,  faced  long  ago  with  the  danger  of 
being  crushed  by  Russia,  realized  that  she  must  op 
pose  a  united  Europe  to  Russian  aggression  if,  a  cen 
tury  hence,  that  aggression  was  to  be  stayed.  With 
characteristic  maladresse  she  has  sought  to  organize 
Europe  by  brute  force  under  her  own  leadership,  with 
the  result  that  she  herself  stands  for  the  moment  as 


272     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

the  menace  of  all  other  powers.  That  is  why  all 
other  powers  have  combined  against  her. 

But  if  the  western  powers  will  not  accept  the  lead 
ership  and  control  of  Germany,  how  much  less  likely 
are  they  to  acquiesce  in  the  leadership  of  Russia. 
And  let  us  not  overlook  for  a  moment  the  fact  that 
the  realization  of  the  Russian  program,  even  in  its 
minimal  form,  would  give  her  that  supreme  position. 
Russia  might  stop  at  the  Elbe,  but  there  would  be 
nothing  to  stop  her.  Conceding  that  the  program 
of  overt  conquest  would  not  be  carried  to  its  logical 
limit  of  world  subjection,  a  greater  Russia,  peopled 
from  the  Elbe  to  the  Pacific,  as  that  vast  expanse 
soon  will  be,  would  sit  at  the  head  of  the  table.  Sub 
serviency  would  be  the  sole  alternative  to  subjection. 
And  with  habitual  subserviency  would  come  that  loss 
of  buoyant  initiative,  that  toadying  deference,  which 
spells  the  doom  of  a  civilization  and  which  evokes  the 
protest  of  our  instincts  almost  as  completely  as  does 
physical  subjection.  The  world  will  be  as  unwilling 
to  be  Russianized  as  to  be  Germanized,  and  it  will 
ultimately  find  it  even  more  difficult  to  avoid  it. 

And  since  we  have  joined  in  the  effort  to  avert 
German  dominion,  is  it  not  likely  that  we  shall  join 
in  an  effort  to  avert  a  greater  and  a  worse?  The 
contingency  is  remote,  perhaps,  but  not  improbable. 
It  is  true  we  are  far  away  from  Russia  and  have  a 
minimum  of  occasion  to  clash.  It  is  true,  too,  that 
when  Russia's  day  has  come,  we  shall  be  a  very  dif 
ferent  people  from  what  we  now  are.  It  may  seem 
that  our  growth  in  the  next  hundred  years  will  put  us 
quite  beyond  the  need  of  deference  toward  any.  Un- 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  EUROPE     273 

fortunately  we  shall  not  be  the  only  ones  to  grow. 
This  great  fact  remains  which  nothing  can  change, 
which  no  other  fact  can  outweigh.  Russia  has  more 
power  of  growth  and  more  room  to  grow  in  than  we. 
Her  territory  is  nearly  three  times  as  large,  and  the 
realization  even  in  part  of  her  ambitions  would  make 
it  much  larger.  Its  average  productivity  is  probably 
greater  than  that  of  our  own  country.  Her  popula 
tion  is  larger  and  the  rate  of  increase  higher.  Her 
culture,  though  inferior,  is  but  held  in  abeyance  while 
are  laid  broad  and  deep  the  physical  foundations  of 
national  life.  It  will  match  our  own  when  once  those 
foundations  are  laid.  It  is  difficult  to  see  what  is  to 
prevent  Russia  from  distancing  ourselves  and  others 
in  the  race.  There  are  endless  petty  qualifiers  of 
these  broad  relations,  but  they  do  not  modify  their 
essential  truth,  and  insistence  upon  them  only  be 
fogs  the  issue.  These  qualifiers  may  be  all  im 
portant  in  deciding  the  questions  of  the  hour,  but  in  a 
forecast  of  the  remoter  future  the  more  completely 
we  forget  them  the  better.  For  that  forecast  one 
fact  is  all-important.  The  power  that  acquires  con 
trol  of  the  Eastern  Hemisphere,  acquires  control  of 
the  world.  Is  it  not  plain  that  the  policy  of  America 
must  be  to  prevent  the  domination  of  the  Eastern 
Hemisphere  by  any  one  power?  The  struggle  is 
with  Germany  today.  It  will  be  with  Russia  tomor 
row. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

GERMANY,    THE    STORM    CENTRE 

AT  the  moment  of  writing  these  lines,  one  country 
engages  the  attention  of  Americans.  We  are  at  war 
with  Germany.  The  war  has  been  slow  in  coming, 
and  we  have  been  enabled, —  compelled, —  to  scan 
every  step  of  the  path  which  has  led  us  to  it.  But 
probably  there  are  few  of  us  who  do  not  feel  a  cer 
tain  mystification  about  it  all.  It  seems  strange  and 
unnatural  still,  a  thing  so  out  of  our  habitual  reckon 
ings,  that  though  there  is  no  mistaking  the  path  ahead, 
we  are  puzzled  and  dazed  to  make  out  the  path  be 
hind.  How  did  we  ever  get  where  we  are?  Can  it 
be  possible  that  the  path  we  have  followed  in  all  in- 
nocency  and  good  will  these  many  years  led  naturally 
and  inevitably  here? 

This  sense  of  mystification  is  the  more  pronounced 
because  of  the  unexpected  form  which  the  war  has 
assumed.  There  have  been  prophecies,  of  course, 
these  many  years,  that  war  must  sometime  come  be 
tween  the  United  States  and  Germany.  These 
prophecies  have  attracted  little  attention  save  as  a 
subject  for  editorial  pleasantry,  but  such  slight  im 
pression  as  they  have  made  has  not  at  all  prepared  us 
for  such  a  war  as  this.  It  has  always  been  assumed 
that  war  with  Germany,  if  it  came,  would  come  as  the 

274 


GERMANY,  THE  STORM  CENTRE     275 

result  of  German  aggression  in  the  Western  Hemis 
phere,  that  it  would  be  essentially  a  naval  war  or  a 
war  on  American  soil  to  repel  a  German  invasion. 
That  we  could  under  any  circumstances  be  induced  to 
participate  in  a  European  war  and  to  send  an  army  to 
Europe,  while  as  yet  America  was  untouched  and  we 
were  confronted  with  only  the  most  hypothetical  dan 
gers,  was  a  suggestion  too  preposterous  for  the  most 
alarmist  of  prophets  or  the  most  credulous  of  his  fol 
lowers.  Yet  that  is  what  we  are  doing,  and  doing 
with  the  almost  unanimous  approval  of  the  American 
people. 

Is  this  an  accident,  or  is  there  something  in  the 
character  and  situation  of  the  two  peoples  that  made 
such  a  result  inevitable?  If  it  is  an  accident,  there  is 
little  likelihood  that  it  will  happen  again.  We  have 
but  to  see  it  through,  or  bring  it  to  an  end  by  the  neces 
sary  concessions  (we  can  concede  much  to  end  so  pain 
ful  an  inadvertence)  and  then  renew  our  care-free 
existence.  But  if  there  is  something  in  the  character 
and  situation  of  the  two  peoples  that  made  this  war 
inevitable,  then  it  may  all  happen  again, —  perhaps 
again  and  again, —  unless  radical  remedies  can  be 
provided  against  it.  In  that  case  concession  may  be 
not  conciliation,  but  suicide.  No  graver  question 
than  this  confronts  America  among  the  nations. 

To  arrive  at  an  understanding  of  our  relation  to 
Germany,  we  must,  for  the  time  being,  quite  forget 
our  part  in  the  problem  and  consider  Germany's  situ 
ation,  endeavouring  to  ascertain  the  causes  which  tend 
to  disturb  the  world  equilibrium  in  that  quarter. 
Obviously,  Germany's  immediate  concern  is  not  with 


276     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

America  but  with  the  neighbouring  countries  of  Eu 
rope.  Our  problem  grows  out  of  the  European 
problem,  and  we  can  not  understand  the  one  without 
first  considering  the  other. 

The  outstanding  fact  in  the  present  war  has  been 
the  insurgence  of  Germany.  All  efforts  on  the  part 
of  her  apologists  to  represent  her  as  essentially  pacific 
and  forced  into  the  war  by  the  aggressions  of  her 
enemies,  have  been  unavailing.  True,  she  has  kept 
the  peace  for  more  than  forty  years,  while  her  neigh 
bours  have  engaged  in  bloody  wars,  but  we  cannot  es 
cape  the  conviction  that  during  this  long  peace  she 
has  never  been  really  pacific.  Her  excessive  preoccu 
pation  with  military  affairs,  her  avowed  discontent 
with  her  lot,  and  her  constant  assertion  that  her 
safety  was  threatened  by  the  machinations  of  her 
enemies  have  kept  the  world  nervous.  Her  case  has 
seemed  to  be  one  of  national  paranoia,  a  disorder 
which  no  other  nation  has  manifested  in  like  degree. 

The  reaction  of  all  this  has  been  to  put  Europe  on 
the  defensive,  and  in  this  Germany  has  found  fresh 
evidence  of  her  allegations.  This  in  turn  has  spurred 
her  on  to  new  efforts  for  self-defence,  and  these  ef 
forts  have  intensified  the  apprehensions  of  her  neigh 
bours  and  roused  them  to  a  farther  effort  in  turn. 
When  at  last  the  great  rivalry  ended  in  the  only  way 
in  which  it  could  end,  the  first  move  again  seems  to 
have  been  with  Germany. 

In  all  this  series  of  moves,  the  question  of  priority 
is  a  difficult  one,  and  discussion  leads  to  no  compelling 
conclusion.  Each  move  is  motived  by  a  preceding 
move  of  the  rival  party,  and  as  always  in  the  great 


GERMANY,  THE  STORM  CENTRE     277 

human  game,  we  search  in  vain  for  a  beginning. 
Nor  is  the  question  of  much  interest  save  to  those  who 
have  need  of  exculpation.  But  to  the  dispassionate 
onlooker  it  is  not  easy  at  first  to  see  the  ground 
of  Germany's  obsession.  Despite  the  historic  antip 
athies  of  Europe,  no  one  who  has  been  long  in 
touch  with  the  nations  of  western  Europe,  can  have 
failed  to  note  their  growing  disinclination  to  war. 
They  were  absorbed  in  schemes  of  colonial  develop 
ment  and  industrial  and  social  reorganization,  and  it 
was  only  by  the  most  strenuous  exertion,  sometimes 
in  excess  of  constitutional  authority,  that  their  more 
far-seeing  leaders  prevented  a  fatal  ebb  in  their  mili 
tary  enthusiasm.  France,  to  be  sure,  had  her  griev 
ance  against  Germany,  but  this  grievance  had  so  com 
pletely  lost  its  hold  upon  the  popular  imagination, 
that  nothing  but  the  experience  of  what  they  believed 
to  be  a  war  of  wanton  aggression,  could  have  revived 
it.  England  had  no  historic  grievance  and  no  conceiv 
able  reason  for  attacking  a  peaceable  Germany. 
The  allegation  that  England  brought  about  this  war 
as  an  occasion  for  destroying  rival  German  com 
merce,  is  too  much  belied  by  her  mature  policy  and 
by  the  inherent  probabilities  of  the  situation  to  im 
press  the  unbiased  mind.  The  mere  money  cost  of 
this  war  would  have  wiped  out  the  gains  of  such  a  dia 
bolical  venture  for  a  century  to  come,  and  this  was 
perfectly  foreseen. 

The  relation  of  Germany  to  Russia  was  less  reas 
suring,  but  even  here  the  danger  was  certainly  not  im 
minent.  It  is  true  that  Russia  chafes  under  her  po 
sition  of  dependence  as  regards  access  to  the  sea,  and 


278     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

the  full  realization  of  her  ambitions  in  this  respect 
would  ultimately  endanger  Germany,  for  Russia  un 
doubtedly  desires  to  have  an  access  to  the  Baltic  un 
der  her  control.  This  can  mean  nothing  less  than 
the  control  of  the  Danish  straits,  and  presumably  the 
extension  of  Russia  westward  to  the  river  Elbe,  thus 
cutting  Germany  in  twain.  Such  an  extension  would 
be  a  little  less  preposterous  than  it  might  seem,  for 
the  population  is  mixed  and  patchy,  German  and 
Slavic  settlements  alternating  pretty  much  all  the  way 
between  Petrograd  and  Berlin.  There  can  be  no 
doubt  that  the  scheme  finds  a  place  in  the  extreme 
Russian  program.  But  Russia's  designs  in  this  quar 
ter  are  very  remote.  Her  interest  in  the  Baltic  is 
as  nothing  to  her  interest  in  the  Dardanelles,  and 
the  control  of  the  latter  would  normally  present  no 
such  difficulties  as  the  control  of  the  former.  Upon 
this  enterprise,  therefore,  all  her  effort  has  been  and 
long  will  be  concentrated.  When  the  northern  proj 
ect  comes  up,  a  really  peaceable  Germany  ought  to  be 
able  to  count  on  the  solid  backing  of  all  Western 
Europe  to  protect  her  from  Russian  aggression, 
which,  if  successful,  must  in  the  end  menace  Ger 
many's  neighbours  as  well  as  herself. 

The  general  assumption,  therefore,  that  a  peace 
able  Germany  was  in  no  danger  of  attack  would 
seem  to  be  justified  by  the  situation  in  Europe.  Ger 
many  had  but  to  keep  her  place,  and  make  it  plain  to 
Europe  that  she  was  content  to  keep  her  place,  to  in 
sure  immunity  from  attack,  or  overwhelming  support 
in  case  of  such  attack.  Germany  has  made  no  such 
impression  upon  Europe  for  the  very  good  reason 


GERMANY,  THE  STORM  CENTRE     279 

that  she  is  not  content  with  her  place  and  is  resolved 
to  better  it  at  all  costs,  and  that,  before  the  develop 
ment  and  union  of  neighbouring  states  shall  make  the 
task  impossible.  Germany  demands  her  "  place  in 
the  sun." 

It  is  this  discontent  of  Germany  that  endangers  the 
peace  of  Europe.  The  powers  lying  farther  west 
have  reached  what  all  regard  as  fairly  definite  terri 
torial  limits,  and  while  minor  conflicts  of  interest  still 
exist,  it  is  not  too  much  to  assume  that  the  good  sense 
of  those  immediately  concerned  and  the  pressure  of 
other  powers  jealous  for  the  general  peace,  are  suf 
ficient  to  prevent  war  among  them.  If  Russia  is  less 
dependable,  we  may  be  certain  that  with  the  aid  of 
Germany,  she  could  be  kept  from  endangering  the 
peace  of  Europe  and  of  the  world.  The  discontent 
of  Germany  is  therefore  a  matter  of  supreme  concern. 
What  is  Germany's  grievance?  What  will  satisfy 
her  and  lead  her  to  take  her  place  among  the  peace 
ably  disposed  nations,  the  true  guarantors  of  the 
world's  peace? 

First  and  foremost,  she  wants  room.  The  Ger 
man  Empire  is  at  present  about  the  size  of  the  State 
of  Texas.  While  this  area  is  larger  than  that  of 
many  nations,  and  quite  sufficient,  as  the  result  has 
demonstrated,  to  support  a  highly  significant  national 
life,  Germany  nevertheless  deems  it  inadequate. 
This  demand  for  more  territory  can  hardly  be  called 
unreasonable,  at  least  by  Germany's  present  enemies, 
but  unfortuntely  Germany  is  a  late  comer,  and  she 
finds  that  all  available  lands  have  been  taken  or 
blocked  by  earlier  takings.  Her  demands  can  be 


280    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

met,  therefore,  only  by  despoiling  those  now  in  pos 
session,  a  proceeding  only  to  be  justified  by  the  most 
cogent  reasons.  Such  reasons  her  destined  victims 
declare  do  not  exist.  Thus,  M.  Guyot,  a  distin 
guished  French  authority,  argues  that  despite  her 
rapidly  expanding  population,  there  is  no  congestion 
in  Germany.  Emigration,  once  heavy,  has  virtually 
ceased,  although  nearly  a  million  are  added  to  the 
population  every  year.  This  does  not  look  as  though 
the  population  of  Germany  had  reached  the  satura 
tion  point.  M.  Guyot  believes  the  present  popula 
tion  of  sixty-eight  millions  could  safely  be  increased 
to  ninety  millions,  since  even  this  number  would  give 
her  a  population  of  but  166  per  square  kilometre, 
as  against  260  per  square  kilometre  for  Belgium. 
The  conclusion  is,  of  course,  that  her  territory  is  am 
ple  for  her  people  and  that  her  restiveness  is  quite  un 
justified. 

M.  Guyot's  estimate  is  very  moderate.  The 
writer  has  ventured  in  another  connection  to  suggest 
two  hundred  millions  as  a  possible  maximum  for  Ger 
many.  But  Germany  can  support  two  hundred  mil 
lions  or  ninety  millions  or  even  sixty-eight  millions, 
only  on  condition  that  like  England  or  Belgium,  she 
allow  herself  to  become  a  specialized  industrial  na 
tion,  making  things  for  others  to  use,  and  dependent 
upon  other  countries  for  her  food  and  for  the 
raw  materials  of  her  manufactures.  Assuming  M. 
Guyot's  estimate,  when  Germany  has  ninety  millions, 
she  will  be  dotted  all  over  with  immense  manufac 
turing  cities,  with  hardly  more  people  upon  the  land 
than  now,  and  with  at  least  one  half  her  people  de- 


GERMANY,  THE  STORM  CENTRE     281 

pendent  upon  foreign  food  and  perhaps  three  fourths 
of  her  factories  dependent  upon  foreign  materials. 
Something  like  that  is  the  condition  of  England  to 
day,  while  Belgium,  whose  example  is  cited  as  proof 
that  Germany  can  support  more  than  her  present 
population,  in  normal  times  produces  but  22  per  cent, 
of  her  bread.  In  other  words,  while  Belgium  has  a 
population  of  260  per  square  kilometre,  she  raises 
bread  for  only  57  per  square  kilometre,  less  than  half 
the  number  that  Germany  is  already  compelled  to  pro 
vide  for. 

This,  of  course,  is  a  perfectly  possible  program. 
The  economic  dependence  involved  is  common  to 
many  nations  and  has  been  accepted  by  both  Germany 
and  England  as  a  condition  of  wealth  and  power. 

But  there  is  this  immense  difference  between  indus 
trial  England  and  industrial  Germany.  England 
possesses  territories  varied  in  character  and  dis 
tributed  all  over  the  globe,  which  can  supply  the  neces 
sary  food  for  her  people  and  the  materials  for  her 
industries.  Moreover,  she  has  long  maintained  com 
plete  control  of  the  routes  leading  to  these  territories 
and  indeed  to  all  other  territories  with  which  she  can 
maintain  profitable  economic  relations.  Her  colonies 
and  her  control  of  the  sea  completely  emancipate  her 
from  what  would  otherwise  be  an  abject  economic 
dependence. 

Germany  has  neither  colonies  nor  control  of  the 
sea.  Her  economic  development,  therefore,  tends  to 
make  her,  not  another  England,  but  another  Belgium. 
It  is  possible,  and  even  probable,  that  if  Germany 
would  peaceably  accept  the  situation,  the  other  coun- 


282     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

tries,  always  glad  of  a  good  customer,  would  never 
withhold  the  food  and  raw  materials  that  she  desires. 
We  may  be  perfectly  sure  that  Britain  has  never 
thought  and  would  never  think  of  doing  so.  But 
Germany  does  not  feel  safe, —  honestly  and  truly  does 
not, —  and  when  England  tries  to  reassure  her,  and 
in  all  sincerity  bids  her  trust  the  friendliness  of  her 
kinsmen,  she  has  an  uncomfortable  way  of  saying: 
*'  You  try  it  for  a  while.  Give  us  possession  and  con 
trol  for  a  time,  and  we  will  see  that  you  are  looked  out 
for."  Of  course  there  are  all  kinds  of  reasons  why 
such  an  exchange  of  roles  is  impossible,  but  if  it  were 
ever  so  possible,  it  is  to  be  feared  that  the  Briton 
would  feel, —  would  honestly  and  truly  feel, —  that 
it  was  not  safe.  Lord  Morley  and  a  few  sanguine 
Englishmen  have  seemed  willing  to  accept  some  such 
situation,  but  the  British  people  have  shown  no  in 
clination  to  adopt  their  view.  If  we  are  disposed  to 
criticize  this  attitude  as  unworthy  and  ungenerous,  it 
behooves  us  to  remember  that  men  have  seldom  been 
generous  or  just  to  those  who  were  wholly  in  their 
power.  Not  that  any  nation  would  wantonly  and 
without  provocation  cut  off  the  food  supply  of  an 
other.  But  there  is  certain  to  be  provocation. 
Rivalry  and  shortsightedness  inevitably  produce  mis 
understandings  and  mutual  grievances,  and  the  cer 
tainty  that,  if  worst  comes  to  worst,  one  party  al 
ways  holds  the  winning  hand,  counsels  habitual  sub 
mission  on  the  part  of  the  other.  This  habitual  sub 
mission  eventually  modifies  profoundly  the  national 
temper,  stifling  the  imagination  and  stunting  the  facul 
ties  of  the  people  and  circumscribing  their  culture. 


GERMANY,  THE  STORM  CENTRE     283 

Our  much  cherished  independence  has,  therefore,  a 
very  real  and  tangible  value  which  it  is  futile  to  dis 
parage. 

This  then  is  Germany's  first  fear,  the  fear  of  dan 
gerous  dependence  as  a  specialized  industrial  nation. 
She  is  not  big  enough,  in  her  present  shut-in  position, 
to  assert  a  real  independence  like  that  of  Britain,  and 
yet  she  is  too  big  to  accept  the  abject  dependence  of 
Belgium,  as  she  must  do  if  she  peaceably  accepts  the 
present  situation.  She  must  become  bigger,  and  she 
must  be  quick  about  it,  for  the  longer  she  waits,  the 
more  fatal  becomes  the  weapon  of  hunger  that  her 
rivals  in  self-protection  can  turn  against  her.  Even 
as  it  is,  she  has  probably  waited  too  long.  M. 
Guyot's  argument  amounts  to  saying  that  Germany's 
economic  dependence,  though  rapidly  increasing,  has 
not  yet  reached  its  maximum, —  not  a  very  conclusive 
argument. 

Bearing  in  mind  this  general  fact,  the  German  pro 
gram  which  at  first  sight  seems  so  audacious,  becomes 
intelligible.  In  the  first  place  she  wants  colonies, 
great  territories  which  can  grow  food  and  furnish 
rubber  and  the  countless  other  tropical  and  local 
products  which  her  industrial  development  necessi 
tates.  She  wants  sea  power,  if  not  enough  to  over 
whelm  her  rivals,  at  least  enough  to  deter  them  from 
trying  to  overwhelm  her  or  close  the  sea  routes 
against  her.  And  partly  because  pretty  much  all  the 
available  colonies  have  been  appropriated,  and  partly 
because  her  situation  surrounded  by  powerful  nations 
is  so  different  from  that  of  England,  she  wants  more 
room  near  home,  a  consideration  strongly  emphasized 


284    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

by  her  need  of  better  access  to  the  sea.  Her  natural 
sea  coast  on  the  north  and  all  her  best  harbours  are 
shorn  away  by  two  helpless  little  nations,  peopled 
with  her  own  kinsmen  and  maintained  by  her  rivals 
for  no  other  purpose  than  to  keep  her  at  a  safe  dis 
tance.  To  the  south,  where  she  justly  foresees  a  vast 
future  development,  she  has  no  outlet  in  her  own 
right,  and  even  her  ally  is  but  meagrely  provided. 
The  Adriatic,  the  ^Egean,  the  Black  Sea,  and  the 
Persian  Gulf,  each  giving  access  to  vast  commercial 
areas,  are  the  natural  outlets  of  the  great  industrial 
region  of  Central  Europe,  of  which  in  turn  Germany 
is  the  natural  dominant  element.  To  extend  her  con 
trol,  not  necessarily  by  direct  annexation,  but  by  alli 
ance,  industrial  penetration,  and  paramount  influence 
of  one  sort  or  another,  until  she  touches  the  English 
Channel,  reaches  down  and  grasps  the  mouth  of  the 
Adriatic,  plants  herself  firmly  on  the  ^Egean,  the 
Black  Sea,  and  the  Persian  Gulf,  and  controls  the 
Dardanelles,  may  seem  a  preposterous  program,  but 
Germany  is  convinced  that  nothing  less  than  this  will 
give  her  real  independence.  Whatever  part  of  this 
program  she  omits  will  be  only  so  much  added  to  the 
program  of  rivals  who  may  or  may  not  be  consider 
ate,  but  who  in  any  case  will  control.  The  hated  de 
pendence  will  remain,  and  the  great  border  strong 
holds  built  by  nature,  being  in  the  hands  of  her  rivals, 
they  will  tighten  the  cordon  about  her  and  close  its 
few  remaining  gaps  whenever  she  refuses  to  meet 
their  demands. 

This,  therefore,  is  the  central  and  vital  part  of 
Germany's  vast  program;  a  greater  Germany  stretch- 


GERMANY,  THE  STORM  CENTRE     285 

ing  from  Antwerp  to  Avlona,  to  Salonica,  to  the 
Persian  Gulf,  to  Odessa  and  Warsaw.  But  it  is  only 
the  central  part.  Around  this  vast  centre  is  to  be 
formed  a  wide  penumbra  of  tropical  and  other  col 
onies,  producers  of  food  and  materials,  commensur 
ate  with  the  great  centre  which  they  are  to  serve. 
This  secondary  but  larger  part  of  the  program  in 
which  we  are  plainly  more  immediately  interested, 
and  which  for  that  reason  we  must  reserve  for  special 
consideration,  is  quite  as  necessary  as  the  other  to 
that  economic  self-sufficiency  which  Germany  seeks. 
An  imperial  program,  truly,  but  one  about  which 
German  statesmen  seem  to  differ  only  as  to  which 
part  it  is  better  to  realize  first.  All  unite  in  the 
belief  that  Germany,  by  a  prompt  and  colossal  effort 
at  expansion,  should  avert  the  calamity  of  economic 
dependence  and  insignificance. 

But  economic  dependence  is  not  the  only  or  the 
greatest  danger  that  Germany  fears.  There  is  an 
other  which,  though  remote,  is  really  more  serious 
and  probably  exercises  more  influence  over  the  minds, 
—  or  let  us  say,  the  instincts, —  of  the  German  peo 
ple.  This  is  the  danger  of  being  reduced  to  relative 
impotence,  not  only  politically,  but  culturally  (a  far 
more  important  consideration)  by  the  sheer  immen 
sity  of  neighbouring  races.  The  obvious  menace  is 
from  Russia,  but  the  more  serious  menace  is  from 
the  Anglo-Saxon.  Not  a  military  menace.  It  can  not 
be  too  strongly  insisted  that  Germany  has  never  been, 
and  in  all  probability  would  never  have  been,  in  dan 
ger  of  attack  from  Great  Britain.  Her  claim  that 
she  was  so  threatened  before  the  outbreak  of  the  pres- 


286     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

ent  war,  has  been  rejected  by  the  entire  world.  If 
the  two  powers  are  now  at  war,  it  is  because  Germany 
willed  it  so.  But  it  is  equally  true  that  the  terms  of 
that  peace  which  Britain  sought  only  to  maintain, 
were  terms  which  insured  the  ultimate  subordination 
of  Germany,  and  the  certainty  that  her  civilization 
would  play  a  lessening  part  in  shaping  the  destiny 
of  mankind. 

There  is  a  well  established  tendency  of  culture  to 
follow  the  lead  of  the  majority.  Quality  may  offset 
quantity  within  certain  limits,  but  quantity  counts  and 
counts  enormously.  So  also  superior  power,  military, 
political,  economic.  These  impose  upon  the  minds  of 
men  and  win  their  suffrages.  Big  nations  take  the 
lead  of  little  nations,  big  cities  of  little  cities,  and 
dominant  political  elements  of  subordinate  political 
elements,  not  only  in  diplomacy  and  war,  but  in  the 
subtler  realm  of  the  spirit.  Thus  parvenu  Rome 
overshadowed  incomparable  Athens,  and  left  the  in 
ferior  Roman  culture  as  the  chief  legacy  of  the  an 
cient  to  the  modern  world.  So  the  finer  earlier  cul 
ture  of  southern  France  yielded  to  the  political  suprem 
acy  of  Paris  and  the  cruder  north.  And  so  the  su 
perior  culture  of  southern  Germany  is  yielding  to  the 
political  supremacy  of  Prussia  and  Berlin.  There 
are  many  reasons  for  this,  some  of  them  subtle  and 
elusive,  but  others  mere  questions  of  practical  con 
venience.  The  matter  of  language  is  an  illustration. 
Who  takes  the  trouble  to  learn  Dutch?  It  is  not 
that  the  language  or  the  literature  of  Holland  are 
inferior  (nobody  takes  the  trouble  to  inquire  about 


GERMANY,  THE  STORM  CENTRE     287 

that)  but  that  it  is  so  much  easier  for  a  few  Dutch 
men  to  learn  English  than  for  many  Englishmen  to 
learn  Dutch.  So  the  matter  adjusts  itself  quite  auto 
matically.  Every  educated  Dutchman  speaks  Eng 
lish,  but  almost  never  does  an  Englishman  speak 
Dutch.  The  Dutch  language  thus  slinks  more  and 
more  into  the  background  and  tends  to  disappear, 
taking  with  it  literature,  folk  lore  and  much  else, 
the  very  soul  of  the  nation's  culture.  So  the  Ger 
man  language,  highly  developed  as  it  is  and  en 
trenched  behind  a  magnificent  literature,  serves  the 
German  only  for  home  purposes.  There  is  scarce 
a  community  outside  of  little  Germany  where  the  Ger 
man  can  use  his  own  language,  while  he  can  use  Eng 
lish  over  half  the  world.  The  German  merchant  in 
Shanghai  or  Yokohama  finds  English  as  indispensable 
as  in  London  or  New  York. 

Conceding,  therefore,  that  Britain  will  never  attack 
Germany,  conceding  even  the  far  more  doubtful  prop 
osition  that  Russia  will  never  attack  her, —  a  policy 
to  which  no  friendliness  of  present  government  or 
present  people  can  pledge  its  successors, —  Germany 
still  has  reason  to  fear.  The  domain  of  the  Russian 
culture  is  thirty-five  times  as  large  as  Germany,  that 
of  the  Anglo-Saxon  culture  sixty  times  as  large. 
Making  all  allowances  for  quality  and  imperfect  as 
similation,  the  disparity  is  enormous.  When  there 
are  ten  Russians  to  one  German,  as  there  seemingly 
soon  will  be,  when  the  Anglo-Saxon  race,  thoroughly 
united  in  its  culture  at  least,  and  with  the  most  strate 
gic  of  all  situations,  also  outnumbers  the  German 


288     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

many  fold  and  imposes  its  language  and  its  ways  upon 
the  commercial  world,  men  will  not  take  their  cue 
from  Berlin. 

Who  cares? 

Germany  cares, —  cares  for  this  most  of  all.  It 
is  what  all  peoples  care  for,  what  only  the  would-be 
idealist  forgets.  Mere  abstract  considerations  of 
material  well-being  appeal  to  men  very  little.  Prof 
fer  them  wealth,  comfort,  and  power,  but  in  un 
familiar  forms,  forms  which  do  not  bear  the  hall 
mark  of  their  race,  and  you  will  tempt  them  but  little. 
When  old  Wulf,  the  Gothic  chieftain,  was  doffing  his 
bearskin  preparatory  to  being  baptized  into  the  faith 
that  promised  so  much,  he  asked  the  priest  where  his 
ancestors  were.  The  priest,  with  the  untroubled  posi- 
tiveness  of  the  earlier  day,  replied  "  In  hell,"  where 
upon  Wulf  replaced  his  bearskin,  saying  that  he  would 
"  stay  with  his  own  folks."  There  is  no  hell  like  not 
being  with  our  own  folks.  So  all  men  reason,  and 
Wulf's  German  descendants  most  of  all.  Doubtless 
few  Germans  have  reasoned  the  thing  out  in  this  way, 
or  in  any  way,  but  race  instinct  is  busy  in  them  all, 
and  race  instinct  means  that,  just  that.  Germany 
must  become  big.  It  might  do  to  be  little  somewhere 
else  in  the  world,  but  not  between  the  Saxon  and  the 
Slav.  That  is  what  the  Germans  are  saying.  Not 
a  few  of  them  see  it;  all  of  them  feel  it. 

This,  then,  is  Germany's  program  and  the  world's 
problem,  Greater  Germany.  It  is  a  perfectly  natural 
program,  the  protest  of  a  virile  race  against  the 
stealthy  encroachments  of  races  more  favourably  situ 
ated  and  more  amply  domained.  The  fact  that  it 


GERMANY,  THE  STORM  CENTRE     289 

menaces  our  existence  and  compels  us  to  the  most 
strenuous  exertion  in  self  'defence,  should  not  blind  us 
to  its  essentially  normal  character  and  to  the  per 
manence  of  the  instincts  and  the  interests  which  it  rep 
resents.  It  rather  emphasizes  the  necessity  for  their 
full  recognition. 

But  with  all  its  essential  naturalness,  there  is  an  un 
canny  consciousness  about  this  plan  of  Greater  Ger 
many  as  it  lies  in  the  mind  of  the  German  people. 
No  great  people  ever  before  thought  its  thoughts  out 
loud  as  the  German  people  have  been  doing.  Other 
empires  grow,  but  the  Germans  are  building  theirs. 
The  British  Empire  has  been  aptly  described  as  "  a 
series  of  inadvertences."  Not  so  the  German. 
Everything  is  foreseen,  calculated  and  decreed,  not 
by  an  Alexander  or  a  Napoleon,  but  by  the  collective 
intellect  of  a  great  people.  Nor  was  ever  a  plan  of 
such  magnitude  discussed  so  openly  or  so  frankly 
avowed.  This  has  given  to  German  action  a  deliber- 
ateness  and  a  thoroughness  of  preparation  for  which 
history  offers  no  parallel.  Whether  it  increases  the 
chance  of  success  remains  to  be  seen,  but  it  certainly 
increases  the  redoubtableness  of  the  undertaking. 

This  redoubtableness  is  further  increased  by  the 
fact  that  the  undertaking  does  not  naturally  lend  it 
self  to  compromises  or  half  measures.  If  there  is 
to  be  a  Greater  Germany,  there  is  no  very  natural 
stopping  place  till  it  stretches  from  the  northern  to 
the  southern  seas,  and  from  the  Black  Sea  on  the  east 
to  the  Adriatic  on  the  west.  To  almost  reach  these 
limits  would  not  almost  accomplish  Germany's  pur 
pose,  but  would  spell  essential  failure.  We  must 


290     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

expect  that  these  limits  will  be  sought  with  corre 
sponding  zeal.  How  many  colonies  and  tropical  de 
pendencies  will  be  required  to  supply  such  an  indus 
trial  centre,  no  man  can  say.  We  shall  not  go  far 
wrong  if  we  assume  that  on  this  point  the  German 
people  are  in  an  attitude  of  unlimited  receptivity. 

The  circumstances  of  the  moment  perhaps  warrant 
a  word  of  caution  against  an  easy  misunderstanding. 
We  are  at  war  with  Germany.  It  is  the  time  hon 
oured  custom  of  all  peoples  to  disparage  and  vilify 
those  with  whom  they  are  compelled  to  fight,  a  pro 
cedure  for  which  the  acts  of  Germany  in  the  present 
war  furnish  additional  incentive.  There  is  some 
thing  to  be  said  for  it.  To  hate  a  man  helps  you  to 
hit  him.  At  a  time  when  everything  is  viewed  from 
the  standpoint  of  war  necessity,  a  dispassionate  state 
ment  of  Germany's  case  may  seem  an  unpatriotic  act, 
giving  aid  and  comfort  to  the  enemy.  Possibly  some 
who  thus  reason  may  think  the  writer  "  pro-German. " 
In  the  interest  of  their  farther  patient  attention,  he 
begs  to  disabuse  them.  None  can  feel  more  strongly 
than  he  the  seriousness  of  the  German  menace  or  the 
necessity  of  resisting  it  by  force.  In  all  this  his  sym 
pathies  are  as  pronounced  as  his  convictions. 

But  it  may  be  doubted  whether  the  popular  patriot 
ism  above  referred  to  will  altogether  meet  the  require 
ments  of  a  struggle  so  fundamental  and  so  long  con 
tinued  as  this  is  likely  to  prove.  There  is  need  of 
much  careful  observation  and  cool  calculation  in  deal 
ing  with  such  an  enemy.  The  present  inquiry  is  in 
the  nature  of  a  reconnaissance  of  the  enemy's  posi 
tion.  It  is  courting  disaster  to  attack  him  with  fury 


GERMANY,  THE  STORM  CENTRE     291 

without  knowing  where  his  strong  positions  are  lo 
cated.  It  is  just  because  we  are  not  Germans  and  can 
not  by  any  possibility  find  our  salvation  in  Germany's 
triumph,  that  it  behooves  us  to  know  what  Germany 
is  planning  and  what  are  the  permanent  instincts  and 
interests  that  are  likely  to  give  persistence  to  her  pur 
pose.  Not  until  we  perceive  the  reality  of  German 
need  shall  we  be  prepared  for  the  terrible  intensity  of 
German  endeavour. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

THE    STORM   AREA 

THE  central  feature  of  the  program  of  Greater 
Germany,  the  consolidation  of  Middle  Europe  under 
German  control  and  its  extension  through  Asia  to 
the  Persian  Gulf,  has  been  sufficiently  outlined.  It 
remains  for  us  to  consider  the  program  of  outlying 
dependencies  or  colonies  which  may  seem  at  first 
sight  to  concern  us  more  intimately,  as  it  is  liable  to 
bring  Germany  nearer  to  our  borders.  Whether  we 
are  in  fact  more  concerned  with  this  outlying  portion 
of  the  plan  than  with  its  central  features  remains  to 
be  seen.  Meanwhile  we  must  locate  German  colonial 
ambitions  as  definitely  as  possible.  Fortunately  we 
are  not  left  to  speculation  in  these  matters.  The 
fields  of  practicable  colonial  enterprise  are  few,  and 
conflicting  interests  are  easily  recognized.  There  is 
no  vague  unknown  left  in  the  world  to  embarrass  us 
in  reaching  a  conclusion.  Moreover  we  are  not  com 
pelled  to  speculate  as  to  Germany's  intentions.  Rep 
resentative  publications,  official  utterances,  and  overt 
acts  have  clearly  revealed  the  German  attitude.  Dif 
ferences  of  opinion  of  course  exist  in  Germany  as  else 
where,  but  Germany  has  left  us  in  no  doubt  as  to 
which  opinion  is  dominant.  The  war  has  also 
cleared  the  situation.  Diplomatic  denials  and  dis 
guises  still  abound,  but  they  no  longer  deceive. 

292 


THE  STORM  AREA  293 

Oceanica  early  attracted  German  attention.  Most 
of  these  islands,  and  in  particular,  those  best  suited 
to  whites,  had  been  appropriated  by  other  colonizing 
powers,  but  a  certain  number  remained  in  which  Ger 
many,  at  last  awakened  to  the  importance  of  overseas 
possessions,  saw  possibilities.  A  number  of  these 
clusters  of  coral  islands, —  the  Solomon  Islands,  the 
Bismarck  Archipelago,  the  Caroline  Islands,  and  the 
Marshall  Islands,  and  a  part  of  the  large  island  of 
New  Guinea,  were  hastily  annexed  in  1884-5,  while 
the  major  part  of  the  Samoan  Group  was  acquired  in 
1899  by  the  same  treaty  which  gave  the  minor  island 
and  the  chief  harbour  to  the  United  States.  All  these 
island  possessions  were  seized  at  the  outbreak  of  the 
present  war  and  assigned  to  Australia  or  Japan,  thus 
incidentally  relieving  us  of  a  neighbour  in  Samoa 
whom  recent  developments  might  have  made  uncon 
genial.  It  remains  to  be  seen  whether  the  present 
disposition  of  the  islands  is  confirmed  by  the  outcome 
of  the  war. 

But  it  was  lean  picking  at  best  which  remained  in 
this  part  of  the  world  for  a  nation  that  began  in  1884. 
Germany's  hopes  in  this  quarter  are  built  on  some 
thing  very  different  from  the  left-overs  of  that  date. 
Next  to  Britain  whose  continental  possessions  in  Aus 
tralia  and  New  Zealand  easily  give  her  the  first  place, 
the  great  power  in  Oceanica  is  Holland.  Her  great 
islands  of  Java  and  Sumatra  are  among  the  most 
valuable  tropical  possessions  in  the  world,  and  they 
have  the  farther  great  value  that  they  control  the 
vitally  important  passages  to  the  Far  East  as  com 
pletely  as  do  Gibraltar  or  Suez.  Germany  has  no 


294     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

thought  of  disturbing  Holland  in  her  possession  of 
these  splendid  dependencies.  On  the  contrary  she 
would  be  quick  to  protect  Holland  against  any  other 
power  that  might  menace  her  control.  The  reason 
is  that  Germany  looks  forward  to  the  ultimate  inclu 
sion  of  Holland  in  the  German  Empire,  in  which  case 
Germany  would  automatically  acquire  these  vast  colo 
nial  possessions.  This  was  bluntly  urged  by  Hein- 
rich  von  Treitschke,  the  most  influential  of  all  German 
writers  on  these  subjects.  "  Why  all  this  talk  of 
building  a  colonial  empire?  Why  not  take  Holland 
and  get  one  all  ready  built?"  Holland,  of  course, 
looks  forward  with  very  different  sentiments  to  this 
possibility,  and  counts  upon  the  support  of  Britain, 
who  would  be  doubly  menaced  by  such  a  union,  to  op 
pose  it  by  every  means  in  her  power.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  is  impossible  not  to  recognize  a  certain  rea 
sonableness  in  Germany's  ambition.  The  separation 
of  the  Low  Countries  from  Germany,  containing,  as 
they  do,  most  of  her  natural  seacoast  and  all  her  best 
harbours,  and  peopled  as  they  are  with  a  race  es 
sentially  German,  is  one  of  the  most  obvious  hard 
ships  in  the  present  political  arrangement  of  the 
world,  while  the  great  tropical  possessions  of  Hol 
land  are  far  better  suited  to  the  needs  of  German  than 
of  Dutch  industry.  What  a  pity  that  Germany's 
temper  is  such  as  to  utterly  alienate  her  kinsfolk,  and 
that  her  ambitions  are  so  inordinate  that  she  can  not 
be  trusted  with  reasonable  access  to  the  world !  Ger 
many  should  not  have  Holland  and  Belgium  so  long 
as  she  makes  them  hate  her,  and  as  long  as  she  cher 
ishes  ambitions  which  deliberately  contemplate  the 


THE  STORM  AREA  295 

ruin  of  the  world's  greatest  peoples  the  world  must 
barricade  her  own  house  against  her. 

Next  in  availability  and  perhaps  even  greater  in 
importance  as  a  field  of  exploitation  is  Africa.  Here 
in  1884  Germany  seized  nearly  a  million  square  miles 
of  territory,  possession  of  which  she  confirmed  dur 
ing  the  next  six  years.  These  possessions  were  some 
what  extended  in  1911,  especially  by  access  to  navi 
gable  waters,  as  the  result  of  the  protracted  contro 
versy  over  Morocco,  and  very  large  projects  of  link 
ing  up  East  and  West  Africa  were  at  one  time  enter 
tained.  These  plans  were  thwarted  by  the  extension 
of  the  British  possessions  in  South  Africa  up  through 
the  centre  of  the  continent,  thus  separating  German 
East  Africa  from  the  German  colonies  of  South  West 
Africa  and  the  Kamerun  on  the  West  Coast.  One  of 
the  conditions  of  peace  suggested  not  long  since  by  a 
conservative  German  of  the  highest  authority,  who 
was  willing  to  surrender  pretty  much  everything  else 
in  the  German  program,  was  the  transfer  to  Germany 
of  a  strip  of  the  Belgian  Congo  which  should  link  to 
gether  German  East  and  West  Africa.  There  can 
be  no  question  that  the  project  of  annexing  Belgium, 
so  tenaciously  urged  by  the  leaders  of  German  im 
perialism,  was  motived  quite  as  much  by  the  desire  for 
the  vast  Belgian  Congo  as  by  the  need  of  a  port  at 
Antwerp  and  a  fortress  at  Liege. 

The  division  of  Africa  among  the  great  powers 
has  been  perhaps  the  most  fruitful  source  of  friction 
in  the  whole  range  of  recent  colonial  enterprise. 
The  various  foreign  colonies  began  as  small  trading 
posts  in  some  one  of  the  protected  landing  places  or 


296     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

at  the  mouth  of  some  river  which  offered  access  to 
the  interior.  From  these  points  they  were  gradu 
ally  extended  by  exploration  and  the  development  of 
trade  until  they  came  into  touch  with  one  another 
or  crossed  one  another's  routes.  Friction  was  the 
almost  invariable  result.  Gradually  these  disputes 
have  been  settled  and  boundaries  have  become  defi 
nite,  but  the  division  is  utterly  fortuitous  and  sets  at 
defiance  all  the  requirements  of  administrative  and 
economic  convenience.  The  different  powers  have 
sandwiched  their  colonies  in  between  one  another  in 
a  way  that  now  blocks  railway  development  and  the 
systematic  organization  of  the  country.  Consolida 
tion  through  exchange  or  some  sort  of  redistribution 
has  long  been  a  recognized  need,  but  international 
jealousies  and  mutually  excluding  ambitions  have 
rendered  it  impossible.  At  the  time  of  writing, 
all  the  German  colonies  have  been  seized  by  Britain 
and  France.  If  this  seizure  is  confirmed,  the  re 
sult  may  be  as  momentous  for  Africa  as  for  the 
European  states  concerned.  The  exclusion  of  Ger 
many  from  tropical  Africa,  unless  compensated  in 
other  quarters,  would  have  incalculable  consequences 
for  Germany,  for  it  is  here  that  she  has  seen  the 
best  prospect  of  realizing  her  colonial  ambitions. 
Holland  may  come  sometime  and  perhaps  colonies 
elsewhere,  but  for  the  immediate  future,  Africa  was 
the  one  hopeful  prospect.  The  first  statement  of 
possible  peace  terms  to  come  from  a  German  official 
put  in  the  forefront  the  necessity  of  a  large  and  uni 
fied  Germany  territory  in  tropical  Africa. 

Quite  distinct  from  the  field  we  have  been  consid- 


THE  STORM  AREA  297 

ering  is  northern  Africa,  a  comparatively  narrow 
coastland  along  the  southern  littoral  of  the  Mediter 
ranean  which,  though  in  the  same  continent  as  the 
region  just  described,  is  separated  from  it  by  the 
Sahara  Desert,  a  barrier  more  impassable  than  any 
ocean,  while  its  climatic  and  strategic  character  puts 
it  in  quite  a  different  category.  Northern  Africa  has 
valuable  resources  which  appeal  to  German  enter 
prise.  It  is  situated  on  the  great  highway  of  the 
world,  strategic  alike  for  commerce  and  for  war. 
Above  all  it  is  a  land  in  which  white  men  can  live, 
perhaps  the  only  one  in  the  colonial  market  in  which 
there  is  a  reasonable  chance  that  the  people  of  a  pos 
sessing  race  could  establi3h  themselves  as  the  domi 
nant  element  in  the  population.  Nowhere  in  the 
world  has  Germany  scanned  the  possibilities  of  colo 
nial  establishment  more  anxiously  than  here.  Un 
fortunately  she  came  too  late.  Algeria  went  to 
France  in  1827,  long  before  the  German  Empire 
existed.  France  acquired  Tunis  in  1881  and  Britain 
occupied  Egypt  in  1882.  Germany's  colonial  policy 
had  not  yet  begun.  The  seizure  of  Tripoli  by  Italy 
in  1911  was  undoubtedly  motived  in  part  by  fear  of 
German  aggression  in  this  quarter,  while  the  final 
establishment  of  a  French  protectorate  in  Morocco 
closed  a  prolonged  diplomatic  controversy  in  which 
Germany  exhausted  every  resource  to  secure  a  foot 
hold  in  this  most  coveted  part  of  northern  Africa. 
Her  failure  in  this  struggle  was  beyond  doubt  the 
precipitating  cause  of  the  present  war,  for  it  con 
vinced  her  that  nothing  but  the  crushing  of  her  rivals 
would  secure  the  necessary  opportunity.  But  Mor- 


298     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

occo  commanded  Gibraltar  and  so  might  cut  the 
British  Empire  in  two.  It  must  not  be  in  the  hands 
of  a  probable  enemy. 

Ever  since  the  British  occupied  India,  thus  securing 
for  themselves  a  dominant  position  not  only  in  the 
Far  East  but  in  the  world,  the  ambition  of  all  colonial 
powers  has  been  to  find  another  India.  The  choice 
has  never  been  difficult,  for  there  is  but  one  other 
country  comparable  to  India  in  size,  density  of  popu 
lation,  and  natural  resources.  China  has  about  the 
same  area  as  India.  Its  population  is  generally  sup 
posed  to  be  greater.  Its  resources  are  far  superior. 
As  the  impotence  of  China  became  increasingly  ap 
parent  during  the  nineteenth  century,  she  became  the 
object  of  jealous  solicitude  on  the  part  of  the  coloniz 
ing  powers  of  Europe,  who  encamped  around  her 
borders  as  anxious  heirs  wait  round  the  bedside  of  a 
departing  relative.  Britain,  as  the  first  comer,  nat 
urally  had  the  best  location.  Depending  as  always 
upon  her  navy,  she  had  her  great  station  at  Hong 
Kong,  at  the  convenient  southeast  corner  where  the 
population  and  the  trade  of  China  focus  in  the  great 
city  of  Canton.  Hong  Kong  which  is  both  chief 
arsenal  and  chief  commercial  port,  a  marvel  of  natu 
ral  defence,  was  the  key  to  the  situation,  while  the 
great  cities  of  Shanghai  at  the  mouth  of  the  Yangtse 
and  Tientsin  in  the  Gulf  of  Pechili,  both  open  to  the 
trade  of  all  nations  but  essentially  under  the  commer 
cial  control  of  Britain,  commanded  the  trade  of  cen 
tral  and  northern  China  respectively. 

France,  as  we  have  seen,  seized  Tongking  farther 
south  than  Hong  Kong,  acquiring  —  not  a  fortress 


THE  STORM  AREA  299 

and  commercial  harbour  as  Britain  had  done, —  but 
a  vast  colony,  which  however  was  intended  primarily 
as  the  base  for  an  advance  into  southern  China.  She 
too  had  her  "  concessions  "  in  Shanghai,  Tientsin, 
and  elsewhere,  though  the  commercial  results  have 
been  less  satisfactory  than  in  the  case  of  the  British. 

With  the  sudden  awakening  of  Germany  to  the 
importance  of  colonies  and  foreign  trade,  attention 
turned  promptly  to  the  Far  East.  German  pro 
cedure  was  characteristically  systematic  and  methodi 
cal  in  contrast  with  the  fortuitous  policy  of  Britain 
whose  government  action  has  always  followed  in  the 
wake  of  private  enterprise.  There  was  little  or  no 
German  commerce,  but  it  was  determined  that  there 
should  be,  and  to  this  end  a  strong  station  and  sub 
sidized  shipping  lines  were  deemed  essential.  Gov 
ernment  agents  were  sent  out  to  study  the  situation. 
One  reported  favourably  on  the  island  of  Yezo 
(northern  Japan)  as  well  suited  to  Germany's  pur 
pose  and  obtainable  "  by  purchase  or  otherwise." 
It  was  finally  decided,  however,  that  a  position  in 
northern  China  near  the  all  important  Gulf  of  Pechili 
was  most  desirable,  and  China  was  forced  in  1897 
to  yield  a  commanding  position  on  the  peninsula  of 
Shantung  with  valuable  mining  and  railway  conces 
sions  as  penalty  for  the  killing  of  two  German  mis 
sionaries  belonging  to  an  order  that  Germany  had  ex 
pelled.  Too  much  attention  should  not  be  given  to 
this  circumstance.  Germany  certainly  did  little  at 
this  time  to  sugar-coat  the  pill,  but  the  pill  was  not 
essentially  different  from  that  which  other  nations 
had  compelled  China  to  swallow. 


3oo     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

The  choice  of  northern  China  as  headquarters  of 
German  influence,  though  inferior  in  some  respects 
to  Britain's  position  in  the  south,  had  its  advantages. 
It  was  an  advantage  to  be  at  the  opposite  end  from 
Britain  in  the  event  of  a  division.  It  would  then  be 
possible  to  claim  a  large  domain  in  northern  China 
with  less  risk  of  British  opposition,  especially  if  Ger 
man  commercial  effort  were  concentrated  on  this  field 
in  the  meantime.  It  is  noteworthy  that  Germany  has 
acquired  a  large  concession  in  Tientsin,  the  trade 
metropolis  of  northern  China,  but  that  in  the  treaty 
ports  farther  south  she  is  less  in  evidence.  The  Ger 
man  was  everywhere,  but  official  emphasis  was  laid 
upon  German  enterprise  in  the  north. 

There  was  a  further  reason  for  this  location. 
The  capital  of  China  is  located  in  the  north,  and  the 
presence  of  Germany  in  the  north  could  not  but  exert 
a  powerful  pressure  upon  the  Chinese  government. 
This  expectation  was  promptly  realized.  German 
influence  became  noticeably  paramount  in  the  years 
immediately  following  the  occupation  of  Kiaochow. 

One  disadvantage  of  the  location  was  not  realized, 
or  was  at  least  underestimated  at  the  time  by  Ger 
many.  The  establishment  in  the  nearby  Shantung 
Peninsula  of  a  strong  post  by  a  great  military  and 
naval  power  aroused  the  fear  and  the  hostility  of 
Japan,  a  country  until  that  time  in  close  sympathy 
with  Germany.  That  Japan  could  be  a  rival  of  Ger 
many  hardly  seemed  likely  in  1897,  least  of  all  that 
she  could  ever  be  a  dangerous  rival.  Yet  Germany 
had  united  with  Russia  to  force  Japan  out  of  Port 
Arthur,  thus  robbing  her  of  the  fruits  of  her  recent 


THE  STORM  AREA  301 

victory  over  China.  In  a  word,  these  two  mighty 
powers  had  bidden  Japan  not  to  take  herself  quite 
so  seriously,  and  in  particular,  not  to  get  in  the  way  of 
her  betters.  Japan  has  at  least  one  attribute  of  true 
greatness.  She  knows  how  to  take  rebuffs  and  bide 
her  time,  a  subject  upon  which  it  behooves  us  to  re 
flect. 

Once  established  in  Shantung,  Germany's  policy  de 
veloped  rapidly.  It  suited  her  purpose  for  a  time  to 
enter  into  an  agreement  with  Britain  and  France  by 
which  the  three  natural  divisions  of  China  as  deter 
mined  by  the  great  river  valleys,  were  recognized  as 
"  spheres  of  influence  "  of  the  three  powers.  The 
south  fell  to  France,  the  great  Yangtse  valley,  cen 
tral  China,  fell  to  Britain,  and  northern  China  to 
Germany.  Commerce  was  of  course  free  to  all,  but 
railway  and  mining  concessions  and  in  general  those 
major  enterprises  which  do  not  admit  of  duplication 
and  which  imply  the  backing  of  a  whole  nation,  were 
to  be  recognized  as  perquisites  of  the  powers  as 
stated.  But  this  policy  was  abandoned  almost  as 
soon  as  started,  and  Germany  embarked  upon  a  policy 
of  incontinent  commercial  conquest  of  the  entire  East. 
How  far  private  enterprise  was  backed  by  gov 
ernment  subsidy  or  other  aid,  and  how  far  it  was  a 
preliminary  to  other  and  more  serious  designs  we 
shall  probably  never  know.  Both  beliefs  were  widely 
entertained  before  the  war  and  subsequent  experiences 
have  gone  far  to  confirm  them. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  present  war,  Germany  was 
summarily  ejected  from  Kiaochow  by  Japan  who,  for 
the  present  at  least,  usurps  her  place.  The  total  in- 


302     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

terruption  of  German  communications  and  the  pro 
hibition  by  the  Allies  of  trade  with  enemy  subjects  has 
dealt  a  staggering  blow  to  German  commercial  in 
terests.  If  the  much  discussed  participation  of  China 
in  the  war  should  become  a  substantial  fact,  China 
could  seriously  injure  her  great  antagonist  in  at  least 
one  way,  the  cancellation  of  her  railway  and  mining 
concessions  and  an  embargo  upon  her  trade  and  bank 
ing.  Thus  would  be  effected  the  complete  expulsion 
of  Germany  from  the  Far  East. 

There  remains  the  American  continent.  North 
America  offers  little  opportunity,  being  occupied  by 
powers  whose  subordination  is  not  at  present  to  be 
attempted.  Still,  North  America  has  not  been  neg 
lected.  Immense  numbers  of  Germans  have  come  to 
the  United  States,  lost  to  Germany  at  first,  but  for 
the  last  twenty  or  thirty  years,  watched  with  assiduous 
care  by  the  mother  country.  Much  more  than  any 
other  nation,  Germany  has  adopted  the  new  policy 
of  retaining  the  emigrant  by  organization  and  propa 
ganda.  This  war  has  been  a  revelation  of  the  extent 
to  which  this  policy  has  been  carried  and  of  the  re 
sults  attained,  results  astonishing  to  us,  though  dis^ 
appointing  to  Germany.  If  this  war  accomplishes 
nothing  else,  it  is  much  to  be  hoped  that  it  will  brand 
as  an  unfriendly  act  the  effort  of  any  nation  to  main 
tain  its  own  organized  nationality  within  the  confines 
of  another  state.  Such  an  organization,  in  itself  po 
tential  sedition,  becomes,  when  supplemented  by  the 
incredible  espionage  of  Germany,  a  permanent  in 
vasion  of  neighbour  states. 

But  it  is  in  Latin  America  that  Germany  sees  her 


THE  STORM  AREA  303 

opportunity.  In  this  area  two  or  three  times  the  size 
of  Europe  and  twenty  to  thirty  times  the  size  of 
Germany  not  a  single  powerful  state  has  developed. 
It  contains  the  largest  bulk  of  tropical  land  in  the 
world  except  one,  territories  capable  of  producing 
everything  grown  in  the  tropics  in  almost  limitless 
quantities.  The  valley  of  the  Amazon  alone  is  said 
to  be  capable  of  feeding  the  entire  present  population 
of  the  globe.  It  contains  white  man's  land  enough 
for  half  a  dozen  Germanys,  not  only  the  temperate 
regions  of  Argentina  and  Chile,  but  the  plateaux  in  a 
large  part  of  Brazil  and  other  tropical  regions. 
Finally  it  controls  the  second  most  valuable, —  per 
haps  ultimately  the  most  valuable, —  trade  route 
in  the  world,  Panama.  It  would  indeed  be 
strange  if  Germany  had  not  thought  of  these  possi 
bilities. 

Americans  have  been  loath  to  believe  in  the  exist 
ence  of  German  designs  upon  this  hemisphere,  partly 
because  of  our  habitual  over-confidence  which  has  led 
us  to  overlook  or  misconstrue  Germany's  inconspicu 
ous  efforts  here.  We  have  assumed  quite  too  readily 
that  our  Monroe  Doctrine  has  deterred  Germany 
from  making  any  attempt  to  acquire  a  foothold  in 
America.  There  is  no  warrant  for  such  an  assump 
tion.  Germany  has  not  been  deterred  by  any  threat 
or  fear  of  our  opposition.  Bismarck  declared  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  a  piece  of  international  imper 
tinence,  and  German  opinion,  official  and  unofficial, 
has  been  unanimous  in  its  repudiation.  Germany  has 
held  in  abeyance  her  designs  affecting  the  Americas 
because  they  were  of  necessity  late  numbers  on  her 


304     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

program.  A  great  deal  had  to  be  done  before  the 
final  issue  was  joined  in  America.  It  must  be  Greater 
Germany  and  not  little  Germany  which  should  risk 
so  vast  an  undertaking,  and  hence  the  consolidation 
of  middle  Europe  must  first  be  accomplished.  Nor 
could  such  a  venture  be  risked  until  Germany  had  ac 
quired  control  of  the  sea,  for  the  likelihood  that 
Britain  would  oppose  a  move  so  prejudicial  to  her  own 
American  interests  was  one  amounting  to  certainty. 
The  defeat  of  Britain  was  therefore  a  necessary  pre 
liminary.  Finally  it  must  be  a  richer  Germany  that 
could  afford  such  an  undertaking,  and  hence  the  de 
velopment  of  the  industries,  not  only  of  Germany, 
but  of  that  whole  middle  Europe  that  she  counts  on 
making  into  the  Greater  Germany  of  the  future,  must 
first  be  accomplished  if  the  great  penumbra  of  the 
mighty  empire  was  to  be  complete.  It  is  with  these 
huge  preliminaries  that  Germany  is  now  busy.  Her 
industrial  development  has  been  pushed  with  a  fever 
ish  energy  that  knows  no  parallel,  not  merely  by  the 
stimulus  of  private  emulation  but  by  state  pressure 
and  state  aid,  as  an  indispensable  condition  of  the 
state's  aggrandizement.  Even  this  war,  so  huge  as  to 
seem  the  end  of  all  things,  was  begun  and  is  even  now 
regarded  by  Germany  as  a  preparation  for  greater 
things. 

But  Germany  has  not  been  idle  in  America.  It 
was  necessary  to  create  here  the  "  interests  "  that  the 
empire  in  due  season  would  feel  called  upon  to  "  pro 
tect."  So  German  commerce  with  Latin  America  has 
been  stimulated  in  every  possible  manner,  and  Ger 
man  emigration  has  been  skilfully  directed  to  locali- 


THE  STORM  AREA  305 

ties  where  it  could  prosper  and  retain  its  German  char 
acter.  These  localities  have  been  chiefly  Chile  and 
southern  Brazil.  Argentina,  the  most  promising  of 
all,  is  too  large,  too  populous,  and  too  intensely 
Latin,  to  be  readily  influenced  by  German  colonies. 
But  Chile  and  Brazil  both  have  a  hybrid  population 
with  little  power  of  organization  or  vigorous  asser 
tion.  To  these,  therefore,  and  especially  to  the  lat 
ter,  German  emigration  has  been  directed.  Here 
have  grown  up  whole  colonies  numbering  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  Germans  and  controlling  whole  prov 
inces.  German  is  the  language  spoken  and  German 
customs  are  carefully  retained.  Brazilian  citizenship 
has  been  generally  refused. 

What  reason  have  we  to  believe  that  Germany  con 
templates  anything  more  than  legitimate  commerce 
and  emigration?  This  to  begin  with  (not  to  mention 
published  proposals  and  discussions)  that  every  effort 
is  made  to  keep  these  settlers  from  becoming  Brazil 
ian.  When  Germany  encourages  her  people  who  set 
tle  in  foreign  lands  to  cast  in  their  lot  with  the  people 
of  those  lands  and  to  give  to  the  new  land  of  their 
adoption  allegiance  of  both  lip  and  heart,  learning  its 
speech  and  its  ways,  and  identifying  themselves  with 
its  civilization,  then  we  may  assume  that  Germany 
loyally  recognizes  the  integrity  of  these  countries  and 
their  right  to  a  permanent  place  in  the  family  of  na 
tions.  Her  policy  in  Latin  America  has  been  con 
spicuously  the  reverse  of  this,  while  unofficial  utter 
ances,  at  least,  have  been  of  a  nature  to  confirm  the 
most  extreme  conclusions.  Official  disclaimers  made 
at  a  time  when  Germany  was  straining  every  nerve  to 


3o6     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

prevent  our  joining  the  Allies,  will  deceive  none  but 
the  willing. 

As  these  words  are  written,  however,  more  posi 
tive  proof  comes  to  hand.  The  Brazilian  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs  announces  that  the  German  ambas 
sador  to  Argentina  has  urged  his  government  that  the 
time  has  come  to  u  reorganize  "  southern  Brazil  with 
a  view  to  the  realization  of  German  purposes,  a 
charge  substantiated  by  the  publication  by  our  gov 
ernment  of  the  dispatches  of  this  ambassador.  This 
confirms  the  deepening  suspicions  of  recent  years. 

Mention  of  Latin  America  in  this  connection  with 
its  custody  of  the  Panama  Canal,  brings  us  to  another 
phase  of  German  expansion,  and  that  not  the  least 
important,  the  annexation  of  the  sea.  It  is  extremely 
difficult  for  those  who  have  lived  their  lives  on  land 
and  are  unable  to  imagine  a  habitable  earth  without 
terra  firma  under  their  feet,  to  think  of  the  sea  as  a 
territory  which  millions  of  human  beings  can  inhabit 
and  make  yield  them  a  livelihood.  But  this  is  liter 
ally  true,  and  an  expanding  population  in  this  age  finds 
few  better  opportunities  than  to  launch  out  upon  the 
sea,  put  the  world  under  tribute  for  its  carrying  serv 
ice,  tap  the  distance  reservoirs  of  energy  to  which  it 
gives  easy  access,  and  bulwark  land  and  empire  be 
hind  its  redoubtable  defences.  Like  Japan  and  for 
like  reasons,  Germany  long  ago  saw  her  opportunity 
and  expressed  her  decision  in  the  words  of  the  Kaiser: 
"  Our  future  lies  on  the  sea."  We  are  not  here  con 
cerned  with  the  inevitable  conflict  with  Britain  which 
this  policy  of  Greater  Germany  foreshadowed,  though 
that  conflict  is  one  which  must  ultimately  decide  our 


THE  STORM  AREA  307 

own  fate.  But  we  must  remind  ourselves  of  the  oft 
repeated  truth  that  such  a  development  of  maritime 
interests  means  a  corresponding  development  of  naval 
power,  with  its  inevitable  naval  stations  and  its  ambi 
tion  to  control  strategic  waterways.  The  bearing  of 
this  upon  our  problem  of  the  Caribbean  hardly  re 
quires  elaboration.  We  at  present  possess  the  Pan 
ama  Canal  and  a  few  miles  of  adjacent  territory,  but 
the  possession  of  any  defensible  site  on  the  borders 
of  the  Caribbean  would  jeopardize  our  possession  of 
the  Canal  and  might  absolutely  paralyse  its  com 
merce.  With  the  present  status  of  submarine  war 
fare,  it  would  reach  much  farther  and  might  destroy 
all  commerce  on  our  Atlantic  seaboard.  When  we 
recall  Germany's  determined  attempt  to  intervene  in 
Venezuela,  her  former  opposition  to  the  cession  of 
the  Danish  Islands,  her  notification  that  she  would  not 
acquiesce  in  our  intervention  in  Hayti,  and  the  recent 
rumour  of  negotiations  for  a  submarine  base  in  Vene 
zuela,  the  danger  of  German  intervention  in  Carib 
bean  affairs  ceases  to  be  speculative.  Fortunately, 
the  apathy  and  incredulity  of  recent  years  has  begun 
to  disappear,  and  it  now  seems  possible  that  America 
will  safeguard  her  interests  before  it  is  too  late. 

The  danger  to  America  of  a  German  settlement 
south  of  the  equator  is  less  evident,  but  perhaps  not 
less  real.  A  German  colony  in  the  rich  uplands  of 
southern  Brazil  would  inevitably  push  northward, 
precisely  as  an  English  colony  in  New  England 
pushed  westward  till  there  was  no  more  land  to  oc 
cupy.  The  indolent  Brazilian  tropics,  despite  their 
veneer  of  western  civilization,  would  oppose  no  more 


3o8     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

effective  opposition  to  advancing  Germany  than  the 
English  encountered  from  the  followers  of  Massa- 
soit,  while  the  lure  of  their  coveted  products  would 
tempt  eager  industrial  Germany  more  than  the  treas 
ures  of  Peru  tempted  the  covetous  Spaniard.  The 
mastery  of  South  America  by  the  German  would  be 
as  inevitable  as  was  the  mastery  of  North  America 
by  the  Anglo-Saxon. 

The  German  advance,  however,  is  likely  to  take  a 
more  insidious  form.  The  creation  of  an  avowed 
colony  may  be  deemed  inexpedient,  as  likely  to  invite 
opposition.  A  possibly  wiser  policy  may  be  to  ac 
quire  influence  in  Brazil  while  leaving  it  nominally 
independent,  the  policy  which  Britain  has  so  long  suc 
cessfully  maintained  toward  Portugal.  This  in  any 
case  is  one  phase  of  German  policy.  To  this  end, 
large  settlements  of  Germans,  extensive  investments 
of  German  capital,  the  development  of  commerce 
with  Germany,  and  the  financing  of  the  Brazilian  state, 
may  all  be  made  to  contribute.  Few  persons  are 
aware  how  far  this  policy  had  been  advanced  toward 
complete  control  before  the  outbreak  of  the  present 
war.  The  decision  of  Brazil  to  enter  the  conflict  on 
the  side  of  the  Allies  is  for  that  country  a  declaration 
of  independence. 

The  dispassionate  reader  can  hardly  have  read  the 
foregoing  pages  without  the  mental  query:  'Why 
should  Germany  not  finance  Brazil  and  capture  her 
trade?  Why  should  she  not  possess  South  America 
as  the  Anglo-Saxon  controls  North  America?  "  That 
such  control  would  mean  immeasurable  improvement, 
no  one  acquainted  with  present  conditions  in  South 


THE  STORM  AREA  309 

America  can  for  a  moment  doubt.  It  is  the  tragedy 
of  civilization  that  the  Anglo-Saxon  can  not  bid  his 
Teuton  cousin  godspeed  in  so  beneficent  an  under 
taking.  Alas,  the  German  is  not  content  to  control 
South  America,  and  such  control  attained  or  even 
begun,  could  not  fail  to  precipitate  a  struggle  be 
tween  these  two  virile  peoples  which  could  end  only 
with  the  destruction  of  one  or  the  other.  The  Anglo- 
Saxon  is  hardly  ready, —  can  hardly  be  expected, — 
to  give  the  Teuton  a  place  in  the  sun  at  the  expense 
of  himself  retiring  into  the  shade.  In  the  interest  of 
Teuton  and  Saxon  alike,  this  internecine  struggle 
should  be  avoided.  In  due  time  the  writer  will  ven 
ture  a  suggestion  as  to  the  possibility  of  a  happier 
outcome.  For  the  moment  there  can  be  for  the 
Anglo-Saxon  but  one  duty,  to  resist  unsparingly  the 
unsparing  Teuton  advance. 

As  we  have  passed  in  rapid  survey  over  the  dif 
ferent  fields  of  German  imperial  enterprise,  Oceanica, 
Africa,  North  Africa,  the  Far  East,  America,  one 
statement  closes  every  account, —  lost  in  the  present 
war.  Lost  are  the  coral  islands  and  Samoa.  Lost 
are  German  East  Africa  and  West  Africa,  Togo  and 
Kamerun.  Lost,  even  before  the  war,  were  Morocco 
and  the  coveted  Tripolitan  port.  Lost  are  Kiaochow 
and  the  mines  of  China.  Lost,  in  all  probability,  are 
the  Balkans  and  Bagdad,  the  Dardanelles  and  Con 
stantinople.  Lost, —  but  no.  Here  the  list  ends. 
In  one  quarter  German  interests  have  received  no  se 
rious  check.  Against  German  aggression  in  Amer 
ica,  the  war  has  as  yet  furnished  no  effectual  guar 
anty.  And  assuming  that  present  results  forecast  the 


3io    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

final  settlement,  what  is  the  prospect?  Germany,  ef 
fectually  checked  in  every  other  quarter,  can  not  fail 
to  see  in  America  her  only  opportunity.  As  yet 
America  has  been  spared  because  other  opportunities 
were  more  promising  or  more  immediate.  What  will 
be  her  fate  when  she  becomes  the  only  opportun 
ity?  Already  there  have  been  intimations  that  Ger 
many  would  gladly  meet  the  wishes  of  her  European 
enemies  if  they  would  give  her  a  free  hand  in  Amer 
ica,  a  proposition  to  which  one  power  is  both  shrewd 
enough  and  generous  enough  to  oppose  an  unalter 
able  negative.  This  negative  is  the  only  protection 
which  America  has,  outside  of  its  own  as  yet  inade 
quate  forces,  against  the  aggression  of  the  most  pow 
erful  and  the  most  unscrupulous  nation  in  the  world, 
a  nation  which  war  will  neither  crush  nor  conciliate, 
and  whose  energy, —  only  briefly  spent, —  will  be  the 
more  effectually  directed  toward  these  shores. 

Japan  and  Germany  are  the  two  hungry  nations, 
hungry  from  a  vital  need.  Cramped  in  their  little 
lands,  they  live  in  a  world  that  everywhere  obeys  the 
pitiless  law  of  growth.  Only  a  growth  which  their 
present  territories  do  not  permit  can  prevent  their 
being  grown  off  the  face  of  the  earth  by  peoples  like 
unto  themselves  but  blessed  with  broader  lands. 
They  will  dispossess  by  any  means  rather  than  tamely 
acquiesce  in  such  a  fate.  Can  we  resist  Japan?  Yes, 
if  we  will.  Can  we  resist  Germany?  Yes,  if  we 
put  forth  our  utmost.  But  neither  is  the  ultimate 
issue.  Can  we  resist  them  both  should  hunger  com 
pel  them  to  make  common  cause?  This  is  a  perpet 
ual  possibility. 


CHAPTER  XX 

THE  GREATEST    EMPIRE 

THE  British  Empire  holds  a  unique  place  not  only 
in  Europe  but  in  the  world.  Unlike  other  great  em 
pires,  past  and  present,  it  has  its  seat  in  a  small  island 
from  which  centre  it  asserts  an  almost  incredible  au 
thority.  Japan  alone  among  the  great  powers  is 
somewhat  similarly  situated,  but  the  authority  of 
Japan  extends  but  little  beyond  her  own  islands,  while 
that  of  Britain  covers  an  area  a  hundred  times  that  of 
her  island,  a  quarter  of  the  entire  globe,  while  about 
a  third  of  the  human  race  own  allegiance  to  her  flag. 

But  the  nature  of  this  authority  is  more  remark 
able  than  its  extent.  Closely  scrutinized  it  seems  to 
fade  away  and  leave  nothing  tangible,  seems  in  short, 
not  to  be  authority  at  all.  Some  one  has  said  that  if 
the  words  "  British  "  and  "  empire  "  were  stricken 
out  of  the  English  language,  the  British  Empire  would 
cease  to  exist,  in  other  words,  that  the  British  Empire 
is  only  a  name  which  is  backed  by  no  substantial  re 
ality.  Heinrich  von  Treitschke  declared  that  the 
British  Empire  was  "  a  sham,"  and  punctuated  his 
anti-British  propaganda  by  the  assertion  that  it  was 
not  in  the  nature  of  things  human  that  a  sham  should 
endure  for  ever.  Yet  despite  this  absence  of  anything 
like  authority  as  the  world  has  known  it,  the  fact  re- 

311 


3i2     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

mains  that  Britain's  children  come  when  she  calls, — : 
that  they  scarce  wait  for  her  calling.  They  refuse  to 
recognize  her  right  to  command  their  services.  They 
even  refuse  to  promise  voluntary  assistance  in  case 
the  mother  country  should  be  in  straits.  Yet  that 
service  is  rendered  and  that  assistance  is  granted  with 
a  unanimity  and  a  heartiness  which  no  other  power 
can  surpass.  It  is  this  inner  character  of  the  British 
Empire  rather  than  its  peculiarities,  geographic,  eth 
nic,  or  political,  which  we  need  to  understand. 

The  nucleus  of  the  British  Empire  consists  of  the 
islands  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland.  It  is  here  that 
the  chief  dissonance  in  the  empire  is  found.  Great 
Britain,  though  peopled  by  different  races,  has  become 
unified  in  a  very  high  degree.  It  is  hardly  surpassed 
by  France,  the  recognized  model  of  race  unity.  But 
Ireland  has  neither  entered  that  unity  nor  formed  a 
unity  of  her  own.  Former  misrule  in  Ireland  has 
wrought  mischief  which  has  not  been  removed  by 
over-representation  in  the  British  Parliament  and 
other  substantial  if  tardy  concessions.  Differences  of 
religion  have  sharpened  and  embittered  the  conflict. 
But  in  this  and  in  other  respects  Ireland  is  divided 
against  herself.  A  minority  of  the  Irish  people,  of 
earlier  British  origin,  share  the  religion,  the  indus 
trial  character,  and  the  wealth  of  the  larger  island, 
and  insist  upon  retaining  the  closest  connection  with 
it.  The  less  affluent  majority,  differing  in  tempera 
ment,  in  religion,  and  in  economic  status,  desire  par 
tial  or  complete  separation, —  for  here  again  there  is 
no  agreement.  Local  autonomy  would  seemingly  be 
the  reasonable  arid  easy  solution  of  this  problem 


THE  GREATEST  EMPIRE  313 

were  it  not  for  these  deepening  clefts  in  Ireland  itself. 
The  British  sympathizing  minority  not  unreasonably 
fear  that  a  majority  from  whom  they  have  been  sepa 
rated  by  one  of  the  bitterest  feuds  that  history  re 
cords,  will  so  adjust  taxation  as  to  burden  those  forms 
of  industry  of  which  they  are  the  chief  owners,  or 
otherwise  discriminate  against  them,  while  the  major 
ity  naturally  feels  that  an  Irish  state  can  not  afford  to 
lose  its  only  wealthy  constituencies.  In  turn  this  ma 
jority  itself  is  divided  into  moderates  who  desire  au 
tonomy  and  extremists  who  desire  complete  separa 
tion.  Probably  nowhere  in  the  world  can  persons  of 
alleged  intelligence  be  found  who  have  so  little  con 
sciousness  of  the  realities  of  the  world  situation  as 
these  Irish  extremists.  In  our  own  country  espe 
cially,  where  irresponsibility  is  naturally  most  com 
plete,  their  representatives  exhaust  the  possibilities  of 
political  unpracticality.  The  effort  now  being  made 
to  effect  a  degree  of  union  among  these  discordant 
elements, —  a  union  which  must  naturally  precede  any 
concession  on  Britain's  part, —  would  be  of  absorbing 
interest  were  it  not  overshadowed  by  the  tragedy  that 
threatens  to  engulf  humanity. 

It  may  be  noted  that  Ireland  as  regards  area, 
wealth,  and  population,  is  a  negligible  factor  in  the 
British  Empire  whose  serious  interests  it  continually 
jeopardizes.  But  the  location  of  Ireland  is  such  as 
to  make  it  the  most  strategic  of  all  British  possessions. 
Upon  its  absolute  control  depends  the  very  existence 
of  the  Empire.  Not  the  British  Parliament  but  the 
maker  of  the  planet  decreed  the  dependence  of  Ire 
land. 


3 14    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

Outside  this  central  nucleus  the  British  Empire  con 
tains  a  large  number  of  elements  differing  widely 
from  one  another  in  almost  every  conceivable  respect. 
First,  there  are  stations  which  are  essentially  fort 
resses,  like  Gibraltar,  Malta,  and  Aden.  These  are 
necessarily  under  military  government  (though  not 
under  martial  law) ,  their  population,  itself  little  more 
than  a  camp  following,  having  all  necessary  safe 
guards,  but  no  direct  voice  in  matters  affecting  im 
perial  interests. 

Then  there  are  crown  colonies  inhabited  by  popula 
tions  of  low  development,  especially  in  the  tropics. 
These  are  administered  directly  by  appointees  of  the 
British  Government,  a  service  now  governed  by  tradi 
tions  which  are  one  of  the  most  valuable  products  of 
human  experience.  Some  of  these  like  Nigeria  and 
Guiana  are  vast  territories  where  native  populations 
are  and  ever  must  be  the  chief  consideration.  Others 
like  Singapore  and  Hong  Kong,  are  mere  trading 
posts  where  a  cosmopolitan  and  exotic  population  soon 
overshadows  the  native  element.  The  government 
makes  as  much  or  as  little  use  of  local  citizenship  as 
its  character  permits,  a  very  considerable  use  in  the 
examples  last  given,  although  imperial  interests  are 
still  controlled  from  the  imperial  centre. 

Rising  higher  in  the  scale,  we  have  dependencies 
whose  people  have  developed  some  capacity  for  self 
government  with  the  inevitable  pride  in  their  own 
forms  and  outward  manifestations  which  such  capac 
ity  implies.  With  incredible  deference,  the  fruit  of 
long  experience,  Britain  preserves  these  native  insti 
tutions,  even  their  excrescences  and  defects  in  which 


THE  GREATEST  EMPIRE  315 

too  often  a  people  recognizes  its  individuality  and 
defends  its  self-respect.  But  justice  and  efficiency  be 
yond  anything  the  native  ever  knew,  are  secured  by 
the  simple  device  of  the  "  resident "  whose  unobtru 
sive  admonitions  come  weighted  with  the  awe  of 
Britain.  Such  are  Egypt,  the  native  states  of  India, 
and  the  Federated  Malay  States. 

But  interest  chiefly  centres  in  the  great  self-govern 
ing  "  dominions  "  of  Canada,  Newfoundland,  Aus 
tralia,  New  Zealand,  and  South  Africa.  These  in 
clude  nearly  two  thirds  the  area  of  the  empire  and 
are  peopled  with  men  of  the  British  race  or  men 
capable  of  easy  assimilation.  These  five  dominions 
have  acquired  entire  independence.  It  is  difficult  to 
see  wherein  the  independence  of  Canada  differs  in  any 
essential  respect  from  that  of  the  United  States.  It 
has  its  own  Parliament  and  passes  its  own  laws  on  all 
subjects.  It  is  true  that  a  governor  is  appointed  by 
the  British  crown,  but  he  holds  his  office  on  the  strict 
condition  that  he  will  do  no  governing.  He  has  the 
privilege  of  signing  bills  passed  by  Parliament,  but 
unlike  our  president,  he  has  not  the  privilege  of  not 
signing  them.  There  can  not  be  the  slightest  doubt 
that  an  attempt  to  veto  such  a  bill  would  necessitate 
his  instant  recall,  or  failing  that,  the  result  would  be 
that  Canada  would  withdraw  from  the  empire,  as  we 
are  assured  she  is  free  to  do  at  any  moment  if  she 
wishes.  No  doubt  an  able  governor  may  be  a  very 
influential  person,  but  hardly  more  so  than  an  able 
British  ambassador  at  Washington,  such,  for  instance, 
as  Viscount  Bryce.  In  a  sense  his  influence  is  dis 
tinctly  less  than  it  would  be  in  private  station  because 


3i6     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

of  the  embargo  laid  upon  all  direct  political  activities 
on  his  part. 

This  obviously  gives  Canada  complete  autonomy, 
or  freedom  to  manage  her  own  affairs.  But  Canada 
has  more  than  autonomy.  She  has  independence. 
She  levies  her  tariffs  against  Britain  quite  as  against 
other  countries.  When  some  years  since  there  was 
an  agitation  in  favour  of  a  lower  tariff  within  the  em 
pire,  Canada  was  careful  to  remind  the  British  agi 
tators  that  that  was  a  matter  for  her  to  settle.  She 
ultimately  made  the  desired  concession,  but  nothing 
would  have  extorted  it  if  Britain  had  questioned  her 
right  to  withhold  it.  This  proud  assertion  of  inde 
pendence  is  celebrated  in  Kipling's  poem,  Our  Lady 
of  the  Snows. 

"  A  Nation  spoke  to  a  Nation, 

A  Queen  sent  word  to  a  Throne : 
'  Daughter  am  I  in  my  mother's  house, 

But  mistress  in  my  own. 
The  gates  are  mine  to  open, 

As  the  gates  are  mine  to  close, 
And  I  set  my  house  in  order,' 

Said  our  Lady  of  the  Snows." 

In  the  more  vital  matter  of  military  co-operation 
Canada  has  equally  asserted  her  independence. 
When  the  question  was  raised  in  the  Canadian  Parlia 
ment  whether  Canada  would  pledge  her  aid  to  the 
mother  country  if  the  latter  should  be  involved  in 
war,  the  subject  was  debated  and  the  vote  was  in  the 
negative.  Canada  reserved  the  right  to  pass  judg 
ment  on  the  war  in  question  and  to  help  if  she  felt  the 
war  to  be  justified.  She  none  the  less  was  prompt  to 


THE  GREATEST  EMPIRE  317 

send  troops  in  the  Boer  war,  and  in  the  present  war 
her  exertions  have  surpassed  the  utmost  expectations 
of  the  empire. 

Finally,  Canada  reserves  independence  in  the  mat 
ter  of  treaties  with  foreign  powers.  She  has  repeat 
edly  negotiated  treaties  with  the  United  States  with 
out  British  intervention.  No  doubt  this  right  has 
been  exercised  with  much  discretion  and  with  defer 
ence  to  British  opinion,  but  hardly  more  than  would 
be  shown  by  any  power  sustaining  close  relations  of 
commerce  and  friendship  with  Great  Britain.  The 
limit  of  this  freedom  has  never  quite  been  tested, 
simply  because  there  has  been  no  inclination  to  test  it, 
but  British  assurance  has  been  publicly  given  that 
Canada  is  free  to  withdraw  from  the  Empire  and 
continue  as  a  separate  nation  or  even  join  the  United 
States  if  she  wishes.  It  would  be  difficult  to  imagine 
independence  going  farther.  No  doubt  if  Canada 
should  enter  a  combination  hostile  to  the  Empire, 
Britain  would  take  prompt  measures  in  self  defence, 
but  only  as  she  would  do  in  like  case  with  any  state. 

The  foregoing  applies  substantially  without  change 
to  the  five  "  dominions."  All  are  independent  na 
tions  held  together  in  a  tacit  league  which  does  not 
limit  in  the  least  their  independence  or  do  violence  to 
their  individuality,  but  which  none  the  less  secures 
the  most  substantial  advantages  to  all  participants. 
It  keeps  a  third  of  the  human  race  in  peace  among 
themselves  and  united  in  defence  against  outside  ene 
mies.  It  provides  a  court  of  arbitration  for  all  dif 
ferences  that  may  arise  among  the  component  states, 
a  court  of  immense  experience  and  unrivalled  pres- 


318     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

tige.  And  above  all  it  furnishes  to  a  group  of  grow 
ing  and  naturally  diverging  peoples,  a  vast  unifying 
influence,  an  imperial  oversoul  that  saves  them  from 
the  pettiness,  the  provincialism,  and  the  hostilities 
which  would  otherwise  be  the  inevitable  incident  of 
their  separate  development.  If  Britain  finally  suc 
ceeds  in  lifting  such  dependencies  as  India  and  Egypt 
up  to  the  status  of  self-governing  dominions,  the  goal 
toward  which  all  effort  is  at  present  directed  and  to 
ward  which  clear  progress  is  being  made,  she  will 
crown  an  achievement  which  has  no  parallel. 

It  is  impossible  to  exaggerate  the  importance  of 
this,  the  supreme  political  achievement  in  the  history 
of  the  world.  The  problem  of  the  ages  has  been  to 
unite  men  without  crushing  them.  Union  with  sub 
jection  of  body  and  spirit  and  consequent  stagnation, 
has  been  a  commonplace  of  history.  Egypt  effected 
it  four  thousand  years  ago,  as  China  has  effected  it 
since.  Greece  escaped  it  by  a  strenuous  endeavour, 
risking  and  ultimately  losing  her  all  rather  than  sur 
render  her  individuality.  But  union  which  should 
secure  peace  among  men,  yet  leave  the  varied  life  of 
every  community  and  every  individual  unrepressed  in 
all  its  infinite  suggestiveness,  this,  though  sincerely  at 
tempted  by  Rome,  has  first  been  measurably  accom 
plished  by  Britain. 

The  system  has  its  foundation  in  the  great  English 
speaking  dominions  planted  in  the  four  corners  of 
the  earth.  Each  of  these  is  free  to  observe  and 
criticize  the  rest,  free  to  experiment,  and  to  copy  or 
reject  the  experiments  of  others.  The  reaction  of 
these  independent  dominions,  one  upon  another,  gives 


THE  GREATEST  EMPIRE  319 

a  dynamic  quality  to  Anglo-Saxon  civilization  which 
all  widely  disseminated  civilizations  have  hitherto 
lost.  The  stagnation  which  inevitably  follows  the 
standardizing  of  human  institutions  has  hitherto  been 
the  most  serious  and  the  most  legitimate  of  all  ob 
jections  to  the  policy  of  imperialism.  At  all  costs, — 
yes,  even  at  the  cost  of  world  wars, —  civilization 
must  remain  dynamic.  The  instinctive  revolt  of  the 
world  against  German  kultur  is  due,  not  to  its  fright- 
fulness  or  to  any  other  inherent  defect,  but  to  its  piti 
less  intolerance.  Germany  Germanizes  whatever  she 
acquires.  She  has  sought  to  Germanize  every  colony, 
to  standardize  all  her  component  states.  She  at  one 
time  standardized  all  her  universities  with  the  result, 
—  as  expressed  by  one  of  their  professors, —  of  "  im 
mense  immediate  improvement  and  no  progress 
since."  Progress  was  secured  by  the  sacrifice  of 
progressiveness.  In  a  less  degree  Americans  make 
the  same  mistake.  With  a  fatuous  trust  in  the  uni 
versal  applicability  of  American  adaptations,  we  are 
Americanizing  the  Filipinos.  We  have  presented 
them  with  a  miniature  copy  of  the  American  govern 
ment,  Senate,  House  of  Representatives,  Cabinet  and 
all,  which  they  will  wear  as  a  Hottentot  wears  a  top 
hat.  We  can  admire  but  we  can  not  yet  emulate  the 
amazing  live-and-let-live  principle  of  British  organi 
zation. 

Not  less  wonderful  than  the  dominions  with  their 
utter  freedom  and  their  elusive  spiritual  bond,  are  the 
great  dependencies,  like  India  and  Egypt,  in  their  em 
bodiment  of  the  same  great  principle.  They  are  not 
independent  like  the  dominions  simply  because  they 


320    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

can  not  be.  "  Liberty  is  not  a  gift;  it  is  an  achieve 
ment."  It  is  not  a  thing  to  be  granted,  but  a  thing 
to  be  wrought  out  in  the  structure  of  the  body  politic. 
If  independence  were  granted,  they  could  not  main 
tain  their  position  in  the  peaceable  family  of  nations. 
They  could  not  even  maintain  coherence  within  their 
borders.  Independence  with  rapine  and  famine 
within  and  war  without,  is  not  an  achievement.  Of 
that  the  world  has  known  no  lack.  If  these  desolat 
ing  experiences  are  to  be  avoided,  these  fundamental 
conditions  of  peace  must  be  imposed  where  they  can 
not  be  self-developed,  as  they  are  imposed  upon  the 
backward  individual  by  those  who  are  compelled  to 
accept  his  companionship.  Bengali  and  Mahratta 
must  not  fly  at  each  other's  throats  nor  wreck  the  land 
and  waste  the  folk  with  famine.  The  needful  contri 
bution  of  the  tropics  to  modern  civilization  must  not 
be  interrupted.  But  these  fundamentals  once  guar 
anteed,  the  vast  routine  of  administration  is  left  to  the 
native  machinery.  It  is  not  only  permitted  to  do  this 
work,  it  is  encouraged  to  do  it,  helped  to  do  it,  made 
to  do  it,  saved  from  the  mistakes  that  would  wreck  it 
or  turn  it  into  an  engine  of  destruction.  Britain 
could  do  the  work  better,  but  only  with  the  destruc 
tion  of  that  vital  principle  upon  which  all  growth  de 
pends,  the  people's  consciousness  that  the  work  is 
theirs,  theirs  with  its  privileges,  theirs  with  its  re 
sponsibilities,  theirs  with  its  opportunities  and  its  door 
into  the  limitless  future.  Said  an  Indian  native 
prince  to  a  Briton:  "  You  British  would  administer 
this  country  much  better  than  I  do,  but  my  people 
would  rather  see  me  ride  into  town  on  my  elephant 


THE  GREATEST  EMPIRE  321 

than  enjoy  the  best  administration  on  earth."     And 
his  people  made  the  natural,  the  inevitable,  choice. 

With  all  its  marvels,  however,  the  British  Empire 
has  long  been  recognized  as  an  unfinished  structure, 
and  with  the  development  of  its  dependencies  and  the 
growth  of  its  dominions,  that  incompleteness  has  be 
come  more  apparent.  The  task  of  arbitrating  the 
differences  that  arise  between  members  of  the  im 
perial  family, —  differences  as  serious  as  those  be 
tween  any  nations  in  the  world, —  and  of  champion 
ing  their  cause  against  outsiders,  necessarily  devolved 
at  first  upon  the  mother  country.  In  the  helplessness 
of  infancy  and  childhood,  parental  arbitration  and 
protection  are  appropriate  and  inevitable,  but  as 
youth  strains  toward  manhood,  restiveness  betrays 
the  consciousness  of  new  powers  and  new  needs.  As 
the  parental  sphere  becomes  more  restricted,  its  task 
becomes  more  delicate.  The  same  great  ends  must 
still  be  accomplished,  but  by  indirection,  by  counsel 
rather  than  by  authority.  Nor  is  the  need  one-sided, 
but  rather  mutual. 

The  growing  need  in  Britain  has  been  for  some 
organ  suitable  for  the  exercise  of  truly  imperial  au 
thority.  The  British  Parliament,  theoretically  the 
source  of  all  authority,  represents  in  fact  only  the 
British  Isles.  It  is  suited  for  the  management  of 
their  affairs  and  is  more  than  needed  for  them  alone. 
To  add  representatives  from  the  dominions  would 
unfit  it  for  the  management  of  local  affairs,  while  giv 
ing  it  doubtful  fitness  for  imperial  functions.  The 
spiritual  bond  of  the  empire  was  ideal  in  its  way,  but 
there  were  concrete  things  of  an  imperial  sort  to  do, 


322     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

and  there  was  need  of  a  concrete  instrument  to  do 
them. 

Yet  imperial  federation,  though  a  recognized  need 
in  some  form,  has  been  dreaded  alike  by  England  and 
by  the  dominions.  England  has  been  too  long  the 
acknowledged  ruler  of  the  empire  to  take  very  kindly 
to  the  idea  of  sitting  in  council  with  her  colonies  as 
equals.  There  seems  to  be  an  element  of  presump 
tion  in  such  a  proposal.  On  the  other  hand,  the  do 
minions  are  too  jealous  of  their  independence  to  will 
ingly  submit  to  any  abridgment  of  it,  even  by  a  coun 
cil  in  which  they  have  a  share.  For  instance,  India 
insists  on  the  right  of  her  people  as  British  subjects 
to  travel  and  settle  anywhere  in  the  British  Empire, 
while  Australia  absolutely  refuses  to  admit  Asiatics  to 
the  dominion.  Suppose  a  council  of  the  Empire 
should  decide  in  favour  of  India's  contention.  The 
bare  possibility  of  such  a  decision  is  sufficient  to  as 
sure  Australia's  veto.  For  remember,  no  dominion 
can  be  coerced  into  such  a  union. 

The  impossible  seems  nevertheless  to  have  been 
accomplished  by  this  war  which  has  dissolved  so  much 
of  the  older  fabric  of  civilization.  When  the  British 
Cabinet  was  reconstituted  and  five  members  became 
the  real  rulers  of  the  British  Empire,  the  astute  Lloyd 
George,  perceiving  that  the  paternalism  of  England 
and  the  provincialism  of  the  dominions  had  alike  dis 
solved  in  the  fiery  ordeal  of  war,  summoned  the  prime 
ministers  of  the  dominions  to  London  to  an  "  Im 
perial  Conference  "  to  consider  plans  for  the  conduct 
of  the  war  and  decide  upon  the  terms  on  which  the 
Empire  would  be  willing  to  make  peace.  It  was  an 


THE  GREATEST  EMPIRE  323 

innocent  and  natural  looking  proposal.  What  more 
reasonable  than  that  these  partners  in  the  struggle 
should  deliberate  regarding  their  common  and  vital 
interests.  Yet  it  was  an  immense  innovation.  It  was 
England  that  had  made  plans  for  other  wars  and 
decided  the  terms  of  peace.  But  now  it  is  the  Em 
pire.  With  a  great  price  the  dominions  had  bought 
their  citizenship. 

This  Council  once  brought  together  and  the  British 
mind  wonted  to  its  obviously  reasonable  task,  the 
bold  premier  quietly  announces  in  a  newspaper  inter 
view  that  the  prime  ministers  of  the  dominions  will 
remain  in  council  after  the  war;  that  their  countries 
will  miss  them,  but  that  they  must  get  along  without 
them ;  that  they  must  stay  in  London  and  help  govern 
the  British  Empire.  In  such  unobtrusive  fashion 
does  this  greatest  of  empires  announce  the  revision 
of  its  venerable  constitution  and  the  inauguration  of 
a  new  era.  Later  reports  are  to  the  effect  that  the 
Council  will  meet  annually  hereafter.  Imperial  fed 
eration  is  an  accomplished  fact. 


CHAPTER  XXI 

THE    GREAT    FELLOWSHIP 

THE  relation  of  the  United  States  to  a  power  which 
holds  a  third  of  humanity  in  fief  could  not  but  be  a 
fact  of  the  first  importance,  even  without  kinship  or 
close  historic  connection.  But  when  it  is  remem 
bered  that  it  is  to  this  empire  that  we  owe  our  origin, 
that  we  are  one  of  its  seceding  members,  that  its  lan 
guage,  its  literature,  its  institutions,  its  entire  civiliza 
tion  are  essentially  identical  with  our  own,  and  that 
the  relations  between  the  two,  commercial,  political, 
and  cultural,  have  always  been  of  the  closest,  the  im 
portance  of  this  relation  easily  overshadows  all  other 
facts  of  a  political  order  in  the  world.  This  relation 
is  of  course  a  historic  product,  a  thing  made  possible 
by  the  events  of  three  hundred  years.  Equally,  any 
future  relation  which  may  exist  between  the  two  coun 
tries  must  be  an  outgrowth  of  the  present  and  the 
past.  There  is  talk  from  time  to  time  of  an  Anglo- 
Saxon  alliance.  The  reader  will  perhaps  have  dis 
covered  ere  this  that  the  writer  has  very  little  faith  in 
our  power  to  institute  vital  relations  of  helpfulness 
between  nations  by  formal  agreement.  For  thirty 
years  Italy  was  in  league  with  Germany  and  Austria, 
yet  when  the  crisis  came,  she  took  the  other  side. 
Why?  Because  she  was  on  the  other  side  all  the 

324 


THE  GREAT  FELLOWSHIP          325 

time.  Historic  conditions  had  created  between  her 
self  and  Austria  a  relation  of  antagonism  which  no 
formal  league  could  remove.  This  war  has  been  a 
continuous  revelation  of  the  inability  of  formal  agree 
ments  to  modify  the  actualities  of  historic  evolution. 
In  the  light  of  these  facts,  the  desirability  of  an 
Anglo-Saxon  alliance  is  a  question  of  minor  interest. 
No  matter  how  desirable  co-operation  between  the 
two  great  Anglo-Saxon  groups  might  be,  a  formal 
alliance  will  not  secure  it.  It  is  but  a  moderate  hy 
perbole  to  say  that  if  we  haven't  a  union,  we  can  not 
get  it,  and  if  we  have  it,  we  can  not  get  rid  of  it.  The 
real  question  is,  therefore,  what  has  been  and  what 
is  the  relation  between  the  two  countries.  We  have 
not  to  do  with  formal  and  official  relations  except 
as  they,  like  straws  upon  the  surface,  sometimes  be 
tray  the  direction  of  deeper  currents.  Even  overt 
acts,  friendly  or  hostile,  are  of  secondary  importance. 
The  important  thing,  if  we  can  discover  it,  is  the 
mutual  reaction  of  race  instincts,  past  and  present, 
for  upon  these  alone  can  be  based  a  safe  prophecy 
of  the  future. 

As  we  glance  backward  over  our  mutual  history  the 
first  facts  that  obtrude  themselves  are  the  two  wars 
which  we  have  fought  with  Britain.  It  is  a  signifi 
cant  fact  that  Britain  is  the  only  country  with 
which  we  have  been  twice  at  war.  A  closer  inventory 
discloses  numerous  points  of  friction,  involving  more 
or  less  prolonged  periods  of  strained  relations,  the 
Maine  boundary,  the  Oregon  controversy,  the  long 
drawn  out  Isthmian  Canal  dispute,  the  Venezuelan 
boundary  case,  the  Behring  Sea  controversy,  and 


326     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

others.  There  was  decided  friction  between  the  two 
powers  in  Hawaii  and  Samoa  before  the  final  settle 
ment,  with  occasional  acts  far  from  creditable  to 
either  side.  Finally,  and  perhaps  more  unpleasantly 
remembered  that  anything  else,  there  was  unfor 
tunate  hesitation  on  the  part  of  the  British  govern 
ment  during  our  civil  war,  with  much  private  aid  and 
some  official  encouragement  to  the  Confederacy. 
These  facts,  hardly  to  be  matched  by  any  like  array 
in  connection  with  any  other  nation,  have  impressed 
the  popular  imagination  and  given  colour  to  the  belief 
that  Britain  was  our  traditional  enemy.  This  tradi 
tion  continued  with  us  until  our  war  with  Spain,  when 
for  the  first  time  incidents  of  the  dramatic  sort  that 
the  popular  imagination  loves,  began  to  array  them 
selves  on  the  other  side. 

Despite  these  facts  and  in  the  face  of  this  long 
standing  tradition,  it  may  safely  be  asserted  that  the 
relation  between  the  two  countries, —  and  more  par 
ticularly  the  attitude  of  Britain, —  has  never  been  one 
of  serious  hostility,  nor  has  our  membership  in  the 
Anglo-Saxon  fellowship  (which  is  the  substance  of 
the  British  Empire)  ever  been  cancelled.  We  have 
become  independent,  but  so  have  Canada  and  Aus 
tralia.  We  have  declared  our  independence,  but  so 
have  they,  over  and  over  again.  We  fought  for 
our  independence, —  and  for  theirs, —  and  Britain 
fought  for  it  too,  fought  with  us  against  a  king  who 
acted  without  her  warrant  and  against  a  theory  of 
government  that  she  had  repudiated  with  the  sword 
a  century  before.  Britain  protects  Canada  and  Aus 
tralia,  but  she  also  protects  us.  She  has  stood  by  us 


THE  GREAT  FELLOWSHIP          327 

from  the  first,  and  in  every  crisis  of  our  history  she 
has  tipped  the  scale  in  our  favour.  Canada  and  Aus 
tralia,  uncoerced,  proffer  their  aid  to  Britain,  and  so 
do  we,  in  this,  the  first  crisis  sufficiently  serious  to  re 
quire  our  aid.  Granting  that  the  relation  is  less  close 
than  in  the  case  of  Canada,  that  we  have  more  dis 
tinctive  symbols,  and  that  our  political  and  social 
forms  are  more  divergent  from  the  original  type, 
these  facts  qualify  but  little  the  general  truth  of  our 
essential  oneness  as  manifested  in  the  history  of  the 
last  hundred  and  fifty  years.  The  superlative  im 
portance  of  this  fact  warrants  a  brief  but  careful  in 
quiry. 

The  seeming  hostility  between  the  two  countries  is 
most  in  evidence  in  our  war  of  independence.  Yet 
it  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  the  loyalty  of  Britain 
was  never  more  manifest  than  in  that  very  struggle. 
It  is  a  truism  of  history  that  the  British  king  at  that 
time  was  engaged  in  a  last  forlorn  attempt  to  rule 
without  the  consent  of  his  people.  This  policy,  en 
joined  upon  him  by  a  masterful  but  imprudent 
mother,  was  resented  in  England  and  the  colonies 
alike.  It  was  too  late  in  the  day  for  the  monarch 
to  attempt  a  coup  d'etat  and  abolish  representative 
institutions.  What  he  tried  to  do  was  to  corrupt 
them.  In  theory  the  responsibility  of  the  Cabinet  to 
Parliament  and  through  it  to  the  people  was  re 
spected,  but  a  parliamentary  majority  was  maintained 
against  the  will  of  the  people  by  bribery.  It  was  this 
anti-English  government  which  attempted  to  govern 
both  colonies  and  England  without  their  consent,  and 
was  resisted  by  both  and  at  last  overthrown  by  both. 


328     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

Not  that  the  English  people  had  as  yet  formulated 
the  principles  of  their  present  imperial  policy.  The 
empire  as  a  fellowship  of  uncoerced  states  had  come 
into  being  unawares,  a  thing  without  precedent.  Its 
essence  was  intangible  and  elusive.  There  were  no 
names  for  it.  The  traditions  of  government  did  not 
fit  it,  and  inevitably  led  to  misapprehension.  The 
seers  were  few  who  recognized  in  the  accident  of 
frontier  independence  united  with  the  tradition  of 
allegiance,  the  principle  of  a  new  world  order,  but 
still  there  were  seers.  When  this  principle  was  put 
to  the  inevitable  test,  what  more  natural  than  that 
each  party  should  at  first  construe  independence  as 
the  end  of  union?  But  because  in  advance  of  this 
assumed  separation  they  had  not  appreciated  the  bond 
that  bound  them,  so  afterwards  they  did  not  appre 
ciate  that  it  bound  them  still. 

But  the  crowning  proof  of  the  attitude  of  Britain 
at  this  time  is  to  be  found  in  the  peace  negotiations 
following  the  surrender  of  Cornwallis.  France  and 
the  colonies,  allies  in  the  war, —  which  was  in  fact  but 
a  frontier  episode  in  a  great  European  struggle, — 
had  made  the  usual  agreement  not  to  make  peace  ex 
cept  in  co-operation.  When  the  time  for  peace  came, 
the  real  race  instincts  asserted  themselves. 

It  seems  ungracious,  at  a  time  when  the  world 
unites  in  homage  to  French  heroism  and  unostenta 
tious  sacrifice,  to  question  the  tradition, —  never  so 
acceptable  as  now, —  of  the  friendship  of  France  in 
the  days  of  our  need.  It  may  lessen  our  scruples 
somewhat  to  recall  that  the  France  with  which  we 
had  then  to  deal  was  not  the  free  France  of  our  day, 


THE  GREAT  FELLOWSHIP          329 

was  indeed  hardly  France  at  all,  but  the  government 
of  Louis  XV  and  Pompadour  which  with  little  war 
rant  assumed  to  act  in  her  name.  That  this  govern 
ment  gave  us  help  is  not  to  be  questioned.  That  it 
did  so  from  friendship  is  much  more  doubtful. 

France  had  been  at  war  with  England  for  a  century 
over  India,  America,  and  other  dependencies.  She 
had  lost  everything  on  the  heights  of  Quebec  only  a 
few  years  before.  She  was  not  ready  to  accept  that 
verdict  as  final,  and  seeing  an  opportunity  by  a  power 
ful  European  alliance  to  reverse  it,  she  attacked  once 
more  her  redoubtable  foe.  To  detach  the  American 
colonies  was  but  one  of  her  many  objects.  It  was 
the  only  one  in  which  she  succeeded.  Her  further 
object  was  to  so  detach  them  that  they  would  be  de 
pendent  upon  herself,  a  plan  unpleasantly  suggestive 
of  reconquest.  For  this  she  relied  upon  the  peace 
negotiations.  When  the  time  came  she  procrastinated 
and  manoeuvred  to  secure  American  subserviency  be 
fore  entering  upon  the  negotiations.  It  was  even  sug 
gested  that  the  colonies  should  not  ask  England  to 
recognize  their  independence,  but  should  allow  France 
to  guarantee  it  instead,  a  suggestion  the  purport  of 
which  hardly  requires  discussion. 

Meanwhile  the  English  king  had  failed  in  his  at 
tempt  to  rule  without  consent,  and  the  English  people 
had  come  into  their  own.  At  once  the  friendship 
which  they  had  manifested  toward  the  colonies 
throughout  the  war  made  itself  felt  in  the  councils  of 
government.  And  now  comes  one  of  the  most  as 
tounding  paradoxes  of  history.  England  connived 
with  her  rebellious  colonies  to  rescue  them  from  the 


330     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

clutch  of  France.  The  story  of  that  clandestine  peace 
forced  upon  the  French  minister,  despite  his  undis 
guised  indignation,  perhaps  reflects  little  honour  upon 
our  plighted  faith  at  that  time,  but  it  reveals  as 
hardly  anything  else  could  have  done  the  underlying 
bond  between  Anglo-Saxon  kin.  The  secret  clause 
in  this  treaty  by  which  it  was  agreed  that  the  northern 
boundary  of  Florida  was  to  be  latitude  thirty-two 
thirty  if  Florida  was  finally  assigned  to  Britain,  and 
thirty-one  if  Florida  went  to  Spain,  was  a  further  in 
dication  of  Britain's  willingness  to  favour  the  colo 
nies,  though  independent,  as  against  any  other  power. 
After  this  peace  events  moved  rapidly  in  Europe. 
The  fountains  of  the  great  deep  were  broken  up  in 
the  French  Revolution,  and  from  the  turmoil  emerged 
Napoleon.  England  was  the  supreme  obstacle  to  his 
plan  of  world  empire,  and  against  her  he  hurled  all 
his  might.  Her  supreme  reliance  was  her  fleet  which 
held  the  u  tight  little  isle  "  inviolate.  Never  since 
its  history  began  has  Britain's  navy  been  subjected  to 
so  rude  a  test.  Not  a  ship  or  a  sailor  could  be 
spared,  if  the  great  fabric  of  Britain's  empire  was  to 
escape  a  destruction  that  should  leave  not  one  stone 
upon  another.  But  these  were  days  of  harsh  disci 
pline  and  imperfect  patriotism  on  both  sides  the  An 
glo-Saxon  sea.  American  ships  became  harbours  of 
refuge  for  deserting  British  seamen,  their  patriotism 
being  matched  by  that  of  American  soldiers  at  that 
time,  of  whom  we  are  told  that  400,000  were  drafted 
during  the  ensuing  war,  while  never  more  than  6,000 
were  under  arms  at  one  time.  In  her  attempt  to  sup 
press  desertion,  Britain  resorted  to  the  high-handed 


THE  GREAT  FELLOWSHIP          331 

measures  that  any  nation  will  adopt  when  its  existence 
is  at  stake.  We  were  too  far  away  to  feel  our  in 
terests  involved  in  the  struggle  and  too  much  under 
the  influence  of  recent  war  traditions  to  feel  the  bond 
of  kinship.  The  result  was  one  of  the  most  impru 
dent  as  it  was  one  of  the  most  inglorious  wars  of  all 
history.  Despite  brilliant  isolated  combats  on  the 
sea,  the  result  was  for  us  humiliating  defeat.  Our 
territory  was  invaded,  our  army  defeated,  and  —  in 
symbol  of  subjection, —  our  capitol  was  burned. 

It  is  difficult  to  say  to  which  side  this  war  was  the 
more  distasteful.  All  kinds  of  motives  mingled  to 
produce  the  increasing  disgust  which  led  both  parties 
to  seek  a  shamefaced  peace.  Among  these  motives, 
however,  there  was  not  wanting  the  consciousness 
that  the  war  was  fratricidal  and  an  ethnic  absurdity. 
There  was  no  weak  sentimentality  about  it,  but  a  mas 
culine  disgust  at  the  nagging  family  feud  which  far 
more  wholesomely  betrayed  the  sense  of  essential 
community  of  interest. 

It  is  interesting,  however,  to  note  the  terms  of 
peace.  There  can  be  no  question  that  America  was 
beaten,  no  question  that  we  might  have  been  forced 
to  acknowledge  British  suzerainty.  Britain  was  over 
whelmingly  superior,  and  in  December,  1814,  when 
peace  was  made,  the  menace  of  Napoleon  seemed  at 
an  end.  Both  the  navy  and  the  armies  employed 
against  that  supreme  antagonist  might  have  been 
turned  against  us.  Yet  the  first  article  of  the  treaty 
stipulates  for  mutual  restoration  of  territory  and 
property  taken  during  the  war,  while  its  one  con 
structive  article  is  a  pledge  of  co-operation  in  sup- 


332     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

pressing  the  slave  trade.  The  issues  which  had 
caused  the  war  were  not  mentioned.  They  had 
passed  with  the  emergency  that  created  them. 

The  terms  of  this  treaty  are  astounding.  Britain 
had  us,  and  she  gave  us  back  to  ourselves.  And 
forthwith  the  two  resume  their  co-operation  in  the 
great  work  of  humanity  which  stands  primarily  to  the 
credit  of  the  Anglo-Saxon,  all  as  a  matter  of  course. 
Amazing  that  it  should  be  so;  still  more  amazing  that 
it  should  not  amaze  us. 

It  is  appropriate  to  bear  in  mind  this  common  ef 
fort  against  the  slave  trade,  when  we  note  that  in 
the  next  conspicuous  episode  of  our  history  Britain 
was  unsympathetic.  The  annexation  of  Texas  which 
resulted  in  war  with  Mexico,  was  opposed  by 
Britain  and  France.  It  is  perhaps  of  all  our  imperi 
alistic  moves  the  one  which  commands  least  sym 
pathy  among  ourselves.  The  reason  is  that  it  was 
avowedly  a  movement  for  the  extension  of  slavery. 
Doubtless  later  events  have  reconciled  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  family  to  the  action  of  its  one-time  black  sheep, 
but  we  can  hardly  wonder  that  at  the  time  it  met  with 
reproof.  Not  that  British  coldness  at  this  time  was 
purely  ethical  or  philanthropic.  The  Oregon  feud 
was  at  its  height.  Nations  like  individuals,  and  even 
more  than  individuals,  are  always  largely  influenced 
by  considerations  of  self  interest.  But  moral  sym 
pathies  are  always  a  powerful  factor,  and  often  turn 
the  scale,  as  they  did  in  this  case  when  we  forfeited 
them,  and  as  they  did  in  the  next  crisis  when  the  life 
of  the  nation  depended  upon  them. 

Probably  no  single  situation  in  our  national  history 


THE  GREAT  FELLOWSHIP          333 

is  the  subject  of  more  misapprehension  than  our  re 
lation  to  European  nations  during  the  civil  war.  The 
legend  is  that  Britain  and  France  were  hostile  to  the 
Union  cause,  and  that  only  the  intervention  of  Russia 
prevented  their  recognizing  the  Confederacy  and  de 
ciding  the  war  in  its  favour. 

The  myth  of  Russian  friendship  may  be  readily 
disposed  of.  There  can  be  no  question  that  the  visit 
of  the  Russian  fleet  to  New  York  at  a  critical  mo 
ment  in  the  war  was  a  most  fortunate  accident,  and 
that  it  exerted  much  influence  upon  nations  whose  in 
terference  we  had  reason  to  dread.  But  it  seems  to 
have  been  proven  beyond  question  that  the  coinci 
dence  was  an  accident,  and  that  Russia  was  unaware 
of  the  crisis  in  which  she  so  fatefully  intervened. 
Nor  is  there  anything  in  her  attitude,  before  or  since, 
to  warrant  the  assumption  of  friendship  toward  the 
United  States. 

We  are  chiefly  concerned,  however,  with  the  atti 
tude  of  Britain.  It  is  well  to  remember  at  the  outset 
that  this  was  a  civil  war,  not  a  war  between  ourselves 
and  a  foreign  state.  Hesitation  was  therefore 
natural,  even  to  one  committed  to  sympathy  with 
America,  for  both  parties  were  American.  The  situ 
ation  was  further  complicated  by  the  fact  that  the 
southern  states  were  at  that  time  the  sole  purveyors 
of  raw  material  to  one  of  the  greatest  of  British  in 
dustries, —  cotton.  Whole  districts  in  England  were 
devoted  to  this  industry,  and  failure  to  get  cotton 
condemned  the  operatives  to  idleness  and  almost  to 
starvation.  Yet  our  blockade  closed  southern  ports 
and  cut  off  the  supply  almost  absolutely.  Men  would 


334     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

be  superhuman  who  would  acquiesce  without  protest 
in  such  a  situation,  and  a  government  that  did  not  try 
to  secure  the  conditions  of  existence  for  its  people 
would  be  guilty  of  a  breach  of  trust.  The  British 
government  did  try  by  every  available  means  to  open 
the  southern  ports,  and  considered  seriously  the  ques 
tion  of  recognizing  the  Confederate  government. 

It  was  in  the  face  of  this  imminent  peril  that  our 
government  sent  its  ambassadors,  not  to  the  British 
government,  but  to  the  English  people.  The  elo 
quent  Henry  Ward  Beecher  in  particular  was  charged 
with  this  delicate  mission.  The  story  as  told  to  the 
writer  by  a  contemporary,  is  more  than  a  romance. 
Landing  at  Liverpool  he  appealed  at  once  to  the  cot 
ton  operatives  of  Lancashire.  They  were  hungry, 
sullen,  and  boisterous.  The  great  orator  was 
greeted  with  a  shower  of  venerable  eggs.  Nothing 
daunted,  he  cracked  a  joke  at  the  expense  of  his  un- 
gallant  opponents,  and  was  rewarded  by  a  laugh. 
That  was  his  opportunity,  and  building  upon  this  mo 
ment  of  fleeting  sympathy,  he  launched  out  upon  his 
defence  of  the  Union  cause  and  his  plea  for  human 
freedom.  There  was  silence,  then  applause,  then  an 
ovation.  Fame  preceded  him  to  the  next  town,  and 
the  next,  until  his  journey  toward  London  became  a 
triumphal  progress.  And  following  him  came  a  peti 
tion  from  these  operatives  of  Lancashire  to  their  gov 
ernment,  praying  that  they  should  not  recognize  a 
government  based  on  human  slavery.  Much  has 
been  said  of  the  British  statesmen  of  the  time,  of  Mr. 
Gladstone  and  his  momentary  defection  from  the  high 
principles  to  which  his  life  was  devoted,  but  what 


THE  GREAT  FELLOWSHIP          335 

shall  be  said  of  a  nation  that  pours  out  its  gratitude 
to  an  autocracy  whose  navy  strays  in  unwittingly  at  an 
opportune  moment,  and  withholds  it  from  a  free  peo 
ple  who  will  to  hunger  for  its  sake? 

During  the  years  that  followed  the  civil  war,  there 
was  a  strange  dissonance  between  the  two  peoples. 
American  cockeyness  was  much  in  evidence  in  the  po 
litical  rally,  the  partisan  press,  and, —  most  regret 
table  of  all, —  in  those  travesties  upon  fact,  the  text 
books  of  our  public  schools.  The  writer  recalls  the 
time  when  certain  American  statesmen,  who  for  the 
last  twenty  years  have  been  staunch  friends  of  Britain, 
were  making  their  bid  for  favour  by  the  ever  popular 
method  of  twisting  the  lion's  "tail.  In  England  there 
were  few  such  utterances, —  and  no  such  textbooks. 
It  is  difficult  to  say  whether  friendship  for  America 
was  purposely  fostered  or  was  a  spontaneous  mani 
festation,  but  fostering  is  impossible  without  a  meas 
ure  of  spontaneity.  The  important  thing  is  that 
British  friendship  was  a  fact. 

The  Spanish  war  was  a  revelation  to  the  American 
people  of  its  status  with  European  nations.  The 
writer  had  the  misfortune  to  live  in  Germany  during 
that  period.  To  enlarge  upon  his  experiences  and 
observations  at  that  time  would  be  unpleasantly  in 
structive.  His  command  of  the  language  saved  him 
from  the  worst  of  that  brutal  browbeating  which  sent 
back  most  of  his  fellow  American  students  of  the 
time  embittered  for  life  against  the  nation  which 
seemed  to  be  leagued  to  a  man  in  a  campaign  of  mis 
representation  and  slander  against  a  nation  which 
they  had  elected  to  hate.  Time  and  time  again  he 


336    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

has  witnessed  from  his  window  a  squad  of  newsboys 
go  dashing  down  the  street  crying:  "Extra!  Ex 
tra  !  Great  Spanish  victory,"  and  the  diminutive 
sheets  were  sold  for  ten  pfennigs  each,  as  fast  as  they 
could  be  handed  out.  Never  was  an  American  vic 
tory  announced.  Never  did  one  of  these  announce 
ments  contain  even  a  nucleus  of  truth.  All  were  ut 
ter  inventions.  Yet  the  hoax  never  failed  to  work. 
A  press  venal  beyond  anything  we  know,  coined  thus 
the  hate  of  the  people  for  its  nefarious  gain.  Ameri 
cans  in  Paris  in  those  days  were  not  much  happier 
than  those  in  Berlin.  Not  until  a  boycott  was  insti 
tuted  against  the  gowns  and  millinery  of  this  capital 
of  fashion  was  civility  in  some  measure  restored. 

It  was  all  very  natural.  America  was  suddenly 
emerging  from  her  isolation  and  appeared  upon  the 
scene  as  a  disconcerting  factor  in  the  plans  of  Europe. 
But  why  this  instant  brace  against  us?  Why  not  at 
least  an  attempt  to  win  our  favour,  to  make  us  sub 
servient  to  their  own  far-reaching  designs?  The  an 
swer  is  simple.  They  were  then  enemies  of  Britain, 
and  they  knew,  when  we  did  not,  that  the  Anglo- 
Saxons  were  one. 

They  knew,  and  Britain  knew.  Nothing  could  be 
more  striking  than  the  contrast  between  her  attitude 
and  that  of  the  countries  noted.  Popular  manifesta 
tions  of  sympathy  were  innumerable,  and  there  was 
now  no  reason  why  government  should  not  follow 
suit.  This  it  did  in  many  ways,  and  with  results  that 
we  can  hardly  yet  appreciate.  We  have  recently 
learned  from  Lord  Cromer,  at  that  time  British  ad 
ministrator  of  Egypt,  how  he  "  stretched "  British 


THE  GREAT  FELLOWSHIP          337 

neutrality  in  such  a  way  as  to  prevent  the  reinforce 
ment  of  the  Spanish  fleet  at  Manila.  Doubtless  other 
British  authorities  did  the  same  as  occasion  offered. 
Neutrality  is  an  imperfectly  defined  thing  and  leaves 
a  wide  margin  of  liberty  to  those  who  are  called 
upon  to  interpret  its  obligations. 

Britain's  attitude,  however,  is  best  revealed  by  the 
famous  incident  of  Manila  Bay  which,  though  elabo 
rated  by  the  inevitable  myth  faculty  into  a  pictur- 
esqueness  and  symmetry  somewhat  in  excess  of  fact, 
none  the  less  represents,  perhaps  even  more  truly  than 
mere  fact,  the  actualities  of  the  situation.  This  in 
deed  is  the  very  function  of  myth.  Actual  happen 
ings  usually  interpret  but  partially  the  logic  of  the 
situation.  Myth  gives  to  fragmentary  fact  the  logi 
cal  completeness  necessary  for  interpretation.  Cam- 
bronne  is  recorded  as  saying  at  Waterloo :  "  The 
Guard  dies  but  never  surrenders. "  He  did  not  die 
but  lived  to  deny  that  he  ever  said  it.  But  that  is 
what  he  ought  to  have  said,  for  the  Guard  refused 
to  surrender  and  perished,  leaving  their  leader 
wounded  in  their  midst.  Myth  puts  in  his  mouth  the 
appropriate  words.  This  is  said  to  forestall  the  in 
evitable  criticism  that  the  incident  is  a  "  Dewey  myth." 
Be  this  as  it  may,  it  is  certain  that  it  essentially  re 
cords  the  facts  concerning  one  of  the  most  critical 
situations  in  which  our  country  was  ever  placed. 
The  story  is  here  given  as  it  is  told  in  Manila. 

It  was  foreseen  in  Europe  that  America  must  needs 
destroy  the  Spanish  fleet  in  Manila  Bay  as  a  protec 
tion  to  her  Pacific  commerce.  It  was  also  realized, — 
better  in  Europe  than  with  us, —  that  this  would  para- 


338     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

lyse  Spanish  power  in  the  Philippines  and  leave  the 
islands  to  be  appropriated  by  any  power  so  minded. 
One  power,  for  reasons  already  stated,  was  decidedly 
so  minded.  A  powerful  German  fleet  was  dispatched 
to  Manila  Bay  with  instructions  which  may  be  sur 
mised  from  what  follows.  It  is  said  to  have  been 
far  superior  to  the  fleet  of  Admiral  Dewey. 

The  Spanish  fleet  was  destroyed  as  expected,  and 
the  expected  situation  resulted.  The  Spaniards,  in  ill 
favour  with  the  natives,  would  have  perished  if  left 
to  their  fate.  Dewey,  perceiving  their  danger,  re 
mained  and  sent  for  assistance.  Meanwhile,  his  fleet 
policed  the  bay  and  protected  Manila.  Anchorages 
were  assigned  as  usual  by  harbour  authorities,  and 
movements  in  the  harbour  were  forbidden  after  nine 
o'clock  at  night.  Here  was  a  test  case  for  the  Ger 
man  commander.  To  obey  these  instructions  was  to 
recognize,  tacitly  at  least,  American  authority  in  the 
Philippines.  This  authority  was  precisely  what  the 
German  fleet  had  come  there  to  challenge.  The  Ger 
man  fleet  ostentatiously  shifted  its  anchorage  after 
nine  o'clock.  The  next  morning  Admiral  Dewey, 
who  is  believed  to  have  conferred  in  the  meantime 
with  the  captain  of  a  single  British  cruiser  then  in 
the  harbour,  sent  peremptory  word  to  the  German 
admiral  bidding  him  keep  the  anchorage  assigned  and 
adding, —  popular  report  may  have  modified  the 
phraseology, —  that  "if  he  wanted  fight  he  could 
have  it  at  the  drop  of  the  hat." 

It  w.as  now  the  German's  turn  to  visit  the  British 
captain  of  whom  he  is  said  to  have  asked:  '  What 
would  you  do  in  the  event  of  trouble  between  Ad- 


THE  GREAT  FELLOWSHIP          339 

miral  Dewey  and  myself?  "  To  which  he  is  said  to 
have  replied:  "What  I  would  do  in  that  event  is 
known  only  to  Admiral  Dewey  and  myself."  It  was 
further  noticed  that  the  British  cruiser  had  taken  a 
position  exactly  between  that  of  the  German  and  the 
American  flagships,  symbolical  of  the  position  so  long 
occupied  by  the  navy  which  it  represented.  There 
was  no  trouble  between  the  American  and  German 
fleets. 

Whatever  criticism  may  take  from  this  expressive 
story,  the  main  facts  are  certain.  The  German  fleet 
was  sent  to  Manila,  and  its  purpose  can  have  been 
none  other  than  that  here  indicated.  That  there  was 
friction  between  the  two  commanders  is  also  certain, 
as  is  the  fact  that  the  commander  of  the  more  power 
ful  fleet  backed  down  before  the  commander  of  the 
weaker  fleet  and  the  representative  of  the  weaker 
power.  That  this  was  done  through  either  fear  of  or 
regard  for  the  United  States,  is  unthinkable  in  the 
light  of  recent  events.  Whether  Germany  had  a 
right  to  seek  to  annex  the  Philippines,  or  whether  we 
did  wisely  in  annexing  them,  is  not  now  the  question. 
The  moral  of  the  story  is  that  to  accomplish  her  own 
ends,  Germany  was  willing  to  risk  war  with  the 
United  States,  and  that  Britain  interposed  her  veto. 
Germany  has  always  been  willing  to  risk  war  with  us 
to  accomplish  her  ends,  and  Britain  has  always  inter 
posed  her  veto.  We  have  ample  assurance  that  Ger 
many  has  intimated  to  Britain  her  willingness  to  con 
cede  all  demands  in  the  old  world  on  condition  that  ^ 
she  be  allowed  a  free  hand  in  the  new,  and  that  the 
offer  has  been  summarily  rejected.  Britain  is  pour- 


340    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

ing  out  her  blood  to  win  what  she  could  have  had  long 
ago  by  bartering  our  safety.  That  she  has  had  her 
own  interest  in  view  in  protecting  our  interests,  does 
not  lessen  the  value  of  that  protection. 

It  seems  clear  that  in  the  years  immediately  preced 
ing  the  present  war  Britain  has  been  far  more  con 
scious  than  we  of  the  essential  unity  of  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  world.  Her  dealings  with  the  great  domin 
ions  which  despite  their  stoutly  asserted  independence 
are  so  indisputably  one  with  herself,  have  doubtless 
accustomed  her  to  the  idea  of  an  underlying  unity  as 
nothing  in  our  experience  has  done.  Moreover,  her 
position  in  Europe,  on  the  firing  line  of  the  great  race 
struggle,  has  taught  her,  as  we  have  not  been  taught, 
the  necessity  of  race  solidarity,  if  the  Anglo-Saxon 
civilization  is  to  resist  the  dangers  which  threaten  it. 
Of  the  whole  Anglo-Saxon  fellowship,  none  have  felt 
so  little,  or  had  so  little  occasion  to  feel,  the  reality  of 
that  fellowship  as  ourselves. 

Yet  there  are  plain  indications  that  through  all 
the  years  we  have  unconsciously  recognized  it.  Said 
an  educated  German  in  the  first  year  of  the  war: 
" 1  can  not  understand  you  Americans.  You  are  a 
perfect  riddle  to  me.  To  think  that  you  do  not  see 
your  chance  now  to  seize  Canada!  n  The  writer  was 
simply  stunned  by  a  remark  so  stupid.  What  reply 
was  possible  to  a  man  who  could  talk  or  think  like 
that?  He  tried  in  imagination  to  carry  the  conversa 
tion  further.  "  But  we  do  not  want  Canada.  We 
have  room  enough."  Imagine  his  German  scorn. 
u  You  do  not  want  Canada,  you  who  grasped  at  New 
Brunswick  and  wrangled  for  Oregon,  and  defied  your 


THE  GREAT  FELLOWSHIP          341 

constitution  to  get  Louisiana  and  made  war  to  get 
California?  You  want  the  earth.  You  have  room 
enough?  Did  you  need  room  when  you  got  Louisiana 
or  Florida?  "  "  But  Canada  is  distinct  in  institutions 
and  in  her  unassimilated  French  population."  "  But 
haven't  you  the  same  population  and  institutions  in 
Louisiana?  Are  they  more  alien  than  the  Mexicans 
of  New  Mexico?  And  how  about  the  Porto  Ricans 
and  the  Filipinos?"  "But  strategic  considerations 
played  a  part  in  some  of  these  annexations." 
"  Strategic  considerations !  Is  there  a  frontier  in  the 
world  so  exposed  as  your  northern  frontier?  An 
arbitrary  line  which  is  neither  defended  nor  defens 
ible,  you  should  annex  Canada  for  that  reason  alone, 
even  though  all  else  forbade.  No,  your  policy  re 
mains  a  mystery.  You  have  been  the  most  aggressive 
and  imperialist  nation  on  earth.  No  nation  has  an 
nexed  so  often,  so  indiscriminately,  so  heedless  of  race 
or  sentiment  or  defence,  as  you.  And  here  you  have 
your  one  supreme  opportunity,  an  opportunity  fa 
voured  by  every  consideration,  a  territory  indissolubly 
united  with  your  own  and  crippled  for  lack  of  you  as 
you  for  lack  of  it,  a  territory  which  links  up  your 
present  domains,  a  territory  peopled  with  your  own 
race,  largely  with  your  own  emigrants,  the  chance  of 
all  chances,  and  you  do  not  take  it,  do  not  see  it.  It 
is  strange." 

And  slowly  the  realization  came  that  it  is  strange. 
Yet  it  is  true.  We  do  not  want  Canada.  Nothing 
is  surer  than  that.  It  isn't  simply  that  we  do  not 
want  to  coerce  her.  That  of  course.  But  we  do  not 
even  wish  that  she  wanted  to  come.  It  is  a  marvel 


342     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

that  we  feel  so,  when  we  remember  how  we  have  felt 
toward  all  other  neighbours.  Why  is  it? 

The  answer  is  simple,  but  one  which  our  keen  wit- 
ted  German  could  never  understand.  We  have  Can 
ada.  The  arbitrary  line  which  separates  us  is  at 
once  the  most  indefensible  and  the  safest  frontier 
on  earth.  The  historic  accidents  that  separate  the 
two  countries  have  given  one  more  precious  centre  of 
individuality  and  race  initiative,  that  anti-toxin  for 
the  stagnation  which  is  too  wont  to  follow  the  union 
of  the  families  of  men,  but  they  have  in  no  way 
jeopardized  that  fundamental  unity  which  has  its 
seat, —  not  in  that  consciousness  where  we  coquette 
so  often  with  fickle  fancies,  but  in  the  deep  uncon 
scious  instincts  which  guard  our  being. 

For  us  the  supreme  phenomenon  of  the  present  war 
is  the  lifting  of  this  unconscious  sense  of  race  unity 
up  into  the  light  of  consciousness.  We  were  united 
before;  now  we  know  it.  For  years  we  have  dwelt 
care-free  within  the  precincts  of  our  race.  We  have 
put  our  unthinking  trust  in  its  far-flung  battle-line 
and  thought  only  of  the  prowess  of  our  own  right 
arm  and  its  wooden  sword.  With  a  confidence  born 
of  long  immunity,  we  have  indulged  in  doubtful 
amenities,  our  heads  given  up  to  little  feuds,  while 
the  heart  kept  the  citadel.  And  now  of  a  sudden  the 
citadel  is  assaulted  by  a  host  that  has  sworn  not  to 
leave  one  stone  upon  another.  At  the  call  of  the 
heart  we  recognize  that  it  is  our  citadel.  We  have 
found  ourselves  and  the  race  has  saved  its  soul. 
There  was  no  other  salvation. 


CHAPTER  XXII 

FORECAST 

IT  is  difficult  to  see  whence  we  came,  but  far  more 
difficult  to  see  whither  we  are  going.  Yet  whence 
we  came  matters  little  save  as  it  tells  us  whither  we 
are  going.  History  is  nothing  if  it  does  not  end 
in  prophecy.  With  all  deference  these  slight  sug 
gestions  are  offered  in  an  attempt  to  complete  our 
task  by  projecting  somewhat  into  the  future  the 
movement  which  we  have  been  following. 

We  face  the  future  always  with  two  questions, 
what  is  going  to  happen,  and  what  can  we  do  to  make 
things  happen  right?  To  the  novice  the  second 
question  seems  the  more  important.  The  need  for 
intelligent  intervention  and  constructive  mechanism 
is  urgent.  There  is  a  temptation  to  overlook  or 
undervalue  the  unobtrusive  building  forces  of  life, 
and  to  put  our  trust  in  contrivance  and  device,  in 
things  that  men  have  thought  out  and  determined 
upon,  instead  of  things  wrought  unawares  by  instincts 
that  ask  no  sanction  of  intellect  or  will. 

With  the  new  consciousness  of  this  larger  race 
unity  something  of  this  spirit  comes  upon  us.  What 
can  we  do  to  hasten  a  consummation  so  devoutly  to 
be  wished?  Would  it  not  be  well  to  have  an  Anglo- 
British  alliance  duly  documented  and  attested  to  de- 

343 


344     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

fine  our  mutual  obligations?  Is  it  not  highly  im 
portant  that  we  mutually  pledge  ourselves  to  arbitrate 
our  differences  and  prescribe  in  advance  the  pro 
cedure  to  be  followed?  Would  it  not  be  desirable 
that  we  should  have  a  representative  in  the  Imperial 
Conference,  that  council  of  our  race?  These  and 
other  well-meant  suggestions  which  are  increasingly 
heard,  are  the  natural  expression  of  this  new  con 
sciousness  that  we  are  one  race  and  that  we  stand  or 
fall  together. 

The  writer  will  hardly  be  suspected  of  unsympathy 
or  indifference  if  he  confesses  his  doubts  as  to  the 
efficacy  or  the  need  of  these  devices.  A  little  reflec 
tion  on  the  proposals  here  suggested  will  be  peculiarly 
enlightening  as  to  the  nature  of  the  forces  with  which 
we  have  to  deal. 

Arbitration  is  the  most  obvious  possibility,  a  pos 
sibility  long  since  recognized.  There  can  be  no  ques 
tion  that  the  two  countries  have  now  reached  a  point 
where  they  can  arbitrate  their  differences,  or  better 
still,  where  they  can  settle  them  by  the  simpler  pro 
cess  of  friendly  conference.  How  much  does  it  help 
under  such  circumstances  to  promise  that  we  will  so 
settle  them?  It  is  a  little  like  asking  gentlemen  and 
friends  to  promise  to  be  mutually  polite,  harmless 
perhaps,  but  superfluous.  Nor  is  a  prescribed  pro 
cedure  so  likely  to  fit  the  case  as  an  improvised  one, 
for  it  must  be  made  by  guess  before  the  circumstances 
are  known. 

A  formal  alliance,  too,  even  though  aimed  at  the 
very  thing  that  all  desire,  would  probably  hinder 
union  rather  than  promote  it.  Co-operation  in 


FORECAST  345 

minor  matters  in  which  the  two  countries  are  un 
equally  concerned,  is  obviously  undesirable.  An  al 
liance  could  cover  only  matters  of  supreme  import 
ance.  How  draw  the  line?  The  trouble  is  that  the 
line  must  be  drawn  in  the  dark.  When  we  plan  be 
forehand,  we  have  to  deal  with  hypothetical  situa 
tions.  But  real  situations,  when  they  appear,  have  a 
perverse  way  of  not  fitting  into  prearranged  schedules. 
It  is  always  the  unexpected  that  happens.  When 
this  war  broke  out,  Italy  and  Roumania  were  in  al 
liance  with  the  Central  Powers,  and  Greece  with 
Serbia,  all  sincerely  enough,  no  doubt,  but  the  situa 
tion  developed  so  unexpectedly  when  the  time  came, 
that  all  disposition  to  keep  their  promises  vanished. 
In  such  cases,  nothing  is  easier  than  to  find  a  pretext 
for  breaking  them,  and  the  only  result  of  the  alliance 
is  to  give  to  the  injured  party  a  new  and  more  tangi 
ble  grievance.  This  war  is  in  a  sense  a  war  of  prin 
ciples  as  well  as  of  peoples.  The  Central  Powers 
were  bound  by  alliances.  They  had  it  all  nominated 
in  the  bond.  The  others  had  an  entente,  an  under 
standing,  which  specified  little  and  was  hardly  more 
than  a  common  consciousness  of  a  developing  situa 
tion.  The  entente  has  suffered  no  disillusionment, 
while  the  alliances  have  largely  broken  down. 

Formal  representation  in  an  Imperial  Council 
which  should  thus  become  both  the  organ  and  the  visi 
ble  symbol  of  our  race  unity,  is  an  attractive  proposal, 
the  more  so  as  it  would  not  necessarily  lessen  our  ef 
fective  independence.  There  is  little  question,  too, 
that  opportunity  for  such  co-operation  will  present 
itself  in  the  near  future  and  that  it  can  be  made  per- 


346     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

manent  if  we  so  desire.  It  seems  inevitable,  too, 
that  there  will  be  intermittent  occasion  for  these  de 
liberations  of  the  great  family  from  this  time  forth. 
The  temptation  to  make  of  such  a  council  a  standing 
board  of  directors  to  manage  the  largest  body  of 
political  interests  in  the  world  appeals  strongly  to 
those  who  welcome  this  great  unity. 

But  it  is  all  but  certain  that  such  an  arrangement, 
if  formal  and  authoritative,  would  produce  friction 
rather  than  harmony  between  the  two  peoples.  Ad 
justments  which  are  now  possible  and  which  should 
become  increasingly  easy  through  mutual  concession, 
would  be  resented  if  imposed  by  an  Imperial  Council. 
Independence  is  still  the  paramount  sentiment,  not 
only  with  us,  but  with  every  Anglo-Saxon  people. 
The  suspicion  that  it  was  limited  by  the  new  arrange 
ment  would  at  once  operate  as  a  divisive  force. 

It  can  not  be  denied  that  there  would  be  some 
ground  for  such  a  suspicion.  It  must  not  be  forgot 
ten  that,  with  all  their  unity,  the  Anglo-Saxon  peoples 
bristle  with  differences,  and  that  it  is  to  these  very 
differences,  in  large  part,  that  they  owe  their  dynamic 
character  and  power.  It  is  the  glory  of  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  that  he  has  discovered  the  secret  of  unity  with 
out  uniformity,  and  that  secret  consists  largely  in  the 
avoidance  of  mechanism.  A  mill  is  always  looking 
for  grist.  Create  an  organ  of  imperial  unity,  and  it 
will  inevitably  be  tempted  to  magnify  its  function. 
Local  eccentricities  of  healthy  growth  to  which  evo 
lution  must  look  for  its  "  useful  variations,"  would 
be  the  subject  of  its  unconscious  disparagement.  The 
tendency  would  be  toward  assimilation,  toward  the 


FORECAST  347 

elimination  of  annoying  dissimilarities,  above  all,  to 
ward  the  extension  of  general  jurisdiction  over  local 
interests,  a  tendency  toward  that  mechanization  which 
the  Teuton  calls  organization,  and  which  it  is  the 
glory  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  to  have  avoided.  It  is  to 
be  hoped  and  it  is  to  be  expected  that  in  any  emer 
gency  which  may  arise  American  interests  will  be  rep 
resented  in  the  great  Anglo-Saxon  council,  and  that 
the  influence  of  this  greatest  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  na 
tions  will  be  measurably  proportioned  to  its  import 
ance.  But  for  the  present  at  least  it  is  better  that 
that  representation  should  be  informal  and  of  an 
emergency  character,  and  that  Anglo-Saxon  unity 
should  wear  the  aspect  of  a  supreme  privilege  rather 
than  that  of  an  irksome  obligation. 

What,  then,  shall  we  do,  we  who  are  reconciled  to 
Anglo-Saxon  solidarity,  as  it  emerges  from  the 
troubled  twilight  of  our  earlier  history  into  the  full 
light  of  our  larger  morning?  Simply,  recognize  it  as 
a  fact.  It  will  be  a  shortsighted  statesmanship  that 
forgets  even  for  a  moment  that  we  are  but  a  part  of 
a  larger  people,  that  imagines  that  Britain  can  be  for 
us  merely  a  nation  among  the  nations.  Doubtless  in 
the  great  majority  of  our  affairs  we  shall  be,  and 
should  be,  as  independent  of  Britain  as  New  York  is 
independent  of  California,  but  in  matters  that  con 
cern  the  fate  of  our  race  and  our  common  civilization, 
such  independence  will  be  impossible,  for  it  would  be 
suicidal.  To  distinguish  between  these  two  classes 
of  interests  is  one  of  the  nice  questions  which  will 
more  and  more  be  the  test  of  American  statesman 
ship. 


348     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

It  is  in  the  light  of  this  larger  unity  that  we  must 
settle  certain  vexed  questions  that  from  a  purely 
American  standpoint  seem  to  admit  of  no  satisfactory 
solution.  Such  is  the  presence  of  Britain  in  the  Car 
ibbean  where  her  possessions  completely  dominate  the 
situation.  In  view  of  our  anxiety  to  exclude  Ger 
many  and  possibly  other  powers  from  this  region,  it 
has  not  unnaturally  occurred  to  some  whose  vision  is 
bounded  by  a  purely  American  horizon,  that  it  would 
be  well  to  secure  the  withdrawal  of  Britain  as  well. 
And  since  an  American  occupation  of  the  Philippines 
is  utterly  unstrategic  from  an  American  point  of  view, 
what  more  natural  than  to  arrange  an  exchange  of 
the  latter  for  Jamaica,  British  Guiana,  and  the 
numerous  other  British  possessions  in  this  quarter? 
This  would  complete  our  control  of  the  Caribbean 
and  would  relieve  us  of  dangerous  obligations  in  the 
Far  East.  The  argument  is  conclusive  if  we  accept 
its  initial  assumption  that  we  are  a  separate  people, 
destined  to  work  out  our  salvation  in  equal  aloofness 
from  all  other  peoples.  To  an  isolated  America 
the  Philippines  are  a  weakness,  the  British  possessions 
in  the  Caribbean  a  menace. 

But  while  these  possessions  do  not  fit  at  all  into 
an  American  scheme  of  things,  they  fit  perfectly  into 
an  Anglo-Saxon  policy.  The  divided  ownership  of 
the  West  Indies  simply  insures  so  much  the  more  per 
fectly  that  both  peoples  will  guard  this  vital  point  in 
their  communications,  while  the  Philippines,  standing 
as  the  natural  outpost  of  British  Oceanica  as  it  faces 
the  great  Mongolian  East,  again  assure  joint  protec 
tion  of  interests  vital  to  the  Anglo-Saxon  unity. 


FORECAST 


349 


But  is  this  solidarity  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  race  the 
end  of  the  unifying  process?  Is  the  rest  of  mankind 
to  be  forever  gentile,  a  menace  to  the  unity  and  to 
the  civilization  of  our  race?  Or  is  the  process  to  go 
farther  and  a  larger  unity  to  result,  and  if  so,  how; 
along  what  lines;  with  what  inclusions?  Above  all, 
what  of  the  Teuton?  Is  his  menace  to  be  perpetual, 
or  can  he  be  crushed,  or  won  over,  or  placated  with 
some  still  unoccupied  place  in  the  sun?  It  is  impos 
sible  to  avoid  these  questions, —  equally  impossible  to 
give  them  more  than  the  most  tentative  of  answers. 
But  even  such  an  answer  may  have  its  value. 

The  feeling  is  well  nigh  universal  that  the  world 
tends  toward  some  form  of  unity.  Constructive 
thought  simply  balks  at  any  other  hypothesis.  If  it 
could  be  demonstrated  that  all  unity  was  transient 
and  that  men  were  gravitating  apart  rather  than  to 
gether,  it  is  doubtful  if  the  men  of  our  day  would 
take  much  interest  in  the  outcome.  The  fact  that 
men  feel  this  way  does  not  quite  guarantee  that  it 
will  work  out  this  way,  but  it  rather  necessitates  this 
idea  as  our  working  hypothesis,  a  hypothesis,  more 
over,  to  which  any  rational  interpretation  of  history 
lends  its  support. 

There  are  two  ways  in  which  progress  toward  unity 
may  be  conceived  and  possibly  promoted.  The  one 
is  to  assume  all  nations  as  equal  and  equally  eligible, 
to  take  them,  big  and  little,  young  and  old,  Barbarian, 
Scythian,  bond  and  free,  and  get  them  to  pool  their 
issues,  not  all  issues  of  course,  but  a  few  issues,  the 
most  vital  and  obvious,  and  then  slowly  to  progress 
by  getting  more  issues  into  the  pool  and  tightening 


350     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

its  grip  upon  them.  That  is  a  worthy  Teutonic  con- 
ception  of  political  evolution.  It  is  based  on  coercion, 
not  on  cohesion,  on  legal  fiction,  not  on  living  fact. 
It  makes  no  allowance  for  differences  of  character  or 
situation.  It  covers  with  its  guaranty  alike  those 
nations  that  stand  as  pillars  of  the  firmament  and 
those  whose  very  existence  is  a  stumbling  block  to 
civilization.  Men  are  equal  before  the  law,  but  does 
that  make  them  equally  eligible  for  membership  in 
church  or  club  or  in  the  councils  of  industry  or  science? 
It  is  equally  preposterous  to  assume  that  the  nations 
can  be  united  for  the  very  practical  and  perplexing 
purpose  of  maintaining  the  world's  peace,  on  an  as 
sumption  of  equality  and  universal  eligibility.  If 
such  a  "  league  "  is  to  succeed,  some  nations  must  be 
left  out.  Nations  must  grow  together,  not  be  hand 
cuffed  together,  and  only  a  union  of  those  that  have 
developed  a  cohesion  of  vital  tissue  can  give  the 
slightest  promise  of  permanence  or  usefulness. 
These  vital  cohesions  will  be  as  unequal  as  the  nations 
that  they  unite.  The  dream  of  a  universal  bond, 
slight  at  first,  but  slowly  strengthening  until  it  unites 
the  weird  medley  of  existing  accidents  into  an  all-em 
bracing  human  brotherhood  is  a  dream  as  delusive 
as  it  is  unlovely.  It  can  not  be  and  it  should  not  be. 
It  would  but  perpetuate  a  vast  aggregate  inconven 
ience  and  misfit,  the  very  existence  of  which  is  a  suf 
ficient  guaranty  that  it  can  never  be. 

Progress  toward  human  unity  does  not  come  that 
way.  Cohesion  develops,  here  a  little  and  there 
much  and  here  again  none  at  all.  Nations  will  unite 
when  they  feel  like  it,  and  when  they  do  not  they  will 


FORECAST  351 

stay  apart,  will  even  drift  apart,  for  cleavage  will  be 
an  occasional  incident  of  cohesion,  with  discipline  for 
the  froward  and  destruction  for  the  hopelessly  per 
verse.  In  the  great  arena  of  competition  nations 
must  demonstrate  their  capacity  for  nationhood  and 
win  the  right  to  be.  It  is  by  the  growth  of  such  ag 
gregates  as  the  British  Empire  with  admission  from 
time  to  time  of  new  candidates  for  its  fellowship, 
whose  vision  has  broadened  to  its  world  horizon  and 
who  have  developed  a  fellowship  of  spirit  with  its 
live-and-let-live  principle,  that  we  shall  progress  to 
ward  human  unity,  not  by  such  baseless  artifices  as 
a  "  league  to  enforce  peace." 

We  are  then  not  to  regard  the  Anglo-Saxon  unity 
as  a  finality.  That  unity  is  even  now  not  exclusively 
Anglo-Saxon.  The  Anglo-Saxon  is  paramount,  but 
two  thirds  of  the  human  material  in  the  great  com 
bine  are  of  other  races.  There  is, —  or  will  be, — 
room  for  more.  Already  there  are  signs  of  cohesion 
with  other  elements.  Ignoring  the  present  co-opera 
tion  with  Latin  and  Slav,  a  co-operation  which  noth 
ing  but  long  centuries  of  unforced  continuance  can 
possibly  develop  into  true  cohesion,  there  are  such 
obvious  cases  as  Norway  and  Holland,  countries  in 
timately  associated  with  Britain  in  the  intercourse  of 
life  and  drawn  to  it  by  the  constant  menace  of  an 
aggression  which  they  can  not  resist.  Doubtless  the 
last  thing  they  are  thinking  of  is  entering  the  British 
Empire,  but  it  should  be  clear  by  this  time  that  the 
cohesion  of  which  we  speak  involves  no  such  efface- 
ment  of  state  or  institutions  as  it  would  to  become 
a  province  of  the  German  Empire. 


352     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

But  our  thought  hurries  incontinent  to  Germany, 
the  supreme  problem  of  the  hour.  Germany  sees  in 
herself,  not  in  Britain,  the  nucleus  of  the  new  world 
order.  She  unhesitatingly  decides  that  the  British 
combination  must  be  subservient  or  be  dissolved  and 
its  elements  regrouped  into  a  new  formation.  Never 
was  a  struggle  so  vast  or  so  fundamental.  Seldom 
have  antagonists  been  so  determined.  What  will  be 
the  outcome?  Can  Germany  be  crushed  or  democ 
ratized  into  peace?  Is  there  room  for  two  such 
powers  in  the  world?  Must  the  struggle  be  post 
poned  only  to  be  resumed  with  fuller  resources  in  a 
greater  Armageddon? 

Undoubtedly  Germany  will  be  democratized,  pos 
sibly  is  being  democratized  as  these  lines  are  written, 
but  will  that  bring  peace?  Possibly  for  the  moment, 
for  the  nations  are  weary,  and  internal  changes  might 
easily  be  made  acceptable  pretexts  for  calling  a  halt. 
But  the  hope  at  which  men  seem  to  be  grasping  that 
democracy  will  remove  the  cause  of  conflict  is  a  de 
lusion.  The  nations  are  not  fighting  for  democracy 
but  for  existence  and  for  dominion.  The  most  im 
perialist  countries  of  the  world  during  the  past  cen 
tury  have  been  the  great  democracies.  Democracy 
is  only  a  method  of  expressing  the  will  of  a  people, 
and  unless  human  nature  has  utterly  broken  with  its 
past,  the  things  that  have  looked  good  to  men  since 
history  began  are  likely  to  seem  good  to  them  still. 
No  passion  has  been  more  constant  in  the  human  race 
than  the  desire  of  peoples  to  extend  the  sway  of  their 
own  ideals  and  their  own  ways  as  far  as  possible  in 
the  world.  To  assume  that  democracy  will  extinguish 


FORECAST  353 

this  passion  is  to  assume  that  it  will  extinguish 
human  nature.  Are  not  the  democracies  of  the  world 
even  now  fighting  to  discredit  autocracy  and,  indi 
rectly  at  least,  to  impose  democracy,  their  way  of 
governing  and  doing,  upon  a  people  for  whom  democ 
racy  is  not  as  yet  a  necessity  of  self-expression?  De 
mocracy  will  not  remove  the  Teuton  menace. 

Can  Germany  be  crushed?  Perhaps  so,  but  to 
what  purpose?  Germany  is  used  to  being  crushed. 
Germany  was  crushed  in  the  Thirty  Years'  War  as  no 
nation  could  now  bring  itself  to  crush  another.  In 
parts  of  her  territory  the  population  was  reduced  by 
ninety  per  cent.  The  whole  land  was  devastated  and 
the  race  began  again  at  the  bottom.  Yet  in  the  fol 
lowing  century  Frederick  the  Great  led  this  people  to 
victories  which  threatened  to  shatter  Europe.  A  few 
decades  later  Germany  was  ground  under  the  heel  of 
Napoleon  until  every  spark  of  vitality  seemed  extinct. 
Yet  Germans  turned  the  tide  at  Waterloo  and  paved 
the  way  for  the  uprising  of  half  a  century  later  and 
for  the  world  menace  of  today.  As  compared  with 
these  ordeals,  the  punishment  that  Germany  is  re 
ceiving  today,  the  utmost  that  decent  enemies  can  in 
flict  upon  her,  is  little  more  than  a  passing  smart. 
Her  population  is  essentially  intact,  the  loss  being 
hardly  more  than  the  normal  increase  of  recent  years. 
Her  cities  are  uninjured,  her  factories  are  standing, 
and  her  whole  industrial  life  essentially  undisturbed. 
They  will  remain  so,  no  matter  what  victory  the  allies 
may  win.  Nor  is  it  at  all  probable  that  the  much 
talked  of  policy  of  later  economic  repression  will  be 
attempted,  or  will  succeed  if  attempted. 


354    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

No,  there  is  nothing  to  be  hoped  from  crushing 
Germany.  Crushing  will  keep  her  quiet  for  a  season, 
but  not  for  long.  If  the  crushing  that  she  got  in  the 
Thirty  Years'  War  did  not  put  a  quietus  on  her  effort, 
no  subsequent  crushing  is  likely  to  do  so.  With  each 
rebuff  she  will  only  draw  back  into  her  shell,  study 
the  lesson  of  her  defeat,  recuperate  her  forces,  or 
ganize  a  larger  portion  of  the  vast  raw  humanity  be 
yond  in  support  of  her  cause,  and  return  to  the  charge 
with  increased  momentum  and  unabated  purpose.  It 
is  not  sure  that  she  will  ever  succeed.  It  is  not  sure, 
alas,  that  she  will  not  succeed.  The  one  sure  thing 
is  that  she  will  keep  trying.  Those  who  dream  of  a 
quiescent  Germany  as  the  result  of  anything  the  pres 
ent  war  can  accomplish,  military  triumph,  political  re 
form,  or  paper  promise,  are  cherishing  a  perilous  de 
lusion. 

What  can  save  us  from  that  perpetual  and  ever  in 
creasing  menace  from  across  the  Channel?  No 
power  on  earth  save  Germany  herself.  She  will  not 
accept  the  lot  of  a  dependent  power,  nor  would  we  in 
her  place.  She  is  too  big  to  become  a  second  Bel 
gium.  Her  culture  is  too  distinctive  and  too  power 
ful  to  be  extinguished  or  surrendered  for  another. 
It  is  useless  to  tell  her  that  she  still  has  room,  that  we 
bear  her  no  malice.  She  must  have  more,  must  get 
it  seemingly  at  our  expense.  And  yet  she  must  not, 
must  not.  Hence  these  forays  that  never  conquer 
and  these  crushings  that  never  subdue. 

Suppose  a  single  authority  were  recognized  from 
Inverness  to  Bagdad,  through  this  danger  zone  of  the 
world.  What  problems  it  would  solve !  Belgium, 


FORECAST  355 

Holland,  the  Channel  tunnel,  the  Balkans,  the  Dar 
danelles,  the  Bagdad  Railway,  Persia,  India,  Egypt, 
the  Suez  Canal, —  the  list  is  endless.  There  is  scarce 
a  problem  that  vexes  the  Foreign  Offices  of  Europe 
which  it  would  not  eliminate  or  simplify. 

Fantasy,  of  course.  No  such  thing  seems  within 
the  range  of  practical  policy.  Yet  along  the  road 
that  leads  that  way  we  must  travel  toward  safety  and 
power.  Nothing  else  will  save  us  from  suicide;  noth 
ing  else  from  being  engulfed  by  the  swarming  East. 
No  evil  designs  are  imputed  to  Russia,  China,  or 
Japan,  but  designs  have  very  little  to  do  with  it. 
Those  great  peoples,  illimitable  in  numbers  and  en 
dowed  with  resources  unmatched  in  the  west,  must  in 
evitably  pass  through  stages  in  their  development  in 
which  war  will  be  not  uncongenial,  stages  in  which  the 
Zeitgeist  will  laugh  at  treaties  and  coronation  oaths, 
and  in  which  no  mysticism  of  temperament  or  kindli 
ness  of  heart  will  insure  against  the  adolescence  of 
their  culture.  What  will  these  vast  masses  of  hu 
manity,  with  their  redundant  energy  and  their  rudi 
mentary  scruple,  do  to  a  Europe  engaged  in  the  game 
of  the  Kilkenny  cats? 

If  this  war  is  not  to  be  fought  utterly  in  vain,  it 
must  not  preclude, —  it  must  in  some  degree  further, 
—  an  understanding  between  Teuton  and  Saxon.  It 
would  be,  in  the  phrase  of  Thucydides,  the  saddest 
war  in  history  if  it  jeopardized  or  postponed  that  re 
sult. 

But  does  it  jeopardize  or  postpone  it?  On  the  con 
trary,  this  war  is  the  indispensable  preliminary  to 
an  understanding.  We  know  little  of  the  negotia- 


356    AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

tions  looking  to  that  end  which  have  passed  between 
the  two  countries  in  recent  years,  but  it  is  inconceiv 
able  that  any  such  negotiations  should  have  been  suc 
cessful  under  the  conditions  that  have  hitherto  pre 
vailed.  A  temper,  the  most  insufferable  that  history 
records,  has  obsessed  the  German  nation,  and  that 
increasingly,  for  more  than  a  generation.  The  term, 
Prussian  militarism,  by  which  it  is  popularly  known, 
does  not  adequately  express  either  its  extent  or  its 
character.  It  is  a  temper  that  knows  no  co-opera 
tion  except  vassalage,  no  leadership  except  domina 
tion,  no  graciousness  except  patronage.  In  the  his 
torian  and  the  diplomat,  as  in  the  soldier,  it  is  a 
temper  of  bullying  insolence.  All  round  the  planet 
during  thirty  years  of  travel  the  writer  has  watched 
this  unspeakable  rudeness  of  the  German  to  those  to 
whom  deference  and  protection  was  due,  has  seen  him 
oust  women  from  their  seats,  bully  the  weak,  and 
win  by  his  fists  what  any  but  a  Hottentot  would  dis 
dain  to  accept  save  as  the  gift  of  courtesy.  It  is  one 
of  their  own  publicists  who  has  said  that  the  Germans 
are  the  best  hated  nation  in  Europe  because  they  have 
no  manners. 

It  is  the  same  in  the  field  of  intellect.  There  is  an 
insolent  cocksureness  about  German  estimates  of  men 
and  nations  which  hides  under  the  mask  of  scholar 
ship  the  most  abysmal  ignorance  in  the  civilized 
world.  It  has  vitiated  the  most  laborious  historical 
research  on  earth  by  making  all  the  past  a  prepara 
tion  for  the  Hohenzollern  apotheosis.  This  is  ham 
mered  into  the  German  all  the  way  from  the  primer 
to  the  doctor's  thesis.  As  an  inevitable  corollary, 


FORECAST  357 

the  history  of  other  nations  is  travestied  and  their 
portrait  drawn  in  caricature.  Writes  Professor 
Rudolph  Huch  in  closing  a  summary  of  British  and 
French  civilization :  "  There  are  races  which  are  in 
capable  of  attaining  a  high  humanity,  incapable  of  in 
fluencing  the  world.  Such  nations  are  destined  to 
hew  wood  and  draw  water  for  the  dominant  nations. 
If  they  can  not  fill  this  inferior  office  they  must  per 
ish."  This  appreciative  estimate  of  Germany's  rivals 
may  well  be  offset  by  Germany's  modest  estimate  of 
herself,  as  expressed  by  Professor  von  Stengel,  the 
eminent  German  authority  on  international  law. 
When  asked  whether  Germany  would  participate  in 
conferences  at  the  Hague  after  the  war  for  the  de 
velopment  of  international  law,  he  said  "  No  ";  that 
such  conferences  would  be  unnecessary  under  a  "  Ger 
man  peace."  "  The  one  condition  of  prosperous  ex-, 
istence,  especially  for  neutrals,"  he  said,  "  is  submis 
sion  to  our  supreme  direction.  Under  our  overlord- 
ship  all  international  law  would  become  superfluous, 
for  we  of  ourselves  and  instinctively  give  to  each  one 
his  rights."  1 

It  is  this  spirit  of  arrogant  provincialism,  organiz 
ing  with  perverse  ingenuity  its  laboriously  gathered 
facts,  which  has  given  Germany  a  diplomacy  without 
finesse,  a  knowledge  without  insight,  a  cleverness  with 
out  wisdom,  and  a  might  without  dominion.  Ger 
many  needs  seaports  and  colonies  and  broad  domains, 
but  most  of  all  she  needs  a  change  of  heart. 

From  this  spirit  which  is  as  hated  on  the  banks  of 
the  Danube  as  it  is  on  the  banks  of  the  Thames, 

!The  italics  are  the  writer's. 


358     AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

nothing  can  save  her  except  the  chastening  of  over 
whelming  defeat.  Lloyd  George  was  right  when  he 
said  that  it  was  not  enough  to  conquer  Germany  by 
hunger;  that  she  must  be  beaten  on  her  chosen  ground 
and  with  the  weapons  in  which  she  trusts.  With  this 
German  temper  there  can  be  no  compromise.  Let  us 
hope  that  its  enemies  will  not  falter.  Woe  to  the 
man  or  nation  that  calls  an  untimely  halt  to  this  war 
so  necessary  for  the  Allies,  for  us,  and  for  Germany 
herself. 

But  when  this  spirit  is  exorcised,  Germany  will  re 
main, —  prostrate,  it  may  be,  like  the  demoniac  from 
whom  the  unclean  spirit  had  been  cast  out, —  but  still 
there,  always  there,  and  holding,  despite  herself,  the 
fate  of  Europe  in  her  keeping.  With  such  a  Ger 
many  we  must  have  an  understanding.  Political 
union  is  unthinkable,  alliance  probably  impracticable, 
but  somehow  the  habit  of  concert,  the  instinctive 
sense  of  common  rather  than  of  opposed  interest, 
must  grow  up  and  come  to  dominate  this  danger  zone 
of  the  world.  Somehow  this  race  which  the  world 
can  not  endure,  and  which  yet  the  world  can  not  spare, 
must  learn  to  "  accept  equality  and  not  seek  domina 
tion."  The  task  is  arduous  and  the  consummation 
remote.  The  hardest  part  of  the  doing  is  the  getting 
willing  to  have  it  done.  But  there  is  no  other  way. 

It  is  important  to  anticipate  an  objection  which, 
despite  all  that  has  been  said  in  the  foregoing  pages, 
is  likely  to  suggest  itself,  an  objection  which  the  Ger 
man  is  sure  to  express  with  lofty  scorn.  '*  What 
then  is  the  superlative  merit  of  your  scheme  of  unify 
ing  the  Germanic  races  as  contrasted  with  ours? 


FORECAST  359 

The  difference  is  merely  that  you  want  the  English 
man  on  top  instead  of  the  German."  No,  what  we 
want  is  the  English  principle  on  top  instead  of  the 
German.  That  principle  is  the  principle  of  fellow 
ship,  not  of  feudalism.  It  leaves  each  one  free  to 
live  his  own  life  and  think  his  own  thoughts  and  go 
his  own  ways,  and  sees  the  power  and  the  greatness 
of  the  fellowship  in  this  liberty  of  its  members.  It 
is  not  as  hewers  of  wood  and  drawers  of  water  to  a 
dominant  nation  that  the  United  States  and  Australia 
and  Canada  take  their  place  alongside  Britain  in  the 
great  Anglo-Saxon  fellowship.  It  is  not  "  submission 
to  our  supreme  direction  "  to  which  Germany  must 
consent  as  a  condition  of  making  common  cause. 
Only  under  this  freer  organization  of  which  Britain 
has  given  to  the  world  the  first  working  demonstra 
tion,  can  we  hope  to  be  ourselves, —  can  Germany 
herself  hope  to  find  her  place  in  the  sun. 

For  there  are  no  more  vacant  places.  Germany 
has  said  it.  A  schoolboy  can  see  it.  If  Germany  is 
to  play  that  part  in  the  world  which  her  rich  racial 
endowment  warrants,  it  must  be  in  the  territories  now 
occupied  by  the  Anglo-Saxon  race  or  within  its  sphere 
of  influence.  They  are  enough  for  both.  Again 
Germany  has  said  it,  for  she  declares  that  under  her 
leadership  and  organization  all  these  peoples  can  find 
there  happiness  and  prosperity.  Let  us  hope  as  much 
under  other  leadership  and  with  another  and  freer  or 
ganization.  For  though  the  world  must  be  subdued 
to  order,  humanity  must  somehow  still  be  free. 


APPENDIX 


APPENDIX 

Allusion  has  been  made  in  the  Preface  to  the  article 
by  the  Earl  of  Cromer  in  the  Yale  Review  for  Jan 
uary,  1917.  This  article  is  essentially  a  review  of 
my  earlier  volume,  of  which  this  book  is  a  sequel. 
The  attitude  of  my  distinguished  critic  is  sufficiently 
indicated  by  his  first  reference  to  my  book.  Speak 
ing  of  the  problem  of  war  and  peace  he  says: 
"  Nowhere  is  it  discussed  with  greater  thoroughness 
and  acumen  than  in  a  very  able  work,  entitled  '  The 
Things  Men  Fight  For/  written  by  Professor 
Powers.  .  .  .  His  book  may,  therefore,  usefully  be 
taken  as  a  text  upon  which  to  dilate  upon  some  of  the 
proposals  which  have  recently  been  under  discus 
sion."  This  favourable  attitude  is  amply  confirmed 
by  the  discussion  which  follows.  It  is  in  grateful 
appreciation  of  this  estimate  rather  than  in  the  spirit 
of  controversy  that  I  venture  a  few  words  of  explana 
tion. 

He  begins  with  a  kindly  correction  of  "  some  minor 
errors  of  fact  "  which  he  generously  adds  "  in  no 
way  detract  from  the  value  "  of  the  work.  I  had 
spoken  of  a  plebiscite  having  been  taken  in  the  Ionian 
Islands  in  1864  previous  to  their  surrender  to  Greece 
and  he  says:  "  I  was  at  that  time  on  the  staff  of  Sir 
Henry  Storks,  the  last  of  the  British  Lord  High 
Commissioners.  .  .  .  Although  I  am  only  speaking 

363 


364  APPENDIX 

from  personal  recollection  of  events  which  occurred 
more  than  fifty  years  ago,  I  think  I  may  state  with 
confidence  that  no  plebiscite  of  the  whole  population 
was  taken."  To  be  set  right  by  such  a  man,  himself 
an  actor  in  those  far  away  events,  was  an  unlocked 
for  honour.  I  accepted  his  statement  at  once  as 
wholly  conclusive,  the  more  willingly  perhaps,  that 
this  supposed  plebiscite  had  seemed  to  lend  colour  to 
a  modern  proposal  in  which  I  had  no  confidence. 

Curiously  enough  I  chanced  to  be  reading  at  the 
time  the  "  Memories  "  of  Lord  Redesdale,  which  had 
recently  appeared,  followed  almost  immediately  by 
the  author's  death.  Lord  Redesdale  was  for  more 
than  half  a  century  in  the  service  of  the  British  gov 
ernment,  most  of  the  time  in  the  Foreign  Office.  Al 
most  simultaneously  with  the  reading  of  Lord  Crom- 
er's  article  I  came  upon  the  passage  (Vol.  I,  pp. 
324-7)  in  which  Lord  Redesdale  describes  his  visit 
to  Corfu  in  November,  1864,  the  year  of  the  British 
withdrawal.  In  this  brief  passage  he  refers  three 
times  to  the  "  plebiscite,"  using  that  term,  and  even 
reports  at  some  length  the  reasons  given  by  a  local 
priest  for  voting  as  he  did.  Here  we  have  the  testi 
mony  of  two  contemporary  witnesses,  both  of  the 
highest  competency,  yet  in  direct  disagreement.  Such 
is  the  problem  of  the  historian. 

More  significant  is  Lord  Cromer's  criticism  of  my 
suggestion  that  the  Italian  expedition  against  Tripoli 
was  undertaken  with  the  connivance  of  Britain.  As 
the  point  is  of  some  importance,  I  venture  to  quote 
the  statement  to  which  exception  is  taken. 

"  Tripoli  was  a  nominal  dependency  of  Turkey, 


APPENDIX  365 

and  its  seizure  by  Italy  involved  war  with  that  coun 
try.  Egypt,  though  under  British  control,  was  also 
in  name  a  part  of  the  Turkish  Empire,  and  as  such, 
pledged  to  support  the  cause  of  its  suzerain.  The 
position  of  Britain  in  Egypt  was  peculiarly  calculated 
to  show  her  hand.  If  she  wished  Tripoli  to  remain 
Turkish,  she  had  but  to  permit  Egypt  to  aid  Turkish 
arms,  or  merely  to  open  Egypt  to  the  passage  of 
Turkish  troops,  and  Italian  conquest  would  become 
impossible.  Britain  could  have  plausibly  explained 
that  she  was  merely  permitting  an  unquestioned  right, 
and  refraining  from  interference  in  a  matter  in  which 
she  had  no  concern.  On  the  other  hand,  her  actual 
control  of  Egypt  enabled  her  to  close  that  country  to 
the  passage  of  troops  under  the  equally  plausible  pre 
text  of  insuring  its  tranquillity,  and  her  own  neutral 
ity,  thus  assuring  Italian  success  in  turn.  She  chose 
the  latter  alternative,  against  strong  pressure  from 
both  Turkey  and  Egypt  itself.  Britain  did  not  dis 
approve  the  seizure.  Indeed,  when  we  recall  the  fact 
that  the  masterful  Lord  Kitchener,  whom  the 
Egyptians  were  wont  to  obey,  was  sent  by  an  un 
friendly  British  cabinet  to  rule  that  country,  and  that 
the  Italian  expedition  was  launched  immediately  after 
his  arrival,  it  is  difficult  not  to  see  in  the  move  the 
masterly  hand  of  British  diplomacy." 

To  this  last  statement  Lord  Cromer  takes  excep 
tion.  "  Nothing  is  more  certain,"  he  tells  us,  "  than 
that  Italian  policy  in  connection  with  Tripoli  was 
wholly  due  to  Italian  initiative,  and  that  the  British 
government,  far  from  encouraging,  rather  dis 
couraged  the  project."  To  have  allowed  the  passage 


366  APPENDIX 

of  Turkish  troops  through  Egypt  "  would  have  con 
stituted  an  unfriendly  act  to  a  nation  to  whom  we  are 
bound  alike  by  past  traditions,  political  sympathy, 
and  present  interests,  whilst  on  the  other  hand,  events 
in  Turkey  had  wholly  alienated  British  sympathies 
from  the  Ottoman  government." 

Yes,  beyond  a  doubt.  I  should  be  the  last  to  sug 
gest  that  Britain  ought  to  have  favoured  Turkey. 
She  has  done  that  once  too  often  as  it  is.  My  sug 
gestion  that  Britain  had  a  hand  in  the  transaction 
was  not  in  the  least  in  the  nature  of  a  criticism.  No 
British  government  in  its  senses  could  have  decided 
differently.  But  I  submit  that  if  Britain's  interests 
and  sympathies  had  inclined  her  toward  Turkey,  she 
would  have  had  a  perfectly  plausible  excuse  for  con 
struing  Egypt  as  a  part  of  the  Turkish  Empire  as  in 
theory  she  had  always  consistently  done,  and  using  it 
to  Italy's  undoing.  She  showed  her  hand  by  her  deci 
sion  in  this  matter,  a  perfectly  right  decision,  but  none 
the  less  one  that  revealed  her  policy.  If  her  hand 
was  not  in  the  transaction,  it  should  have  been  there. 

But  Lord  Cromer  says  the  move  was  made  wholly 
on  Italian  initiative  and  that  it  was  rather  discouraged 
than  encouraged  by  the  British  government.  Lord 
Cromer  certainly  knew,  and  his  word  is  unimpeacha 
ble.  Does  this  contradict  my  assumption? 

It  has  been  settled  at  least  since  1 8  8 1  that  Italy  had 
a  reversionary  right  to  Tripoli.  All  Europe  knew 
the  decision.  The  time  and  manner  of  occupation  of 
course  would  depend  on  circumstances.  The  habit 
ual  attitude  of  Italy  was  that  of  straining  at  the  leash. 
That  of  Europe,  and  particularly  of  France  and  Eng- 


APPENDIX  367 

land,  was  one  of  caution.  They  feared  trouble  with 
their  Moslem  populations.  No  doubt  the  proposal 
to  seize  Tripoli  emanated  from  Italy,  and  no  doubt 
Britain  advised  caution.  None  knew  better  than 
Britain  that  whatever  the  immediate  outcome,  the 
policy  of  excluding  Germany  from  northern  Africa 
must  ultimately  result  in  war  with  that  country.  She 
foresaw  and  accepted  these  consequences,  but  she  de 
ferred  the  catastrophe  by  every  means  in  her  power. 
Is  it  unplausible  to  conclude  that  Britain  both  wel 
comed  and  dreaded  the  seizure  of  Tripoli  by  Italy, 
that  in  common  with  other  powers,  she  had  long  been 
committed  to  that  arrangement,  and  yet  that  when 
the  moment  came  she  always  saw  reasons  for  caution 
and  "  far  from  encouraging,  rather  discouraged  the 
project"?  If  statesmen  are  at  all  like  other  mor 
tals,  such  a  contradiction  between  permanent  policy 
and  the  policy  of  the  moment  would  be  most  natural. 
Moreover  Lord  Cromer's  statement  implies  but  a 
very  mild  dissuasion  on  Britain's  part,  and  one  which 
undoubtedly  yielded  to  Italian  argument  and  impor 
tunity  long  before  the  blow  was  struck.  When  that 
moment  came,  the  coincidence  of  British  and  Italian 
action  was  one  not  easily  explained  as  the  result  of 
accident. 

The  remaining  strictures  of  the  article  may  be 
summed  up  in  the  single  statement  that  I  have  made 
out  too  much  of  a  case  for  Germany.  This  Lord 
Cromer  attributes  to  my  excessive  desire  to  be  im 
partial,  since  he  recognizes  that  my  sympathy  for  the 
cause  of  the  Allies  is  in  no  doubt.  In  particular  my 
recognition  of  a  certain  reasonableness  in  Germany's 


368  APPENDIX 

claim  to  Holland  and  Belgium  because  their  ports 
are  the  natural  outlets  for  her  industrial  districts  and 
because  their  population  is  Germanic,  arouses  his 
British  susceptibilities.  He  characterizes  the  ethno 
logical  argument  as  "  miserably  weak  "  and  asserts 
that  it  does  not  justify  German  annexation.  He  cu 
riously  overlooks  the  fact  that  I  reach  the  same  con 
clusion  in  the  passage  referred  to,  where  I  express 
the  opinion  that  "  the  two  countries  (Holland  and 
Belgium)  offer  a  base  of  possible  offence  against 
Britain  which  must  not  on  any  account  be  allowed  to 
pass  into  German  hands."  I  have  been  emphatic 
throughout  my  book  in  asserting  that  the  ethnological 
argument  is  always  weak  when  it  is  in  conflict  with 
the  more  permanent  fact  of  geographical  unity,  or 
the  vital  needs  of  commerce  and  national  defence. 
Significantly  enough,  when  the  argument  gets  away 
from  Belgium,  my  distinguished  critic  thinks  that  I 
"  exaggerate  "  "  the  difficulties  of  drawing  ethnic 
frontiers,"  and  urges  that  u  if  Italians  ruled  in  the 
Trentino,  and  Austria  were  no  longer  to  be  allowed 
to  exercise  its  Germanizing  influence  over  unwilling 
Slavs,  one  cause  of  European  disturbance  would  be 
eliminated."  Yes,  and  another  cause  of  disturbance 
would  be  introduced,  whether  less  or  greater,  only 
experience  can  teach  us.  That  Italy  should  have  the 
Trentino,  I  have  emphatically  maintained.  The 
ethnological  argument  here  coincides  with  the  great 
interests  of  commerce  and  defence.  All  argument  is 
one  way.  But  whether  the  break-up  of  the  Austrian 
empire  and  the  formation  of  ethnic  states  in  that 
much  troubled  region  would  conduce  to  the  world's 


APPENDIX  369 

peace  I  very  much  doubt.  A  glance  at  the  ethno 
graphical  map  of  the  Balkans  is  not  reassuring.  The 
trouble  is  that  ethnic  interests  are  here  not  in  har 
mony  with  commercial  and  strategic  interests,  but  in 
conflict  with  them.  Moreover  ethnic  frontiers  here 
are  not  definite.  Perhaps  some  one  can  tell  where 
the  line  comes  between  Greek  and  Bulgarian,  between 
Hungarian  and  Roumanian,  between  Slav  and  Ger 
man,  but  it  is  doubtful  if  any  one  could  persuade  the 
peoples  themselves  to  accept  his  conclusion.  My 
statement  that  the  Austrian  government  is  "  indispen 
sable  "  is  criticized  as  unproved.  The  proof  is  in  the 
obvious  fact  that  it  normally  keeps  ten  quarrelsome 
nationalities  at  peace,  which  would  otherwise  almost 
certainly  be  at  war. 

My  great  critic  is  after  all  British,  and  I  respect 
him  for  allowing  his  patriotism  to  colour  his  reason 
ing.  If  Britain  is  to'  exist,  Belgium  must  be  kept  from 
German  control  and  the  great  scheme  of  Mittel- 
Europa  must  be  checkmated.  This  last  can  be  ac 
complished,  so  the  Allies  believe,  only  by  dissolving 
the  polyglot  state  which  Germany  has  made  subser 
vient  to  her  ends.  The  ethnic  argument  here  favours 
Britain's  contention  and  Lord  Cromer  looks  upon  it 
with  favour.  In  the  case  of  Belgium  ethnic  consid 
erations  favour  Germany,  and  he  considers  the 
argument  "  miserably  weak."  I  believe  it  to  be  weak 
in  both  cases.  If  the  temporary  playing  up  of  the 
ethnic  factor  in  the  Balkans  can  help  to  thwart  the 
most  baneful  designs  that  have  ever  menaced  human 
ity,  I  most  willingly  subscribe  to  it,  but  though  that 
may  save  the  world,  it  will  not  save  the  Balkans. 


370  APPENDIX 

Their  hope  lies,  not  in  the  maintenance  of  perfectly 
inconsequential  ethnic  differences  which  are  at  odds 
with  both  commercial  and  strategic  interests,  but  in 
assimilation  and  union.  I  wish  a  single  power  ruled 
every  inch  of  territory  from  Bohemia  to  Constanti 
nople,  but  I  do  not  wish  Germany  to  be  that  power, 
nor  any  state  that  is,  or  may  become,  subservient  to 
her.  The  ethnic  argument  may  be  good  policy  here, 
but  I  believe  it  to  be  fundamentally  unsound.  The 
formation  of  ethnic  states  in  the  Balkans  can  be  at 
best  only  a  temporary  expedient,  a  concession  to  race 
individuality  in  a  situation  where  counter  claims  over 
whelmingly  predominate  and  where,  in  the  interest  of 
civilization,  these  claims  must  eventually  be  recog 
nized.  It  is  infinite  pity  that  Germany  can  not  be 
permitted  to  unify,  even  with  a  degree  of  compulsion, 
this  divided  and  yet  indivisible  outpost  of  Europe. 
Yet  nothing  is  more  certain  than  that  she  cannot  be 
trusted  with  this  task  and  with  the  guardianship  of 
our  citadel  until  she  can  cease  "  swash-buckling 
through  the  streets  of  Europe."  Until  then  we  must 
temporize.  Perhaps,  too,  it  is  a  necessity  of  our 
nature  that  we  should  urge  our  makeshifts  under  the 
sanctions  of  a  general  philosophy,  however  fallacious. 
The  unqualified  endorsement  of  ethnic  claims  seems 
to  me  to  be  such  a  procedure. 

One  suggestion  of  Lord  Cromer  fills  me  with  the 
keenest  regret  that  his  thought  could  not  have  been 
more  fully  disclosed.  I  was  on  the  point  of  asking 
for  this  fuller  statement  when  I  learned  that  his  voice 
had  passed  into  eternal  silence.  He  speaks  of  him 
self  as  "  an  Englishman,  who  would  certainly  not,  in 


APPENDIX  371 

the  ordinary  colloquial  language  of  the  day,  be  classed 
as  a  democrat  by  his  own  countrymen,  but  who  is, 
nevertheless,  a  strong  supporter  of  those  liberal  in 
stitutions  which  are  the  outward  and  visible  signs  of 
every  democratic  form  of  government."  Referring 
to  my  statement  that  "  modern  peoples  are  more  bel 
ligerent  than  their  governments,  for  their  passions  are 
less  restrained  by  knowledge  of  difficulties,"  he  says: 
"  If  this  view  be  correct,  it,  of  course,  cuts  away  the 
ground  from  under  the  feet  of  those  who  look  to  an 
extension  of  democratic  institutions  as  the  best  safe 
guard  against  the  occurrence  of  war.  But  is  it  cor 
rect?  It  certainly  can  not  be  proved  to  be  false,  and 
the  experience  of  history  rather  points  to  the  con 
clusion  that  it  is  true.  Nevertheless,  it  is  not  unduly 
optimistic,  to  hold  that  present  symptoms  appear  to 
indicate  that  the  trend  of  democratic  opinion  will  in 
the  near  future  be  peaceful  rather  than  bellicose." 

I  know  no  more  fascinating  subject  for  speculation 
than  that  suggested  in  this  last  sentence.  Nor  do  I 
know  any  man  who  has  lived  in  my  day  whose  opinion 
is  entitled  to  more  respect  in  such  matters  than  Eng 
land's  greatest  administrator  whose  judgments  were 
based  on  half  a  century  of  successful  experience  in 
the  governing  of  men.  What  were  the  "  symptoms  " 
which  led  him  to  hope  that  democracy  was  about  to 
reverse  the  teachings  of  history  and  become  "  peace 
ful  rather  than  bellicose"?  He  has  given  us  no 
hint,  and  I  strive  in  vain  to  discern  them.  The 
democracies  of  Athens  and  Rome,  of  Britain  and 
France  and  America,  have  all  been  aggressively  im 
perialist.  Class  struggles  for  the  moment  absorb  the 


372  APPENDIX 

attention  of  modern  democratic  peoples,  and  war  is 
decried,  not  in  the  interest  of  peace,  but  in  the  inter 
est  of  other  war.  I  can  not  believe  that  peace  so 
motived  is  really  peace,  or  that  the  shifting  of  the 
struggle  from  race  to  class  is  any  great  gain  to  con 
temporary  humanity.  I  believe  in  democracy,  but 
not  as  a  panacea.  It  gives  us  freedom,  but  it  does 
not  give  us  peace.  It  so  happens  that  in  the  present 
struggle  democracy  is  lined  up  against  autocracy. 
The  coincidence  is  impressive  but  I  believe  it  to  be 
accidental.  In  a  war  between  the  democratic  and 
the  autocratic  powers,  democracy  is  incidentally  at 
stake,  but  democracy  is  not  the  issue.  With  all  defer 
ence  to  Lord  Cromer's  opinion,  I  can  not  resist  the 
conclusion  that  here  as  in  the  "  ethnic  argument,"  he 
is  unconsciously  influenced  by  considerations  of  policy. 
Chance  has  willed  that  at  last  the  slogan  of  democracy 
should  appeal  to  all  the  Allies.  But  I  believe  that 
Raemakers,  the  most  scathing  critic  of  German  au 
tocracy  that  the  war  has  produced,  was  nearer  right 
when  he  said  that  if  Germany  were  a  republic  to 
morrow  with  Liebknecht  or  Scheidemann  for  presi 
dent,  her  relation  to  the  other  powers  would  not  be 
essentially  modified.  A  change  in  the  form  of  gov 
ernment  neither  creates  nor  indicates  a  change  of 
heart  in  the  matter  which  here  concerns  us.  Democ 
racy  and  imperialism  are  concurrent  movements  in 
the  life  of  our  time,  perhaps  of  every  progressive 
time.  They  compete  actively  for  the  interest,  the 
sympathy,  and  the  finite  energies  of  their  constituen 
cies,  but  the  two  movements  are  not  logically  opposed, 


APPENDIX  373 

and  it  is  vain  to  attempt  to  stay  the  one  by  hastening 
the  other.  The  temper  of  democracy  is  neither  con 
cessive  nor  altruistic.  What  reason  is  there  to  be 
lieve  that  it  will  prove  pacific? 


INDEX 


Africa,  143,  165,  257,  295-8,  367 
Agadir,   151 
Alaska,  61-2,  89-91,  97 
Algeria,  151 
Arbitration,  52,  68,  344 
Argentina,  171-3,  305-6 
Ashburton,  53 
Australia,   315,   326,   359 
Austria,  259-65,  323,  368-70 
Autocracy,  2,  203 

Beecher,  Henry  Ward,  334 
Bismarck,   36,  303 
Brazil,   172,   188,  305-8 
Britain,      British      Empire,      see 
England 

California,  60,  64,  76,  341 
Canada,    47,    65,   90-1,    93,    in, 

199,  3I5~7,  326-7,  359 
Canal,  see  Panama 
Caribbean,  85,  120,  124,  141-52, 

154-7,   1 60,   162,  258,   348 
Central    America,    136-40,    156, 

186 
China,    Chinese,    212,    215,    228, 

238,    248,    256,    258,    298-302, 

340-2,  355 

Cleveland   (President),  95 
Colombia,  152,  237 
Colonies,  15-26,  32-8 
Congo,  181,  188,  257 
Costa  Rica,  139 
Cromer,  53,  336,  363-73 
Cuba,  49-51,  86,  101-6,  108,  112- 

23,  127-33,  Hi-2,  155,  187 

Danish   Islands,   91-2,   109,   in, 

150,  246,  248,  307 
Democracy,  2,  3,  4,  203-5,  370-3 
Denmark,  247-8 


Egypt,  28,  102,  114-5,  131,  151, 
186-7,  246,  257,  318,  336,  355, 

365-7 

England,  15-38,  42-4,  46,  59-68, 
99,  144-5,  i5*»  *92,  277,  311- 
44,  357 

Florida,  43-6,  48-51,  56,  58,  70- 

71,  84,  no,  172 
France,   French,   20-2,  40,   73-4, 

88,     145-6,     151,    254-8,    277, 

297,  332,  336,  357 

Gadsden  purchase,  80-2 

Germany,  39,  99,  127,  129,  147™ 
55,  223,  247,  264-5,  271-2, 
274,  3io,  319,  323,  335-8, 
351-9,  367-70,  372 

Gladstone,  334 

Grant,   92-3 

Guani,  107-8 

Guiana,  144,  147,  348 

Hawaii,  94-9,  107-9 

Hayti,  129-36,  155,  159,  186,  192, 

197 
Holland,  147-8,  244,  248-9,  293- 

94,  35i,  355,  368 
Honduras,  128,  139 
Hungary,  260-5 

Imperial  Council,   322-3,  344-7 
Imperial   federation,   322 
India,  319-20,  322,  355 
Indians,  18-20,  25,  171 
Ireland,  312-13 

Italy,  244,  252-4,  297,  324,  345, 
368 

Japan,  9,  143,  150,  211-39,  299- 

301,  355 
Jefferson,  46,  49,  51,  58,  86,  87 


375 


INDEX 


Kitchener,  365 
Korea,  215-9,  246 

Latin   America,   3,    166-74,   X97> 

219,  252,  302,  304-6 
Lewis  and  Clark,  59 
Louisiana,  45,  47,  70,  255,  341 

Maine,  52-3 

Manila,  see  Philippines 

McKinley,  102 

Mexico,  71-82,  85,  88,  no,  152-4, 

168,  187,  199,  219-20,  255,  332 
Mississippi    (river),   43,   45,    51, 

56 
Monroe  Doctrine,  7,  49,  88,  129, 

162,  1 66,  198,  240,  303 

Napoleon,  45-6,  254,  331,  353 
New  Brunswick,  52-3,  340 
New  Orleans,  46 
Nicaragua,  128,  134-40,  150,  198 

Oceanica,  293,  348 
Oregon,  59-68,  72,   340 

Panama,  in,  123,  187,  197,  307 
Pan-Americanism,  158-74 
Parliament,  31-8,  321,  327 
Philippines,    104-7,    144-5,    J58> 

161-2,   191-3,  269,  319,  337-9, 

34i,  348 
Platt    Amendment,    112,    115-21, 

131-2,  197 
Polk,  65-6,  78 
Population,  214-5,  279-81 
Porto  Rico,  103-4,  IQ6,  108,  341 
Portugal,  151,  208,  244-5,  3°7 


Puritans,  15-8 
Putumayo,  181 

Quebec,  22 

Raemakers,  372 
Redesdale,  364 
Representation,  31,  34 
Roman  Empire,  29-31,  158 

Salvador,   139 

Samoa,  98-100,  107-8,  158 

Santo  Domingo,  92-4,   123,  126- 

30,  133,  141,  155,  186,  192,  198 
Seward,  89-92,  94,  95,  109 
Slavery,  66-7,  72-3,  332 
Spain,  21,  42-50,  54,  59,  61,  96, 

100-7,  244,  250-2,  335 

Taft,  128 

Texas,  48,  71-7,  332 

Treaties  of  Peace,  with  England, 

42,    331;    with   Mexico,   76-9; 

with  Spain,  100 
Tripoli,  151,  364-7 
Tropics,    175-93 
Tutuila,  see   Samoa 

Vancouver,  63 
Venezuela,  149,  152,  307 

Washington    (state),  62-3 

Webster,  53,  84-5 

West    Indies,    45,    84,    112,    199, 

34.8 
Whitman,  64 

Yazoo  Lands,  44 


FEINTED    IN    THE    UNITED    STATES    OP    AMERICA 


T 


(HE  following  pages  contain  advertisements  of  books 
by  the  same  author  or  on  kindred  subjects. 


The  Things  Men  Fight  For 

BY  H.  H.  POWERS,  PH.D. 
Sometime  Professor  of  Economics  in  Stanford  University 

Price  $1.50 
Of  this  book,  Lord  Cromcr,  in  The  Yale  Review,  said: 

"  Can  the  present  contest  be  rightly  described  as  a  *  war  to  end 
war'?  If  German  militarism  is  crushed,  will  a  long  era  of  peace 
be  certainly  inaugurated?  Similar  hopes  were  cherished  at  the 
close  of  the  Napoleonic  wars.  They  proved  to  be  delusive.  Is 
history  in  this  respect  to  repeat  itself?  ...  A  voluminous  liter 
ature  already  exists  on  the  subject.  Nowhere  is  it  discussed 
with  greater  thoroughness  and  acumen  than  in  a  very  able  work, 
entitled  The  Things  Men  Fight  For,  written  by  Professor  Pow 
ers." 

"  Probably  no  other  book  dealing  with  the  war  and  its  sources 
has  made  so  dispassionate  and  unbiased  a  study  of  conditions 
and  causes  as  does  this  volume." —  New  York  Times. 

"  Out  of  the  unusual  knowledge  born  of  wide  observation  and 
experience  came  this  unusual  book.  We  may  not  altogether 
agree  with  its  conclusions,  but  we  must  admire  the  breadth  of  it, 
and  feel  better  informed  when  we  have  perused  it.  The  liberal 
spirit  of  it  cannot  fail  to  impress  the  careful  reader." — Literary 
Digest. 

"Dr.  Powers'  volume  is  one  of  the  most  arresting,  stimulat 
ing  and  original  discussions  dealing  with  the  fundamental  causes 
of  war  thus  far  published." — Philadelphia  Press. 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

Publishers     64-66  Fifth  Avenue     New  York 


The  Message  of  Greek  Art 

BY  H.  H.  POWERS,  PH.D. 

President  of  the  Bureau  of  University  Travel 
Author  of  Mornings  with  Masters  of  Art 

Decorated  cloth,  8vo,  $2.00 

As  the  title  of  the  book  implies,  the  subject  here  chiefly  dis 
cussed  is  Greek  Art,  but  with  emphasis  rather  upon  the  adjec 
tive  than  upon  the  noun.  The  subject  is  never  dissociated  in 
thought  from  its  great  background  of  Greek  civilization  and 
history,  and  it  derives  its  chief  interest  to  the  writer  from  the 
fact  that  it  so  constantly  reveals  and  interprets  this  larger  fact. 
It  is  therefore  the  message  of  Greek  Art,  what  it  has  to  tell  us 
of  the  Greeks,  of  their  personality,  their  ideals  and  their  experi 
ences,  that  will  chiefly  concern  us,  rather  than  considerations  of 
process  or  later  accident. —  From  the  Author's  Introduction. 

Mornings  With  Masters  of  Art 

BY  H.  H.  POWERS 
Profusely  illustrated  throughout. 

Decorated  cloth,  8vo,  $2.00 

This  is  an  interpretation  of  the  development  of  Christian  art 
from  the  time  of  Constantine  to  the  death  of  Michael  Angelo. 
The  book  is  handsomely  illustrated  with  one  hundred  and  twenty- 
five  half-toned  reproductions  of  some  of  the  work  of  the  most 
famous  artists.  The  table  of  contents  is  as  follows :  The  After 
glow  of  Greece,  How  Art  Became  Christian,  The  Bursting  of 
the  Bonds,  The  First  of  the  Moderns,  The  Larger  Vision,  The 
Protest  of  Faith,  The  Revolt  Against  the  Church,  The  New 
Paganism  and  the  Old  Faith,  The  Contribution  of  Pisa,  Ghiberti, 
the  Painter  in  Bronze,  The  New  Science,  Leonardo,  The  Ma 
gician  of  the  Renaissance,  Umbria  and  Her  Artist,  Raphael  in 
Rome,  Art  in  the  School  of  Lorenzo  and  Savonarola,  The  Great 
Pope,  His  Tomb  and  His  Chapel  and  Art  Transcendent. 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

Publishers     64-66  Fifth  Avenue     New  York 


The  World  at  War 


BY  GEORG  BRANDES 
(Translated  by  Catherine  D.  Groth) 

$1.50 

"  Perhaps  no  other  European  writer  of  the  present  day 
is  fitted  equally  with  Brandes  to  discuss  the  titanic  con 
flict  of  the  nations  from  the  standpoint  of  the  neutral 
observer." — New  York  Evening  Post. 

The  World  at  War  gives  Dr.  Brandes'  reflections  on 
the  war  and  the  events  leading  up  to  it,  written  before 
and  during  the  great  conflict.  From  the  prophetic  fore 
bodings  written  in  1881  to  his  conclusion  as  to  what  the 
basis  of  the  coming  peace  must  be,  Dr.  Brandes  touches 
with  fearlessness  and  a  burning  sense  of  justice  upon  the 
various  aspects  of  the  war,  keeping  at  the  same  time  an 
unbiased  viewpoint.  The  fact  that  Dr.  Brandes  is  prac 
tically  the  only  living  neutral  writer  of  world-wide  repu 
tation  gives  the  book  a  special  significance. 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

Publishers     64-66  Fifth  Avenue     New  York 


The  Nature  of  Peace 


BY  THORSTEIN  VEBLEN 

Author  of 

The  Theory  of  the  Leisure  Class 

Imperial  Germany  and  the  Industrial  Revolution 

The  Instinct  of  Workmanship 

Cloth,  $2.00 

A  close  analysis  of  war  and  the  basis  of  peace.  This  book 
is  of  special  interest  just  now  on  account  of  its  insistence  upon 
the  absolute  destruction  of  the  German  Imperial  State  as  the 
only  assurance  of  a  permanet  peace.  The  ideals  towards  which 
civilization  is  moving  make  the  elimination  of  the  dynastic  pow 
ers  absolutely  necessary.  "  The  new  situation,"  says  Professor 
Veblen,  "  requires  the  putting  away  of  the  German  Imperial  estab 
lishment  and  the  military  caste;  the  reduction  of  the  German 
peoples  to  a  footing  of  unreserved  democracy." 

A  democratization  of  the  Dynastic  powers,  Japan  and  Germany, 
must  be  followed  by  provisions  for  better  methods  of  govern 
ment;  by  more  just  distribution  of  wealth  for  the  world  at  large; 
and  by  a  general  neutralization  of  citizenship  throughout  the 
world.  This,  Professor  Veblen  thinks,  can  be  accomplished 
gradually,  perhaps  by  neutralizing  trade,  colonies,  etc. 

Readers  of  Professor  Veblen's  other  books  will  welcome  this 
new  volume  which  is  written  in  his  usual  suggestive  and  con 
vincing  manner. 


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American  World  Policies 

BY  WALTER  E.  WEYL 

Author  of 
The  New  Democracy 

Cloth,  8vo,  $2.25 

"  One  can  almost  afford  to  throw  away  everything  else  in  print 
on  the  subjects  covered  and  take  this  book  as  a  starting  point 
from  which  to  face  the  future."—  Chicago  Tribune. 

"A  keen  analysis  of  the  world  forces  to  which  our  domestic 
policy  must  be  adjusted  if  we  are  to  keep  our  national  integrity 
and  play  an  effective  part  in  shaping  international  affairs.  It  is 
an  essay  in  clarification,  an  attempt  to  give  the  American  lay 
man  the  facts  upon  which  to  base  an  intelligent  foreign  policy. 
Dr.  Weyl  has  wisely  avoided  the  temptation  to  write  a  paper 
constitution  for  a  hypothetical  world  state,  and  has  chosen  in 
stead  to  offer  a  preface  to  international  politics.  It  is  this  quality 
of  self-restraint,  combined  with  his  great  ability  to  think  and 
write  clearly,  that  distinguishes  Dr.  Weyl's  volume.  American 
World  Policies  is  an  extremely  valuable  aid  to  the  intellectual 
preparedness  of  American  statesmen  and  laymen  in  this  time  of 
international  crisis." —  ROBERT  BRUERE,  in  The  New  Republic. 

"  A  tonic  and  salutary  volume,  driving  hard  to  the  realities  that 
underlie  American  action  and  mercilessly  exposing  the  dangers 
that  lurk  in  what  to  the  casual  eye  seems  evidence  of  national  suc 
cess." — New  York  Evening  Post. 


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